What about Flag State Performance? (or the disproportonate burden of PSM)

Over the last few years, we have seen a valid focus on Port State Measures, and area I work a lot on its planning and operational aspects. This was all strengthened in 2009 with FAO’s PSMA, which has been gaining strength, particularly after its implementation.

Melvin getting ready to board one of the carrriers involved in the over 450 trasnipment in for we authorise and control.

And while I’m always cautious to stress that signing an agreement is not implementing it and that you can be doing excellent PSM without having signed the treaty. As a key tuna port in the world, we here in Majuro have focused a lot of effort on it. Every incoming fishing vessel (including RMI flagged) goes through a risk assessment that creates the Arriving Vessel Intelligence Report (AVIR). The intelligence analysis and risk determination allow for the identification of risks in three different categories corresponding to three steps in the analysis, including (i) identity – whether the vessel is who it says it is, (ii) manoeuvring – the vessel’s activity and operations and whether these were adequately reported, and (iii) licensing – whether the vessel is allowed to be in the location it was. The risk analysis performed by MIMRA is focused on fishing vessels to assess the legality of the catch and on carriers' activities not directly related to transhipments.

But it really pisses me off that we are actually, and to a large extent, taking on something that Flag states should be doing! How is it up to us to inspect and authorise vessel unloading when the flag state has access to the same tools we have(or more), and they do not do it… 

UNCLOS is clear in article 94: Duties of the Flag State. Every State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag, furthermore flag State responsibilities extend into  Articles 58.3 (rights and duties of other states in the EEZ), 62.4 (utilisation of living resources of the EEZ), and 192 (general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment).

And if that wasn't enough, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea delivered in 2015 its Advisory Opinion regarding IUU fishing activities. 

The Tribunal distinguished the flag State’s responsibility under UNCLOS from its liability.

The flag State, in fulfilment of its obligation to effectively exercise jurisdiction and control in administrative matters under article 94 of the Convention, has the obligation to adopt the necessary administrative measures to ensure that fishing vessels flying its flag are not involved in activities in the exclusive economic zones of other Member States…. The foregoing obligations are obligations of “due diligence”.

With respect to liability, the Tribunal declared that the liability of the flag State does not arise from a failure of vessels flying its flag to comply with the applicable laws and regulations because “the violation of such laws and regulations by vessels is not per se attributable to the flag State” (¶ 146).

Instead, the liability of the flag State arises from its failure to comply with its own “due diligence” obligations. Thus, the flag State will not be liable if it has taken “all necessary and appropriate measures to meet its ‘due diligence obligations” to ensure that vessels flying its flag do not conduct IUU fishing activities in the EEZ of the coastal States.

So if we, as a developing country port state, exercise sufficient due diligence to evaluate the activities of foreign vessels, it should be to validate and strengthen the fag state due diligence, not to take responsibility on their failings as it is now! These are your vessels; how come you don't authorise unloading based on checking on the compliance of their fishing trips, independently from where they are!

I already hear them saying… but we have hundreds of vessels fishing worldwide… we cannot control them all…. Well, sorry, but that does not exempt you from your responsibilities… if they cannot control each one of these fishing beyond your EEZ, they should not licence them to leave. Or directly, they should not flag them if they don't have the means to be responsible for them as required by international law.

Back in 2017, in the traceability for fisheries compliance book we wrote for FAO we identified what are the ideal Flag state configuration; we recommend that there needs to be some form of flag State authorisation of the unloading. 

And in the recent “Advancing end-to-end traceability along capture fisheries and aquaculture value chains” , we also identify Unloading (transhipment at sea, in port or landing, or any combination thereof) where Flag state best practices request vessels to seek to unload authorization from the flag state (independent of port entry or transhipment at sea).

And I will stake it a step further when it comes to transhipments in the HS, and it should be the role of the flag state of that carrier to do an analysis similar to the one we do in Port States before authorising the reception of fish... they have access to the same tools we have… this is essential “due diligence” and equivalent measures.

I’m starting to get unnerved by the present trend of having ports in countries that have not signed to PSMA qualified as “Port of Convenience” regardless of whether they implement PSM or not… Signing a piece of paper does not make you compliant! We in RMI have not signed yet, but we comply with every aspect of PSM; we even publish our PSM system online, something I have not seen many (if any) PSMA signatories do.  

While in the meantime, flags state (many from well-off developed DWFN) keep ignoring their responsibilities and obligations of due diligence as recognised in international law. 

My solution for this? Have an independent body set up by FAO COFI to evaluate flag state performance (perhaps using a version of this one prepared by PEW?) that accesses their compliance and has trade tariffs proportional to the level of compliance… the better a country is, the lesser tariff it pays.

In my experience, you have no incentive to change if it does not hurt your pocket.

Advancing end-to-end traceability along capture fisheries and aquaculture value chains

Back in 2020, I was contacted by my colleague Nada Bougouss from FAO with the idea of “writing a technical report on the minimum requirements, authoritative sources and verification mechanisms. An expert consultative workshop will then follow the report. I believe this is timely and will be of high value, especially with the DGST official launch of their Standards next week. KDEs and CTEs are not clearly defined, and it seems businesses and gov. speak different languages to mean the same things, the proposed guide will help clear the ambiguity”

I liked the idea, as it was to extend over aquaculture, and I’m pretty strong on the idea of writing things with other authors that represent diversity and development countries' origin (I did in the past with my Ken Katafono, and with Katrina Nakamura) I wanted to involve somebody with ample experience in aquaculture in Latin America, so I asked my colleagues Yahira Piedrahita and then Vincent Andre, that is very versed in SE Asia and has written before for FAO as co-authors… and they (thankfully accepted) and later once we had the final draft I got my friend Mariah Boyle to do a review that undoubtedly made the book much better

The resulting Guidance document: “Advancing end-to-end traceability along capture fisheries and aquaculture value chains” has been just published, and it responds to a critical need for consensus towards establishing end-to-end traceability through globally agreed and standardized understanding of the critical tracking events (CTEs) along the fish value chain, as well as sources of key data elements (KDEs) related to fish production and product identification. In particular, the Guidance aims at developing insights and addressing gaps in developing and implementing traceability systems for both the private sector and government. Supported by deliberations through various consultations between 2021 and 2022, it also provides technical advice in the enforcement and adequate verification of traceability in fish value chains and seeks to act as a benchmark of existing traceability systems to evaluate their efficacy and identify associated gaps.

While our guidance document is intended to support countries in implementing traceability in fisheries and aquaculture value chains. It discusses the role of traceability for official assurance, yet it draws on the efforts and learning from initiatives led by the private sector in implementing traceability throughout the fish value chain.

In the context of value chains, the document considers that value chains for capture and culture fisheries differ from fishery to fishery, country to country, and frequently within regions.

Moreover, a fish value chain can be defined as interlinked value adding activities that convert inputs into outputs, which in turn add to the bottom line and help to create a competitive advantage. A value chain typically consists of inbound distribution or logistics, manufacturing operations, outbound distribution or logistics, marketing and selling and after-sales service. These activities are supported by purchasing or procurement, research and development, human resource development and corporate infrastructure.

Most of the analysis in this guidance document and the resulting recommendations are based on the identification of CTEs and KDEs under the purview of the “regulatory realm” (see Section 2.2) for specific state actors; how they are covered and how country-level mechanisms could or should serve to support them or supply traceability solutions in segments where solutions are absent and must be provided by individual states.

This guidance document uses for its analysis the literature and initiatives identifying KDEs as well as traceability standards developed by different industries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as non-regulatory standards from the “non-regulatory realm” (see Section 2.3). Yet, it does not propose any specific KDEs or standards for non-regulatory purposes, such as any form of private certifications, ecolabels, fair trade or social standards, and does not enter the area of organic or bio-certification.

Development process

CTEs and KDEs per type of state (Flag, Coastal, Port, Processing and Market)

A two-part process was followed in the development of this guidance document. The first part consisted of a desk study based on secondary sources, bibliographies and the analysis of initiatives by NGOs, governments, the private sector and independent experts, followed by an online public consultation that took place during March and April 2021. Comments and feedback were collected from a wide range of stakeholders from 42 countries.

The second part was the organisation of three virtual regional consultations in 2021 and 2022 (Asia, North Africa and the Near East, and Latin America [(FAO, 2022b)]) with the participation of more than 120 representatives from 34 countries and six international and regional fishery and aquaculture organisations. Delegates and participants deliberated on the CTE and KDE listings and provided additional comments to corroborate their relevance and comprehensiveness.

Read the whole thing if you are keen (we ought to do very accessible), and is free. Otherwise, below are the discussion and recommendations:

Discussion

The aim of this guidance document is to support countries by providing technical advice on the CTEs and KDEs required for robust traceability along the seafood value chain, and the identification of supporting verification mechanisms for official assurance. The guidance document also introduces leading private sector-led initiatives across the seafood value chain as the substrate over which electronic traceability-type solutions can work.

There are many intrinsic and extrinsic challenges in implementing successful and cost-effective traceability. These challenges have created some issues for the operators and the CAs in control of food safety, particularly when engaging in transnational trade.

The GDST initiative correctly identified the opportunities that new digital technologies present for making traceability more possible and affordable than ever, but effective and widespread traceability has faced two major obstacles:

1. Inconsistent demands and formats for information coming from regulators, private certifications, and even retailers or other downstream companies. This has led to confusion, higher compliance costs and lower motivation among producers.

2. Incompatible digital information management systems resulting from the large number of uncoordinated CTEs/KDEs, standards, traceability solutions and solution vendors. This impedes information flow while causing rigidity in business relations and raising barriers to onboarding new suppliers and customers.

By compiling and analysing the CTEs and KDEs from the regulatory realm and incorporating the applicable ones from the non-regulatory realm, this document hopes to facilitate the development of traceability systems that extend over the whole value chain.

The best-case scenario would be that many of the same CTEs and KDEs would be adopted globally for seafood supply chains. If this could be accomplished, many of the challenges relating to traceability – such as inconsistent data formats and interoperability challenges – would be reduced and the resources of companies and governments could be redirected toward verifying the information in the systems and other improvements.

Nevertheless, the authors are very aware that no “one size fits all” solution is possible, and that the views, CTEs and KDEs presented here constitute guidance only, and may not be applicable in their entirety for some products, or even for the same product in different jurisdictions.

Yet, two issues have been identified not only in this guidance document, but also in prior ones (Blaha, Borit and Thompson, 2015) and these remain a non-technical challenge:

Different authorities

Even if traceability systems are well designed and generally well implemented, they can fail with a lack of implementation at a single step. Therefore, it is vital to ensure coordination between the different operators in the production chain and in the control of traceability systems by the CAs involved.

For example, the understanding that IUU happens “at sea” is the one CTE where most of the relevant fishing data (KDEs) are recorded. Besides this being the easiest point to perform this activity, it is possible that this situation is due to the traditional view that MCS (including traceability as a tool for MCS) is something that only happens at the vessel and wharf level, and does not concern processing and the risks of laundering illegal fish. While at the same time the sanitary CA (which requires many of the same KDEs) does not extend its oversight to the vessels and wharfs, nor integrates and cross- checks acquired data with the fisheries authorities.

National (in country) and across-countries traceability

A further topic of importance is the integration of cross-countries (between countries) and national (inside the country) traceability, particularly in the light of many countries with excess processing capacity and low labour costs that import fish and fishery products for further processing and re- export (e.g. China, Viet Nam and Thailand).

National  traceability  is  organized  by  national  administrations  and  governed  by  national  laws. While  many  countries  require  traceability,  especially  requirements  associated  with  exports  to  an international  market,  it  is  often  enforced  with  varied  degrees  of  effectiveness.  Few  to  no  countries provide  standardized  CTEs  and KDEs  and  electronic  traceability  systems  where  specific  types  of products  are  electronically  traced  through  the  entire  national  supply  chain  from  point  of  landing/ import to point of export/re-export.

The cross-countries traceability (in between countries) stops at the point of entry into a country and restarts at the point of exit. If a product does not re-emerge as an export following landing or import, it is deemed to have gone into domestic consumption.

This understanding is to be incorporated into the traceability system’s design so as to accommodate the reality that in many countries, the largest importers of fish raw materials are not processors but diversified  import–export companies.  These  companies  are  sometimes  servicing  a  variety  of  food- related  sectors,  and  often  supply  to  and  distribute  fish  on  behalf  of,  large,  and  probably  small,  re- processors.  Although  this  service  comes  at  a  price,  it  may  offer  essential  flexibility  in  the  dynamic channelling  of  raw  material  to  a  network  of  factories  as  market  conditions  change.  Although  this situation is perfectly legal, the fact that fish may change hands one or more times while in the country has implications for traceability systems.

Finally, interoperability will be always be a challenge to implementing new technology because of the lack of traceability standardization in seafood value chains – both from a technical perspective, where existing traceability systems may not be able to talk to each other, and also from the perspective that there is a need for standardized KDEs to be recorded and shared. This document hopes to contribute to this last point.

 Recomendations

As demonstrated in this document, establishing a consistent and widely adopted set of KDEs and CTEs is an essential part of functional and integrated traceability systems – both for companies and national CAs.

