Do large oceanic MPAs work for tropical tunas? Yeah.... nahh

There was a lot discussions a few months ago in terms of the closure of the Phoenix Islands Protected Area (PIPA) in Kiribati… with far-flung accusations being made against the iKiribati people and China bashing since Kiribati recently re-established diplomatic with them… and (of course!) they must have something to do with it.

The WCPO showing the EEZ of coastal States (light blue), PIPA (yellow) and the three large oceanic MPAs evaluated in the study.

I feel that there is a lot of “amateurism” around MPAs as “magic bullets”. As with most things in fisheries, their utility varies depending on many things… i.e. their utility will be vastly different from a coral reef with demersal species to an open chunk of ocean with pelagic ones.  Furthermore, I’m a strong believer that to fix a problem; you need a toolbox, not just a hammer… (when you only have a hammer, all problems look like nails?)

Furthermore, I had a long-standing beef with MPAs and other conservation measures mostly promoted (and sometimes imposed) by developed countries on people from developing states as blanket statements (30 by 30), where in most cases, locals are only involved in a tokenistic way.

So, I was really interested to see this paper appearing on my radar: “Limited conservation efficacy of large-scale marine protected areas for Pacific skipjack and bigeye tunas” Particularly because I know and immensely respect 3 of the authors, John Hampton and Simon Nicol, both are top scientists at SPC and know the pacific very well (I know about joe, Patrick and Inna but never met them) But crucially I’m verty pleased to see my friend and colleague Kaon Tiamere that is the Acting Director of the Licensing and Compliance Division at the Kiribati MFMRD.

They did not only dig deep into PIPA data but also analysed the likely tuna conservation efficacy of several much larger hypothetical MPAs, each constituting around 33% of the WCPO ocean area. While these larger areas may have a slightly greater impact on tuna stock conservation than the PIPA, and may also be targeted at a much broader range of conservation outcomes, the study concluded that they were unlikely to be effective frontline fisheries management tools for tropical tuna

This paper is crucial reading (in my humble opinion) for those pushing for massive MAPs for pelagic regions, so please read the original

Before I dive into the paper, I like to quote the words of my 3 friends on the SPC release on this paper. Crucial are Kaon’s words as a good antidote to the “white saviourism” of many in the rich environmental NGO world... “Kiribati MFMRD has been concerned that, over the past eight years, the PIPA closure has been negatively impacting Kiribati foreign tuna vessel licence fee revenue which is a critical source of income for Kiribati. These losses are difficult to justify if, as these new analyses suggest, there is little tuna conservation benefit resulting from the PIPA. The Government has decided to re-open the PIPA to tuna fishing from January 2023, and that decision is supported by the results of this work.”

Simon Nicol, Principal Fisheries Scientist (Fisheries & Ecosystem Monitoring & Analysis): “large MPAs like these may provide benefits where fisheries exploit fairly sedentary species and impact habitats but provide only modest contributions to conserving stock-wide abundance of tuna. Additionally, they can disrupt benefits to Pacific Island countries with processing and service industries, whose competitive advantage relies on their proximity to fishing grounds for the vessels that supply their canneries or use their transhipment and service facilities”.

John Hampton, Chief Scientist at SPC’s Fisheries, Aquaculture and Marine Ecosystems Division: “Tropical tunas such as skipjack and bigeye tuna have a wide distribution in tropical and sub-tropical waters of the Pacific, and are capable of spawning anywhere where the water temperature is greater than about 25°C. Their larvae drift in the surface water currents, and as they grow they are able to move widely through the region. So closing off one part of the area tends not to offer much if any protection to species like this.” In addition, “What we tend to see when areas like the PIPA are closed is that the vessels that would have fished there simply move their activities to adjacent areas, which again limits their conservation effectiveness, at least for tuna.” 

“Many countries in the Pacific region have implemented MPAs motivated in part by perceptions of how they would positively impact tuna stocks. This study shows that some of these perceptions were probably overly optimistic. We encourage evaluations like this one, based on the best scientific information on the biology of the stocks and fisheries concerned, be undertaken prior to MPAs being implemented.”

As said before, read the original for free! I just quote below the abstract and the last part of the discussion.

Abstract
Large-scale, no-take marine protected areas (MPAs) have been established in several locations in the Pacific and expansion of such areas to reach 30% of the ocean area is actively promoted in some quarters. Justification for the establishment of large oceanic MPAs often includes the conservation benefits that they would bring for tuna stocks, which are the subject of important commercial fisheries in the Pacific. The aim of this paper was to evaluate the conservation efficacy of an existing MPA, the Phoenix Islands Protected Area (PIPA) and a series of large hypothetical MPAs each constituting approximately 33% of the western and central Pacific Ocean, for two important and contrasting tuna species, skipjack and bigeye tuna. The evaluation was conducted by comparing control and counterfactual simulations in which the estimated population and fishery dynamics of the species were modelled using a high-resolution modelling framework known as SEAPODYM (Spatial Ecosystem And Population DYnamics Model). We found that stock-wide conservation benefits of the PIPA for these species, assuming that total fishing effort is maintained, to be weak to non-existent, and only modest increases in spawning biomass of both species occur within and in the near vicinity of the PIPA itself. For the larger 33% hypothetical MPAs, changes in stock-wide spawning biomass were estimated to be -0.1% to +5.8% for skipjack tuna and +4.8% to +12.0% for bigeye tuna. Conservation efficacy of MPAs for species such as tropical tunas is limited by their wide larval dispersal and high mobility of later life stages, which spatially dissipate the protective effects of MPAs. Also, the displacement of fishing effort from MPAs to areas remaining open can have negative consequences for stocks and fisheries performance in those areas. We conclude that large oceanic MPAs are not likely to be effective frontline management tools for tropical tunas and other species having similar life history characteristics.

 Discussion (last part)
The period covered by the study (1998-2019) encompasses the full range of typically observed environmental variability in the Pacific, including several strong El Niño and La Niña events, thus capturing any interactions between spatial management effectiveness and environmental variability.

 Our findings have contrasted two species of tropical tuna with differing population dynamics and degrees of fishing induced biomass depletion, and should also be informative regarding the likely effects of MPAs on other widely distributed, mobile pelagic species such as yellowing tuna, whose population and exploitation characteristics lie somewhere between skipjack and bigeye tuna. However, our examples do not include species whose biomass has been depleted to levels below biological sustainability limits or stocks that systematically migrate to discrete spawning grounds. How MPAs might contribute to the conservation of pelagic stocks with these characteristics remains untested. No tropical tuna stocks in the WCPO have been depleted to levels below their biological sustainability levels (Hare et al., 2021). Similarly, while stock structure for tropical tuna stocks in the Pacific remains uncertain (Moore et al., 2020), the most recent information from genetic studies has not detected strong evidence of fidelity to discrete spawning grounds (Grewe et al., 2015; Anderson et al., 2020; Natasha et al., 2022).

We recognise that large oceanic MPAs such as the PIPA may have conservation value in areas not analysed in this paper, for example in the protection of coral reef ecosystems and their resident species that might otherwise be heavily fished. However, where the objectives of, and justification for, MPAs include enhancing the conservation of widely distributed pelagic species, this should be carefully evaluated during the planning stage, for example using methods such as those of Ovando et al. (2021) and that presented in this paper. This would allow expectations to be realistic and evaluated against the likely economic and social costs and benefits that would occur.

Ad Hoc Expert Panels: Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs)

I’ve been at times asked to be part of expert consultations (FAO a couple of times and PEW), and I never paid much attention to the differences between consultations and panels… particularly in the frame of RFMOs.

some of my favourite experts

And as I’m now quite keen on seeing things through the lenses of UNCLOS, so I was quite interested in reading this analysis by Valentin J Schatz, for two of the most credible and prestigious law institutions in Law Oxford Public International Law and Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law.

As usual, I recommend you read the original… I just quote the intro and Concluding Remarks below:

Introduction
1 Ad hoc expert panels are a means of the → peaceful settlement of international disputes in the framework of regional fisheries management organizations (‘RFMOs’) (→ Dispute; → Fisheries Disputes; → Fisheries, Commissions and Organizations). From the perspective of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995 (‘UNFSA’), RFMOs are international organizations established by two or more States through → fisheries agreements for the purpose, inter alia, of establishing conservation and management measures (‘CMMs’) in a subregion or region for one or more → straddling and highly migratory fish stocks (Harrison, 2019, 84; → Marine Living Resources, International Protection). As such → fish stocks are not confined to waters within national jurisdiction but are also present on the high seas (→ Fisheries, High Seas), their conservation and management requires cooperation. Against this background, ad hoc expert panels may be placed in the broader context of both dispute settlement in the law of the sea (→ Law of the Sea, Settlement of Disputes) and, more specifically, the settlement of international disputes to which international organizations are parties.

2 In simplified terms, there are two different categories of ad hoc expert panels, which should be distinguished, although this distinction may not always be clear. The first category represents a consensual procedure on the basis of international law for the settlement of disputes of a technical nature between two or more RFMO members by panellists of their own choosing. The second category—Review Panels—shares most of the general features of the first category but constitutes a special procedure between RFMO members and the RFMO itself to review a decision of the RFMO and/or recommend alternative or interim measures (→ International Organizations or Institutions, Legal Remedies against Acts of Organs).

3 Ad hoc expert panels differ from the traditional means of dispute settlement non- exhaustively listed by Article 33 Charter of the United Nations, 1945 (‘UN Charter’) and Article 279 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (‘UNCLOS’), which include → negotiation, inquiry (→ Fact-Finding), → mediation, → conciliation, → arbitration, and → judicial settlement of international disputes. Accordingly, they fall within the scope of the catch-all term ‘other peaceful means’ under Article 33 UN Charter. A comparison with other means of dispute settlement illuminates the nature of ad hoc expert panels, although any categorization in abstract terms is rendered difficult by the fact that they take a variety of different shapes. Generally, ad hoc expert panels share many elements of other forms of → alternative dispute resolution, most importantly conciliation and arbitration (Harrison, 2019, 92). Against this background, they may be categorized as ‘hybrid’ or ‘mixed’ procedures whose features may be placed on a spectrum between what could be called ‘quasi-arbitration’ (eg compulsory Review Panels rendering binding recommendations) and ‘quasi-conciliation’ (eg voluntary ad hoc expert panels rendering non-binding recommendations). The → Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) refers to ad-hoc expert panel proceedings as ‘other interstate proceedings’ rather than ‘interstate arbitrations’ or ‘interstate conciliations’ (see PCA Cases webpage). To the extent that a type of ad hoc expert panel does not render binding decisions, it may also be qualified as a → quasi-judicial body (cf Romano, 2011, 255).

Concluding Remarks
34 Compulsory ad hoc expert panel procedures can make an important contribution to the prevention and settlement of disputes of a technical nature in the framework of RFMOs. In particular, the incorporation of Review Panel procedures in the decision-making procedures of RFMOs can be a suitable alternative to the unfettered rights of members to opt-out of CMMs, which undermine the effectiveness of conservation and management by RFMOs (Lodge and others, 2007, 75–76). Review Panels procedures can also increase accountability of both RFMOs and their members with respect to conservation and management obligations laid down in the legal frameworks of RFMOs, including UNCLOS and the UNFSA. The findings and recommendations of the two SPRFMO Review Panels were accepted and complied with (eg SPRFMO Annual Report, 2013, 2). Generally, the existence of Review Panels coincides with younger generation RFMOs (eg SEAFO, SPRFMO, or WCPFC) and older generation RFMOs whose constitutive treaties have been amended after the adoption of the UNFSA (eg NAFO and, although the procedures are not currently in force, NEAFC). In 2006, the General Assembly of the United Nations (‘UNGA’) (→ United Nations, General Assembly) has urged States to undertake performance reviews of RFMOs, using the best practices of RFMOs (UNGA Res 61/105 (8 December 2006), para 73). Following this call, recent performance reviews have criticized the absence of both modern decision-making procedures and effective dispute settlement procedures in older generation RFMOs, such as the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (‘ICCAT’) (Report of the Independent Performance Review of ICCAT, 2016, 59–60) or the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (‘IOTC’) (Report of the 2nd IOTC Performance Review, 2016, paras 65–69, 176–78).

Blue Shark catch and trade report

Normally I would not blog on reports/studies published by NGOs. I generally keep myself to reports by inter-governmental organisations and some academic papers. As much as I respect some NGOs, my experience doing some research for them is that they need their results to fit their narratives. And generally plain facts don't have the doom factor that they need to keep their business model going…

I’m not making a moral judgement on that attitud, I just don't take part doing research for them.

So generally, I would not be blogging on a shark report commissioned by an NGO… yet in this case, I know personally (and trust the integrity) 3 of the authors. Furthermore… the results explain the behaviour and decisions of some of the members of the WCPFC witch is the only RFMOs I have insight access to.

As always… read the original… I just quote below some findings of the report I find very revealing.

Taiwan and Spain catch as much blue shark as all other flag States globally combined. The top five blue shark fishing nations (Taiwan and Spain, along with Japan, Indonesia and Portugal) account for close to 80% of global blue shark landings.

Most blue shark catch is from targeted longline fleets, and this is evident in all sea basins; it is misleading to consider blue shark as ‘just bycatch’ in tuna and swordfish longline fisheries. In the Atlantic Southwest 5 tonnes of blue shark are caught for every 1 tonne of tuna; the majority of longliners here are targeting sharks and tuna is the bycatch.

Large-scale commercial fleets harvest 90% of blue shark catches, the overwhelming majority of which are longliners. Distant Water Fishing nations catch 74% of the global blue shark catch.

A Global ex-vessel value of tuna species (2018), and minimum global ex-vessel value of blue shark (20182019) (source: Poseidon)

The ex-vessel value of blue shark meat and fins in 2019 is estimated to be $411 million. The total value of blue shark meat is five times more than the value of the fins at this stage in the supply chain.

Although finning and dumping of carcasses has likely diminished with the rising value of shark meat globally, incentives to engage in finning remain, particularly where shark meat remains undervalued, or in fisheries where non-shark target catch (e.g. tuna and swordfish) is a lot more valuable than shark; where high-grading at sea makes financial sense at given times, and where reefers continue to accept illegal consignments of fins at sea.

The last two decades has seen the global shark meat trade increase significantly, doubling in value since the early 2000s. At the same time, shark fin exports have been relatively stable.

