The significance of the Soviet presence in 1985 was too great for the US to overlook and for the Pacific to forget. This ‘Pacific Tuna Leverage’ enabled them to negotiate effectively with larger powers. However, with the collapse of the USSR, this leverage diminished. Nevertheless, post-Cold War geopolitics presented new opportunities.
The West has long viewed the South Pacific as either “an American lake” or a traditional sphere of influence for Australia and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand. However, this perspective neglects China's long-established presence in the region, which goes through different stages due to China’s own political issues that can be traced back many centuries.
For an in-depth analysis of the history of this presence and where China was already going, I recommend reading the late USP Professor Ron Crocombe’s 2007 masterful “Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West”
At that time, he asserted that a ‘spectacular transition’ was underway in the Pacific Islands: from ‘overwhelmingly’ Western sources of external influence, ‘whether cultural, economic, political or otherwise’, to Asian sources. While acknowledging some concerns regarding mutual misunderstanding and the discrepancies in size between Asian giants and their Pacific Island neighbours, Crocombe was less apprehensive about the growing Asian presence than many academic and government commentators from Australia, New Zealand, and the USA. Instead, he viewed this development as potentially beneficial to Pacific Islanders, as they remain adaptable and responsive to new circumstances, players, and opportunities.
However, what I have seen since 1991 is that the Chinese presence has followed a pattern, evolving from the initial presence and influence of Chinese nationals to the increasing presence and impact of the Chinese government.
The presence of Chinese nationals in the Pacific Islands can be traced back to the late 1800s and occurs in various stages[1]: Huashang, or traders seeking commercial opportunities, emerged later in the 19th century, followed by huagong, or overseas labourers, who primarily worked for non-Chinese companies. Then, in the early 20th century, the huaqiao, or sojourners, established communities that often-included huashang and huagong, maintaining ongoing connections to China. The fourth and final category, huayi, emerged after 1980, consisting of Chinese individuals who move freely within the global economy to capitalise on new opportunities and have, to some extent, transformed into a non-diplomatic corps representing the Chinese presence.
The Huayi became prominent in the Pacific Islands in the 1990s. Many members of long-standing Chinese communities in the Islands express concern about the Huayi's lack of sensitivity to local customs and view them as disruptive competitors rather than potential business and marriage partners. The Huayiare are distinguished from previous migrants by their weaker ties to China and their high degree of mobility in the global economy that has developed over the last four decades.
While the businesses of more established Chinese nationals were perceived as advantageous to locals, those of huayi frequently involved get-rich-quick schemes, such as logging, sea cucumber harvesting, coastal fisheries, shops, and supermarkets. These ventures were regarded as exploitative to locals; nonetheless, it was also in their business interests to garner support and favour from local politicians. Significant reactions can be seen in some of these contexts, such as the riots in Honiara in 2006 and 2021 and in Nuku’alofa in 2006.
In this process, it is essential to acknowledge the "cold war" between Taiwan and China, which provided the backdrop for Taiwan’s efforts to secure exclusive recognition from Pacific Island nations. However, as China has become increasingly integral to the global economy, the number of states recognising Taiwan has dwindled following a few decades of “dollar diplomacy". This involved buying recognition through aid and infrastructure less patronisingly than Western and other Asian donors, mainly by not interfering in internal affairs and refusing to comment on domestic policy in the Pacific Islands.
Somewhat paradoxically, Taiwanese and Chinese non-interference and straightforward business approaches support the free-market principles that underpin much of Western donors' aid conditionality. These donors aim to reduce government spending and replace it with private-sector providers.
Nonetheless, Chinese infrastructure projects, for instance, have faced criticism for their inadequate construction standards, an overreliance on Chinese crews instead of employing local workers, poor working conditions for local staff, and a tendency to collaborate with national governments.
With significantly greater resources, China’s diplomatic influence is expanding and concentrating on strategically important countries and sectors. It consistently supports regional political leaders with proposals that align with local political priorities, providing them access to development finance, diplomatic engagement, and crucial infrastructure such as ports, airports, and telecommunications.
In relation to “Tuna Diplomacy,” Taiwan has been the “little giant” that has excelled in the tuna industry until very recently. Taiwan began to develop its fishing industry in the 1950s, and by the 1960s, it turned to distant-water fishing to address overfished coastal waters. This transition transformed Taiwan into a global player in high-seas fisheries, particularly with tuna, and even more so in the Pacific.