While technology has enabled many examples of successful implementation and is constantly evolving, implementing advanced technology is secondary to having well-developed traceability along the value chain, not only with accurate and well-defined KDEs and CTEs, but with standards that facilitate integration, management and transmission of data. Hence, prior to deciding which technology is to be used, it is critical to define what data are to be acquired, and to determine the sources and jurisdictions involved at each type of state or entity of the traceability system to be built.

All types of states, entities and operators have essential roles to play in the implementation of traceability mechanisms. Some responsibilities and duties are directly related to the implementation of rigorous traceability mechanisms, whereas others are only loosely related – but together they provide the conditions in which traceability functions can be enforced.

The overall recommendation of this document for countries is to: 1) identify and define standardized KDEs and CTEs for commercial and regulatory traceability; and 2) follow strict due diligence (using a holistic and integrated approach) involving all stakeholders at legal, commercial and operational level prior to commitment.

In order to achieve the two recommendations above, critical forethought needs to be given to the following (not exhaustive) list of considerations:

Use of defined and flexible standards

• Once the identification and definition of the CTEs and KDEs is completed, stakeholders across the supply chain should consider adopting industry-wide use of the standards using globally unique identification of units as a significant step forward for electronic and interoperable seafood traceability.

• An example of such standard is the GDST Standards and Guidelines for Interoperable Seafood Traceability Systems, Version 1.0. These industry-developed standards are designed to improve the reliability of seafood information, reduce the cost of traceability and contribute to supply chain risk reduction and to securing the long-term social and environmental sustainability of the sector.

Traceability and value chain considerations for due diligence

• An exhaustive understanding of all possible is needed - as distinct from desirable - supply-chain events and scenarios under consideration.

• Consideration should be given to small-scale producers supplying domestic markets and potential gaps in national traceability systems where information is challenging to capture.

• Clear identification and definition of the CTEs and KDEs are needed in the value chain under consideration.

• For regulatory purposes, the segments of analysis need to consider the administrative, logistic and legal aspects associated with the types of states, entities and operators that have custody of fishery and aquaculture products as they move through national and international supply chains, from harvesting and processing to the consumer end market.

• A clear understanding of the current operational and logistical advantages and limitations of the traceability system in existence (if any) is needed.

Good Bye Peter Flewwelling

I keep this blog very fishery oriented on topics of my interest, and a lot of it around the Monitoring, Control and Surveillance area, which is where I work the most… but today will be a bit more personal

As I sat on a meeting for the WCPFC Transhipment IWG… it occurred to me how come I am here, considering my origin and past.

As usual, it comes to people, mentors and opportunities… so in this post, I want to thank a mentor who unfortunately died a couple of weeks ago.

I met him in one of my 1st jobs as a consultant in 2000 in Sri Lanka, and we kept in touch since then.

He embodied the role of a mentor for his capacity and humanity. He literally wrote the first books on fisheries MCS back in 1994 for FAO after his days in the Canadian Navy and kept the same good and cool attitude from then till his last job as the Compliance Manager of the NPFC

 He was the 1st that welcome me as a fisherman into the fisheries officers’ world, and I know he was genuinely happy for me when I kept getting jobs along that line of work, and there was always an encouraging answer to my many questions along the way.

He worked worldwide and always supported people… and so many people got in touch with similar stories to mine in terms of the support and guidance he gave so generously.

He had a great laugh and was always keen to see the positives… I know he would not like tears, so I here celebrate his life and say a public thank you for the help provided…

And I’m sure I’m not the only one that feels the same!

Pacific Handbook for human rights, gender equity and social inclusion in tuna industries

I always remark that SPC does top-quality publications not only in terms of content but also in terms of design, and as such, I’m always proud (and humbled) when they use my pictures for their excellent publications, yet this time is a double pride since are not only my photos but also many references to the paper I co-authored last year with K Nakamura and Y Ota (A practical take on duty to uphold human rights in seafood workplaces) and many of my blog entries.

This one, the Pacific Handbook for human rights, gender equity and social inclusion in tuna industries comes from the hand of my friend Professor Kate Barclay plus  Aliti Vunisea, Megan Streeter, Senoveva Mauli and Natalie Makhoul, all of whom I interacted with in the past.

This publication follows the footsteps of the existing SPC Handbook on gender equity and social inclusion in coastal fisheries and aquaculture (that also used many of my pictures) as they adopted the idea of a practical handbook with tools, case studies, tips and stories to speak to fisheries practitioners and to support the application of gender equity and social inclusion (GESI) principles in the tuna industries.

This new ‘Tuna Handbook’ also includes human rights (HR) topics complementing gender equity and social inclusion concepts with an extended outlook into more specific human rights issues such as working conditions and labour rights. In addition, the ‘Tuna Handbook’ expands on the dual responsibilities of the public sector and the tuna industry as the private sector player.

In a nutshell, the handbook has 9 modules (all with my pictures in the covers) that are divided into four thematic areas:

1. Introduction – the basics: Module 1 1 (Overview) and Module 2 (MEL and Social Analysis) 

2. Site-specific human rights and GESI issues – from the sea to the shore: Modules 3, 4 and  5 (HR and GESI at sea/in port areas/in onshore processing facilities)

3. Broader human rights and GESI relevance: Modules 6, 7 and 8 (HR and GESI in the informal SSF tuna sector/in fisheries science and management/stakeholder engagement)

4. The national scale: Module 9 (Fiji case study)

All modules are also stand-alone publications, which can be downloaded separately.

The handbook is primarily addressed to fisheries practitioners working for national fisheries agencies but also to the private sector, civil society, and intergovernmental organisations. Educational institutions may also benefit from the handbook to support the integration of human perspectives, social science and their dynamics into course development and research.

Needless to say, I was even more flattered when Kate (she is at the top of this field) said publicly: “Apart from your amazing photos, Francisco, your blogs and papers have some of the best ideas and points for human rights in tuna fisheries for the region. Thank you!” as someone relatively new to the academic field of Labour rights at sea and coming from an operational angle, her words are really encouraging.

So, if you are interested in the topic, make sure you dig into this publication as it sets the stage in the Pacific with lessons learned for the rest of the world.

The usual culprits in the HS transhipment scene

I have written ad nauseam on HS transhipment in the WCPFC and abuse of the impracticability exemption. I also proposed some solutions, and I’m working on the deck in the intercessional working group for transhipment reform at the WCPFC.

In principle, it should not be too hard to fix, really… is only a small group of countries doing it, and they are the same across all oceans.

This new study by my colleague Gohar Petrossian and colleagues (based on her prior work) for PEW does illustrate it again… and again…

Read the original, here are some brief quotes

Flag trends

The study found that most carrier vessels were flagged to just a few countries: Panama (54% of key carriers); Taiwan, Province of China (10%); China (9%); and Liberia (5%). When looking at relationships between flags, Panamanian-flagged carrier vessels had the largest number, 2,082, of encounters with fishing vessels flagged to China, accounting for 24% of all detected transshipments. (See Figure 2.) Carrier and fishing vessels both flagged to Taiwan had the second-strongest connection at 1,109 encounters, or 13% of all transshipments.

Several countries, including Panama, allow foreign-owned or -controlled vessels to register under their flag through an “open registry.” In recent years, several countries have highlighted issues regarding Panama’s monitoring and control of its registered vessels. For example, in December 2019 the European Union issued a second formal warning to Panama because of the country’s persistent failures to meet its obligations to fight illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. And the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration recorded several violations by Panamanian-flagged vessels in its 2019 and 2021 biennial reports to Congress.

Global transshipping networks

The study identified 12 distinct networks or “communities” of key carriers and estimated their relative importance and contribution to the overall global network. Five of those communities, which the research team referred to as A, B, C, D and E, collectively accounted for 65% of all activities, with the top three communities (A, B and C) conducting almost half (49%) of global transshipment. Not surprisingly, given the analysis’s focus on RFMOs that oversee tuna and squid fisheries, four of the top five communities were largely associated with tuna and tuna-like fisheries and the fifth was probably associated with squid fisheries.

Community A
The top community included 23 key carriers—mostly flagged to Panama and Liberia—that conducted nearly a quarter (22.7%) of the transshipment events examined. Community A’s transshipment activity spanned multiple ocean basins and RFMO management boundaries, with noticeable hot spots in the Western and Eastern Central Pacific regions, Indian Ocean, Southeast Atlantic and the Eastern Central Atlantic, as well as near the EEZs of the West African coast.

Community B
This group of 12 key carriers, flagged to Taiwan and Panama, engaged in the second-highest proportion of transshipment events (14.7%), primarily in the Western Indian Ocean and Western Pacific.

Community C
This group, which accounted for 11.4% of the activities and contained five key carriers, showed low overall geographic spread, with transshipment events concentrated in the southeast Pacific region and just outside the EEZs of French Polynesia and Pitcairn Islands.

Community D
Like Community A, Community D’s encounters, which made up 8.2% of activities and involved eight key carriers, were spread across the Western and Eastern Central Pacific regions—mainly the equatorial Pacific. However, unlike the other communities, this group conducted significant activity immediately outside of several EEZs, including those of the Solomon Islands, Nauru, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Tokelau and French Polynesia. (these are my focus see one example below of the many I have)

is not doing nothing “ilegal” but where is the impracticability of hamering the costal waters of Fanning (always outside the 12nm) and then after being fishing near kiritimiati (a official port) and doing over 200 to tranship in 4 nm of the EEZ, instead of doing less than 100 to Kiritimati… inpracticability yeah right…

 Community E
The 19 key carriers in Community E mainly engaged with Panama-flagged fishing vessels. This community operated in a wide geographic area with hot spots in the Northwest Pacific Ocean and high seas areas close to the EEZs of Russia, Peru and Argentina, which are associated with productive squid fisheries.

Conclusion

By identifying the key carriers and the vessel communities of which they are a part, this study sheds light on the global reach of these carriers and the true scale of the transshipment network. These findings, in turn, highlight the need for better coordination among countries, businesses and market stakeholders, especially for oversight of activities on the high seas. To effectively manage increasing transshipment activities, stronger regulatory frameworks are needed oceanwide to ensure that vessels are operating within legal requirements and illegal catch does not reach the marketplace.

Obviously, I agree with these points…and I think that we around all initiatives have to act in a pack and puch from all corners... add requirements for EM for TS in HS, and add observers.... since the present scenario is not functioning...

We should also push for an independent observer programme, here is what I wrote for PEW last year (summary already lodged here https://www.wcpfc.int/file/672477/download... ) this could make the TS at sea very expensive and such push the vessels to come over to port at a reduced rate.... look at the fees that IATTC observer earns (340USD/day) and the ones agreed to that and paying it are China, Japan, Korea, Panama, Chinese Taipei, Vanuatu... and this is one way less profitable fishery than the WCPFC… so coming to port should be cheaper

 this is gonna be a loooooong swim in rough waters… when it shouldn’t be

Enforcement approaches against illegal fishing in national fisheries legislation

This blog post has been brewing for a while and is about a paper published recently…. There are two factors to it.. 1) it deals directly with a key component of my work, and 2) the lead author is a friend and mentor!

here is where you start with evidence findeng…. but never where you finish (My broh Stephenson doing his weor on a carrier)

I got to know Blaise back in Tonga in 1998 when he was starting his career at FAO, and I was on my 1st consultant job getting over my impostor syndrome from coming to work as an FAO consultant with people and boats I was fishing with 3 years before!

Working with Blaise in Palau a few years back

In any case, I think the liking was mutual, and we have always stayed in contact since then, he has always been incredibly generous with his advice on professional and personal matters, and I have been lucky to work with him on PSM issues back in his home country PNG and a few more after that.

Besides being incredibly capable, his best quality (at least in my opinion) is very simple to define; he is a “gutpela man” (good person, kind and thoughtful) in Tok Pisin.

The topic of the most recent paper he was the main author says it all in the title: “Enforcement approaches against illegal fishing in national fisheries legislation.” This topic is pertinent for me since my work on MCS is delimited by the strength and extent of the legislative framework that covers it. In my past life as a compliance guy with the industry, I used my mantra of “how can you regulate what you don't understand” to my client's advantage when things went to court, and my role in finding holes and technical inconsistencies in prosecution cases… not that I’m proud of it…. But I see worst with really powerful accountancy firms that make corporate clients pay lesser proportionate tax than a teacher…

In any case, the reality is that soon as things get into court, everything takes time, and it gets VERY expensive… so it is much better to settle outside court…

Yet, for this to be an option, the case you build and the evidence has to be so irrefutable that it is cheaper for the vessel owner to cut their losses and get on with stuff. And here is where I focus a lot of my work on mentoring.. where to find and secure irrefutable evidence on board fishing vessels… which normally is beyond the documents the skipper presents.

For us in MIMRA, this has worked very well; in none of the 5 cases we brought to our legal counsel through the implementation of our PSM procedures was pursued into the court system. The vessels’ owners realised that is was better to settle since the cases were waterproof (pun intended). Here are the public details of one of these cases.

Blaise and co-authors explore a few overarching questions underpinning the scholarly debate on illegal fishing and crimes in the fisheries sector.

First, whether criminalising illegal fishing or subjecting such fishing to criminal law processes leads to better compliance with fisheries legislation or is a more effective approach to tackling illegal fishing. Second, whether the problem of illegal fishing persists due to the lack of its criminalisation or the resistance by States to criminalising illegal fishing activities.