The blue shark meat trade is more complex than the fin trade as there are more end-user markets. It involved 177 countries in the 2017-2019 period. In 2019, the volume exported equated to 67,326 t when converted to LWE, which is 35% of the global blue shark catch.

Except for China, which gained prominence as an exporter and importer of blue shark meat, the main exporting (Spain, Portugal, Taiwan, and Indonesia) and importing countries (Brazil, Italy, Greece & Singapore) have remained stable over this period. The key bilateral trades are shown in the figure below.

Top 10 bilateral flows of blue shark meat 2017-2019 (source: ARTiS data)

When trade connections are analysed further, we find that China acts as a ‘keystone,’ connecting imports and exports to many other trading nations. Thailand, Taiwan and Vietnam were also other key trading countries in Asia, while Morocco, the USA and New Zealand (I wonder if this accounts for the Spanish “swordfish” fleet that unloads here to send to Spain), were key in Africa, America and Oceania, respectively.

Brazil is the top consumer nation of shark meat and blue shark specifically, but most consumers don’t know they are eating shark meat. More than half of Brazilian consumers of “cação” (which commonly uses blue shark meat) say they have never eaten shark in their lives (Bornatowski et al. 2015). The role of Uruguay is key in this trade, acting as a regional hub; processing and trading landings by different international fleets into Brazil, which are classified as re-exports. This situation is underpinned by a weak regulatory framework that fails to identify products down to the species level throughout the supply chain.

The lack of specific labelling in many shark meat supply chains means that consumers often do not know they are buying shark meat.

Hong Kong remains the centre of the fin trade, but shark fin consumption in Hong Kong is declining and other Asian markets (Taiwan, China and Indonesia) are increasing their share of the trade.

The blue shark has the highest known population growth rates among pelagic sharks, which explains the species’ comparative resilience to fishing pressure, but fishing effort is largely unmanaged and, in many regions, increasing. Blue shark is estimated to be declining in the Atlantic and Indian oceans and increasing in the Pacific.

Of the four t-RFMOs covered, only IOTC is constrained by its Convention to directly manage oceanic sharks. Management rules of the four t-RFMO provide for bans on shark finning, which directly benefits blue shark conservation. Many countries have also introduced measures to ban shark finning by their fleets and by their nationals, often extending these measures to trade rules. But overall, shark management plans remain fragmented and patchy, with numerous gaps as well as areas of overlapping (and conflicting) protection.

Recommendations

1. RFMOs should increase direct management of blue shark fisheries to properly manage fishing mortality relative to stock status.

2. RFMOs should improve monitoring, reporting and observer coverage on vessels targeting blue shark.

3. Support global and regional efforts to tackle IUU fishing by Distant Water Fleets as these will directly benefit blue shark fisheries. This includes implementation of the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) and governance capacity building in the regions associated with major blue shark fisheries (e.g. Southwest Pacific, Eastern Central Pacific, Southeast Atlantic).

4. Encourage the use of specific trade codes for the key traded shark species and improved inspection to ensure their correct use.

5. Prevent blue shark products from IUU fishing and endangered shark species being traded as blue shark by improving trade control through; a. development of Catch Documentation Schemes (CDS) in RFMOs; or b. listing blue shark as an Appendix II CITES species, which has a similar requirement to a CDS.

6. Support campaigns to improve seafood labelling and traceability requirements and raise consumer awareness in key consumer markets such as Brazil, Southern Europe and global pet food markets.

7. Encourage blue shark-targeted fisheries to undergo third-party certification as a driver for improved governance, e.g. to reduce the bycatch of juveniles and other shark species. (not sure about this one)

8. Promote sustainable, healthy shark fin alternatives to consumers in key Asian domestic markets & their expat communities overseas.

9. Spatial protection measures should be supported. To aid compliance, these should include mitigation for the impact of restrictions on the livelihoods of small-scale fishers.

Climate-driven redistribution of Pacific tunas and the joint role of WCPFC and IATTC

I remember reading papers of my interest, on wondering about the authors, who they are, where they work, and so on… it must be a sign of my age (and more concise interests?) that now I read a really good collegiate paper by 16 authors, and I know personally 11 of them!

Average biomass distributions (kg km–2) of skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye tuna in the Pacific Ocean basin for 2015 (2011−2020) (left), and mean anomalies (kg km–2) from the average 2015 biomass distribution of each tuna species projected to occur by 2050 (2044−2053) under the RCP 8.5 greenhouse gas emissions scenario (right).

I have written before about the impact of climate change on the distribution of pacific tuna stocks, the impact on tuna dependent PICs and now this paper (by many of the same authors as the others) that tackles what both tuna RFMOS in the pacific should do about this, not only from the management perspective but also from the global legal framework set-up by UNCLOS and UNFSA.

As usual, I recommend you read the original, as nothing beats that! I just quote here the abstract and the “Discussion and actionable recommendations” (which is a very nice subtitle!)

Climate change is predicted to alter the distributions of tropical tuna stocks in the Pacific Ocean. Recent modelling projects significant future shifts in tuna biomass from west to east, and from national jurisdictions to high seas areas. As the distributions of these stocks change, the relevant regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs)—the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)—will need to develop an expanded framework for cooperation and collaboration to fulfil their conservation and management responsibilities under international law. The key elements of a possible expanded framework for cooperation can be developed, and fundamental areas for collaboration identified, by applying and adapting principles established in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, and the constituent instruments of the RFMOs themselves. Our analysis reveals a wide range of important issues requiring cooperation, and three clear priorities. First, a formal mechanism for cooperation is needed to enable effective and efficient decision-making and action by the two RFMOs on key issues. Second, further cooperation is required in scientific research and modelling to better understand the biology and distributions of Pacific tuna stocks and how they will respond to climate change, and to inform stock assessments and harvest strategies. Third, the RFMOs must cooperate to define appropriate limits on fishing for each stock in a way that ensures they are compatible across the two organisations, taking into account their different members and management regimes.

Discussion and actionable recommendations

As our analysis has shown, there are a wide range of important issues on which WCPFC and IATTC will need to cooperate to combat climate-driven changes to the distribution of tropical Pacific tuna stocks. Some of these need to be addressed as a priority, while some will be more appropriately addressed over a longer timeframe. Some are complex and will require potentially delicate and difficult discussions, while others are more straightforward and should be easily achievable. Drawing together the issues identified across the four areas of RFMO activity discussed above, three concrete actions with cross-cutting effects can be identified as priorities.

First, WCPFC and IATTC must establish a more comprehensive approach to cooperation, elevating it to a formal governance issue, in order to ensure that the two organisations can take and implement timely, informed, effective, and transparent decisions. At present, cooperation between the two RFMOs is based on a rather ad hoc combination of: observing meetings; exchanges between Executive Directors; sharing the text of conservation and management measures; exchanging data; authorizing reciprocal observer coverage; and cooperating on some northern stocks through the Joint Working Group. In adopting measures for the overlap area as a short-term solution in 2012, the two organisations agreed that a longer-term process should be established to explore avenues for managing tuna stocks in the entire Pacific Ocean (IATTC, 2012b; WCPFC, 2013). Ten years later, the time has come to establish a more formal mechanism to facilitate that sort of process, which will be critical to successful cooperation in the other issues identified in this paper. A low risk and immediately actionable starting point toward this would be to establish a joint working group, involving Secretariat staff and/or members of both Commissions, which could be charged to examine and provide recommendations on specific priority matters for cooperation—but over time, a more sophisticated mechanism is likely to be required.

A second priority for cooperation is to advance scientific knowledge of key issues to improve understanding of the biology and distribution of Pacific tuna stocks and how they will respond to climate change, and inform the conduct of stock assessments and the development of harvest strategies. International law requires States to make decisions based on the best scientific evidence available, to cooperate in scientific research, and to strengthen scientific research capacity in relation to highly migratory stocks—and it is evident from the discussion above that such research is essential to enable the two RFMOs to consider and prioritize action on other issues. Since there is already a significant practice of scientific collaboration to build on, such as the Pacific-wide stock assessments for northern stocks which have been facilitated by the ISC, we suggest that agreement to cooperate on further issues—including sampling, modelling approaches and data collection—should be sought and actioned as quickly as possible.

Third, it is clear that WCPFC and IATTC must cooperate to define appropriate limits on fishing for each stock in a way that is compatible across the two organisations, taking into account their different members and management regimes. This is likely to be a complex task, which will necessarily be informed by some of the other areas of cooperation discussed in this paper—such as stock assessments, the development of harvest strategies, and a common understanding of how fishing limits are currently managed across the two RFMOs. It will also require an effective mechanism for cooperation, which ensures that the process is robust and transparent, and that the legitimate rights and interests of all States—as well as conservation and management principles—are properly taken into account. In this respect, one starting point might be for the two RFMOs to agree on some principles for dealing with shifting stocks to guide their work.

Finally, this discussion has also revealed some broader legal and policy issues which will require further consideration. First, as a matter of the international legal framework, further clarification is required as to how the ‘duty to cooperate’, which applies to each State whose nationals are fishing on the high seas, applies between RFMOs with jurisdiction over straddling and highly migratory stocks in adjacent areas of high seas. In this respect, the predicted climate-driven redistribution of Pacific tropical tuna stocks has highlighted a gap in the UNFSA, which does not clearly provide a framework for cooperation between RFMOs, or establish how ‘compatibility’ applies in relation to stocks which straddle areas of high seas under the competence of two different RFMOs, or the shift in distribution of fishery resources as a result of climate change. Second, not only are fish stocks predicted to move from an area under the jurisdiction of one RFMO to an area under the jurisdiction of another RFMO, but from areas under national jurisdiction to areas of high seas. This raises extremely difficult questions about the sovereign rights of coastal States, the potential to recognize or compensate loss and damage, and the allocation and transferability of rights from the EEZ to the high seas. Given the importance of tuna stocks to communities and economies in States across the Pacific Ocean—and particularly the predicted effects on many of the SIDS in the WCPO—finding just and equitable solutions to these difficult questions will require not only careful legal and policy analysis, but further cooperation between WCPFC and IATTC.

What was the deal with Harvest Strategy "scaremongering" at the WCPFC?

From my personal position (as the absolute “no one I am), private certifications of any sort (such as quality/seafood safety, ecolabels and now labour ones), are unethical and colonial. Their existence is based on fostering the perception that fishers and government institutions (particularly those of developing countries) cannot be trusted with what they do. So they need an external, more "trustable" verification (by an overwhelming number of certification bodies based in developed countries, mostly former colonisers themselves). You know… we just to make sure it is true and "those people" are not doing their usual tricks.... and of course, they have to pay for the certification cost, so the rich people can feel reassured about the food they eat... (the salt in the injury is that seafood has to be imported since the rich people totally destroy their own fisheries)

In any case, when this reaches the RFMO level…. It really ruffles me… since this is one of the few places where the poor and small sit at the same table that the rich and developed.

 So to explain the technical insight of what went on, I will use and quote the good work of my friends at the latest FFA Trade and Industry News.

A harvest strategy (also referred to as a management procedure (MP)) is a framework that specifies pre-determined management actions for a fishery or stock necessary to achieve agreed management objectives and respond to changes in stock status. Harvest strategies represent best practice in fisheries management as decisions relating to fisheries or stocks are more consistent, predictable and transparent.

FFA members had two harvest strategy-related proposals to WCPFC19 for potential adoption. The first is a draft Conservation and Management Measure (CMM) for an interim management procedure for skipjack tuna in the WCPO. The MP’s objective is to ensure that the spawning biomass depletion ratio of skipjack tuna is maintained on average in the long-term at around the target reference point (TRP) (50% of unfished spawning biomass) and above the limit reference point (LRP) (20% unfished spawning biomass), with no greater than 20% risk of the LRP being breached. The MP would be applied in a repeating three-year cycle, with the first two cycles treated as a trial; it covers the catch and effort of purse seine, pole-and-line and other commercial fisheries in EEZs and high seas.  

In recent years, WCPFC members have demonstrated a general willingness to progress harvest strategy development and adoption for key stocks. However, progress has been slow given the complexity of harvest strategy development and the capacity limitations of some members; the suspension of in-person meetings due to COVID-19 travel restrictions has also hampered progress. According to FFA members, “Not only will the adoption of this MP take better account of uncertainty, including the uncertainties of related to climate change, it will also be an important step in ensuring the effective management and sustainable use of the stock, and meeting the interests global markets in sourcing sustainable tuna products.”

This, of course, has to be seen in the light that the stocks are well managed and stable thanks to the combined action of the FFA membership, the PNA VDS and SPC’s State of the art science and data collection arrangements, so there was no full urgency…(I wish they had the same sense of urgency and were zealots for the reform of HS transhipment or the general mess that is Longline)

The proposed CMM was adopted and, as such, allowed the required scoring for MSC certifications on target tuna stocks (Principle 1), of their client fisheries that required them to be able to demonstrate that there is an available harvest strategy for a key tuna stock. It will also help to inform the development of management procedures for the remaining key tuna stocks.

FFA members also proposed to amend CMM 2014-06 - Establishing a Harvest Strategy for Key Fisheries and Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean to include a new paragraph that explicitly states that ….the Commission shall adopt harvest control rules (HCRs) for skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye and South Pacific albacore tunas before the stocks decline below levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield (MSY)”. This amendment stems from a condition in the Marine Stewardship Council’s (MSC) fisheries certification standard (MSC SA2.5.3b) that “an agreement or framework is in place that requires the management body to adopt HCRs before the stock declines below BMSY”.

Which is needed because recently, the Independent Adjudicator (IA) assigned to an objection to PNA’s scope extension to add FADs (see below) and bigeye to its MSC-certified skipjack and yellowfin free-school purse seine fishery ruled that this condition has not been met by WCPFC. Hence, based on the IA’s decision, PNA’s bigeye scope extension was unsuccessful. While MSC and the IA maintain that there is no system of ‘precedent’ in the MSC objection process, the IA’s decision may be treated as ‘new information by MSC conformity assessment bodies (CABs), potentially impacting future assessments and surveillance audits. Further, outcomes of MSC assessments for target stock requirements (Principle 1) are harmonised across different fisheries.