Despite having one of the largest fishing industries in the world, Taiwan cannot fully engage in international fisheries management and conservation efforts due to its ambiguous political status and limited “international space.” However, it has utilised its “tuna diplomacy” as political leverage to enhance its participation in bilateral, regional, and international fisheries-related agreements.
Taiwan's official diplomatic relations have been limited for decades, and the "One China" policy hampers its participation in international institutions. China replaced Taiwan in the UN in 1971, and its growing global influence has further restricted Taiwan's ability to engage with the UN and its specialised agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Maritime Organization, and the International Labour Organization—all of which address fisheries issues.
Yet, the UNFSA (United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement) crystallised the concept of “fishing entities” for the first time in a binding UN instrument. Although the agreement's text never explicitly mentions Taiwan, “fishing entities” generally include it. While the international community does not recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state for the purposes of membership in international governmental organisations that require statehood, its designation as a “fishing entity” in the UN allows Taiwan to navigate challenges related to its political status while participating in RFMOs.
Taiwan’s first full RFMO membership in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) in 2002 marked a significant milestone for the island, given its historically limited involvement in RFMOs. However, Taiwan is designated as “Chinese Taipei,” and the WCPFC Convention conferred upon Taiwan rights and responsibilities similar to those of states holding Contracting Party status, yet as a non-contracting party but a member, Taiwan has a limited range of rights. For example, it is ineligible to serve as chair or vice-chair, determine the Commission’s headquarters, or appoint the executive director. Otherwise, it participates fully in the WCPFC’s workings.
China is a relatively new player in the tuna industry, having begun in 1988 with only a handful of longliners. However, it took them a couple of decades to venture into the significantly more lucrative “industrial” purse seine fishery. This fishery was not part of their traditional expertise, so they needed to develop their knowledge over time, and China excels at this. They play the long game.
The role of tuna fisheries has gradually expanded, often starting as an extension of a fishery in which Chinese nationals have long been involved: the sea cucumber fishery.
Many Chinese nationals residing in the Pacific have maintained connections with fisheries departments for decades. The shift towards “domestic” longlining saw licenses being acquired and subsidised Chinese vessels chartered or flagged under national status, leading to the establishment of numerous “national” fishing companies, albeit with Chinese ownership and funding.
I think the Chinese diplomatic strategy (obviously not “official”) of bankrolling existing domestic fisheries investment, even if in many cases not lucrative… was clever and paid in the long term, as it been seen as locally involved and creating work opportunities, even if when one visits those companies all management is Chinese, and all operators are locals.
These worked better than Taiwanese companies “investing” in their allied countries, usually by flagging a few vessels and paying licenses to fish in domestic waters, sometimes without a locally based representative.
The Chinese strategy of “domestic” investment was then replicated in countries still allied to Taiwan, acting as “trojan horses” to an extent.
For instance, in Kiribati in 2012 (when it was still an ally of Taiwan), a Chinese national established and operated a successful fishing company in Fiji, initially focused on sea cucumbers, then reef fish and longline tuna, subsequently acquiring Fijian citizenship and establishing a joint venture tuna processing plant in Tarawa (Kiribati Fish Limited) as a Fijian citizen. This private company, which was initially located in the former Chinese embassy in Kiribati, became vacant after Kiribati switched its allegiance from China (since 1980) to Taiwan in 2003 KFL made a significant investment in Tarawa, surpassing what any ordinary fishing company could achieve. They constructed a complete wharf extension to set up a state-of-the-art processing factory equipped with waste desalinators—an investment likely costing between 20 to 30 million dollars, beyond the budgets of most fishing companies. Naturally, the company initially operated Chinese-owned yet Fijian-flagged vessels, taking advantage of Pacific Island policies, and later began chartering Chinese-flagged longline vessels to operate under domestic licenses and, in most cases, exit the zone and tranship at sea using the loophole related to the “impracticability exemption” to the prohibition to tranship at sea in the WCPFC, finally, the company also got domestic licenses for Purse Seine fisheries and of course chartered a whole new fleet of Chinese made, flagged and operated. So, basically, for a country that did not have relations with China, most of the resident commercial fisheries activity and investment was Chinese, and no doubt a lot of slow but constant pressure was applied behind the scenes.
I do not doubt that not all the investments were privately backed, and KFL must have “lost” astonishing amounts of money over the past decade.