They analyse the primary fisheries legislation of States and the EU to understand better the enforcement approaches adopted therein, the responses used to empower national authorities, establish processes, delineate liability, and fix the sanction scheme, including the level of sanctions in terms of severity for illegal fishing.

They ultimately aim to demonstrate that the options used to combat illegal fishing set out in national fisheries legislation are not limited to a single type of enforcement approach.

Indeed, their assessment of national fisheries legislation shows that most States seem to follow a dual enforcement approach, which includes provisions enabling the use of both administrative and criminal processes and sanctions to enforce against illegal fishing and fishing-related activities.

They rightly support a multipronged approach to address illegal fishing, which may include legal solutions such as criminalising serious fisheries violations.

As usual, I recommend you read the original, as it also dwells on the role of regional organisations, especially FFA.

I just quite the conclusion here below:

The ‘most appropriate’ legal strategy to tackle illegal fishing through regulatory frameworks does not rely on and should not depend upon the law-maker’s emphasis on a particular enforcement approach, whether administrative, civil or criminal. As seen in this assessment, most States endorse a dual enforcement approach in their primary fisheries legislation with respect to the authority competent for processing fisheries offences, the respective process, applicable liability and sanctions for illegal fishing. The findings reveal that most countries have employed both administrative and criminal processes and sanctions to combat illegal fishing in their primary fisheries legislation. Hence, there is no single solution, at least in terms of what the national fisheries legislation by foreign fishers should provide for, with a view to tackling illegal fishing. It is not by purely focusing on management and MCS provisions, or in solely establishing rigorous processes and severe penalties of criminal sanctions and years of imprisonment that States can combat illegal fishing.

A vital consideration for ensuring that the primary fisheries legislation of a country is robust in facilitating effective enforcement to tackle illegal fishing is that the relevant laws take advantage of the most efficient and practical enforcement options made available by the countries’ legal system and practice. At the same time, the fisheries legal framework must implement and be consistent with relevant international and regional instruments and standards. Notably, in accordance with the LOSC, national legislation of concerned States must include a provision on prompt release of the arrested foreign vessel and crew (Article 73(2), LOSC) and must not impose, for the violation of fisheries legislation, the penalty of imprisonment and any other form of corporal punishment in their respective EEZs, unless otherwise agreed by the concerned States (Article 73(3), LOSC). The procedure of prompt release is separate from, not incidental to or prejudicial to the coastal State’s judicial or administrative proceeding (on the merits) against the vessel and crew for the violation of its fisheries laws .

Due to the complex nature of illegal fishing, the solution for this persisting global problem in fisheries seems to require a multipronged approach targeting different facets of the problem. The actions and thinking promoted by legal scholars and international organizations is that combatting illegal fishing and crimes in the fisheries sector should not be limited or restricted to a single enforcement approach and softening the actions against illegal fishing, especially when it is accompanied by transnational organized crime dimensions. Irrespective of whether a country has established and emphasises an administrative/civil and/or criminal processes to enforce fisheries legislation, it is important that in applying the existing framework, States are attentive to the particularities of the fisheries context, especially with respect to the special needs of small-scale fisheries.

We submit that illegal fishing activities that involve elements of transnational organized crime should be considered a serious violation (or a serious crime), which should consequently attract congruent enforcement action. Indeed, members of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) have enjoyed relative success by treating illegal fishing as a serious matter regardless of whether administrative or criminal enforcement is used. The imposition of severe penalties for illegal fishing and the overall reduction in IUU fishing in the FFA region is a result of a combination of efforts, actions and approaches, including: building knowledge; revising legislation to ensure better MCS (through e.g., evidentiary provisions, higher penalties and forfeiture of vessels); raising awareness and education (stakeholders, enforcement officers, parliamentarians, judges) to change public and judiciary perception so that illegal fishing is considered a serious crime.

Steps towards recognising illegal fishing as a serious violation deserving severe penalties, as noted above, include: associating it with crimes in the fisheries sector and other aggravating aspects such as the harm it causes to ecosystems and the environment; considering its transnational nature; treating it as a crime against humanity; or treating it as a serious crime where organised criminal groups are involved in such fishing. In addition to these options, Lindley and Techera draw attention to the lack of synergies in the operation of the international community’s toolkit essential to address illegal fishing, suggesting a ‘regulatory pluralism approach’ and the need to put in place a ‘collaborative global body charged with bringing the instruments and actors’ together. Indeed, most scholars point to the importance of examining, interpreting and applying various fields of law relating to illegal fishing, and the concomitant and coordinated efforts from the respective institutions and stakeholders to address the problem.

Our message is essentially the same, noting that, as regards national fisheries legislation, both criminal and administrative or civil enforcement approaches could be adopted by States, in line with State legislative practice.

At the international level, inter-agency collaboration particularly through the FAO and UNODC, has advanced the work in clarifying the linkages, challenges and legal responses to crimes in the fisheries sector. We add to this initiative by having demonstrated how States have approached enforcement to address illegal fishing in national fisheries legislation and emphasising how to build on that. Our findings show that the use of criminal proceedings to tackle illegal fishing are not any close to an innovation in States’ legislative practice, nor could such practice be considered insufficient by lack of criminalization of illegal fishing activities. Criminal proceedings are already in place and appear to have not been used effectively enough by States to tackle illegal fishing. This needs to change, commencing with viewing certain illegal fishing as a serious violation warranting adequate and sustained enforcement effort leading to the imposition of severe penalties to have the desired deterrent impact.

My own experience and take on the labour issues on board fishing vessels

I’m always kind of cautious about writing on being a fisherman and the issues that it brings (the same way that about being a fisheries observer, even if it was less time) because it only a take, my own one, based on my experience in some fisheries a while ago and to a point a privileged one, being part European and a big intimidating looking man (so I been told).

Yet that does not invalidate my experiences, particularly when I read so much about labour issues in fishing by people that, while well intended, never spend much (or any) time as commercial fishers in fishing boats. 

I have been working in this area for a few years, and I have been involved in some worthwhile initiatives, have published both academically and non-academically, and have been qualified by ILO as an inspector on labour issues on fishing boats. So, my interest is not an amateur one.

Yet it did confront me at a recent conference where I was a speaker and the panellist on IUU fishing. I put a lot of time into explaining the MCS structure we use in the FFA region, the methodology we used for our IUU qualification report in 2016, how we used the results to both guide better MCS operations and better data sources, and how the 2021 quantification update showed a fall in 50% of the estimates… yet 90% on the discussion was on labour issues. And they are not the same… they may happen in the same workplace, yet they may not be automatically related.

Furthermore, the discussion mainly mixed safety at sea, human rights violations and labour issues in one bag, considering that all fishing fleets are equally distributed everywhere. And somehow setting the picture that all fishermen are simultaneously criminals and labour rights victims.

And this is not my experience… so I was asked to write about it… so yeah, this blog entry is the result.

Again, what I write below is what I have seen in almost 40 years of working in commercial fishing in the South Atlantic, eastern, western and South Pacific and a little bit in the Indian Ocean, across side and stern trawlers, squid jiggers, demersal and surface longliners, purse seiners, pole and liners.

Yet I’m the 1st one to recognise that most of that experience did happen a while ago, while I was halfway in between the deck and the bridge either as deck boss and/or 3rd /2nd  mate/navigator and when DWFN had mostly crew from their own states and reflagging to open registries wasn't as common then as is today.

Overall, in my experience, I’ll say that I have personally witnessed and/or experienced the issues I will qualify below in 60 to 70% of fishing trips I have been on, so yes, they are prevalent.

Now, as with anything in nature, events are distributed in the shape of a bell curve, which is the most common type of distribution for a variable, so much so that it is also known as the “normal” distribution. 

The highest point on the curve, or the top of the bell, represents the most probable event in a series of data (its mean, mode, and median in this case), while all other possible occurrences are symmetrically distributed around the mean, creating a downward-sloping curve on each side of the peak. The width of the bell curve is described by its standard deviation.

Now, by far, the most common labour issue I have seen and experienced in my life is to be paid what I was promised and on time. And I’ll say this way over 50% of the issues most fishermen face… yet this is seldom mentioned…and most of the focus is on the almost human rights side of things.

Also, in my experience, the payment issues arise from two elements:

1. The nature of fishing… while there are many different ways in which fishermen get paid, most of them involve some share arrangement of catch value, and you get to that after the fish is sold (one of the many jobs I had was to the crew rep at the time of “weight in” of catch.. so from here you make some estimates) so basically you don't really know your full payment until it arrives… and mostly id does not arrive to you, but to your dependents somewhere in the word that have no idea how much you estimated.

   and

2. the overall dodginess of the company you work for, which (again, in my experience) relates to the overall dodginess of the country where they are from… transparency international corruption indexes align pretty well with my best and worst experiences (NZ was the best if you keen to know… the worst are like comparing if you rather have diarrhoea or vomiting)

The rest is a gradual descent into human interactions and pettiness… and for that, we need to understand the overall relationship structure of males in confined spaces, as you see in jails, the armed forces, mining, oil industry, etc..  a lot of it has been analysed in the military (and I know it from personal experience having joined the Navy as a cadet at 12 years old).

Sociological research in the navy suggests that tyrannical behaviours include arbitrariness and self-aggrandisement, belittling others, lack of consideration, a forcing style of conflict resolution, discouraging initiative, and noncontingent punishment. And if you see, a lot of the issues analysed in the “labour rights” literature( aka bullying, physical, emotional and sexual abuse, etc.) are (for me) deeply rooted in the nature of the job and the people on board.

Research calls this petty tyranny, and it is argued to be the product of interactions between individual predispositions (beliefs about the industry, their subordinates, glorifying themselves, and preferences for action) and situational facilitators (institutionalised values and norms, power asymmetry, and stressors).

Consequently, this causes low self-esteem, performance, work unit cohesiveness, rank endorsement, high frustration, stress, reactance, helplessness, and work alienation among pairs, abuse by those pairs, depression, and, unfortunately, as witnessed once suicide. It is further argued by scholars on the topic (since the 50s), that these effects may trigger a vicious circle that sustains and even enhances tyrannical behaviour. 

On one side, it is also essential to understand the type of people that go into fishing and why they are doing it…

I wrote a bit on my case here, but in a nutshell, when I started, the primary qualifications you needed to go fishing were a hard stomach and to don't give a shit about much, really… so it was somewhat natural fitting for me. It was rough, but the entry requirement was (and still is really low). 

Yet you soon realise that it is not a job for “normal” people. If you don't know if you are coming back every time you get out fishing, everyday life looks different.

Also, the basis of your relationship with fellow humans changes… when you share living quarters that are barely liveable with people you never meet before, yet you hear ALL their body’s noises less than a meter from you… one develops an open mind and thick skin.

I soon realised I didn’t have to like the bloke next to me… nor he had to like me! But we needed to trust each other because our lives depended on each other. I fished with awesome people and some real shitheads whose views about aspects of life I despised… but they were “solid” fishermen, and I’ll have them as crew anytime.

But also, you don’t really get involved in their dealings with others unless they are shitheats with you… then you need to react and stand your ground.

Yet if you cannot (for whatever reason) hold yourself against the real shitheads, the petty tyrants… your life can descend fast into nasty places due to progressive bullying and physical harm.

Life at sea sorts out people quite fast; either you deal with it, or you don't, and as such is better if you don’t go back... but as said, that is a luxury many don’t have… and there (at least in my tiny brain) is where the most prominent problems arise.

And I wish the culture in fishing boats, as the culture in jail or in the navy, could be changed overnight to be more progressive and inclusive; they are definitively changing. Yet, never at speed needed… and I’m not sure if they ever will, unfortunately, to the extent that some expect.

If you have never been in the armed forces, ordinary jails or fishing boats, you can look into many war movies and see that these situations are unfortunately not uncommon on jobs of this nature. I was always quite lucky in both my navy and fishing experience to be a big, odd, yet dependable guy… as to people not to mess too much with me. But on the other side, my time and experiences in the navy were the loneliest and most depressive time of my life… I had dragged my PTSD since then, over most of my career, until very recently when I had no other option than to confront it with professional help if I wanted to maintain my family, and I will always be very thankful and indebted to my wife for helping me to confront a lot of it.

In any case, fishing was (and still is) the option for people on the margin of “normal” society, for the “unadapted” (what a concept!), to have a chance to make relatively good money (at least in comparison with the other options available) if one had the guts to deal with it.

Also, from personal experience, I met more people with dyslexia, PTSD and what I got to know later as Asperger’s or autism spectrum syndrome than in any other context I have been.

That was then… today’s picture is different; while it still has some of those guys, but now includes the poorer (and sometimes options-less) citizens of complex countries in SE Asia (Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, etc). I fished with many of them, and their angle was different; their options are so much more limited than for westerners (or part Europeans like me), so they get into fishing because it is one of the few things they can do and not because they are not really good for anything else (as in my case). 

Needless to say, and as a corollary, for every shithead I worked with, I also fish with some of the most unique, resourceful, resilient and genuinely gentle people I’ll ever met, they allow me to have a worldview that most rich westerners dont have in fishing.

In any case, among the slide to the extremes of the normal distribution (again, in my experience), after payment issues, we have bullying/emotional abuse 30%, then physical abuse 10%, and then sexual harassment (1%) last in the extremes.

my onboard bell curve of shit experiences

The fact that they all happen is a tragedy, no doubt.  Yet not all happen in the same frequency and distribution; that does not need to be forgotten as it does help in strategising the measures to deal with these issues that (again) are not exclusive to fishing.