Currently, in the WCPO, there are 33 MSC-certified fisheries from 18 different fishing nations, accounting for 75% of tuna caught in the WCPO. Hence, FFA members’ proposed amendment to CMM 2014- 06 is likely to be widely supported as it will benefit all WCPFC members with MSC-certified tuna fisheries in the WCPO.

So, of course, each of these 33 fisheries is a revenue source to MSC, the CABs and the lobby organisations that make a living of it. The fishery in the WCPO is regulated in the same way by the WCPFC, is fished by all under the same management, gears, MCS framework, observers, etc., is all the same… and is 75% certified… so the other 25% is not because they don't pay… not because they do something radically different.

So yeah… I just see hypocrisy all around and, to an extent, neocolonial blackmail… Tuna would not collapse next year if the WCPFC didn’t agree this year to a heavily politicked issue needing more consensus.

Pointing fingers at FFA, PNA & SPC that, have been working on this for a long time ain’t fair. I find it disheartening that all this process was used to try to erode the strength of Pacific Islands cooperation and to maintain the money flow of the artificial construct that private certifications are, more than to manage better a stock that is well managed.

I personally think the “scaremongering” was way more about their fear of losing money and their relevance in a world that is starting to see beyond their business model rather than the long-term SKJ sustainability and is actually quite colonial.

But anyway… wanted to make sure that I explained the insight into the situation. As for the rest of us, in the wharfs, offices, boarding and fishing boats, computers with models, sampling and monitors, etc, ... life just continues.

 FADs were a big issue a few years ago when it was ruled that they had to stop with compartmentalisation practice… which they gave them self 3 years to do… but this… had to be NOW!

How to inspect Carrier Vessels - our latest MCS Practitioner Guide

A year ago, I posted on the ‘MCS Practitioners Introductory Guides’ aimed to support fisheries inspectors I was commissioned to write by Duncan Copeland from Trygg Matt Tracking (TMT) and the International MCS Network (iMCSn).

The first ones were fishing gear-specific guides on Longline Fishing, Pole and Line Fishing, and Purse Seine Fishing, which are all very pertinent to the WCPO.

To further support capacity building for inspectors and non-inspectors, we worked on a fourth guide for Industrial Fishing Vessel Inspections that are complementary to the gear guides and tackles an introductory understanding of the key considerations and needs during vessel inspections.

And there was one more on the pipeline, that was the Carriers one, which finally has been released (like the prior ones) in 3 languages.

You can download the version in English from here.

Podes descargar la versión en castellano de acá

Vous pouvez télécharger la version française ici

The whole set of all gears, in all languages is here

Carriers are unique from the fisheries compliance perspective since they are cargo vessels that operate in the fishing realm, and as such, fall under the fisheries compliance spectrum and are normally part of the definition of fishing vessels or fishing support vessels, and ergo need to be licensed, have a VMS, in some cases carry observers, plus a whole raft of other requirements.

Yet the reality is that they don’t “behave” or move like fishing vessels, i.e. no fishing gear specifications, closed area restrictions, and the 1000 other things fishing boats have. And also, they are crewed by seafarers and not fishermen, so the “culture” on board is different, and they are subject to specific ILO and IMO requirements that fishing boats are not required…

Surprisingly not much was written about them in the fisheries compliance realm… so I was quite happy to work on this guide.

My approach right from the start, I wrote the initial draft from operations and a practical point of view. As I have said many times before… "it is impossible to measure or regulate what you do not understand".

Besides inspectors, I think they are also a good resource for people in the media, non-specialists in NGOS and institutions with an interest in fisheries.

I hope you find them useful.

When someone ask for Career advice

I guess one of the realisations that one is getting old is when young people write to you asking for some advice or words that may help them in their careers.

you have no idea what will hapen, but stick to some principles

My 1st reaction is normally… I have no idea how I got here… I still pinch myself about it almost every day! I had no clue what would happen, but I stuck to a few principles!

I'd say I get a mail or message once every two months on average…. and I guess today was the one for the end of the year. Their background normally is your marine science/fisheries graduates that are keen to get involved in research, developments or activist angles.

I have been vocal that the biggest challenge I see in fisheries is talent attraction and retention; not only is there a criminalisation of fisheries set-up, but also the fact that civil society expects excellence from everyone in the sector, yet we pay mediocrity at best… so no wonder we have no new people and ideas.

I normally go back to older emails to collect my thoughts… so this time, I put a few in bullet points to keep them for another opportunity… then I decided to do this blog… so I can refer them when next.

This case was particularly interesting since the young scientist that wrote to me volunteered for Sea Shepperd, whose founder went very personal on me for my views on the seaspiracy movie (i’d said almost the same that Daniel Pauly but 2-3 days earlier)… that got me (and my dad with my same name) some death threats later on… but is old story now

Below is my answer, for whatever is worth:

And thanks for reaching out! And thank you for your kind words!

Not sure if I’m at all qualified or experienced to advise anyone 😊… furthermore, I was subjected to substantial personal abuse by Paul Watson and then death threats by supporters of Sea Shepard (the organisation you work with?), for my opinions… so you may disagree with all of them... but here I go:

1. I’m a humanist… is always about people and the incentives we offer them to behave one way or the other. A sense of fairness drives me… not one of righteousness. I don't buy into the crusader stereotype, the saviour, the eco-warrior, etc. Some rules are stupid, and there is a process to change them (surely is flawed and slow, but denaying it is not good either)… yet rules should be applied with fairness… not just to some, while others avoid them.

2. No one in fisheries (or any aspect of life) is totally guilty or innocent. It is the extent of it that varies, according to different people. No one has the moral upper ground here.

3. I focus my work on governments and regional organisations. If one wants to help, one needs to support the official institutions in the countries whose statutory existence is to deal with the issue you want to help. And this is not because the government is better… is because - we like it or not, there will be some form of government in 20-25 years… and I don't know if there will be a particular NGO.

4. Sustainability and environmental damage are not the same. The only way we will not have any environmental impact is for everyone to die at once; anything else implies compromises. Where that compromise is, depends on personal choice and public policy. For me, sustainability is a process, not a line drawn somewhere. Everything has advantages and disadvantages, and we have to navigate ethical choices since there is no one perfect way to achieve a complex goal.

5. The main issue that I learned is that to deal with all sorts of issues in fisheries, you need a toolbox and not just a hammer. When you only have a hammer, then you start to see every problem like a nail… and that is never the case.

6. Be always aware of the truly damaging substrate of colonisation and imperialism… not just in the colonised/intervened countries… but also in how its impacts the preconceived ideas of those growing up in a coloniser / imperialistic country.

7. In my personal view, the whole concept of working in “developing countries” while most times well-intentioned, is deeply rooted in colonial thinking… this is perhaps the biggest issue that I struggle with in my work… and is, to a certain extent, unavoidable if you work in this industry… Hence I try to focus always on working with individuals, spending as much time in the country with them as possible and trying to understand to the best of my capabilities their culture, family and worldview.

8. Of the people we interact with in the world, around 15% live below 1 USD a day, and around 45% live below 2 USD a day (this is the segment where my mother’s family comes from and where I grew up). At present, 71% of the world’s population earn less than 10 USD a day; in other words… almost 3 of every 4 people on our planet earn less per day than the cost of a bottle of wine at a western supermarket. The definitions of sustainability, efficiency, governance and sustainability are decided by rich western countries that comprise the top 29% of the population, the ones that can afford to plan for a future… We are very good at forgetting that too.

9. Even after 30 years of doing international work, I am still learning the challenges of decolonising my perceptions of my work. It also made me realise that my European side thinks in “me” terms, while my non-European side thinks in “we” terms.

10. Finally, and this is not just for work, but for me as a person, I try to live to 2 rules: never be ungrateful, and never be pretentious.

Hopefully, this is of help to you… it is quite helpful to me to order my ideas about it… so I’m actually thankful to you for having made the question

I wish you the best in your work

Francisco

The WCPO tuna fishery: 2021 Overview and status of stocks (and the mess of LongLine)

Every year just before the plenary meeting of the WCPFC (this year in Vietnam), the most important publication (at least in my view) of the tuna world gets published by SPC: The western and central Pacific tuna fishery: 2021 Overview and status of stocks was just released.  

Besides the importance of the information, I got the kick to see one of my pictures for the 2nd time on the cover, something I’m honoured for and forever thankful to the SPC team and Steven Hare in particular.

The publication is a cornucopia of information and an honest appraisal of what is going well (the status of the main 4 stocks - page 52) and what is not (the status of some sharks and billfishes - page 58).

So, I recommend you read it and dive deep into the many excellent graphs.

And while there is a lot to celebrate, I’ll lo bring back something that I already noticed in last year's edition and bring it up again now, and it is related to the longline fleet.

As I stated before, I really like the technicalities and challenges of LL fishing, is perhaps the most skilful and “scientific” of fishing gear I fished with. You need to understand and play with depth, currents, thermocline, primary productivity/temperature, target species chemoreceptors, length and spacing of branchlines, catch manipulation and quality, freezing physics and many more elements… 

And while I have no issues with the domestic and EEZ-based operations, yet the High Seas fleet is a total mess.

As I pointed out last time, the fishery has been declining in volumes and number of vessels over the years, but a more direct measure of effort (hooks fished) has shown a different trend. Total hooks fished in the WCPFC-CA increased from a level of 400 million in the mid 1970s to 600 million in the early 2000s to 800 million in the early 2010s. The peak year in hooks fished was 2012 at 888 million hooks; the level in 2021 was 612 million hooks, a decline of 12% from the 2020 level, and nearly 16% below the average of the previous five years.

What is driving this (in my opinion), relates to a few things but I have, I have touched on two aspects many times in the past, HS transhipments + the abuse of the impracticability exemption and crewing labour issues.

And for me, this graph below (page 42) is indirect proof of the linkages of both.

You see fishing effort, in fleet sizes and number of hooks fished (bottom), for the longline fishery in the WCPFC

In the 1993/4 when I was fishing these waters, it was the heyday of LL in the WCPO, peaking into 5000 vessels. Today as you can see, there is only 1/3 of that fleet left (1600), yet they are soaking almost twice the number of hooks. How can that be possible? Deck and gear setting technology are almost the same.

Since then, transhipment at sea has exploded (as I reported many times*), which allows the vessels to stay fishing longer and, sadly, massivelly increasing the crew's workload.

This strengthens my focus on the two inter-seasonal working groups I’m involved in at the WCPFC, transhipment reform and labour conditions.

* Reported high seas transshipment events in the WCPO have more than doubled from 2011 to 2019. In 2021, 62% of vessels listed on the Record of Fishing Vessels were authorized to transship in the high seas, 85% of which are longliners

The Harvest Strategies blame game

Lots are being discussed and lobbied on the Harvest Strategies issues at the WCPFC. The Harvest Strategy approach remains one of the top priorities of WCPFC, and WCPFC 19 next week will have many discussions addressing different aspects of the Harvest Strategy of various stocks under the purview of the Commission.  They also will also review the indicative work Plan, which has gone through multiple revisions over the last few years.

a stakeholder view

All the CCMs have had a series of meetings this year, including SC18 and  Science-Management Dialogue on management procedures for skipjack tuna and South Pacific albacore. WCPFC 19 will have discussions based on the information from previous meetings with the view to adopting a management procedure for skipjack tuna. The progression of the South Pacific albacore harvest strategy has been slower than the skipjack one for many reasons that may not be popular among NGOs but are very valid.

So there are some NGOs campaigning to get it done, which is fair enough… yet while I support the position of NGOs as “opinion-holders’, I don't think they are more important than those of “stakeholders”… so when fingers are being pointed at FFA for moving cautiously on this (for the own valid reasons), I get irked and call neo-colonialism.

We see the reality every day from our offices in MIMRA; we literally see the fleet and their catches… so when their view is challenged by people on desks in big western capitals associated with interests around private certifications… I, as the “absolutely no one” I am (just a bloke that works with fisheries administrations and regional organisations)… I get pissed off.

Interestingly a very short quote from something is was asked a few months ago made it to an observer paper at the WCPFC meeting by the Ocean Foundation.

It said: “The WCPFC membership is taking the necessary steps to develop and adopt harvest strategies for the key WCPO stocks, recognising the role they have to play in effective Pacific fisheries management and ensuring sustainable development utilisation over the longer term.” And I stand to it…

Yet I quote below my full statements to them for context. And I wish the text in bold italics would have made it to that publication.

This is my testimonial concerning harvest strategies and their role in the effective fisheries management of Western Central Pacific Ocean tuna stocks.

I am a fisheries consultant with over 40+ years of career experience in fisheries in general and 30+ years of direct experience in Pacific fisheries. This experience spans from operating as a fisherman to being a specialist adviser to governmental and multilateral organizations and a country representative attending international fisheries forums, including at FFA, PNA and Western Central Pacific Commission meetings on an annual basis since 2017.

Harvest strategies are an effective management tool in domestic fisheries globally and have relatively recently been successfully implemented in several international fisheries. Although difficult and more complex (in a sense) to apply harvest strategies in international settings, they have a significant role in enabling efficient decision-making and more responsive fisheries management in an increasingly complex marine environment and global stage.

Harvest strategies are beneficial in that they define set biomass targets and thresholds that, when triggered, activate pre-approved management outcomes or actions. This helps traverse and speed up negotiations to achieve timely management decisions, which is better for the fish.

The Western Central Pacific Fisheries Commission has a role in adopting harvest strategies to effectively manage key species in the Pacific, such as yellowfin and bigeye tuna. The Commission has previously recognised the need for harvest strategies reflected in its Conservation Management Measure to develop and implement a harvest strategy approach for key fisheries and stocks in the WCPO (CMM 2014-06).

However, it is essential to recognise that the application of harvest strategies in the international arena is complex on many fronts. It takes time to get right as sometimes in the process of finding consensus, geopolitical interests can influence a science-driven decision process. Furthermore, it has to include the special requirements of developing countries, particularly the potential imposition of a disproportionate burden on SIDS. Nevertheless, I believe that, despite the difficulties, the WCPFC membership is taking the necessary steps to develop and adopt harvest strategies for the key WCPO stocks, recognising the role they have to play in effective Pacific fisheries management and ensuring sustainable development utilisation over the longer term.

I look forward to this year’s WCPFC meeting and further progress being made on this crucial front.