However, by the time Kiribati reverted to China in 2019, the tuna aspect of the diplomatic relationship was operating at full capacity. This happened so quickly that a new joint venture was established on Kiritimati Island, situated on the other side of a nation on an island of immense strategic importance.
Kiribati excels at navigating geopolitics. British colonialism was quite brutal to them, depleting Banaba Island of phosphate and using Kiritimati for nuclear testing. Fisheries account for 80% of their earnings, and they are experts in this field. I have thoroughly enjoyed working there and greatly respect the fisheries leaders; I am incredibly proud to have earned their trust.
If the individuals engaged in the same geopolitics were Westerners, they would be celebrated as diplomatic legends; yet if they are islanders, they are regarded as either corrupt or too “innocent,” or both... This is entirely unjust.
In fact, they are treated with the same paternalistic attitude now as they were during the USSR era. New Zealand’s Prime Minister David Lange was particularly vocal in 1985, arguing that small island states like Kiribati “lacked the capacity” to defend themselves against larger powers like the Soviet Union—the same argument that, 40 years later, is now being used about China.
Yet, is the situation the same today? Not really… The Pacific Islands are institutionally much stronger than they were 40 years ago. They have played the game for over four decades, mostly in unison. However, China is now part of the landscape as well. Interestingly, back in 1985, when the USA, NZ, and Australia were upset, China offered Kiribati aid worth US$350,000 (1985 values) and interest-free loans for developmental purposes.
Since then, China has maintained missions across the Pacific Islands region. It has successfully established its influence in the area with virtually no objections from Western alliance countries until less than a decade ago, largely because China was not regarded as a threat like the Soviet Union once was.
Furthermore, this includes a commitment to developing billions of dollars worth of infrastructure (such as ports, airports, and electricity). Again, there will be no meddling in local politics, transparency, etc., just lots of money invested in activities that benefit (some) locals and their goal of establishing China’s long-term interests in the country.
Now, returning to the present, does China possess the “power” to serve as the leverage point that the USSR had over the USA during the Cold War? More importantly, can the PICs perceive China as a counterbalance to Western geopolitics and, critically, vice versa? Yes and no… China is undeniably a significant player in the geopolitical landscape, and the USA’s isolationism (particularly under the current government) plays into China’s strategy.
Regarding tuna fisheries in the WCPO, particularly in compliance and IUU fishing, China is neither worse nor better than others, particularly considering its current fleet size.
Nevertheless, the dominant narrative in the USA portrays China as the source of all malevolence. This does not accurately represent the reality we observe concerning significant non-compliance per vessel in our Vessel Compliance Index at FFA.
Once again, this does not imply that China is an innocent player. On the contrary, it vigorously pursues its interests, just as the USA has and continues to do. Therefore, the opportunities for PICs to navigate the delicate balance between the two will become increasingly intricate, as allying with just one means losing leverage with the other.
Unfortunately, as I wrote here, when the USSR disappeared, the movement of non-aligned countries somehow lost its independent voice… and became an echo chamber for authoritarians.
The Non-Aligned group (which still exists and is headquartered in Indonesia, albeit having been dormant since 2019) was the original “third world” concept.
While the concept now means poverty, the name wasn't an insult but a sign of hope for the countries that first came together to form the Third World. The US led the capitalist West, and the USSR led the communist East. The Third World, on the other hand, was neither the First World nor the Second World. It was made up of newly independent states that believed in a world that was neither capitalist nor communist.
The Third World was thus not a place but a project.
While the situation today is different, and it seems that being a “communist” equates to having a social conscience, I believe a revamped “non-alignment” movement is primarily based on the choice not to be in between two forms of autocracies.
This is where “tuna diplomacy” demonstrates that the potential for a refreshed “non-alignment” is real and achievable, mainly if it receives support from developing countries in Latin America, East Asia, and even the EU, New Zealand, Japan and Korea.
It feels like the idealistic “market forces” that have driven development and alliances since the Cold War are currently "off the table". The alternatives seem to establish free trade agreements where China can either offload subsidised products or pay tariffs to export to the USA (which largely lacks free trade agreements)
So, instead of focusing on the failings of individual countries, the Third World project can again aim to reform the global system and ensure that the flow of global wealth is not unidirectional and tied to ideologies fostered by a handful of countries out of almost 200.
[1] Paul D'Arcy (2014) The Chinese Pacifics: A Brief Historical Review, The Journal of Pacific History, 49:4, 396-420, DOI: 10.1080/00223344.2014.986078