It really worries me that the criminalisation discourse I see worldwide, is cornering fishermen to a dual role of simultaneously being environmental thugs and victims of labour abuses, with no qualifiers in between them or any risk exposure, and this is not fair.

Thankfully I never had to work on vessels where I’ve seen people on bonded labour of slavery… I would have done something for sure; I know these events do happen… yet they occur in fleets that I had no exposure too.

So yeah, this is my take for whatever it is worth… it comes with the advantage of being a no-one and not having to tow an institutional line; you are free to disagree… but please don't discredit my experience because it is different to yours… or your saviour narrative.

Thailand denies port use to a carrier setting FADs in the WCPO... this is good news!

Back in November last year, I was talking to a friend that is a fishing master on a Purse Seiner around here in the Marshall Islands, in regard to the work I had been doing with starboard.nz, I was showing him the capabilities of the system, and we started analysing the “strange” movements of a carrier (Sun Flower 7), as you can see below:

why? wind and currents are going south east to north west

Why would a carrier do that? For both of us the 1st reaction was the same… its dropping FADs… but then the former Search and Rescue guy in me was… could it be like a search pattern? I checked it with the local seaptrol and it wasn't a SAR call for that area

It was interesting to note that they started doing that pattern in the EEZ of Kiribati… so I went back in the system to find another vessel doing similar stuff…

In fact then I foud quite a few more and all related to the same country of owership (Korea) even if flagged to other usual open regiestries… and yes I adviced the right people… and Starboard started developing and algorithm to pick up that behavior

popular area? 2 different carriers a couple of months apart

polular area in 2021-22

So I talked to a few captains, show them the patterns and they all agree with the FAD setting behaviour.

Why is this an issue?

A carrier deploying FADs is considered as fishing under the FFA HMTCs but, most importantly: the WCPFC Convention. 

The WCPFC Convention's definition of fishing includes the deployment of FADs

(iv) placing, searching for or recovering fish aggregating devices or associated electronic equipment such as radio beacons; 

So in principle, if deploying FADs, that carrier was fishing, which it is not licensed to do. They are only licensed to pick up fish and pass provisions and materials (that may include FADs) but not to deploy them on behalf of FVs (as deploying FAD is part of fishing as defined in the WCPFC convention).

So even if it does not have a net, is fishing by definition while dropping and activating e-FADs on behalf of Purse Seiners (at a charge)

We could not do anything here in Majuro, since the vessel wasn't coming into port… Both Pohnpei and Honiara did not pick up on it since their PSM are incipient and usually focus on Purse Seiener's behaviour… and not on carriers.

So when realising that the vessel was going to Bangkok… I sent all the info I had, and I knew they would pick up on it 

And so they did.

Back in 2016 and 17 worked in Thailand, helping with the yellow card that the EU dropped on them, particularly with the set-up of their PSM and the traceability and fish accountability system from landings to exports. So I have maintained good relationships with some people there, particularly with a VERY nice, clever and committed Thai-English friend working with, whom I have been communicating throughout the whole process, particularly in terms of providing operational knowhow to discredit some of the excuses the vessel captain was providing.

Interestingly the captain was arguing that they were retrieving FAD and not setting them… in fact he argued “verbatim: I consider the floating objects, including, buoys floating as marine debris. Collecting buoys by the crews will support and protect the resources and the Ocean.”

I think is an interesting defence… we are not dropping them, we are picking them up… yet how you prove one or the other?  in any case, both are defined as fishing as discussed above)

Well, having an independent observer programme in all carriers would help… the WCPFC is the only RFMO without one (I wrote about it here).

Yet as a fisherman, you know what a vessel can do and how it operates.

How do you collect whole FADs (they are not small) at 10kts constant and navigate in geometrical patterns and straight lines? In what perfect weather universe FADs are at constant perfect drift at the same longitude and latitude after who knows how much time at sea?

Why would they go from A to B if they are retrieving.... and then to C and then to D... if A and C are closer… fuel is gold at sea.

The captain argued that he was picking them by reducing the speed to 3 knots (but this is not evident nor in the AIS record).

He said they had 2 teams, 1 at the bow and 1 at the midship. 3 crew per team. They used a rope with hooks to haul them up on deck… the eFAD sounder (the only valuable bit of the whole FAD is tied up to the FAD main body), so they will have to bring it all on board… a wet FAD could be anything above 100 kg… and they lift them on board?

And if so… what did they do with the rest of FAD after that? They argue that they transferred the buoys to 2 Purse Seiners (so they discarded the rest of the FAD overboard?) That is a MARPOL violation per se.

They showed some made-up receipts from 2 vessels for the 24 FADs buoys they allegedly collected, saying that they missed many… but then how they knew when picking them up is a straight line that those FAD would belong to those 2 boats only? And they had no records of the made and serial# of the FADs delivered. 

When questioned that the Purse seiners know the position of the FADs perfectly, they have Inmarsat D+ or Iridium (depending on the brand) transmitting positions every hour or less... so the PS can pass the position to the carrier constantly, and therefore they could go straight to the positions. Then the answer was that the FADs weren’t transmitting anymore, which brings us back to the question… how they knew winch ones of the 2 vessels to pick up… otherwise, they are just stealing random FADs?

Image of a Korean style FAD Source here

Furthermore., at that speed, if you recover something from the water, particularly a whole FAD set up, until you bring it to the deck, it will drag by the side of the vessel, and by physics get underneath and even if you cyut off, the main body of the FAD will be minced by the propeller of the carrier or worst getting tangled on it.

Nothing in that recovery scenario makes any absolute sense.

Interestingly it looks like the Korean Fisheries Monitoring Centre was arguing that under WCPFC CMM 2009-02 para 6: A FAD and/or associated electronic equipment may be retrieved by a vessel during the period of a FAD closure if the FAD and/or associated electronic equipment are retrieved and kept on board the vessel until landed or until the end of the closure. Interpretation: no violations because the vessel (Sunflower7) kept the collections until landing.

Yet again, under the WCPFC convention, the retrieving of FADs is fishing… and a carrier is not licensed to fish… furthermore, the FADs weren't kept on board. Nevertheless… it shows an area that where clarification may be needed at WCPFC technical and compliance committee.

From a fisheries MCS perspective, this is also interesting because the fish on board was loaded after the FADs event, so it may be perfectly legal (that was the job of the PSM work of FSM and Solomon Islands, where the carrier got fish from transhipping Purse Seiners), yet what is evaluated here by Thailand are the actions of the vessels before receiving fish, so I guess this is one for the lawyers to argue.

Anyway… I was absolutely stoked when I was informed yesterday that the carrier was denied port use in Bangkok and seemed to be heading north… Now wherever this vessel go will be a test to a few assumptions of IUU fishing… if it goes back to Korea and they don't do anything, this is pretty bad in terms of their obligations under FAO PSMA (they are a party to that agreement)… and denying port use is a big deal… so keeping an eye on it.

News on the port use denial are just coming in media in English, you can see a google translation here from a Thai news site, and a bit from Thai TV below

This is good news… my role in this saga was minimal; I just found it, analysed it and passed it to the right people. I’m no one at the enforcement level. This is proof that cooperation works and things happen when a government like Thailand puts their foot down… we need more of that by more governments. Congratulations, and thanks to all involved!

Update 23/3, this is now very oficial… this is the 1st time i see a port use denial under PSMA, and being communicated to the WCPFC… this is big

Labour standards and “equal pay for equal work” principle in tuna vessels

Based on my presentation at TUNA 2022, during the 17th INFOFISH World Tuna Trade Conference and Exhibition in Bangkok, last October. My friends from the INFOFISH magazine asked me to write an article around the issues of labour on board tuna vessels from my personal experience and perspective as an ex-fisherman, that now work on compliance aspects and does research and policy work on this topic. But also that none of these initiatives addresses exploitation and the “equal pay for equal work” principle.

The article was just published in the issue 2/2023 (March/April 2023) of the INFOFISH International magazine. but you you can download the pdf from here or read from the images below.

I wrote this article for INFOFISH to provide an update on the current global developments (both positive and negative), and ask who should legally be looking after the interests and welfare of workers on board tuna vessels.

I’m really thankful to INFOFISH for the opportunity and for respecting my take on this complex topic… that would not be really complex if flag states lived up to their obligations. I had to smile at the last bit of what they wrote about me as the author: “This article has undergone minimal editing so as to adequately convey Francisco’s strong opinions in his inimitable style and candour, on why we must think of people before profits.”

Industry involvement in international tuna fishery negotiations

I have always been very open about my industry background; I’ll say that it has been fundamental to whatever I know about fishing. My academic career gave that experience a formal knowledge framework around fishing and sustaining fishing, while my work with the government and intergovernmental institutions gave me the regulatory, operational and legal framework in which fishing happens.

Corporate reach at WCPFC

I was a fisherman working in science, then a scientist working in industry and then a fisherman/scientist working in government. I was very fortunate to have had that opportunity, and I wish more people have the opportunity to spend time in each of these three realms.

As a ex-fisherman, I always believe that as industry is part of the problem, they have to be part of the solution; and now that as a government advisor, we cannot pretend to regulate what we don't understand.

Hence I was very happy to read this paper by some authors I know, Laurenne Schiller, Quentin Hanich and Megan Bailey (I think I still need to meet Graeme Auld): Increasing industry involvement in international tuna fishery negotiations. 

The paper, for me, has two great takeaways: the 1st is that industry involvement in decision-making (at least in the WCPFC) is not inconsistent with good management and sustainability; in fact, one could argue it is necessary. The 2nd one is of personal interest, and is the analysis of the affiliations of the industry players and the very interesting graph that I chose to illustrate this blog entry; mainly since we talk a lot about the “domestication” of the industry when flagging to the Pacific Islands (PICs), yet these are not PICs companies… they are DWFN based companies that find economically and, in many cases, good political opportunities in flagging their vessels in PICs. The paper dully recognises that “Future work should investigate the detailed relationships between companies and countries we observed here, as the flags these companies use may lend deeper insight into the region’s complex corporate seascape”.

It is a good read with great graphs with the bonus advantage of explaining the delegations' works and the different participants' roles per delegation. As usual, read the original! I quote below the Science for society and Summary (I don't usually see those headers) and Conclusions!

Science for society

Tuna is a food staple for many families, and billions of cans are consumed annually. Most tuna comes from the Western Pacific where fishing companies pay to fish in island country waters. Ensuring the catch is sustainable is the collective responsibility of all countries, so governments meet annually to negotiate fishery quotas and restrictions. Little is known about how companies participate in these negotiations, although outcomes affect their businesses, and whether they abide by outcomes affects the long-term sustainability of tuna. By combining negotiation attendance lists and interviewing attendees, we found industry attendees now almost outnumber those from government, and 15 of 158 companies accounted for 41% of recent industry representation. While 70% of island delegations had foreign industry representatives, interviewees suggested current company involvement does not negatively affect negotiation decisions and may even help ensure sustainable tuna fisheries in this region.

Summary

The private sector can play a prominent role in global ocean governance. Yet, industry stakeholders are diverse, and how specific companies engage with policymakers remains poorly understood. Here, we focus on Western and Central Pacific tuna fisheries, which provide ∼60% of global tuna catch and a critical source of income for developing island states. We identified relationships between companies and governments in international fishery negotiations from 2005 to 2018. Relative industry attendance nearly doubled during this time, and 15 of 158 companies have dominated corporate representation since 2014. Further, industry members outnumbered government policymakers on half of the ten largest delegations, and 70% of island state delegations included foreign companies. Meeting attendees corroborated the influence of industry stakeholders, but this differed across countries. During our study period, management of tuna fisheries improved overall, suggesting that company involvement does not hinder sustainability outcomes and could play a supportive role when agendas are aligned.

Conclusions

Increasing industry involvement at WCPFC is happening during a time of strong regional leadership by island state governments and sustainable fishing effort, suggesting that industry influence is not interfering with, and may even be supporting sustainable fishing practices in this region. The nature of business interests (i.e., where they make profit) relative to the resource in question likely dictates the degree to which business and sustainability interests can be aligned.

In internationally managed fisheries, such alignment is partly driven by increasing drive to access sustainable seafood markets and suggests that industry involvement in international negotiations can be constructive when country and company objectives are aligned. Still, wellbeing and equity of local communities must be at the forefront of fisheries management decisions to ensure long-term benefits to both nature and people.

Thus, we suggest that the best way for the private sector to support sustainable fishery outcomes in this part of the world is by ensuring their engagement in negotiations does not undermine the sovereign rights of SIDS and their aspirations of ensuring the long-term tuna viability of tuna populations in the region.

Do large oceanic MPAs work for tropical tunas? Yeah.... nahh

There was a lot discussions a few months ago in terms of the closure of the Phoenix Islands Protected Area (PIPA) in Kiribati… with far-flung accusations being made against the iKiribati people and China bashing since Kiribati recently re-established diplomatic with them… and (of course!) they must have something to do with it.

The WCPO showing the EEZ of coastal States (light blue), PIPA (yellow) and the three large oceanic MPAs evaluated in the study.