—-

now at a personal level…  

 the MSC pressure on getting the tropical tuna measure (TTM) and the Harvest strategy (HaSt) agreement in place at the WCPFC meeting, same as some NGOs are running a scaremongering campaign as you can see in the images below. I call a fully vested interest in that…

The tropical tuna measure (TTM) and the Harvest strategy (HaSt) agreement is perhaps the most complex issue faced at the WCPFC... is highly technical with a lot of moving parts of which harvest strategies are one... I just want to give a word of caution if you decide to tackle it, as is very easy to fall into holes and potentially antagonise parties. Is important to keep in mind that the WCPFC Harvest Strategy Workplan is delayed not because of a lack of dialogue and understanding of its importance of it, but mostly because the debate on harvest strategy elements has become a geopolitical tool used by some DWFN to influence future allocations and (of course!) entrench privilege.

As per the MSC angle, they have been publicising a lot… well... if there is no HaSt agreement, MSC will no doubt be the most affected in all of this... the reality is that they have more at stake and to lose than SIDS... if they were to suspend the certification of the key fishery that brings most of the volume under their logo they would lose a LOT of money...

Would they shoot their own foot based on a process that is delayed due to politics? Doubt it! They need the fishery more than the fishery needs them. A few years ago they were in a similar spot in terms of compartmentalisation around FADs... so they gave themselves time (3 years to suspend it) instead of suspending the fisheries because they are not sustainable!... and now looks like there is no need to suspend it because it looks like tuna fishing with FADs can be MSC certified. 

The Tuna market depends on the WCPO catches... Do you think that if the tuna fisheries of the region were to lose MSC certification, all the canneries would go: Ahhh no... we not gonna can tuna anymore because is not MSC certified? of course not! They will keep going because people will keep eating tuna.

MSC is in a tight spot… under their new standards and the adjudication system changes are that if the HsSt and reference points are not agreed, they will need to (just because it is on paper, and not because the stocks ate at risk) take the certification out… if they do so… as say they lose their cash cow, and if they don’t they will be crucified by the NGO that oppose fisheries.

A lot is at stake, the setting of HaSt will be good for MSC, but that's not the primary purpose of the HsSt... the reason why MSC can certify the tuna fishery because it is managed sustainably by the SIDS and not the opposite… people should NEVER forget that.

Furthermore, while adopting a skipjack management procedure would look good on paper, the reality is that there are gaps and weaknesses in the current management framework, especially for the management of fishing on the high seas, which is less controlled and far less effectively monitored than fishing in national waters. It is going to be difficult to fully apply longer-term management arrangements until the weakness in high seas management is addressed

The stocks are healthy (as you can see here)... because FFA/PNA continues to manage and sustain their fishery against the raft of obligations they have signed onto at the pace that ensures their capacity is catered for and fits their purpose in short to medium term with the long term outlook for a regionally sustained fishery.

Tuna will not collapse next year if the WCPFC doesn’t agree this year to a heavily politicked issue needing more consensus.

Pointing fingers to FFA, PNA & SPC that have been working on this for a long time, ain’t fair.

I personally think the “scaremongering” driven by the MSC and some of their lobby groups are way more about their fear of losing money and their relevance in a world that is starting to see beyond their business model rather than the long-term SKJ sustainability and is actually quite colonial.

Towards responsible transparency: understanding why fishers are cautious about sharing data

I always try to make the best of every situation… if you cannot change the circumstances, maximise the use and rescue whatever you can from what is happening. That was my attitude while at home during the covid pandemic, so I participated in all training, workshops and seminars I was able to.  

Examples of data types aligned with the five points on the Data Spectrum

One of the most interesting ones, not just because of the topic, but also because of the calibre of the people involved, was a workshop on fisheries data confidentiality, with a few sessions from 30 June to 15 July 2022, organised by the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS) and Global Fishing Watch.

It was an interesting exercise as it included academics, industry and a couple of consultants. The outcomes became a report that a few participants compiled under Kamal Azmi's lead. The report was presented as a paper to the forthcoming meeting of the WCPFC, and I quote here some of the key parts, yet as usual, I recommend you read the original from here.

Summary for Policy Makers

Transparency is generally seen as good for governance by strengthening government accountability, reducing incentives for corruption, improving the quality of decision making and strengthening trust in governance processes. In extractive sectors, such as fisheries, transparency can help to ensure compliance, build a social licence to operate and build consumer trust for market advantage. Conversely, confidentiality of data and information can erode social trust in institutions.

Greater availability of fisheries data can serve multiple scientific, management and compliance objectives. Data are arguably more powerful when combined with other data by multiple users. Fishery managers and a wide range of stakeholders can improve their understanding of the fisheries and fishery resources, the level of compliance with conservation and management measures and the effectiveness of management regimes. Fishers are, in turn, more likely to trust that compliance is effectively enforced. Third parties, such as researchers, can add to the scientific rigour applied to the fishery and support more effective management. And consumers also increasingly want to know that the seafood they eat has been sustainably and ethically caught and processed.

“Data sharing” does not necessarily mean data are publicly available. Fishers are typically required to provide data to national fisheries authorities and, in regional fisheries, to regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs). International fisheries law creates duty to share or exchange fisheries data with other relevant States and RFMOs. But data-sharing requirements usually do not mean that data must be shared publicly as open data.

Declaring data as confidential does not explain why. Data are often treated confidentially with good reason. For example, domestic laws typically protect fisheries data under fisheries management and privacy legislation. But in some cases data are regarded as confidential simply because they have been declared to be so. This circular argument conflates “confidentiality” – the extent to which data are protected – with “sensitivity”, which refers to the extent to which harm may be caused if data were to be released more widely.

A recent workshop asked representatives of fishing vessel operators and owners, fish buyers and other stakeholders what makes fisheries data sensitive. The workshop was premised on an assumption that some data may reveal vessel-specific competitive advantages, such as skills and knowledge, proprietary corporate information or intelligence and personal information. The workshop sought to investigate this assumption more deeply. There are many types of data generated and collected in fisheries. In this workshop we focused on a small subset of data related to fishing activity in surface and midwater pelagic fisheries:

• Vessel identity and ownership

• Vessel location and movement

• Vessel authorisations and licences

• Transhipments

• Catch and effort data

Some dimensions of data could, in some cases, be altered to reduce sensitivity. These dimensions could include spatial or temporal aggregation, specific redactions and alteration of context-specific differences (e.g. gear type or management regime), and could be adjusted individually or in combination.

Vessel identity, corporate ownership, authorisations and catch and effort data are generally not seen as sensitive in isolation. However, sensitivities would arise when ownership was linked to individuals due to privacy and personal security concerns. Vessel authorisations are also not regarded as sensitive. They are readily available on the websites of RFMOs and are trusted sources of updated information about the fishing vessel’s ownership and history. Catch and effort data when combined with vessel identity are highly sensitive as they provide insights into a vessel or fleet’s operations.

Vessel location and movement data are particularly sensitive but can vary with the type of gear or the type of fishery. Sensitivity was largely due to the risk of competitor vessels taking advantage of the skills and experience of other fishers. Sensitivity of fishing location data diminishes over time but opinions vary as to the length of time after which data could be made public. These differences could be explained by the context, including gear types and fishing strategies employed, the type of management regime orfor different target species. For example, pelagic longlining activity data was regarded as less sensitive after a single trip while the sensitivity of purse seine activity diminishes after 60 to 90 days, depending on the operations of the vessel. Spatially aggregated data ranging from 1x1 degree to 5x5 degrees is also considered to be less sensitive while still useful for most research purposes. Location data are much less sensitive in fisheries governed by individual output (i.e. catch quota) controls or where there was a high level of cooperation among fishers.

Transhipment data are both sensitive and a source of frustration for operators. Business intelligence could be gathered about a vessel’s or fleet’s operations by piecing together transhipment data with effort and trip length data. However, a lack of transparency and inconsistent transhipment reporting across fleets means that non-compliant activities were likely going undetected.

Fisheries data were also reported to be sensitive due to operational and business intelligence concerns. Location data is particularly valuable to competing fleets while combinations of catch, effort, transhipment and trip length data and other publicly available information, such as market prices, could provide intelligence about the operations and profitability of a fishing enterprise. That said, some operators are sceptical about the reliability of the assumptions on which such intelligence gathering is based.

Good operators who are more transparent fear they will be more vulnerable to unjustified accusations of bad behaviour. Publicly available data could be misinterpreted, damaging the reputations of good actors and in some cases, leading to security concerns for individuals and assets. Paradoxically, bad operators would carry on unhindered as little information was known about them.

Fishers support full transparency in the long-term but this is tempered by current inconsistencies in the level of transparency and compliance among different operators and fleets. The pathway toward greater transparency needs to ensure that all participants in a fishery are subject to the same reporting and data sharing requirements and that these are enforced fully and consistently. This would mean that a more transparent operator is not placed at a competitive disadvantage compared to a less transparent operator. An important first step would be to ensure that all operators meet current reporting and data sharing requirements to the same standard.

Vessel operators are more likely to respond to calls for greater transparency if the rationale is clear. Further research is required to more fully understand what data are not available to third parties and why they should be available. Identifying ways to handle data without particular fields, such as vessel identity, may also warrant further investigation. And further work could be conducted into whether releasing vessel monitoring system (VMS) data more widely after 60 to 90 days would be acceptable to vessel operators, and under what circumstances.

Conclusion

Increasing calls for transparency make intuitive sense in the quest for more effectively and sustainably managed fisheries. Citizens seek greater accountability in the way public resources are exploited by private interests. But data and information about an individual vessel’s or fishing enterprise’s operations hold considerable commercial value to the enterprise and its public release would represent a loss of value. It may also increase risks or add new risks that were previously low or non-existent. Steps toward transparency must therefore consider commercial and other sensitivities that underlie the confidential treatment of fisheries data, such as vessel identity and ownership, authorisations, vessel location and movement, transhipment and catch and effort data.

This workshop aimed to identify some of the key sources of sensitivity. We identified some clear grounds for sensitivity, particularly in relation to personal privacy and security, and data that reveal skill, knowledge and experience that in turn provide certain operators with a competitive advantage. Sensitivity may vary in fisheries with catch-based controls or a high degree of cooperative behaviour but the exact boundaries require further investigation. The passage of time or spatial aggregation can help to reduce sensitivity but it is less clear exactly what values and under what circumstances this would occur.

Recent developments in the public accessibility of AIS data have meant that the recent and historical location of large fishing vessels is becoming increasingly difficult to hide. Overall, fishers support greater transparency but the pathway to that longer-term objective must not place more transparent operators at a competitive disadvantage. This likely means that the transparency playing field should be levelled by bringing all actors into line with current transparency and reporting requirements before progressing further toward full transparency. Operators also expect third parties who call for greater transparency to make the case for who needs to know, why they need to know and how sensitivities will be managed.

An Independent High Seas Transshipment Regional Observer Program for the WCPFC?

As we finished last week with the Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC) meeting of the WCPFC last week many of the recurring topics came up again… and again… It is frustrating but I have learned to play the game by the rules, and while change is never fast enough but at least we keep moving.

While I will tackle the labour issues another day… I come back today to a perennial favourite… High Seas Transhipment

Starting the obserber repport

Written ad nauseum about it… yet make it clear that while we have a CMM that prohibits transhipments at sea (and works for all Purse seiners) yet for LL does leave a massive loophole that has been absolutely abused… CMM 2009-06 states that “to the extent practicable, transhipment must be conducted in ports”,… yet what is practical has not been defined (i wrote about it here)

I’ll say that 90% of the FFA members have voiced a preference for a prohibition on all at-sea transshipments, as per the initial text in CMM 2009-06, but, as the practice remains authorized, there is a range of practical reforms available to improve transhipment oversight, especially through observer reporting. As CMM 2009-06 establishes terms and conditions for transshipments in areas beyond national jurisdiction, including the required reporting and the prerequisite for an observer to monitor and verify high seas transshipments, but n practice, very few, if any, observer reports have made their way to the WCPFC, meaning the capacity to independently validate vessel reports remains very limited.

As you imagine, all chances to reform the present transhipment practice, if not bluntly opposed, are drag and watered down by the nations in the WCPFC that are responsible for all the HS transhipments ( (China, Korea, Taiwan, Vanuatu, Japan and Panama)

And we know is a massive and hypocritical loophole… In two recent FFA studies (2016 and 2020) I was involved on the “Quantification of IUU Fishing in the Pacific Islands Region”, highlighted at-sea transhipment in HS as a key area of uncertainty in the longline supply chain. The most recent update- (2020) stated that “important areas of uncertainty remain in the at-sea transhipment component of the longline supply chain and monitoring and control remain a work in progress. In particular, improvements are required to strengthen the implementation of the observer program such that information provided by vessels on the volume and species composition of fish transshipped can be validated against independent observer estimates”.

My last blog was of the hypocrisy of the situation, particularly when you see the immense majority of the transshipments reported on the borders (mile 2001) of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), rather than in the most isolated areas of the high seas – which is where in port transhipment may be considered impractical.

In the past I noted that the WCPFC is the only tuna RFMO (tRFMO) that does not mandate a specific High Seas transhipment observer program for receiving carriers.

Some WCPFC members do mandate observer coverage on their flagged vessels under their national observer program but not under a wider transhipment-specific WCPFC scheme. In addition, there are currently no WCPFC requirements for, or definition of, useful monitoring information for transshipments by observers. And, since WCPFC’s PSMs CMM 2017-02 includes an opt-in mechanism and requires members to specifically request inspections in port, these carriers are unlikely to be afforded the necessary oversight once they enter the final destination port with transshipped product on board. This current process does not provide consistent information conducive to the long-term conservation and sustainable use of tuna resources in the region – a stated aim of the Commission[DBC1] [FB2] .

And while there have been some efforts to standardize transhipment observer training, such as the Pacific Islands Regional Fisheries Observer (PIRFO) Training Framework, where micro-qualifications are “completed in addition to the mandatory units of competency of a full qualification”.

Furthermore, under a contract with FFA’s a couple of years ago, we wrote the competency standards for transhipment observers that meet the criteria for being considered as a micro-qualification and, in due course, should be submitted as a learning unit for accreditation on the Pacific Register for Qualifications and Standards (PRQS) under Educational Quality and Assessment Programme (EQAP). This would be a critical first step toward consistent transhipment observer reporting… yet without the support of all members… ain’t going far.