I feel that there is a lot of “amateurism” around MPAs as “magic bullets”. As with most things in fisheries, their utility varies depending on many things… i.e. their utility will be vastly different from a coral reef with demersal species to an open chunk of ocean with pelagic ones.  Furthermore, I’m a strong believer that to fix a problem; you need a toolbox, not just a hammer… (when you only have a hammer, all problems look like nails?)

Furthermore, I had a long-standing beef with MPAs and other conservation measures mostly promoted (and sometimes imposed) by developed countries on people from developing states as blanket statements (30 by 30), where in most cases, locals are only involved in a tokenistic way.

So, I was really interested to see this paper appearing on my radar: “Limited conservation efficacy of large-scale marine protected areas for Pacific skipjack and bigeye tunas” Particularly because I know and immensely respect 3 of the authors, John Hampton and Simon Nicol, both are top scientists at SPC and know the pacific very well (I know about joe, Patrick and Inna but never met them) But crucially I’m verty pleased to see my friend and colleague Kaon Tiamere that is the Acting Director of the Licensing and Compliance Division at the Kiribati MFMRD.

They did not only dig deep into PIPA data but also analysed the likely tuna conservation efficacy of several much larger hypothetical MPAs, each constituting around 33% of the WCPO ocean area. While these larger areas may have a slightly greater impact on tuna stock conservation than the PIPA, and may also be targeted at a much broader range of conservation outcomes, the study concluded that they were unlikely to be effective frontline fisheries management tools for tropical tuna

This paper is crucial reading (in my humble opinion) for those pushing for massive MAPs for pelagic regions, so please read the original

Before I dive into the paper, I like to quote the words of my 3 friends on the SPC release on this paper. Crucial are Kaon’s words as a good antidote to the “white saviourism” of many in the rich environmental NGO world... “Kiribati MFMRD has been concerned that, over the past eight years, the PIPA closure has been negatively impacting Kiribati foreign tuna vessel licence fee revenue which is a critical source of income for Kiribati. These losses are difficult to justify if, as these new analyses suggest, there is little tuna conservation benefit resulting from the PIPA. The Government has decided to re-open the PIPA to tuna fishing from January 2023, and that decision is supported by the results of this work.”

Simon Nicol, Principal Fisheries Scientist (Fisheries & Ecosystem Monitoring & Analysis): “large MPAs like these may provide benefits where fisheries exploit fairly sedentary species and impact habitats but provide only modest contributions to conserving stock-wide abundance of tuna. Additionally, they can disrupt benefits to Pacific Island countries with processing and service industries, whose competitive advantage relies on their proximity to fishing grounds for the vessels that supply their canneries or use their transhipment and service facilities”.

John Hampton, Chief Scientist at SPC’s Fisheries, Aquaculture and Marine Ecosystems Division: “Tropical tunas such as skipjack and bigeye tuna have a wide distribution in tropical and sub-tropical waters of the Pacific, and are capable of spawning anywhere where the water temperature is greater than about 25°C. Their larvae drift in the surface water currents, and as they grow they are able to move widely through the region. So closing off one part of the area tends not to offer much if any protection to species like this.” In addition, “What we tend to see when areas like the PIPA are closed is that the vessels that would have fished there simply move their activities to adjacent areas, which again limits their conservation effectiveness, at least for tuna.” 

“Many countries in the Pacific region have implemented MPAs motivated in part by perceptions of how they would positively impact tuna stocks. This study shows that some of these perceptions were probably overly optimistic. We encourage evaluations like this one, based on the best scientific information on the biology of the stocks and fisheries concerned, be undertaken prior to MPAs being implemented.”

As said before, read the original for free! I just quote below the abstract and the last part of the discussion.

Abstract
Large-scale, no-take marine protected areas (MPAs) have been established in several locations in the Pacific and expansion of such areas to reach 30% of the ocean area is actively promoted in some quarters. Justification for the establishment of large oceanic MPAs often includes the conservation benefits that they would bring for tuna stocks, which are the subject of important commercial fisheries in the Pacific. The aim of this paper was to evaluate the conservation efficacy of an existing MPA, the Phoenix Islands Protected Area (PIPA) and a series of large hypothetical MPAs each constituting approximately 33% of the western and central Pacific Ocean, for two important and contrasting tuna species, skipjack and bigeye tuna. The evaluation was conducted by comparing control and counterfactual simulations in which the estimated population and fishery dynamics of the species were modelled using a high-resolution modelling framework known as SEAPODYM (Spatial Ecosystem And Population DYnamics Model). We found that stock-wide conservation benefits of the PIPA for these species, assuming that total fishing effort is maintained, to be weak to non-existent, and only modest increases in spawning biomass of both species occur within and in the near vicinity of the PIPA itself. For the larger 33% hypothetical MPAs, changes in stock-wide spawning biomass were estimated to be -0.1% to +5.8% for skipjack tuna and +4.8% to +12.0% for bigeye tuna. Conservation efficacy of MPAs for species such as tropical tunas is limited by their wide larval dispersal and high mobility of later life stages, which spatially dissipate the protective effects of MPAs. Also, the displacement of fishing effort from MPAs to areas remaining open can have negative consequences for stocks and fisheries performance in those areas. We conclude that large oceanic MPAs are not likely to be effective frontline management tools for tropical tunas and other species having similar life history characteristics.

 Discussion (last part)
The period covered by the study (1998-2019) encompasses the full range of typically observed environmental variability in the Pacific, including several strong El Niño and La Niña events, thus capturing any interactions between spatial management effectiveness and environmental variability.

 Our findings have contrasted two species of tropical tuna with differing population dynamics and degrees of fishing induced biomass depletion, and should also be informative regarding the likely effects of MPAs on other widely distributed, mobile pelagic species such as yellowing tuna, whose population and exploitation characteristics lie somewhere between skipjack and bigeye tuna. However, our examples do not include species whose biomass has been depleted to levels below biological sustainability limits or stocks that systematically migrate to discrete spawning grounds. How MPAs might contribute to the conservation of pelagic stocks with these characteristics remains untested. No tropical tuna stocks in the WCPO have been depleted to levels below their biological sustainability levels (Hare et al., 2021). Similarly, while stock structure for tropical tuna stocks in the Pacific remains uncertain (Moore et al., 2020), the most recent information from genetic studies has not detected strong evidence of fidelity to discrete spawning grounds (Grewe et al., 2015; Anderson et al., 2020; Natasha et al., 2022).

We recognise that large oceanic MPAs such as the PIPA may have conservation value in areas not analysed in this paper, for example in the protection of coral reef ecosystems and their resident species that might otherwise be heavily fished. However, where the objectives of, and justification for, MPAs include enhancing the conservation of widely distributed pelagic species, this should be carefully evaluated during the planning stage, for example using methods such as those of Ovando et al. (2021) and that presented in this paper. This would allow expectations to be realistic and evaluated against the likely economic and social costs and benefits that would occur.

Ad Hoc Expert Panels: Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs)

I’ve been at times asked to be part of expert consultations (FAO a couple of times and PEW), and I never paid much attention to the differences between consultations and panels… particularly in the frame of RFMOs.

some of my favourite experts

And as I’m now quite keen on seeing things through the lenses of UNCLOS, so I was quite interested in reading this analysis by Valentin J Schatz, for two of the most credible and prestigious law institutions in Law Oxford Public International Law and Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law.

As usual, I recommend you read the original… I just quote the intro and Concluding Remarks below:

Introduction
1 Ad hoc expert panels are a means of the → peaceful settlement of international disputes in the framework of regional fisheries management organizations (‘RFMOs’) (→ Dispute; → Fisheries Disputes; → Fisheries, Commissions and Organizations). From the perspective of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995 (‘UNFSA’), RFMOs are international organizations established by two or more States through → fisheries agreements for the purpose, inter alia, of establishing conservation and management measures (‘CMMs’) in a subregion or region for one or more → straddling and highly migratory fish stocks (Harrison, 2019, 84; → Marine Living Resources, International Protection). As such → fish stocks are not confined to waters within national jurisdiction but are also present on the high seas (→ Fisheries, High Seas), their conservation and management requires cooperation. Against this background, ad hoc expert panels may be placed in the broader context of both dispute settlement in the law of the sea (→ Law of the Sea, Settlement of Disputes) and, more specifically, the settlement of international disputes to which international organizations are parties.

2 In simplified terms, there are two different categories of ad hoc expert panels, which should be distinguished, although this distinction may not always be clear. The first category represents a consensual procedure on the basis of international law for the settlement of disputes of a technical nature between two or more RFMO members by panellists of their own choosing. The second category—Review Panels—shares most of the general features of the first category but constitutes a special procedure between RFMO members and the RFMO itself to review a decision of the RFMO and/or recommend alternative or interim measures (→ International Organizations or Institutions, Legal Remedies against Acts of Organs).

3 Ad hoc expert panels differ from the traditional means of dispute settlement non- exhaustively listed by Article 33 Charter of the United Nations, 1945 (‘UN Charter’) and Article 279 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (‘UNCLOS’), which include → negotiation, inquiry (→ Fact-Finding), → mediation, → conciliation, → arbitration, and → judicial settlement of international disputes. Accordingly, they fall within the scope of the catch-all term ‘other peaceful means’ under Article 33 UN Charter. A comparison with other means of dispute settlement illuminates the nature of ad hoc expert panels, although any categorization in abstract terms is rendered difficult by the fact that they take a variety of different shapes. Generally, ad hoc expert panels share many elements of other forms of → alternative dispute resolution, most importantly conciliation and arbitration (Harrison, 2019, 92). Against this background, they may be categorized as ‘hybrid’ or ‘mixed’ procedures whose features may be placed on a spectrum between what could be called ‘quasi-arbitration’ (eg compulsory Review Panels rendering binding recommendations) and ‘quasi-conciliation’ (eg voluntary ad hoc expert panels rendering non-binding recommendations). The → Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) refers to ad-hoc expert panel proceedings as ‘other interstate proceedings’ rather than ‘interstate arbitrations’ or ‘interstate conciliations’ (see PCA Cases webpage). To the extent that a type of ad hoc expert panel does not render binding decisions, it may also be qualified as a → quasi-judicial body (cf Romano, 2011, 255).

Concluding Remarks
34 Compulsory ad hoc expert panel procedures can make an important contribution to the prevention and settlement of disputes of a technical nature in the framework of RFMOs. In particular, the incorporation of Review Panel procedures in the decision-making procedures of RFMOs can be a suitable alternative to the unfettered rights of members to opt-out of CMMs, which undermine the effectiveness of conservation and management by RFMOs (Lodge and others, 2007, 75–76). Review Panels procedures can also increase accountability of both RFMOs and their members with respect to conservation and management obligations laid down in the legal frameworks of RFMOs, including UNCLOS and the UNFSA. The findings and recommendations of the two SPRFMO Review Panels were accepted and complied with (eg SPRFMO Annual Report, 2013, 2). Generally, the existence of Review Panels coincides with younger generation RFMOs (eg SEAFO, SPRFMO, or WCPFC) and older generation RFMOs whose constitutive treaties have been amended after the adoption of the UNFSA (eg NAFO and, although the procedures are not currently in force, NEAFC). In 2006, the General Assembly of the United Nations (‘UNGA’) (→ United Nations, General Assembly) has urged States to undertake performance reviews of RFMOs, using the best practices of RFMOs (UNGA Res 61/105 (8 December 2006), para 73). Following this call, recent performance reviews have criticized the absence of both modern decision-making procedures and effective dispute settlement procedures in older generation RFMOs, such as the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (‘ICCAT’) (Report of the Independent Performance Review of ICCAT, 2016, 59–60) or the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (‘IOTC’) (Report of the 2nd IOTC Performance Review, 2016, paras 65–69, 176–78).

Blue Shark catch and trade report

Normally I would not blog on reports/studies published by NGOs. I generally keep myself to reports by inter-governmental organisations and some academic papers. As much as I respect some NGOs, my experience doing some research for them is that they need their results to fit their narratives. And generally plain facts don't have the doom factor that they need to keep their business model going…

I’m not making a moral judgement on that attitud, I just don't take part doing research for them.

So generally, I would not be blogging on a shark report commissioned by an NGO… yet in this case, I know personally (and trust the integrity) 3 of the authors. Furthermore… the results explain the behaviour and decisions of some of the members of the WCPFC witch is the only RFMOs I have insight access to.

As always… read the original… I just quote below some findings of the report I find very revealing.

Taiwan and Spain catch as much blue shark as all other flag States globally combined. The top five blue shark fishing nations (Taiwan and Spain, along with Japan, Indonesia and Portugal) account for close to 80% of global blue shark landings.

Most blue shark catch is from targeted longline fleets, and this is evident in all sea basins; it is misleading to consider blue shark as ‘just bycatch’ in tuna and swordfish longline fisheries. In the Atlantic Southwest 5 tonnes of blue shark are caught for every 1 tonne of tuna; the majority of longliners here are targeting sharks and tuna is the bycatch.

Large-scale commercial fleets harvest 90% of blue shark catches, the overwhelming majority of which are longliners. Distant Water Fishing nations catch 74% of the global blue shark catch.

A Global ex-vessel value of tuna species (2018), and minimum global ex-vessel value of blue shark (20182019) (source: Poseidon)

The ex-vessel value of blue shark meat and fins in 2019 is estimated to be $411 million. The total value of blue shark meat is five times more than the value of the fins at this stage in the supply chain.