There is the perception that having a specific and independent observer programme can be seen as a tacit endorsement of HS transhipment, and while there is definitely merit in that opinion, I like to see it as a practical measure to put pressure (and costs) on transhipping nations, since the reality is that at the moment, we have the worst of all possible situations, no capacity to stop them, nor an independent and effective way to capture the data generated there.

So I was asked to develop an information paper on approaches that improve data collection of the practice and provide a summary of estimated costs and management of observer program management at the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), Internal Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) and Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA).

The analysis is so far not relesed oficially; I just resume the most important bits down below.

High Seas Transshipment Observer Reporting at Other Tuna RFMOs

Other tRFMOs such as Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) and to a certain extent the Secretariat of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) have similar transshipment measures in place which apply to large-scale tuna longline fishing vessels and authorized carrier vessels. Each measure requires that:

• All at-sea transshipments are prohibited unless monitored under the transshipment ROP. 

• Members ensure that all carrier vessels have a transshipment ROP observer onboard

• Members submit annually a comprehensive report assessing the content and conclusions of the reports of the observers assigned to their carrier vessels.

These measures have led to very similar high seas transshipment Regional Observer Programs (ROP) managed and administered by an independent organization across these tRFMOs. The third parties have provided training, coordinated placements, debriefed observers, and reported on transshipment data for over a decade. The implementation of the transshipment observer program is financed by the countries whose longline vessels wish to engage in transshipment operations.

1.     IOTC
Currently managed under Resolution 21/02[1], at sea transshipments observer program in the IOTC area have been managed by the Consortium of Marine Resource Assessment Group (MRAG) and Capricorn Fisheries (Capfish) since 2008. Like ICCAT and IATTC, the responsibilities of the Consortium include the training and provision of qualified observers, managing the logistics for the deployment of observers and their repatriation at the end of the deployment and maintaining the IOTC at-sea transshipment program database. A report for each deployment is also submitted to the IOTC Secretariat at the end of each deployment. In line with the agreed confidentiality rules, these reports are subsequently edited by the IOTC Secretariat and forwarded to the concerned fleets whose vessels have transshipped under the deployment for which the report covers. Additionally, the reports for deployments where Southern Bluefin tuna (SBT) have been transshipped are also forwarded to CCSBT, as per the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the IOTC and CCSBT. This arrangement has the benefit of minimizing costs to the fleets that catches and transships SBT in the IOTC Area.[i]

2.     ICCAT
The ICCAT regional observer program for at-sea transshipments is carried out under the provisions of the Recommendation 21-15 on transshipment. The ICCAT transshipment observer program has been implemented by a consortium comprising of MRAG and CapFish since 2007. This contract provides carrier observer training and annual reports detailing transshipment information and summarizing observer reports from the previous year in addition to equipment purchases and observer deployments under the supervision of the Secretariat.[ii] 

3.     IATTC
IATTC’s transshipment measure - Resolution C-12-07 – also limits at sea transshipment to longline and carrier vessels whose flag countries participate in the program to monitor transshipments at sea. MRAG Americas has been implementing the IATTC ROP since its inception in January 2009; providing similar services outlined above for ICCAT and IOTC. MRAG records and verifies positions of vessels engaged in transshipments to issue daily reports on activities and provides captains with the opportunity to include any other relevant information. Under this program, observers also verify and countersign the transshipment declaration forms.[iii]

4.     CCSBT - Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna
The CCSBT’s observer program to monitor SBT transshipments at sea which came into effect in 2009 (and later revised in 2015), is regulated under the Resolution on Establishing a Program for Transshipment by Large-Scale Fishing Vessels. CCSBTs transshipment program is operated in conjunction with the ROP for transshipments of ICCAT, IOTC and WCPFC to avoid duplication of the same measures. For this reason, the report will focus on the details for ICCAT, IOTC, and IATTC.[iv]

5.     PNA - Parties of the Nauru Agreement 
While not a transshipment ROP, a pertinent example of an independent operated observer program in the WCPO is the PNA Observer Agency (POA); this program assumed responsibility for the FSM Arrangement observer program and has been administered under contract by MRAG Asia Pacific Pty Ltd (MRAG AP) since 2012. MRAG was chosen after considering several service options through an open tender process to outsource the administration of the POA to a commercial service provider. The core responsibilities of MRAG AP under their contractual arrangement is operational logistics focused on identifying and coordinating placements for the PNA observers covering 100% for PS vessels authorized to fish in PNA waters. MRAG coordinates observer contracts, finances, and travel arrangements in addition to providing reports to the PNA. Only observers that are nationals of a PNA member country and accredited by the PIRFO program are eligible to be used by the POA.[v]

Considerations for Implementing an Independent Transshipment ROP in WCPFC

A.     Precedence
In practice all the flag States, and most of the individual carriers operating in the WCPO have experience with independently run transshipment observer programs. The option of delegating the operational and logistical tasks involved in running an ROP under the arrangements set out in CMM 2018-05 on the WCPFC Regional Observer Program, is not new in the WCPO as it has been in place since 2011 under the PNA observer program. The success of the PNA observer program sets a valuable precedent for the potential development and implementation of a high seas transshipment regional observer program (HS TS ROP). Precedence has also been set by FFA member, Vanuatu, who already operates their own observers on carrier vessels, a model that could be upscaled for a centralized high seas transshipment regional observer program.

B.     Observer training
At ICCAT, IATTC and IOTC, observers are required to have at least 1 year of at sea observer experience and submit their CVs to the Secretariat for approval. They then undergo training provided by the consortium as there are no specific standards set by the respective RFMOs. At IATTC for example, the training lasts 5 days and focuses on completing forms, fish identifications, compliance monitoring duties, safety, and communications protocols. For PNA, all observer trainings are provided by PIRFO, and not the POA/MRAG AP, however, where specific observer training (e.g., Marine Stewardship Council Chain of Custody – MSC CoC) is required, this is provided by the PNA Office and supported by MRAG AP[2]. 

A WCPFC high seas transshipment regional observer program (HS TS ROP) could follow the same processes used by the PNA to recruit trained observers under the PIRFO program (including those who have been qualified by their various domestic programs). Carrier observers an also be tasked to use the WCPFC High Seas Transshipment Electronic Reporting System (TSER) App pre-loaded on tablets and connected to Garmin Inreach units (or its equivalent used by the Pacific Community (SPC)). This will enable carrier observers to send data to the commission and the flag state in almost real time. In addition, the program could incorporate electronic crane scales to improve overall transshipment weight reporting. These transshipment e-scales have been studied and recommended to the WCPFC[vi] and are already informally used at ICCAT and other regions.

C.     Observer Cross-certification
ICCAT and IOTC training courses are run in conjunction with one another enabling observers to work in both convention areas and can also monitor CCSBT transshipments. A similar operation might be worth considering for RFMOs neighboring WCPFC, such as IATTC. The 2020 IATTC annual report on transshipment notes that 43 percent of tuna transshipped in the Eastern Pacific Ocean were actually caught in the Western Pacific Ocean[vii] and the 2019 WCPFC Annual Report on Transshipment noted that “high seas transshipment events were reported to have occurred more often in the tropical eastern Pacific, particularly within and around the overlap area with IATTC.”[viii] By standardizing transshipment observer protocols within WCPFC and coordinating with IATTC, both RFMO carriers that operate in both Convention Areas will no longer have to carry two observers, reducing costs and logistical delays. Better coordination can lead to cross-certification of carrier observers[3] (as practiced by ICCAT and IOTC) which could create more opportunities for pacific islanders to be employed on carrier vessels operating in both Convention Areas. Anecdotal information[4] points to some observer preference for carrier vessels over other gear types due to safety, salary, and space considerations.

D.    Data reporting and management
IATTC, ICCAT and IOTC transshipment reports are compiled by the service provider at the end of each trip and submitted to the respective RFMO within a 2–3-week timeframe. All reporting formats and standards used by observers under these programs were originally developed by the consortium according to the specific requirements set out by each tRFMO. These forms were approved by their respective tRFMO and have since been standardized across all three tRFMOs. Summary observer reports are also sent on a five-day basis by ICCAT and IOTC observers on carriers, outlining vessels, dates, and locations where at sea transshipments occurred over that period. ICCAT also publishes observer reports on their website with relevant sections hidden for confidentiality purposes. Within the PNA program, the provider submits an annual report to the PNA office, not to WCPFC. Observer workbooks for reporting are provided by PIRFO and debriefing of observers is also done through a PIRFO qualified debriefer (generally from the national program). Debriefing reports are then sent directly by MRAG AP to the POA, who sends it to SPC, and finally from SPC to WCPFC. MRAG AP also works closely with the vessel companies and their agents in relevant ports to assist during observer placements with accommodation, meals, and transport for the observers, to ensure cost-effectiveness of the program.

WCPFC could implement an independent HS TS ROP that encapsulates a combination of systems currently employed by other tRFMOs and the PNA program. Everyday management and logistics of carrier observers can be handled by an independent party while a streamlined reporting system is developed by WCPFC. Carrier observer minimum data fields are currently being considered by the TSIWG and could complement the FFA transshipment observer standards and protocols work to establish transshipment observer and transshipment declaration forms. Together these groups can develop a transshipment observer reporting system that best fits WCPFC’s needs.

E.     Program costs and cost recovery mechanisms
The costs of outsourcing these programs based on their respective 2019 operations (prior to the COVID-19 pandemic disruption), range from US$280k (ICCAT), US$810k (IOTC) to US$1.04M (IATTC) annually. These costs are recovered from the respective members of the 3 RFMOs that participated in at sea transshipments through their authorized longline vessels. For IATTC, the fee is calculated based on the total costs of the program and paid into a special account that the RFMO Secretariat manages. For the IOTC and ICCAT, costs are based on the quantity of fish transshipped in the preceding year. These costs are usually broken down per observers’ daily rates at sea and on shore (in transit or training).

The total program costs for administering the PNA observer program is based on the number of authorized fishing vessels and the number of fishing days per vessel. MRAG has fixed some costs that are charged to the vessels (to cover logistics) in addition to the $129 per day observer fee and other variable costs (flights, lodging and other logistical costs). The total annual cost for the 70 fishing vessels participating in the program in 2019 is USD $ 2,950,000. The POA has a 100% cost recovery mechanism from the flagged vessels similar to the other tRFMOs.

There is a clear overlap in the distant water fishing countries and entities involved in centralized HS TS ROPs at other tRFMOs (China, Chinese Taipei, Japan. Korea, Panama and Vanuatu) and those actively transshipping on the high seas within the WCPFC. It would therefore be reasonable to require that these countries pay for a similar system to monitor transshipments within the WCPO. There are multiple options that WCPFC can employ to determine program budgets and ensure full cost recovery. In addition, a centralized program should incorporate all costs associated with visa procurement for Pacific Island observers.

F.     Secretariat requirements
At IOTC, ICCAT and IATTC, the Secretariat maintains the authorized list of carrier vessels, similar to the WCPFC Secretariat maintains its vessel registry. The three tRFMO Secretariats also receive transshipment declarations along with carrier observer reports. These reports are condensed by the providers and sent to the Secretariat to produce an annual summary of the program that is shared with all members. At IOTC, the Secretariat is also engaged throughout the observer deployment process and at ICCAT, the Secretariat receives near real time potential non-compliance reports submitted by the providers. Within the PNA OP, the provider submits reports to the PNA office, and it is inputted into a shared data systems that SPC can use to access. A similar process with transshipment reporting through SPC and the WCPFC Secretariat may be implemented for a WCPO HS TS ROP, keeping any WCPFC Secretariat tasks to a minimum. This Secretariat reporting system would also address a major loophole identified in WCPFC’s current transshipment program – the lack of transshipment observer reporting to the Secretariat. This approach leaves the Secretariat, the Commission, and its science provider – SPC without access to independent records of transshipment activity. A WCPO wide HS TS ROP could address this loophole by putting in place standardized transshipment observer reporting to the Secretariat without adding cumbersome administrative burdens to the WCPFC Secretariat.

Recommendations:

The current patchwork of transshipment monitoring processes in place at WCPFC lack minimum agreed data fields and verification processes present at the other tuna RFMOs. Building from the PNA OP independently run observerprogram, WCPFC could pilot a WCPO wide HS TS ROP. The main tasks of a pilot centralized WCPFC HS TS ROP provider would be to coordinate with the WCPFC Secretariat to:

1. Identify available observers from national programs. 

2. Facilitate observer contracts and coordinating placement of observer’s onboard vessels 

3. Coordinate flight, visa, and accommodation arrangements for observers. 

4. Administer financial arrangements (including allowances for observers in transit)

5. Develop and administer a Code of Conduct for observers 

6. Facilitate insurance for observers 

7. Manage the provision of technical and safety equipment 

8. Coordinate debriefing, data management and reporting

The proposed pilot could be completed by an independent party to provide a more detailed cost/benefit analysis specific to the region and detail efficiencies in operations which require:

1. Reporting minimum transshipment observer data fields and submission to the WCPFC Secretariat

2. Enhanced transshipment data sharing agreements with IATTC

3. Responses to transshipment observer reports from countries who transship

References

[1] In the case of the twelve (12) Indonesian wooden carrier vessels listed on the IOTC Record of Authorised Vessel and listed in the measure, a national observer programme may be used in place of an observer from the ROP. National observers shall be trained and will carry out all of the functions of the regional observer, including provision of all data as required by the IOTC and equivalent to those prepared by the ROP Contractor. This provision will be rescheduled in consultation with the IOTC Secretariat as a two-year pilot project to be started in 2021. The effectiveness of the project shall be examined in 2023 to conclude whether the programme offers the same level of assurances as those provided by ROP.

[2] Anecdotal information points to some observers completing the PIRFO and MRAG training to then join MRAG Americas observer program due to better pay and working conditions.

[3] A recent FFA report included a recommendation to “start discussions with neighbouring RMFOs to fully describe and document the similarities and differences in the sampling programmes to achieve harmonisation across RFMOs in data collection and perhaps training certification.”

[4] Observers provide positive feedback regarding working in ICCAT ROP, although the observations can be intense and run for long hours over several days at a time, they enjoy and value working in the program. Many observers are keen to remain available for deployment, and in light of the current Coronavirus pandemic (outside of the scope of this report) continue their valued role in strengthening the MCS within this fishery.