Although finning and dumping of carcasses has likely diminished with the rising value of shark meat globally, incentives to engage in finning remain, particularly where shark meat remains undervalued, or in fisheries where non-shark target catch (e.g. tuna and swordfish) is a lot more valuable than shark; where high-grading at sea makes financial sense at given times, and where reefers continue to accept illegal consignments of fins at sea.

The last two decades has seen the global shark meat trade increase significantly, doubling in value since the early 2000s. At the same time, shark fin exports have been relatively stable.

The blue shark meat trade is more complex than the fin trade as there are more end-user markets. It involved 177 countries in the 2017-2019 period. In 2019, the volume exported equated to 67,326 t when converted to LWE, which is 35% of the global blue shark catch.

Except for China, which gained prominence as an exporter and importer of blue shark meat, the main exporting (Spain, Portugal, Taiwan, and Indonesia) and importing countries (Brazil, Italy, Greece & Singapore) have remained stable over this period. The key bilateral trades are shown in the figure below.

Top 10 bilateral flows of blue shark meat 2017-2019 (source: ARTiS data)

When trade connections are analysed further, we find that China acts as a ‘keystone,’ connecting imports and exports to many other trading nations. Thailand, Taiwan and Vietnam were also other key trading countries in Asia, while Morocco, the USA and New Zealand (I wonder if this accounts for the Spanish “swordfish” fleet that unloads here to send to Spain), were key in Africa, America and Oceania, respectively.

Brazil is the top consumer nation of shark meat and blue shark specifically, but most consumers don’t know they are eating shark meat. More than half of Brazilian consumers of “cação” (which commonly uses blue shark meat) say they have never eaten shark in their lives (Bornatowski et al. 2015). The role of Uruguay is key in this trade, acting as a regional hub; processing and trading landings by different international fleets into Brazil, which are classified as re-exports. This situation is underpinned by a weak regulatory framework that fails to identify products down to the species level throughout the supply chain.

The lack of specific labelling in many shark meat supply chains means that consumers often do not know they are buying shark meat.

Hong Kong remains the centre of the fin trade, but shark fin consumption in Hong Kong is declining and other Asian markets (Taiwan, China and Indonesia) are increasing their share of the trade.

The blue shark has the highest known population growth rates among pelagic sharks, which explains the species’ comparative resilience to fishing pressure, but fishing effort is largely unmanaged and, in many regions, increasing. Blue shark is estimated to be declining in the Atlantic and Indian oceans and increasing in the Pacific.

Of the four t-RFMOs covered, only IOTC is constrained by its Convention to directly manage oceanic sharks. Management rules of the four t-RFMO provide for bans on shark finning, which directly benefits blue shark conservation. Many countries have also introduced measures to ban shark finning by their fleets and by their nationals, often extending these measures to trade rules. But overall, shark management plans remain fragmented and patchy, with numerous gaps as well as areas of overlapping (and conflicting) protection.

Recommendations

1. RFMOs should increase direct management of blue shark fisheries to properly manage fishing mortality relative to stock status.

2. RFMOs should improve monitoring, reporting and observer coverage on vessels targeting blue shark.

3. Support global and regional efforts to tackle IUU fishing by Distant Water Fleets as these will directly benefit blue shark fisheries. This includes implementation of the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) and governance capacity building in the regions associated with major blue shark fisheries (e.g. Southwest Pacific, Eastern Central Pacific, Southeast Atlantic).

4. Encourage the use of specific trade codes for the key traded shark species and improved inspection to ensure their correct use.

5. Prevent blue shark products from IUU fishing and endangered shark species being traded as blue shark by improving trade control through; a. development of Catch Documentation Schemes (CDS) in RFMOs; or b. listing blue shark as an Appendix II CITES species, which has a similar requirement to a CDS.

6. Support campaigns to improve seafood labelling and traceability requirements and raise consumer awareness in key consumer markets such as Brazil, Southern Europe and global pet food markets.

7. Encourage blue shark-targeted fisheries to undergo third-party certification as a driver for improved governance, e.g. to reduce the bycatch of juveniles and other shark species. (not sure about this one)

8. Promote sustainable, healthy shark fin alternatives to consumers in key Asian domestic markets & their expat communities overseas.

9. Spatial protection measures should be supported. To aid compliance, these should include mitigation for the impact of restrictions on the livelihoods of small-scale fishers.

Climate-driven redistribution of Pacific tunas and the joint role of WCPFC and IATTC

I remember reading papers of my interest, on wondering about the authors, who they are, where they work, and so on… it must be a sign of my age (and more concise interests?) that now I read a really good collegiate paper by 16 authors, and I know personally 11 of them!

Average biomass distributions (kg km–2) of skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye tuna in the Pacific Ocean basin for 2015 (2011−2020) (left), and mean anomalies (kg km–2) from the average 2015 biomass distribution of each tuna species projected to occur by 2050 (2044−2053) under the RCP 8.5 greenhouse gas emissions scenario (right).

I have written before about the impact of climate change on the distribution of pacific tuna stocks, the impact on tuna dependent PICs and now this paper (by many of the same authors as the others) that tackles what both tuna RFMOS in the pacific should do about this, not only from the management perspective but also from the global legal framework set-up by UNCLOS and UNFSA.

As usual, I recommend you read the original, as nothing beats that! I just quote here the abstract and the “Discussion and actionable recommendations” (which is a very nice subtitle!)

Climate change is predicted to alter the distributions of tropical tuna stocks in the Pacific Ocean. Recent modelling projects significant future shifts in tuna biomass from west to east, and from national jurisdictions to high seas areas. As the distributions of these stocks change, the relevant regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs)—the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)—will need to develop an expanded framework for cooperation and collaboration to fulfil their conservation and management responsibilities under international law. The key elements of a possible expanded framework for cooperation can be developed, and fundamental areas for collaboration identified, by applying and adapting principles established in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, and the constituent instruments of the RFMOs themselves. Our analysis reveals a wide range of important issues requiring cooperation, and three clear priorities. First, a formal mechanism for cooperation is needed to enable effective and efficient decision-making and action by the two RFMOs on key issues. Second, further cooperation is required in scientific research and modelling to better understand the biology and distributions of Pacific tuna stocks and how they will respond to climate change, and to inform stock assessments and harvest strategies. Third, the RFMOs must cooperate to define appropriate limits on fishing for each stock in a way that ensures they are compatible across the two organisations, taking into account their different members and management regimes.

Discussion and actionable recommendations

As our analysis has shown, there are a wide range of important issues on which WCPFC and IATTC will need to cooperate to combat climate-driven changes to the distribution of tropical Pacific tuna stocks. Some of these need to be addressed as a priority, while some will be more appropriately addressed over a longer timeframe. Some are complex and will require potentially delicate and difficult discussions, while others are more straightforward and should be easily achievable. Drawing together the issues identified across the four areas of RFMO activity discussed above, three concrete actions with cross-cutting effects can be identified as priorities.

First, WCPFC and IATTC must establish a more comprehensive approach to cooperation, elevating it to a formal governance issue, in order to ensure that the two organisations can take and implement timely, informed, effective, and transparent decisions. At present, cooperation between the two RFMOs is based on a rather ad hoc combination of: observing meetings; exchanges between Executive Directors; sharing the text of conservation and management measures; exchanging data; authorizing reciprocal observer coverage; and cooperating on some northern stocks through the Joint Working Group. In adopting measures for the overlap area as a short-term solution in 2012, the two organisations agreed that a longer-term process should be established to explore avenues for managing tuna stocks in the entire Pacific Ocean (IATTC, 2012b; WCPFC, 2013). Ten years later, the time has come to establish a more formal mechanism to facilitate that sort of process, which will be critical to successful cooperation in the other issues identified in this paper. A low risk and immediately actionable starting point toward this would be to establish a joint working group, involving Secretariat staff and/or members of both Commissions, which could be charged to examine and provide recommendations on specific priority matters for cooperation—but over time, a more sophisticated mechanism is likely to be required.

A second priority for cooperation is to advance scientific knowledge of key issues to improve understanding of the biology and distribution of Pacific tuna stocks and how they will respond to climate change, and inform the conduct of stock assessments and the development of harvest strategies. International law requires States to make decisions based on the best scientific evidence available, to cooperate in scientific research, and to strengthen scientific research capacity in relation to highly migratory stocks—and it is evident from the discussion above that such research is essential to enable the two RFMOs to consider and prioritize action on other issues. Since there is already a significant practice of scientific collaboration to build on, such as the Pacific-wide stock assessments for northern stocks which have been facilitated by the ISC, we suggest that agreement to cooperate on further issues—including sampling, modelling approaches and data collection—should be sought and actioned as quickly as possible.

Third, it is clear that WCPFC and IATTC must cooperate to define appropriate limits on fishing for each stock in a way that is compatible across the two organisations, taking into account their different members and management regimes. This is likely to be a complex task, which will necessarily be informed by some of the other areas of cooperation discussed in this paper—such as stock assessments, the development of harvest strategies, and a common understanding of how fishing limits are currently managed across the two RFMOs. It will also require an effective mechanism for cooperation, which ensures that the process is robust and transparent, and that the legitimate rights and interests of all States—as well as conservation and management principles—are properly taken into account. In this respect, one starting point might be for the two RFMOs to agree on some principles for dealing with shifting stocks to guide their work.

Finally, this discussion has also revealed some broader legal and policy issues which will require further consideration. First, as a matter of the international legal framework, further clarification is required as to how the ‘duty to cooperate’, which applies to each State whose nationals are fishing on the high seas, applies between RFMOs with jurisdiction over straddling and highly migratory stocks in adjacent areas of high seas. In this respect, the predicted climate-driven redistribution of Pacific tropical tuna stocks has highlighted a gap in the UNFSA, which does not clearly provide a framework for cooperation between RFMOs, or establish how ‘compatibility’ applies in relation to stocks which straddle areas of high seas under the competence of two different RFMOs, or the shift in distribution of fishery resources as a result of climate change. Second, not only are fish stocks predicted to move from an area under the jurisdiction of one RFMO to an area under the jurisdiction of another RFMO, but from areas under national jurisdiction to areas of high seas. This raises extremely difficult questions about the sovereign rights of coastal States, the potential to recognize or compensate loss and damage, and the allocation and transferability of rights from the EEZ to the high seas. Given the importance of tuna stocks to communities and economies in States across the Pacific Ocean—and particularly the predicted effects on many of the SIDS in the WCPO—finding just and equitable solutions to these difficult questions will require not only careful legal and policy analysis, but further cooperation between WCPFC and IATTC.

What was the deal with Harvest Strategy "scaremongering" at the WCPFC?

From my personal position (as the absolute “no one I am), private certifications of any sort (such as quality/seafood safety, ecolabels and now labour ones), are unethical and colonial. Their existence is based on fostering the perception that fishers and government institutions (particularly those of developing countries) cannot be trusted with what they do. So they need an external, more "trustable" verification (by an overwhelming number of certification bodies based in developed countries, mostly former colonisers themselves). You know… we just to make sure it is true and "those people" are not doing their usual tricks.... and of course, they have to pay for the certification cost, so the rich people can feel reassured about the food they eat... (the salt in the injury is that seafood has to be imported since the rich people totally destroy their own fisheries)

In any case, when this reaches the RFMO level…. It really ruffles me… since this is one of the few places where the poor and small sit at the same table that the rich and developed.

 So to explain the technical insight of what went on, I will use and quote the good work of my friends at the latest FFA Trade and Industry News.

A harvest strategy (also referred to as a management procedure (MP)) is a framework that specifies pre-determined management actions for a fishery or stock necessary to achieve agreed management objectives and respond to changes in stock status. Harvest strategies represent best practice in fisheries management as decisions relating to fisheries or stocks are more consistent, predictable and transparent.

FFA members had two harvest strategy-related proposals to WCPFC19 for potential adoption. The first is a draft Conservation and Management Measure (CMM) for an interim management procedure for skipjack tuna in the WCPO. The MP’s objective is to ensure that the spawning biomass depletion ratio of skipjack tuna is maintained on average in the long-term at around the target reference point (TRP) (50% of unfished spawning biomass) and above the limit reference point (LRP) (20% unfished spawning biomass), with no greater than 20% risk of the LRP being breached. The MP would be applied in a repeating three-year cycle, with the first two cycles treated as a trial; it covers the catch and effort of purse seine, pole-and-line and other commercial fisheries in EEZs and high seas.  

In recent years, WCPFC members have demonstrated a general willingness to progress harvest strategy development and adoption for key stocks. However, progress has been slow given the complexity of harvest strategy development and the capacity limitations of some members; the suspension of in-person meetings due to COVID-19 travel restrictions has also hampered progress. According to FFA members, “Not only will the adoption of this MP take better account of uncertainty, including the uncertainties of related to climate change, it will also be an important step in ensuring the effective management and sustainable use of the stock, and meeting the interests global markets in sourcing sustainable tuna products.”

This, of course, has to be seen in the light that the stocks are well managed and stable thanks to the combined action of the FFA membership, the PNA VDS and SPC’s State of the art science and data collection arrangements, so there was no full urgency…(I wish they had the same sense of urgency and were zealots for the reform of HS transhipment or the general mess that is Longline)

The proposed CMM was adopted and, as such, allowed the required scoring for MSC certifications on target tuna stocks (Principle 1), of their client fisheries that required them to be able to demonstrate that there is an available harvest strategy for a key tuna stock. It will also help to inform the development of management procedures for the remaining key tuna stocks.