[i] Resolution 21/02 On Establishing a Programme for Transshipment by Large-Scale Fishing Vessels https://www.ofdc.org.tw:8181/web/components/Editor/webs/files/Res%2021-02_[E].pdf

[ii] 21-15 Recommendation by ICCAT on Transhipment.
https://www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/2021-15-e.pdf

[iii] Resolution c-12-07 Amendment to Resolution C-11-09 on Establishing a Program for Transshipments by Large—Scale Fishing Vessels. https://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles/Resolutions/IATTC/_English/C-12-07-Active_Amends%20and%20replaces%20C-11-09%20Transhipments.pdf

[iv] Resolution on Establishing a Program for Transhipment by Large-Scale Fishing Vessels (revised at the Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting: 12 October 2017). https://www.ccsbt.org/sites/default/files/userfiles/file/docs_english/operational_resolutions/Resolution_Transhipment.pdf

[v] Per conversations held with MRAG Asia Pacific on 10 December 2021.

[vi] Hosken, M., Blaha, F. and Lasi, F. (2020). Estimation of variability in Purse Seine catch weights. Scientific Committee Sixteenth Regular Session. Online Meeting 11 –20 August 2020. WCPFC-SC16-2020/ST-IP-10.

[vii] Implementation of the IATTC Regional Observer Program for Transshipments at Sea. DOCUMENT IATTC-95-07 CORR. https://www.iattc.org/Meetings/Meetings2020/IATTC-95/Docs/_English/IATTC-95-07-CORR-02-Dec-20_Regional%20Observer%20Program%20for%20transshipments%20at%20sea.pdf

[viii] Annual Report on WCPFC transhipment reporting prepared by the WCPFC Secretariat. WCPFC-TCC15-2019-RP03. https://www.wcpfc.int/node/43557

 [DBC1]It would be good to add that, since WCPFC’s PSMs CMM 2017-02 includes an opt-in mechanism and requires members to specifically request inspections in port, it is unlikely that these carriers are being afforded the necessary oversight once they enter port with transshipped product on board.

 [FB2]Would be important to clear that HS carriers do not come into PICs Ports

of the estimated 100000 fisherman deaths a year , 98% are artisanal and subsistence fishermen, of which 63% occur in inland waters of Africa, the most unfairly treated continent in the world”

I’ve known the good people of the Fish Safety Foundation for a while (NZ is not a big place) and they are committed to the cause. Is hard not be overwhelmed by their reporting of 100000 fishermen diying a year. Is a huge number, and each of them is a tragedy in itself. As a former fisherman that had to bring dead crew members back to shore, the grief I’ve seen in the relatives' eyes is something that will live with me forever.

Of course, as soon as you read the report, you undertand the limitations they faced in reaching those figures but most importantly, the geographical and type of fisheries distribution of these deaths the picture becomes clearer.

Unfortunately, the figure seems to be immediately associated with deaths in commercial fishing and blamed on the rampant IUU fishing… as if there were no people working on fisher safety, rights and IUU fishing anywhere. 

The table above is already telling you that 98000 (98%) of those deaths come from artisanal and inland fisheries in Africa. I’m not going to dwell on the difficulties faced in Africa for generations and generations since colonialism and the lack of resources and opportunities. While working there and witnessing the conditions and crafts the subsistence fisherman use, the very few enforcement capacities of fishing authorities and the absolute lack of political will by some of the authorities I worked with to reign on DWFN on their EEZ… the total share of those deaths in sadly not surprising.

So in this post, I’ll tell you what the situation is in the area I work and know: the Pacific. In terms of small scale fisheries, the bulk of the work done here has been led by SPC and FAO. Already a deep dive into the situation was done in 1991 by my friend Mike McCoy for FAO. Since then a lot of work has been done in 5 key areas

• Sensitising fishery managers that sea safety is a legitimate and important objective of fisheries  management

• Focusing more attention on small fishing vessel safety.

• Improving systems for recording/analysing sea accident data and making use of the results  

• Awareness programmes

• Regional sea safety workshops

While not perfect, it has worked over the years, and with the use of substantial efforts by Search and Rescue Support by NZ and Aus assets and the use of commercial fishing vessels. And there is plenty more that can be found, in fact as recently as this year, I propose working with newer technologies and using sail for emergency rigs.

I do take a strong interest in the drivers for fishers taking risks, and the authors of the report go deep in that. And I agree with them: Governance, IUU, Sustainability, Climate Change, and Poverty have a massive role in it (I also would have included culture winch, from my own experience, is influenced by poverty – you have nothing to lose when you have nothing)

However, I believe that the influence of each of these drivers is also regionally varied… their individual and combined influence in Eastern Africa may not be the same as that in Western Africa, which then will be different in SE Asia and definitively in the Pacific.

And here I take a HUGE issue with a briefing by PEW on this report, one that makes me rethink the collaborations I had with them so far.

For some reason, they have a massive dig at the Pacific Islands, which are barely touched the Fish Safety report and quoting a reference that not even the original, and they state:  

an estimated 24% of Pacific marine catch is underreported each year—with half of that underreported catch reaching international markets

as to justify the comparatively few deaths in the region, on IUU fishing

That figure is demonstrably not true and is based on desktop research that mixes SE Asia with the Pacific. A much fairer quite would have been to quote FFA’s IUU quantification report 2022, a report done by the people that is the forefront to the IUU issues in the region,  where “total annual volume of the product either harvested or transhipped involving IUU activity in Pacific tuna fisheries during the 2017-19 period was 192,186t, with 90% confidence that the actual figure lies within a range of 183,809t to 200,884t” which is substantially less than the 12% they quote reaching the international market.

As said, no issue with the FISH safety report itself, but again I take issue with the usual framing and quoting of their findings by environmental, philanthropic, and media organisations' to shame and further marginalise the thousands that I know and work with, and whose life is devoted to manage fisheries, control IUU and uphold the rights of fisherman.

A much fairer quote needs to be “new study found that of the estimated 100000 fisherman deaths a year , 98% are artisanal and subsistence fishermen, of which 63% occur in inland waters of Africa, the most unfairly treated continent in the world” so this is the one I’m using.

What impact could a red card to Panama will have in the tuna industry?

Panama has been on my mind lately, as I heard rumours that the EU’s DG MARE is brewing a red card for them. Let's get clear that Panama is a flag of convenience / open registry (this article gives some further context on Panama)

124 more of these around… surprisingly no panamenians on board 🙄

Panama had a yellow card in 2012 (lifted in 2024) and the 2nd one in 2019, which didn’t focussed them at all… in fact, right now, I’m following a Panamian carrier we suspect of setting FADs (something they are not licenced to do and is double bad since we are in FAD closure in the WCPFC. Panama, as flag state is responsible, but no answer to queries

Carriers don do stuff like that twice in the same area with 5 months dfifference (and wasn’t weather is over 10kts avg speed)

The forte of Panama in the RFMOs is that it is the preferred flag for carriers and some longliners… but mostly carriers… 125 in the WCPFC alone to be precise.

So Let's imagine that Panama I indeed identified as a non-cooperative third country... among other reasons, due to the lack of control over their flag vessels, and ergo gets the “red card” 

The usual reading of (EC) No. 1005/2008 is that fishery products caught by fishing vessels under the flag of the non-cooperative state do not have access to the EC as they could not provide catch certificates. 

Now... nothing that 1005/2008 defines:

‘fishing vessel’ means any vessel of any size used or intended for use for the purposes of commercial exploitation of fishery resources, including support ships, fish processing vessels, vessels engaged in transhipment and carrier vessels equipped for the transportation of fishery products, except container vessels;

The declaration of "non-cooperating" to Panama would not affect the capture products of other "cooperating" states that are transshipped to Panamanian carriers.

Article 38 - Measures applicable to non-cooperating third countries only says in this regard:

1) the importation into the Community of fishery products caught by fishing vessels flying the flag of such countries shall be prohibited, and accordingly, catch certificates accompanying such products shall not be accepted.

Therefore, it reads NO effect since the catch certificate is issued by the flag state, and the carrier only acted as a transporter, despite falling under the definition of a fishing vessel.

The exciting thing here is that a Taiwanese or Chinese-owned vessel transshipping to a Panamanian would not be affected, but one owned by a Spanish or French national vessel would be, based on the same Article 38, 

6) private trade arrangements between nationals of a Member State and such countries in order for a fishing vessel flying the flag of that Member State to use the fishing possibilities of such countries shall be prohibited; 

A red that only affects the catches by Panamanian vessels would be a blow to some longliners, but the inclusion of carriers would make them immediately leave the Panamanian registry (I suppose they will go to the Liberian 🥺) and would wreck the WCPO tuna industry for a little while until all carriers are re-registered and so on...

In hindsight would be awesome that a red card means all fish that touch vessels with that flag become ineligible for the EU… but at present other than Panama losing face (not that they care)… no changes I’m afraid.

FIPs: A voluntary, corporate “tool” not fit for mitigating labour abuses

Been waiting for this paper for a bit (as I got to see an early draft and really liked it) but also because I got the do one of my 1st boardings in almost 3 years on a jewel of a vessel, the way all vessels could look like and people on board should be cared for.

As for the paper is written by 2 people I have corresponded with in the past and truly respect; Chris Williams (ITF), and Jessica L. Decker Sparks (University of Nottingham & Tufts University): Fishery improvement projects: A voluntary, corporate “tool” not fit for the  purpose of mitigating labour abuses and guaranteeing labour rights for workers.

As usual, I recommend it you read it from the original that is for free

I just will quote some parts that really resonate to me… Starting with this jewel:

Voluntarisation is not a substitute for ratification, implementation, and enforcement of laws and policies pertaining to human and labour rights.

 Anyway, here I go

Abstract
The recent development of a Human Rights and Social Responsibility Policy for fishery improvement projects (FIPs) has accelerated industry and NGO-led initiatives to address human and labour rights violations in seafood supply chains through FIPs. However, this brief communication demonstrates that FIPs’ _social requirements, as currently constituted and reported, suffer from many of the same problems as other voluntary, market-based initiatives that fail to mitigate labour abuses. Examples of these shortcomings include the voluntarisation of what should be binding, international conventions and standards; moving benchmarks that lack meaning for workers; an absence of worker-defined remedy and recourse processes; and confusion around what actually constitutes a human rights due diligence process. In addition, social responsibility imperatives in FIPs present a new threat to the fight against labour abuses in supply chains in that they embrace and risk institutionalizing an ideology that moving towards, rather than complying with, fundamental human rights is acceptable.

Introduction
In the context of weak or absent regulatory environments, private sector, market-based initiatives (e.g., buyer commitments, certifications, and labelling) have increasingly been touted as an alternative mechanism for mitigating a range of labour and human rights abuses in seafood supply chains. Therefore, the recent addition of a ‘social’ _component and remit as a fundamental objective of fishery improvement projects (FIPs) – _on equal footing with improvements in stock biomass or fishing gears used– may sound like a necessary change to achieve a truly sustainable fishery. However, in this short communication, we highlight why FIPs, as currently constituted and reported, will not be an effective part of the fight

FIPs, though, share many of the same features that make these other voluntary measures ineffective, namely they restrict the application of international standards by “voluntarising” _them, rely on self-reporting or flawed third-party social audits, lack enforcement mechanisms and pathways to remedy harm to workers, and fail to center the workers themselves in governance and remedies, choosing instead to simply report on them.

Progress or compliance – a false dichotomy

FIPs are differentiated from certifications in that market incentives are delivered and distributed for progress toward a benchmark, not just when the benchmark has been attained – _this further weakens what FIPs could achieve as minimal progress (however measured) that would suffice. This is the foundational, conceptual problem: a fishery or buyer cannot make progress or demonstrate continuous improvement or movement toward upholding fundamental human rights – _you are either compliant or non-compliant. Freedom from slavery and servitude is specifically articulated in Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [19] – _and thus progress towards a ‘best practice’ _of eliminating forced labour, debt bondage, human trafficking, or modern slavery in a supply chain is in contravention of this and other international conventions. Further, the notion of movement towards human and labour rights improvements creates artificial benchmarks that facilitate colonialist and oppressive comparisons (i.e., FIP A in Europe has less forced labour than that FIP B in South America) and prioritizations. This begs the question of how much forced labour is a supply chain actor willing to tolerate in the name of progress? If a FIP reduces the number of cases of forced labour from 50 to 49 cases per year that could arguably constitute progress; yet, at the same time many supply chain actors will declare they have zero tolerance for forced labour. It is impossible to have both zero tolerance and continuous improvement policies, again a false dichotomy.

Fish or fisher first in FIPs?
FIPs are often applauded for the diversity of their geographic scales [4], but this actually creates challenges for labour and human rights governance. Because FIPs always start from a boundary of the fishery, with human and labour rights being added-on, a FIP is typically not tied to labour governance models and regimes as their governance model follows fish, not people. The foundational International Labour Organization’s Work in Fishing Convention (ILO C188) provides a comprehensive framework for regulating work on fishing vessels [1]. While a flag state does have to ratify C188, and uptake has been slow, a buyer can still request that a vessel owner provide working conditions equivalent with ILO C188′s minimum standards under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) article 94′s obligations of conduct, which is widely ratified. Instead, FIPs make no such demand from buyers. They are neither aligned with, nor seek to enhance mechanisms to ensure that the flag state is compliant with its social responsibilities under UNCLOS. This may actually be perpetuating the aforementioned voluntarisation of binding international conventions, weakening access to labour justice. Without being tied to established labour governance models, this further limits opportunities for remediation – a guaranteed labour right and requirement of ILO C188, not a voluntary or best practice option.

Conclusion
FIPs seek to incentivize sustainable fishing through enhanced commercial market access, effectively to benefit retailers, importers, processors, and others in seafood supply chains – _but with little or no, involvement of workers or labour unions. The beneficiaries are the private sector and the producers with direct links to supply chains, rather than those working onboard the vessels. NGOs also benefit through reputational and financial gains if FIPs are successful. At present, FIPs cannot contribute to a decent work agenda since there is no current mechanism for the inclusion of the needs or necessary improvements in conditions for workers or the input of labour unions into the improvement of the fishery in a legally binding manner. FIPs have no tripartite structure and are voluntarising hard fought human and labour rights, providing a ‘get-out’ for seafood buyers. Interventions that solely focus on increasing fishing profitability can actually increase fisher/worker vulnerability. FIP proponents must broaden the scope of benefits delivered directly as part of a decent work agenda, going beyond the scope of what is considered ‘rational investment’ _by private sector actors in the supply chain. There is no business case for ending exploitation, so this is not the correct means to approach the problem. Market-based pressures can be effective (see worker-driven social responsibility programs), but they cannot be effective as currently conceived in FIPs because they are not binding on retailers and lack fixed benchmarks. Instead of investing in more FIPs, financial investments from retailers would be better used supporting price premiums that are guaranteed to be passed to workers’ _wages. While all businesses must be required to engage in HRDD in a way that is meaningful for and inclusive of workers, a voluntary FIP option distracts from that requirement. The need for a structure wherein actors at the top of the supply chain financially and logistically support improvements throughout, cannot be conflated with FIPs’ false notions of continuous progress. FIPs, as currently designed, will only yield benefits for companies and their NGO partners – not the fishers they purportedly intend to help.

—

Added to this paper is the fact that I’m back in Majuro after almost 3yrs of absence, and very happy to be back in reality. My 1st boarding was this beautiful vessel under the command of my friend Josu.

It is quite incredible… only once before I been to a vessel with such a good level of comfort, safety, maintenance, care for the crew, first aid room with telemedicine, internet for communication, solid salaries, food, and so on… everything is clean, and people is genuinely happy on board.

And if these guys can fish and make money… then why is the rest of the fleet is sooo crappy and pay shit to the crew…

Don't tell me that is subsidies… because the subsidies they have by the flag state are less than the rest of the fleet of the countreis and devided amon at leats 20 nations.

It makes me really happy for the people on board this vessel and sad for the rest of the vessels in the fleet I get to board… most of them very shitty while being certified or on FIPs.

 See for your self the conditions

Labour Standards on Fishing Boats, my presentation at the World Tuna Trade Conference

I’m on my way home after my presentation at TUNA 2022, the 17th INFOFISH World Tuna Trade Conference and Exhibition in Bangkok, Thailand.

I always struggle with these events as there are not what I'm used to, but it is good to see people again.

As many asked me for my presentation, I pasted it here below, they reflect a lot of the views and references I wrote about before

I reminded people that it is because of fishermen, we are all here in this event. I ended it with a quote by Arundhati Roy I read not long time ago, which is quite pertinent.

"There's really no such thing as the voiceless. There are only the deliberately silenced or the preferably unheard."

On becoming trained as inspector of labour conditions on board FV by the ILO.

As I did with most things in fisheries, I started doing the job, then got into the rules, and then got involved with the regulators. As my work gets more involved in the labour side (written a lot about it already) and many skills are transferable, I decided to get a qualification directly from the ILO as an inspector on labour conditions on board fishing vessels. So besides knowing about the issue but having been a fisherman and having written for FAO and published academically on the topic, I can speak now with some authority as an ILO-trained inspector.

 I personally believe that if you want to be helpful in a complex problem like fisher’s labour rights, you need to see it from all angles and be adequately qualified. Pointing the finger at a problem only, shaming the people working on it and expecting them to fix it tomorrow with very few resources may give you media exposure but does not fix the issue.

As with most things in fisheries, is not a lack of regulatory frameworks but a lack of implementation and, in particular by the DWFN that has the opportunity to lead, but also by some developing states that are important flag states due to the lack of capacity. 

The legal and jurisdictional framework for addressing labour conditions on board fishing vessels is centred on art 94(1) and art 94(3) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’). These articles place responsibility on the flag state of a vessel for, inter alia, ‘administrative, technical and social matters’ on the vessel, for ensuring safety at sea, and for ‘the manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of crews, taking into account the applicable international instruments. Much of the international discourse on labour conditions on fishing vessels focuses on the question of how to enhance mechanisms to ensure that the flag state properly fulfils its flag state responsibilities and how states may exercise complementary jurisdiction.

A lot of the specifics are regulated UN specialised agencies (I have been working with FAO for over 30 years) on the labour side is the ILO, which is the only tripartite UN agency that brings together governments, employers and workers to set labour standards, develop policies and devise programmes to promote decent work for all people.

The ILO has been engaged in promoting decent working conditions on board ships and fishing vessels, including through the adoption of international instruments. The Maritime Labour Convention of 2006 establishes minimum international requirements for seafarers’ employment and working conditions, although fishing vessels are specifically exempt from the Convention.20 This gap in scope was filled to a large extent by the ILO Convention concerning Work in the Fishing Sector (‘Work in Fishing Convention C188’), and its accompanying Recommendation concerning Work in the Fishing Sector, both of which came into force in November 2017.

The Work in Fishing Convention seeks to ensure decent work in fishing and — together with the Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention — should provide a comprehensive framework for regulating working conditions and protecting migrant workers on foreign-flagged vessels operating in distant fisheries. It places overall responsibility for working conditions on the owner of the fishing vessel, while skippers are responsible for the safety of fishers on board and for the safety of the vessel.

In many respects, the Work in Fishing Convention parallels the Maritime Labour Convention. However, with only 19 ratifications, it does not have sufficient parties to be considered a ‘generally accepted’ international regulation to which states are required to conform under art 94(5) of UNCLOS. None of the major distant water fishing nations are party. This is significant given the emphasis in the Convention on the primacy of flag state jurisdiction for enforcement purposes.

And honestly, this is pathetic… we have binding measures for the protection and welfare of many species of fish… but not one for fishermen. And while we are working on that at the regional level via FFA and the WCPFC, nothing replaces Flag state responsibility and enforcement.

And when you dive into detail into C188… is not really impossible… is honestly the very basics that any job shall require… yet, as usual, it seems that fishers are considered as being deserving of what jobs on land take for granted.

The Convention addresses issues essential to ensuring decent work on fishing vessels. For example, it:

• establishes the responsibilities of fishing vessel owners and skippers for the safety of fishers on board and for the safety of the vessels (Article 8);

• sets a minimum age for work on board fishing boats and requires special protection for young fishers (Article 9);

• requires fishers to undergo periodic examinations of their medical fitness for work on fishing vessels (Articles 10-12);

• requires that fishing vessels are sufficiently and efficiently manned (crewed), are under the control of a competent skipper, and that the fishers on board are provided sufficient rest periods (Articles 13-14);

• requires fishing vessels to have a crew list and fishers to have the protection of a signed work agreement, setting out the terms of the work they are performing (Articles 15-20, and Annex II);

• entitles fishers to be repatriated when their agreements expire and for other reasons, and prohibits making fishers pay to obtain their jobs, or blacklisting them (Articles 21-22);

• addresses how fishers are paid and that they shall have the means to send money home to their families at no cost (Article 23-24);

• sets standards for living accommodation and food on board (Articles 25-28, and Annex III);

• establishes requirements for occupational safety and health, as well as a basic level of medical care on fishing vessels; (Articles 31-    33);

• ensures that fishers benefit from social security protection no less favourable than that provided to other workers in their country; and, at a minimum, provides protection in cases of their work-related sickness, injury or death (Articles 34-39).

These are, of course, only some of the main ideas, with the details provided in the Articles noted above.

The Convention provides for higher requirements for certain vessels (e.g., larger vessels at sea for longer periods) and exceptions for other vessels (e.g., smaller vessels operating closer to port or at sea for short periods). It also sets out how the requirements of the Convention are to be complied with and enforced (Articles 40-44).

The Convention makes it clear that the fishing vessel's owner is ultimately responsible for conditions of work on board the vessel. It provides that: The fishing vessel owner is responsible for ensuring that the skipper is provided with the necessary resources and facilities to comply with the obligations of this Convention.

The skipper (the person in charge of a vessel) has his or her own responsibilities. The Convention provides that: The skipper is responsible for the safety of the fishers on board and the vessel's safe operation. These responsibilities are spelled out in more detail in Article 8

I’ll write more details on another post, but yeah, I’m looking forwards to doing more in this field.

Annual Report on WCPFC Transhipment Reporting

 As usual, at this time of the year before the Technical and Compliance Committee, we get very good reports from the WCPFC secretariat.

One of the most frustrating for me to read is this one. Particularly when I just had a go a couple of weeks ago at this in terms of HS transhipments observers.

I wrote ad nausea of the impracticability exemption and how much has been abused… this does not change, unfortunately

Impracticability bullshit…As you can see most of the transipmemnts in the HS take place just out of the EEZ pure hypocressy by the transhipping nations

The report is there to read and free to download from the commission webpage. I just will quote some of the things that strike the most. 

• In 2021, 62 % of vessels from 9 CCMs were listed on the RFV as authorised to tranship in the high seas, 85% of which are longliners.

• The 1,007 transhipment events reported to WCPFC in 2021 is 87% of the transhipments in 2020 and 69% of the transhipments in 2018/2019

• The Commission intersessional decisions also suspended the requirement to have an observer on board either the carrier or the fishing vessel to observe transhipments from 27 May 2020 to 15 June but with a transitional period from 15 June – 31 December 2022 during which time CCMs should make best efforts to embark observers following agreed guidelines. In 2021, the level of unobserved transhipments increased to 88% in 2021.

• Bigeye and yellowfin tuna make up the bulk of species transhipped, representing, respectively, 34% and 28% of the 2021 provisional longline catch.

the usual supects

• Information on the location and species mix of transhipments shows distinct changes over the last 6 years, with transhipments now more focused in the central and east Pacific.

• Comparison of transhipment locations with catch per unit effort data indicates a potential relationship with higher areas of bigeye effort.

• There were no new cases of alleged violations of Compliance CMM2009-06 in 2021 or 2022.

• Secretariat analytical processes to identify possible issues with reporting of transhipments e.g. comparisons across datasets, are proving useful but resource constraints in 2020 and 2021 have limited further refinement.

• The main species transhipped in 2021 was bigeye and albacore which represented 34.3 % and 27.5% of the provisional longline catch estimates for that year. In 2020, these species represented 31% of the catch.

Functional Longlining Fleets across the Pacific

While all fishing gears have advantages and disadvantages (like everything else in life!) I have a special thing for longline…. While in most gears, physics and oceanography (they are closely related), the longline has a lot of chemistry… I explored that in my thesis on the development of a selective bait for the Longlining Fishery of Snapper (Pagrus auratus) and maintained an interest in it over the years, as you can read here, here, here and all over here, just to mention a few…, yet always from the perspective of understanding how a longliner catches a group of fishes but never thought on how longlines fish as a group.

So when I was approached by Tim Frawley (whose work I already blogged about here) to be involved in a paper he was writing with others on longliner fleet operations across the pacific, I was immediately interested. And finally, the paper was published (my 3rd paper in 3 years), and on top of that got published on my birthday!

From management, we see longlining in an almost binary approach: tropical and southern. In zone or HS, landing or transhipping… yet the reality is much more complex because longliners are never just one thing catching one type of fish in one place… reality ought to be more complex… and it is… substantially more complex!

Despite their value and ocean impacts, many longline fisheries remain opaque, so we characterised and analysed 11 distinct fishing fleets across the Pacific using public data sources.

In any case , and as usual, I recommend you read the original: Clustering of disaggregated fisheries data reveals functional longline fleets across the Pacific, as it is free. I just will quote the key parts of it, as I’m quite proud of my minimal role in this paper.

With improvements in technology, big ocean data are increasingly used to describe ocean uses and prioritize management action. Within fisheries, much of the discourse to date has concerned the identification of flag states responsible for illegal fishing and/or interactions with protected species. Yet, little guidance exists regarding how recent advances can be leveraged to inform the development of sustainable and equitable harvest-control rules. Here we link vessel movement and registration data with catch reports to characterize “functional fishing fleets” across the Pacific.

Considering the strengths and limitations of each data source, we argue they are more valuable when used collectively to support the evolution of existing management operations than as the sum of their parts deployed in isolation. Indeed, the future sustainability of high seas fisheries may hinge on increased cooperation and transparency required to harness and democratize the benefits of the digital ocean ecosystem for improved governance.

Summary

Ensuring the long-term sustainability of tuna, billfish, and other transboundary fisheries resources begins with data on the status of stocks, as well as information concerning who catches what fish, when, where, and how. Despite recent improvements in fisheries monitoring and surveillance, such dynamics remain poorly understood across the high seas. Here we delineate and describe pelagic longline activity in the Pacific Ocean using a framework that integrates descriptive vessel information and tracking data with species-specific catch reports.

When parsed by distinct vessel behaviors and attributes, disaggregated fisheries data highlight the existence of multi-national, multi-specific (i.e., targeting multiple species) fishing fleets, many of which target waters that span more than one management area.

Our findings emphasize the need for increased coordination across regional and sub-regional governance bodies and suggest that effective and equitable management of the sector may require efforts to move beyond single-species, single-area controls and operational distinctions based primarily on vessel flag and/or gear type alone.

Conclusions and future directions

This characterization of the activity patterns of pelagic longline fishing fleets in the Pacific is just the beginning of a more nuanced understanding of the sector. Undoubtedly, as data quantity, quality, and availability increase, additional fleets with unique behaviors and attributes will emerge from those we have described.

Nevertheless, our results provide valuable evidence of the utility of disaggregated fisheries analyses that integrate descriptive vessel information and tracking data with catch reports to identify and describe the behaviors and attributes of distinct fishing fleets. In the future, such classified groups have great potential to serve as a foundation for a more differentiated and targeted approach to fisheries research, monitoring, and management. Across other disciplines, the utility of disaggregated units is already recognized as critical for the monitoring and management of human-environment interactions.

For transboundary fisheries in the Pacific Ocean, fleet-disaggregated analyses could be used to:

1. Address the differential effects of time/area closures and catch quotas,

2. Analyze the competition for space among sectors (i.e., large-scale versus small-scale, longline versus purse-seine) and emerging ocean users (i.e., offshore wind farms and deep-sea mining claims),

3. Study the socioeconomic attributes and/or environmental associations of different fishing livelihood strategies,

4. Estimate bycatch and non-target species interactions, and

5. Audit self-reported logbook records.

Given the degree to which concerns regarding the relative distribution of costs and benefits continue to impede the adoption of pelagic longline management and conservations measures and recent research regarding the asymmetrical impacts of climate change on regional fishery landings and revenue, we suggest such applications are particularly salient for transboundary fisheries across the Pacific.