FFA members also proposed to amend CMM 2014-06 - Establishing a Harvest Strategy for Key Fisheries and Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean to include a new paragraph that explicitly states that ….the Commission shall adopt harvest control rules (HCRs) for skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye and South Pacific albacore tunas before the stocks decline below levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield (MSY)”. This amendment stems from a condition in the Marine Stewardship Council’s (MSC) fisheries certification standard (MSC SA2.5.3b) that “an agreement or framework is in place that requires the management body to adopt HCRs before the stock declines below BMSY”.

Which is needed because recently, the Independent Adjudicator (IA) assigned to an objection to PNA’s scope extension to add FADs (see below) and bigeye to its MSC-certified skipjack and yellowfin free-school purse seine fishery ruled that this condition has not been met by WCPFC. Hence, based on the IA’s decision, PNA’s bigeye scope extension was unsuccessful. While MSC and the IA maintain that there is no system of ‘precedent’ in the MSC objection process, the IA’s decision may be treated as ‘new information by MSC conformity assessment bodies (CABs), potentially impacting future assessments and surveillance audits. Further, outcomes of MSC assessments for target stock requirements (Principle 1) are harmonised across different fisheries.

Currently, in the WCPO, there are 33 MSC-certified fisheries from 18 different fishing nations, accounting for 75% of tuna caught in the WCPO. Hence, FFA members’ proposed amendment to CMM 2014- 06 is likely to be widely supported as it will benefit all WCPFC members with MSC-certified tuna fisheries in the WCPO.

So, of course, each of these 33 fisheries is a revenue source to MSC, the CABs and the lobby organisations that make a living of it. The fishery in the WCPO is regulated in the same way by the WCPFC, is fished by all under the same management, gears, MCS framework, observers, etc., is all the same… and is 75% certified… so the other 25% is not because they don't pay… not because they do something radically different.

So yeah… I just see hypocrisy all around and, to an extent, neocolonial blackmail… Tuna would not collapse next year if the WCPFC didn’t agree this year to a heavily politicked issue needing more consensus.

Pointing fingers at FFA, PNA & SPC that, have been working on this for a long time ain’t fair. I find it disheartening that all this process was used to try to erode the strength of Pacific Islands cooperation and to maintain the money flow of the artificial construct that private certifications are, more than to manage better a stock that is well managed.

I personally think the “scaremongering” was way more about their fear of losing money and their relevance in a world that is starting to see beyond their business model rather than the long-term SKJ sustainability and is actually quite colonial.

But anyway… wanted to make sure that I explained the insight into the situation. As for the rest of us, in the wharfs, offices, boarding and fishing boats, computers with models, sampling and monitors, etc, ... life just continues.

 FADs were a big issue a few years ago when it was ruled that they had to stop with compartmentalisation practice… which they gave them self 3 years to do… but this… had to be NOW!

How to inspect Carrier Vessels - our latest MCS Practitioner Guide

A year ago, I posted on the ‘MCS Practitioners Introductory Guides’ aimed to support fisheries inspectors I was commissioned to write by Duncan Copeland from Trygg Matt Tracking (TMT) and the International MCS Network (iMCSn).

The first ones were fishing gear-specific guides on Longline Fishing, Pole and Line Fishing, and Purse Seine Fishing, which are all very pertinent to the WCPO.

To further support capacity building for inspectors and non-inspectors, we worked on a fourth guide for Industrial Fishing Vessel Inspections that are complementary to the gear guides and tackles an introductory understanding of the key considerations and needs during vessel inspections.

And there was one more on the pipeline, that was the Carriers one, which finally has been released (like the prior ones) in 3 languages.

You can download the version in English from here.

Podes descargar la versión en castellano de acá

Vous pouvez télécharger la version française ici

The whole set of all gears, in all languages is here

Carriers are unique from the fisheries compliance perspective since they are cargo vessels that operate in the fishing realm, and as such, fall under the fisheries compliance spectrum and are normally part of the definition of fishing vessels or fishing support vessels, and ergo need to be licensed, have a VMS, in some cases carry observers, plus a whole raft of other requirements.

Yet the reality is that they don’t “behave” or move like fishing vessels, i.e. no fishing gear specifications, closed area restrictions, and the 1000 other things fishing boats have. And also, they are crewed by seafarers and not fishermen, so the “culture” on board is different, and they are subject to specific ILO and IMO requirements that fishing boats are not required…

Surprisingly not much was written about them in the fisheries compliance realm… so I was quite happy to work on this guide.

My approach right from the start, I wrote the initial draft from operations and a practical point of view. As I have said many times before… "it is impossible to measure or regulate what you do not understand".

Besides inspectors, I think they are also a good resource for people in the media, non-specialists in NGOS and institutions with an interest in fisheries.

I hope you find them useful.

When someone ask for Career advice

I guess one of the realisations that one is getting old is when young people write to you asking for some advice or words that may help them in their careers.

you have no idea what will hapen, but stick to some principles

My 1st reaction is normally… I have no idea how I got here… I still pinch myself about it almost every day! I had no clue what would happen, but I stuck to a few principles!

I'd say I get a mail or message once every two months on average…. and I guess today was the one for the end of the year. Their background normally is your marine science/fisheries graduates that are keen to get involved in research, developments or activist angles.

I have been vocal that the biggest challenge I see in fisheries is talent attraction and retention; not only is there a criminalisation of fisheries set-up, but also the fact that civil society expects excellence from everyone in the sector, yet we pay mediocrity at best… so no wonder we have no new people and ideas.

I normally go back to older emails to collect my thoughts… so this time, I put a few in bullet points to keep them for another opportunity… then I decided to do this blog… so I can refer them when next.

This case was particularly interesting since the young scientist that wrote to me volunteered for Sea Shepperd, whose founder went very personal on me for my views on the seaspiracy movie (i’d said almost the same that Daniel Pauly but 2-3 days earlier)… that got me (and my dad with my same name) some death threats later on… but is old story now

Below is my answer, for whatever is worth:

And thanks for reaching out! And thank you for your kind words!

Not sure if I’m at all qualified or experienced to advise anyone 😊… furthermore, I was subjected to substantial personal abuse by Paul Watson and then death threats by supporters of Sea Shepard (the organisation you work with?), for my opinions… so you may disagree with all of them... but here I go:

1. I’m a humanist… is always about people and the incentives we offer them to behave one way or the other. A sense of fairness drives me… not one of righteousness. I don't buy into the crusader stereotype, the saviour, the eco-warrior, etc. Some rules are stupid, and there is a process to change them (surely is flawed and slow, but denaying it is not good either)… yet rules should be applied with fairness… not just to some, while others avoid them.

2. No one in fisheries (or any aspect of life) is totally guilty or innocent. It is the extent of it that varies, according to different people. No one has the moral upper ground here.

3. I focus my work on governments and regional organisations. If one wants to help, one needs to support the official institutions in the countries whose statutory existence is to deal with the issue you want to help. And this is not because the government is better… is because - we like it or not, there will be some form of government in 20-25 years… and I don't know if there will be a particular NGO.

4. Sustainability and environmental damage are not the same. The only way we will not have any environmental impact is for everyone to die at once; anything else implies compromises. Where that compromise is, depends on personal choice and public policy. For me, sustainability is a process, not a line drawn somewhere. Everything has advantages and disadvantages, and we have to navigate ethical choices since there is no one perfect way to achieve a complex goal.

5. The main issue that I learned is that to deal with all sorts of issues in fisheries, you need a toolbox and not just a hammer. When you only have a hammer, then you start to see every problem like a nail… and that is never the case.

6. Be always aware of the truly damaging substrate of colonisation and imperialism… not just in the colonised/intervened countries… but also in how its impacts the preconceived ideas of those growing up in a coloniser / imperialistic country.

7. In my personal view, the whole concept of working in “developing countries” while most times well-intentioned, is deeply rooted in colonial thinking… this is perhaps the biggest issue that I struggle with in my work… and is, to a certain extent, unavoidable if you work in this industry… Hence I try to focus always on working with individuals, spending as much time in the country with them as possible and trying to understand to the best of my capabilities their culture, family and worldview.

8. Of the people we interact with in the world, around 15% live below 1 USD a day, and around 45% live below 2 USD a day (this is the segment where my mother’s family comes from and where I grew up). At present, 71% of the world’s population earn less than 10 USD a day; in other words… almost 3 of every 4 people on our planet earn less per day than the cost of a bottle of wine at a western supermarket. The definitions of sustainability, efficiency, governance and sustainability are decided by rich western countries that comprise the top 29% of the population, the ones that can afford to plan for a future… We are very good at forgetting that too.

9. Even after 30 years of doing international work, I am still learning the challenges of decolonising my perceptions of my work. It also made me realise that my European side thinks in “me” terms, while my non-European side thinks in “we” terms.

10. Finally, and this is not just for work, but for me as a person, I try to live to 2 rules: never be ungrateful, and never be pretentious.

Hopefully, this is of help to you… it is quite helpful to me to order my ideas about it… so I’m actually thankful to you for having made the question

I wish you the best in your work

Francisco

The WCPO tuna fishery: 2021 Overview and status of stocks (and the mess of LongLine)

Every year just before the plenary meeting of the WCPFC (this year in Vietnam), the most important publication (at least in my view) of the tuna world gets published by SPC: The western and central Pacific tuna fishery: 2021 Overview and status of stocks was just released.  

Besides the importance of the information, I got the kick to see one of my pictures for the 2nd time on the cover, something I’m honoured for and forever thankful to the SPC team and Steven Hare in particular.

The publication is a cornucopia of information and an honest appraisal of what is going well (the status of the main 4 stocks - page 52) and what is not (the status of some sharks and billfishes - page 58).

So, I recommend you read it and dive deep into the many excellent graphs.

And while there is a lot to celebrate, I’ll lo bring back something that I already noticed in last year's edition and bring it up again now, and it is related to the longline fleet.

As I stated before, I really like the technicalities and challenges of LL fishing, is perhaps the most skilful and “scientific” of fishing gear I fished with. You need to understand and play with depth, currents, thermocline, primary productivity/temperature, target species chemoreceptors, length and spacing of branchlines, catch manipulation and quality, freezing physics and many more elements… 

And while I have no issues with the domestic and EEZ-based operations, yet the High Seas fleet is a total mess.

As I pointed out last time, the fishery has been declining in volumes and number of vessels over the years, but a more direct measure of effort (hooks fished) has shown a different trend. Total hooks fished in the WCPFC-CA increased from a level of 400 million in the mid 1970s to 600 million in the early 2000s to 800 million in the early 2010s. The peak year in hooks fished was 2012 at 888 million hooks; the level in 2021 was 612 million hooks, a decline of 12% from the 2020 level, and nearly 16% below the average of the previous five years.

What is driving this (in my opinion), relates to a few things but I have, I have touched on two aspects many times in the past, HS transhipments + the abuse of the impracticability exemption and crewing labour issues.

And for me, this graph below (page 42) is indirect proof of the linkages of both.

You see fishing effort, in fleet sizes and number of hooks fished (bottom), for the longline fishery in the WCPFC

In the 1993/4 when I was fishing these waters, it was the heyday of LL in the WCPO, peaking into 5000 vessels. Today as you can see, there is only 1/3 of that fleet left (1600), yet they are soaking almost twice the number of hooks. How can that be possible? Deck and gear setting technology are almost the same.

Since then, transhipment at sea has exploded (as I reported many times*), which allows the vessels to stay fishing longer and, sadly, massivelly increasing the crew's workload.

This strengthens my focus on the two inter-seasonal working groups I’m involved in at the WCPFC, transhipment reform and labour conditions.

* Reported high seas transshipment events in the WCPO have more than doubled from 2011 to 2019. In 2021, 62% of vessels listed on the Record of Fishing Vessels were authorized to transship in the high seas, 85% of which are longliners

The Harvest Strategies blame game

Lots are being discussed and lobbied on the Harvest Strategies issues at the WCPFC. The Harvest Strategy approach remains one of the top priorities of WCPFC, and WCPFC 19 next week will have many discussions addressing different aspects of the Harvest Strategy of various stocks under the purview of the Commission.  They also will also review the indicative work Plan, which has gone through multiple revisions over the last few years.

a stakeholder view

All the CCMs have had a series of meetings this year, including SC18 and  Science-Management Dialogue on management procedures for skipjack tuna and South Pacific albacore. WCPFC 19 will have discussions based on the information from previous meetings with the view to adopting a management procedure for skipjack tuna. The progression of the South Pacific albacore harvest strategy has been slower than the skipjack one for many reasons that may not be popular among NGOs but are very valid.

So there are some NGOs campaigning to get it done, which is fair enough… yet while I support the position of NGOs as “opinion-holders’, I don't think they are more important than those of “stakeholders”… so when fingers are being pointed at FFA for moving cautiously on this (for the own valid reasons), I get irked and call neo-colonialism.

We see the reality every day from our offices in MIMRA; we literally see the fleet and their catches… so when their view is challenged by people on desks in big western capitals associated with interests around private certifications… I, as the “absolutely no one” I am (just a bloke that works with fisheries administrations and regional organisations)… I get pissed off.