EEZ-adjacent DWF from a coastal and flag State perspective

One of the areas that I had the interest in exploring for a while now (and it was a catalyser for me to get to the Rhodes Academy) is the legal “tension” between flag states and coastal states… and the areas of my work where is more palpable are: #1) who is responsible for signing off catch certificates assuring the legality of catch, and #2) fishing and transhipping in the mile 201 (a problem we have in the Pacific in particular with transshipping in HS).

transhipping near someone’s EEZ sometime in the past

So with #2 in mind, I read with interest this recent paper by Millicent McCreath and Valentin Schatz, “EEZ-adjacent distant-water fishing as a global security challenge: An international law perspective”.  Their paper uses the tensions between China and Latin American coastal states (in particular, the Chinese squid fleet off Ecuador's and Peru EEZ)and analyses the security challenges posed by DWF from the perspective of international fisheries law.

While the paper goes on security and China, my much more modest interest is related to an interesting take in chapter 4, where they analyse the EEZ-adjacent DWF from a coastal State perspective and then from a flag State one.

From a fisheries and ocean law nerd perspective, it makes a very interesting read, so I take it on me to quote those two sections below! Yet as always! I recommend you read the original since it is totally worth it!

The legal regime for EEZ-adjacent fisheries

International fisheries law comprises a multilayered regime of binding and non-binding instruments of varying geographical and substantive scope, membership and content - all of which lay down rights and obligations of states and other entities (e.g., RFMOs) with respect to the conservation and management of marine capture fisheries. The legal regime applicable to EEZ-adjacent high seas fisheries is particularly complex, which renders an abstract description of this regime difficult. Against this background, the current analysis focuses on the most important instruments for the present purposes, taking the Chinese squid fisheries off the Pacific coast of Latin America as a case study.

For this purpose, this section briefly sketches the relevant substantive requirements imposed by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA), taking into account that not all relevant states are parties to both of these treaties.

EEZ-adjacent DWF from a coastal state perspective

In their EEZs, coastal states have sovereign rights “for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living”, including fisheries. As concretized by Articles 61 and 62 UNCLOS, these sovereign rights include the jurisdiction to prescribe laws and regulations concerning the conservation and management of fisheries in the EEZ. In return, Article 61 UNCLOS imposes conservation and management obligations on the coastal state and Article 62(2) UNCLOS obliges it to grant other states access to the surplus (if any) of the allowable catch. The extent of the coastal state’s EEZ fisheries jurisdiction has been addressed in a number of - sometimes contentious - decisions of international courts and tribunals, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper.  In the context of EEZ-adjacent fisheries, both the geographical and subject-matter scope of the coastal state’s prescriptive jurisdiction are important.

With respect to geographical scope, the coastal state’s prescriptive EEZ fisheries jurisdiction is limited to its EEZ. In this respect, the wording of Article 56(1)(a) UNCLOS (‘[i]n the [EEZ], the coastal state has […] sovereign rights’) in conjunction with the definition and spatial extent of the EEZ stated in Articles 55 and 57 UNCLOS is clear. Coastal states lack EEZ-related jurisdiction to prescribe laws and regulations with respect to the fishing activities of foreign vessels in EEZ-adjacent high seas areas - even where straddling or highly migratory fish stocks within the meaning of Articles 63(2) and 64 UNCLOS, respectively, are concerned. That said, some categories of EEZ-adjacent fishing activity may call the clarity of this distinction (inside vs. outside of EEZ) into doubt. For example, a supply vessel might hover just outside the EEZ to receive transhipments from vessels fishing illegally in the EEZ, forming part of a joint operation. Alternatively, a vessel’s fishing gear (e.g., long-line, net, drifting fish aggregating device (FAD)) might be used in a fashion that results in the gear drifting into the EEZ in order to catch or attract fish that is later brought on board on the high seas. To what extent coastal states might be able to claim prescriptive jurisdiction over vessels located just outside the EEZ in such situations - invoking concepts such as the doctrine of constructive presence - remains an open question.

In terms of subject matter, coastal states may, for example, have an interest in requiring unlicensed foreign fishing vessels to notify entry into or transit through their EEZs, require such vessels to stow their fishing gear while in the EEZ, prove that any catch found on board does not originate from the EEZ, or provide near real-time vessel monitoring system (VMS) data. However, as mere transit as such cannot be classified as ‘fishing’ or ‘fishing-related’,  the extent of prescriptive coastal state jurisdiction over vessels in transit through the EEZ is a legally intricate matter in light of the due regard obligation of coastal states under Article 58(3) UNCLOS vis-à-vis the freedom of navigation of flag states in the EEZ under Article 58(1) UNCLOS. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide an in-depth analysis of the legality of the various requirements that coastal states have enacted in their fisheries laws and regulations.

However, it should be noted that Goodman has shown in a comprehensive study of state practice that at least a certain degree of coastal state jurisdiction with respect to transiting fishing vessels has become recognized, which may be evidence of a shift towards a jurisdictional presumption in favour of the coastal state.  Support for this emergent principle may also be found in China’s reformed Rules on Distant Water Fishing of 2020, Article 32 of which requires Chinese fishing vessels to store their catches, stow their gear, and notify the coastal state in advance in accordance with relevant regulations.

It may be concluded that the geographical scope of the coastal state’s prescriptive fisheries jurisdiction in the EEZ is relatively inflexible, whereas its substantive scope has proved to be more flexible and open to expansive development through state practice, thereby improving the jurisdictional situation of the coastal state.

Whenever foreign vessels fish in the EEZ in violation of laws and regulations that the coastal state has adopted in accordance with its prescriptive jurisdiction, these fishing activities constitute illegal fishing under Para. 3.1.1 IPOA-IUU.  However, if the coastal state exceeds its jurisdiction, its laws and regulations are not opposable to (the vessels of) other states.

EEZ-adjacent DWF from a flag state perspective

EEZ-adjacent high seas fisheries are governed by Part VII of UNCLOS. Under Articles 87(1)(e) UNCLOS all (flag) states enjoy freedom of fishing on the high seas, which is, however, qualified to the extent that it is subject to various conservation and management obligations. Crucially, the right of all states to permit their nationals to fish on the high seas under Article 116 UNCLOS is subject to their treaty obligations (including, for example, the UNFSA or the constitutive instruments of RFMOs),  the ‘rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal states’ provided for, inter alia, in Article 63(2) UNCLOS (straddling stocks) and Article 64 UNCLOS (highly migratory stocks),  and the provisions of Section 2 in Part VII of UNCLOS.63 Articles 63(2) and 64 UNCLOS contain obligations of states fishing for straddling or highly migratory fish stocks to cooperate in the conservation and management of these stocks, either directly or - as is common practice today - through RFMOs.

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to describe the regime of high seas fisheries in detail,  a brief overview of the key obligations is in order. Article 117 UNCLOS establishes a duty of all states “to take, or to cooperate with other states in taking, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas”. Article 118 UNCLOS contains an obligation of all states to “cooperate with each other in the conservation and management of living resources in the areas of the high seas”.

Article 119 UNCLOS provides more detailed standards for total allowable catches and other CMMs taken by states or RFMOs, including the obligation to “take measures which are designed, on the best scientific evidence available to the states concerned, to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield  [MSY]”.

The mentioned obligations to cooperate (Articles 63(2), 64, 117 and 118 UNCLOS) are further concretized and supplemented by the UNFSA, which aims “to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks through effective implementation of the relevant provisions of [UNCLOS]”.  

These two categories of fish stocks are by definition particularly relevant in the context of EEZ-adjacent fisheries as they straddle or migrate across EEZ boundaries with adjacent high seas areas and are thus particularly vulnerable to unilateral exploitation by irresponsible flag states. Article 5 UNFSA contains various conservation and management principles. Among these, the obligation to “apply the precautionary approach” under Articles 5(c) and 6 UNFSA is particularly notable, but others are equally important in the present context: the obligations to “protect biodiversity in the marine environment” (Article 5(g) UNFSA) and to “take measures to prevent or eliminate overfishing and excess fishing capacity and to ensure that levels of fishing effort do not exceed those commensurate with the sustainable use of fishery resources” (Article 5(h) UNFSA) are relevant examples. While these obligations only directly bind States Parties to the UNFSA (i.e., Ecuador and Chile - which both joined in 2016, but not China, Peru or Colombia), the constitutive treaties of relevant RFMOs often incorporate at least some of them. In the present context, Article 3 of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean (SPRFMO Convention) ensures that China and Peru (but not Colombia) are legally bound by the key UNFSA conservation and management principles despite not being States Parties to the UNFSA (although limited to the scope of the SPRFMO Convention).

Under Article 8 UNFSA and the following provisions of the UNFSA, RFMOs and regional fisheries management arrangements (RFMAs) are the main instruments in the implementation of the relevant obligation(s) to cooperate. Notably, pursuant to Article 8(3) UNFSA, where an RFMO or RFMA “has the competence to establish [CMMs] for particular straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks, States fishing for the stocks on the high seas and relevant coastal States shall give effect to their duty to cooperate by becoming members of [the RFMO] or participants in [the RFMA], or by agreeing to apply the conservation and management measures established by [the RFMO or RFMA]”.

 From a practitioner and operational point of view, I’m quite fascinated by this type of analysis where reality and law collide, so I have a healthy level of “envy” for my academic colleagues who can make a living from researching and writing papers on these topics… I wish I could collaborate more often with them!

Observer coverage in the WCPO tuna fishing in “post-covid”

I’m kind of uncomfortable speaking of “post-covid” when worldwide people are dying of the disease. Thankfully not to the levels we had in the past, but it is not out there yet.

For the last 2.5 years the observer coverage in the regions was extremely low, with only 294 observed trips out of 2180 estimated fishing trips across the entire fleet. The lack of observer data significantly affects the precision of the purse seine skipjack but also bigeye tuna catch estimates in the aggregate data used for stock assessments.

SPC has previously advised that if the reduced observer coverage continues beyond 2021/22, there will be increased uncertainty in the estimation of management reference points for bigeye and yellowfin. 

Hence as covid stabilizes, we looking at ways to resume observer coverage. In  RMI we developed a new protocol for boarding observers, and while we maintained a pool of observers active with the domestic-based fleet, the reality is that in the region, we may have had a massive drop in the number of observers to service the estimated over 2000 placements a year we had prior covid.

Observers being self-employed, moved on into new jobs, started families, lost interest, etc… so even if their and the crew on board safety (in terms of covid) was guaranteed, it would take a while to get the core number needed back to the operational levels needed.

A lot of training and refresher training initiatives are taking place to help with this.

The transhipment at sea scenario was a mess before, and is bigger even now… we have seen a reduction in the number of observed transhipment events on the high seas, from 1472 in 2019, to 1172 in 2020, 1008 in 2021, and 348 to date in 2022. Few observers are being deployed on carrier or offloading fishing vessels, with 12% of transhipment observed in 2021 and 7% 2022.

Yet if we look at observer coverage in the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), where the structure of the observer programme is quite different from that in the WCPFC. The IATTC observed 94% of transhipments in 2021 (including those in the overlap area) through a combination of national and IATTC Secretariat placements.

So this makes me question if we absolutely need to reform the way that the WCPFC HS observer programme works (or doesn't work)

 In fact we recognised in the last FFA “Quantification of IUU Fishing in the Pacific Islands Region” that at-sea transhipment as a key area of uncertainty in the longline supply chain, stating that “important areas of uncertainty remain in the at sea transhipment component of the longline supply chain and monitoring and control remain a work in progress. In particular, improvements are required to strengthen the implementation of the observer program such that information provided by vessels on the volume and species composition of fish transhipped can be validated against independent observer estimates”

At present, WCPFC has a requirement for a minimum of 100% ROP observer coverage rate to monitor at-sea transhipment (CMM 2009-06 paragraph 13), but lacks requirements for standardized transhipment observer forms and is the only tuna regional fishery management organization (tRFMO) that has not created a dedicated high seas transhipment observer program for receiving carriers.

So, while some WCPFC members do provide observer coverage on their flagged vessels under their national observer programs, this leaves the Commission to rely on a patchwork system where each member designs its own transhipment observer program without Commission-wide requirements for consistent observer training, data collection, or reporting. Overall, this current process does not provide consistent information conducive to the long-term conservation and sustainable use of tuna resources in the region – a stated aim of the Commission.

Other tRFMOs such as IOTC, ICCAT, IATTC, and - to a certain extent - the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) have comparable transhipment measures that apply to large-scale tuna longline fishing vessels and authorized carrier vessels. Each measure requires that:

• All at-sea transshipments are prohibited unless monitored under the transhipment regional observer program (ROP).

• Members ensure that all carrier vessels have a transhipment ROP observer onboard

• Members submit an annual comprehensive report assessing the content and conclusions of the reports of the observers assigned to their carrier vessels.

Across the RFMOs, these measures have led to very similar high seas transhipment ROPs, financed by the countries whose longline vessels engage in transhipment operations but managed and administered by independent organizations. These third-party organizations have provided training, coordinated placements, debriefed observers, and reported on transhipment data for over a decade.

Also, most of the countries doing transhipment at sea (China, Japan, Korea, Panama, Taiwan) do it across all tRFMOs. So one would think that it would be to their own benefit to have standardised HS transhipment observer schemes across all their fleets, doesnt matter under wich tRFMO their vessels are operating.

I reckon it would be the right time for the WCPFC to explore the option of a centralised WCPFC HS TS ROP that would be managed by a provider that coordinates with the WCPFC Secretariat to:

1. Identify available PIRFO-certified observers from national programs;

2. Facilitate observer contracts and coordinate placement of observers onboard vessels;

3. Coordinate logistics such as flight, visa, and accommodation arrangements for observers;

4. Administer financial arrangements (including allowances for observers in transit);

5. Develop and administer a Code of Conduct for observers;

6. Facilitate insurance for observers;

7. Manage the provision of technical and safety equipment; and,

8. Coordinate debriefing, data management and reporting.

While the Commission considers the advantages of HS TS ROP, it is also worth including the following improvements for the overall effectiveness of transhipment monitoring in the region:

• Adoption of reporting minimum transhipment observer data fields and submission of these reports to the WCPFC Secretariat within 24 hours of disembarkation.

• Enhanced transhipment data sharing agreements with IATTC; and,

• Requirements for countries to respond to transhipment observer reports.