Interestingly a very short quote from something is was asked a few months ago made it to an observer paper at the WCPFC meeting by the Ocean Foundation.

It said: “The WCPFC membership is taking the necessary steps to develop and adopt harvest strategies for the key WCPO stocks, recognising the role they have to play in effective Pacific fisheries management and ensuring sustainable development utilisation over the longer term.” And I stand to it…

Yet I quote below my full statements to them for context. And I wish the text in bold italics would have made it to that publication.

This is my testimonial concerning harvest strategies and their role in the effective fisheries management of Western Central Pacific Ocean tuna stocks.

I am a fisheries consultant with over 40+ years of career experience in fisheries in general and 30+ years of direct experience in Pacific fisheries. This experience spans from operating as a fisherman to being a specialist adviser to governmental and multilateral organizations and a country representative attending international fisheries forums, including at FFA, PNA and Western Central Pacific Commission meetings on an annual basis since 2017.

Harvest strategies are an effective management tool in domestic fisheries globally and have relatively recently been successfully implemented in several international fisheries. Although difficult and more complex (in a sense) to apply harvest strategies in international settings, they have a significant role in enabling efficient decision-making and more responsive fisheries management in an increasingly complex marine environment and global stage.

Harvest strategies are beneficial in that they define set biomass targets and thresholds that, when triggered, activate pre-approved management outcomes or actions. This helps traverse and speed up negotiations to achieve timely management decisions, which is better for the fish.

The Western Central Pacific Fisheries Commission has a role in adopting harvest strategies to effectively manage key species in the Pacific, such as yellowfin and bigeye tuna. The Commission has previously recognised the need for harvest strategies reflected in its Conservation Management Measure to develop and implement a harvest strategy approach for key fisheries and stocks in the WCPO (CMM 2014-06).

However, it is essential to recognise that the application of harvest strategies in the international arena is complex on many fronts. It takes time to get right as sometimes in the process of finding consensus, geopolitical interests can influence a science-driven decision process. Furthermore, it has to include the special requirements of developing countries, particularly the potential imposition of a disproportionate burden on SIDS. Nevertheless, I believe that, despite the difficulties, the WCPFC membership is taking the necessary steps to develop and adopt harvest strategies for the key WCPO stocks, recognising the role they have to play in effective Pacific fisheries management and ensuring sustainable development utilisation over the longer term.

I look forward to this year’s WCPFC meeting and further progress being made on this crucial front.

—-

now at a personal level…  

 the MSC pressure on getting the tropical tuna measure (TTM) and the Harvest strategy (HaSt) agreement in place at the WCPFC meeting, same as some NGOs are running a scaremongering campaign as you can see in the images below. I call a fully vested interest in that…

The tropical tuna measure (TTM) and the Harvest strategy (HaSt) agreement is perhaps the most complex issue faced at the WCPFC... is highly technical with a lot of moving parts of which harvest strategies are one... I just want to give a word of caution if you decide to tackle it, as is very easy to fall into holes and potentially antagonise parties. Is important to keep in mind that the WCPFC Harvest Strategy Workplan is delayed not because of a lack of dialogue and understanding of its importance of it, but mostly because the debate on harvest strategy elements has become a geopolitical tool used by some DWFN to influence future allocations and (of course!) entrench privilege.

As per the MSC angle, they have been publicising a lot… well... if there is no HaSt agreement, MSC will no doubt be the most affected in all of this... the reality is that they have more at stake and to lose than SIDS... if they were to suspend the certification of the key fishery that brings most of the volume under their logo they would lose a LOT of money...

Would they shoot their own foot based on a process that is delayed due to politics? Doubt it! They need the fishery more than the fishery needs them. A few years ago they were in a similar spot in terms of compartmentalisation around FADs... so they gave themselves time (3 years to suspend it) instead of suspending the fisheries because they are not sustainable!... and now looks like there is no need to suspend it because it looks like tuna fishing with FADs can be MSC certified. 

The Tuna market depends on the WCPO catches... Do you think that if the tuna fisheries of the region were to lose MSC certification, all the canneries would go: Ahhh no... we not gonna can tuna anymore because is not MSC certified? of course not! They will keep going because people will keep eating tuna.

MSC is in a tight spot… under their new standards and the adjudication system changes are that if the HsSt and reference points are not agreed, they will need to (just because it is on paper, and not because the stocks ate at risk) take the certification out… if they do so… as say they lose their cash cow, and if they don’t they will be crucified by the NGO that oppose fisheries.

A lot is at stake, the setting of HaSt will be good for MSC, but that's not the primary purpose of the HsSt... the reason why MSC can certify the tuna fishery because it is managed sustainably by the SIDS and not the opposite… people should NEVER forget that.

Furthermore, while adopting a skipjack management procedure would look good on paper, the reality is that there are gaps and weaknesses in the current management framework, especially for the management of fishing on the high seas, which is less controlled and far less effectively monitored than fishing in national waters. It is going to be difficult to fully apply longer-term management arrangements until the weakness in high seas management is addressed

The stocks are healthy (as you can see here)... because FFA/PNA continues to manage and sustain their fishery against the raft of obligations they have signed onto at the pace that ensures their capacity is catered for and fits their purpose in short to medium term with the long term outlook for a regionally sustained fishery.

Tuna will not collapse next year if the WCPFC doesn’t agree this year to a heavily politicked issue needing more consensus.

Pointing fingers to FFA, PNA & SPC that have been working on this for a long time, ain’t fair.

I personally think the “scaremongering” driven by the MSC and some of their lobby groups are way more about their fear of losing money and their relevance in a world that is starting to see beyond their business model rather than the long-term SKJ sustainability and is actually quite colonial.

Towards responsible transparency: understanding why fishers are cautious about sharing data

I always try to make the best of every situation… if you cannot change the circumstances, maximise the use and rescue whatever you can from what is happening. That was my attitude while at home during the covid pandemic, so I participated in all training, workshops and seminars I was able to.  

Examples of data types aligned with the five points on the Data Spectrum

One of the most interesting ones, not just because of the topic, but also because of the calibre of the people involved, was a workshop on fisheries data confidentiality, with a few sessions from 30 June to 15 July 2022, organised by the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS) and Global Fishing Watch.

It was an interesting exercise as it included academics, industry and a couple of consultants. The outcomes became a report that a few participants compiled under Kamal Azmi's lead. The report was presented as a paper to the forthcoming meeting of the WCPFC, and I quote here some of the key parts, yet as usual, I recommend you read the original from here.

Summary for Policy Makers

Transparency is generally seen as good for governance by strengthening government accountability, reducing incentives for corruption, improving the quality of decision making and strengthening trust in governance processes. In extractive sectors, such as fisheries, transparency can help to ensure compliance, build a social licence to operate and build consumer trust for market advantage. Conversely, confidentiality of data and information can erode social trust in institutions.

Greater availability of fisheries data can serve multiple scientific, management and compliance objectives. Data are arguably more powerful when combined with other data by multiple users. Fishery managers and a wide range of stakeholders can improve their understanding of the fisheries and fishery resources, the level of compliance with conservation and management measures and the effectiveness of management regimes. Fishers are, in turn, more likely to trust that compliance is effectively enforced. Third parties, such as researchers, can add to the scientific rigour applied to the fishery and support more effective management. And consumers also increasingly want to know that the seafood they eat has been sustainably and ethically caught and processed.

“Data sharing” does not necessarily mean data are publicly available. Fishers are typically required to provide data to national fisheries authorities and, in regional fisheries, to regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs). International fisheries law creates duty to share or exchange fisheries data with other relevant States and RFMOs. But data-sharing requirements usually do not mean that data must be shared publicly as open data.

Declaring data as confidential does not explain why. Data are often treated confidentially with good reason. For example, domestic laws typically protect fisheries data under fisheries management and privacy legislation. But in some cases data are regarded as confidential simply because they have been declared to be so. This circular argument conflates “confidentiality” – the extent to which data are protected – with “sensitivity”, which refers to the extent to which harm may be caused if data were to be released more widely.

A recent workshop asked representatives of fishing vessel operators and owners, fish buyers and other stakeholders what makes fisheries data sensitive. The workshop was premised on an assumption that some data may reveal vessel-specific competitive advantages, such as skills and knowledge, proprietary corporate information or intelligence and personal information. The workshop sought to investigate this assumption more deeply. There are many types of data generated and collected in fisheries. In this workshop we focused on a small subset of data related to fishing activity in surface and midwater pelagic fisheries:

• Vessel identity and ownership

• Vessel location and movement

• Vessel authorisations and licences

• Transhipments

• Catch and effort data

Some dimensions of data could, in some cases, be altered to reduce sensitivity. These dimensions could include spatial or temporal aggregation, specific redactions and alteration of context-specific differences (e.g. gear type or management regime), and could be adjusted individually or in combination.

Vessel identity, corporate ownership, authorisations and catch and effort data are generally not seen as sensitive in isolation. However, sensitivities would arise when ownership was linked to individuals due to privacy and personal security concerns. Vessel authorisations are also not regarded as sensitive. They are readily available on the websites of RFMOs and are trusted sources of updated information about the fishing vessel’s ownership and history. Catch and effort data when combined with vessel identity are highly sensitive as they provide insights into a vessel or fleet’s operations.

Vessel location and movement data are particularly sensitive but can vary with the type of gear or the type of fishery. Sensitivity was largely due to the risk of competitor vessels taking advantage of the skills and experience of other fishers. Sensitivity of fishing location data diminishes over time but opinions vary as to the length of time after which data could be made public. These differences could be explained by the context, including gear types and fishing strategies employed, the type of management regime orfor different target species. For example, pelagic longlining activity data was regarded as less sensitive after a single trip while the sensitivity of purse seine activity diminishes after 60 to 90 days, depending on the operations of the vessel. Spatially aggregated data ranging from 1x1 degree to 5x5 degrees is also considered to be less sensitive while still useful for most research purposes. Location data are much less sensitive in fisheries governed by individual output (i.e. catch quota) controls or where there was a high level of cooperation among fishers.

Transhipment data are both sensitive and a source of frustration for operators. Business intelligence could be gathered about a vessel’s or fleet’s operations by piecing together transhipment data with effort and trip length data. However, a lack of transparency and inconsistent transhipment reporting across fleets means that non-compliant activities were likely going undetected.

Fisheries data were also reported to be sensitive due to operational and business intelligence concerns. Location data is particularly valuable to competing fleets while combinations of catch, effort, transhipment and trip length data and other publicly available information, such as market prices, could provide intelligence about the operations and profitability of a fishing enterprise. That said, some operators are sceptical about the reliability of the assumptions on which such intelligence gathering is based.

Good operators who are more transparent fear they will be more vulnerable to unjustified accusations of bad behaviour. Publicly available data could be misinterpreted, damaging the reputations of good actors and in some cases, leading to security concerns for individuals and assets. Paradoxically, bad operators would carry on unhindered as little information was known about them.

Fishers support full transparency in the long-term but this is tempered by current inconsistencies in the level of transparency and compliance among different operators and fleets. The pathway toward greater transparency needs to ensure that all participants in a fishery are subject to the same reporting and data sharing requirements and that these are enforced fully and consistently. This would mean that a more transparent operator is not placed at a competitive disadvantage compared to a less transparent operator. An important first step would be to ensure that all operators meet current reporting and data sharing requirements to the same standard.

Vessel operators are more likely to respond to calls for greater transparency if the rationale is clear. Further research is required to more fully understand what data are not available to third parties and why they should be available. Identifying ways to handle data without particular fields, such as vessel identity, may also warrant further investigation. And further work could be conducted into whether releasing vessel monitoring system (VMS) data more widely after 60 to 90 days would be acceptable to vessel operators, and under what circumstances.

Conclusion

Increasing calls for transparency make intuitive sense in the quest for more effectively and sustainably managed fisheries. Citizens seek greater accountability in the way public resources are exploited by private interests. But data and information about an individual vessel’s or fishing enterprise’s operations hold considerable commercial value to the enterprise and its public release would represent a loss of value. It may also increase risks or add new risks that were previously low or non-existent. Steps toward transparency must therefore consider commercial and other sensitivities that underlie the confidential treatment of fisheries data, such as vessel identity and ownership, authorisations, vessel location and movement, transhipment and catch and effort data.

This workshop aimed to identify some of the key sources of sensitivity. We identified some clear grounds for sensitivity, particularly in relation to personal privacy and security, and data that reveal skill, knowledge and experience that in turn provide certain operators with a competitive advantage. Sensitivity may vary in fisheries with catch-based controls or a high degree of cooperative behaviour but the exact boundaries require further investigation. The passage of time or spatial aggregation can help to reduce sensitivity but it is less clear exactly what values and under what circumstances this would occur.

Recent developments in the public accessibility of AIS data have meant that the recent and historical location of large fishing vessels is becoming increasingly difficult to hide. Overall, fishers support greater transparency but the pathway to that longer-term objective must not place more transparent operators at a competitive disadvantage. This likely means that the transparency playing field should be levelled by bringing all actors into line with current transparency and reporting requirements before progressing further toward full transparency. Operators also expect third parties who call for greater transparency to make the case for who needs to know, why they need to know and how sensitivities will be managed.