FIPs: A voluntary, corporate “tool” not fit for mitigating labour abuses / by Francisco Blaha

Been waiting for this paper for a bit (as I got to see an early draft and really liked it) but also because I got the do one of my 1st boardings in almost 3 years on a jewel of a vessel, the way all vessels could look like and people on board should be cared for.

As for the paper is written by 2 people I have corresponded with in the past and truly respect; Chris Williams (ITF), and Jessica L. Decker Sparks (University of Nottingham & Tufts University): Fishery improvement projects: A voluntary, corporate “tool” not fit for the  purpose of mitigating labour abuses and guaranteeing labour rights for workers.

As usual, I recommend it you read it from the original that is for free

I just will quote some parts that really resonate to me… Starting with this jewel:

Voluntarisation is not a substitute for ratification, implementation, and enforcement of laws and policies pertaining to human and labour rights.

 Anyway, here I go

Abstract
The recent development of a Human Rights and Social Responsibility Policy for fishery improvement projects (FIPs) has accelerated industry and NGO-led initiatives to address human and labour rights violations in seafood supply chains through FIPs. However, this brief communication demonstrates that FIPs’ _social requirements, as currently constituted and reported, suffer from many of the same problems as other voluntary, market-based initiatives that fail to mitigate labour abuses. Examples of these shortcomings include the voluntarisation of what should be binding, international conventions and standards; moving benchmarks that lack meaning for workers; an absence of worker-defined remedy and recourse processes; and confusion around what actually constitutes a human rights due diligence process. In addition, social responsibility imperatives in FIPs present a new threat to the fight against labour abuses in supply chains in that they embrace and risk institutionalizing an ideology that moving towards, rather than complying with, fundamental human rights is acceptable.

Introduction
In the context of weak or absent regulatory environments, private sector, market-based initiatives (e.g., buyer commitments, certifications, and labelling) have increasingly been touted as an alternative mechanism for mitigating a range of labour and human rights abuses in seafood supply chains. Therefore, the recent addition of a ‘social’ _component and remit as a fundamental objective of fishery improvement projects (FIPs) – _on equal footing with improvements in stock biomass or fishing gears used– may sound like a necessary change to achieve a truly sustainable fishery. However, in this short communication, we highlight why FIPs, as currently constituted and reported, will not be an effective part of the fight


FIPs, though, share many of the same features that make these other voluntary measures ineffective, namely they restrict the application of international standards by “voluntarising” _them, rely on self-reporting or flawed third-party social audits, lack enforcement mechanisms and pathways to remedy harm to workers, and fail to center the workers themselves in governance and remedies, choosing instead to simply report on them.

Progress or compliance – a false dichotomy

FIPs are differentiated from certifications in that market incentives are delivered and distributed for progress toward a benchmark, not just when the benchmark has been attained – _this further weakens what FIPs could achieve as minimal progress (however measured) that would suffice. This is the foundational, conceptual problem: a fishery or buyer cannot make progress or demonstrate continuous improvement or movement toward upholding fundamental human rights – _you are either compliant or non-compliant. Freedom from slavery and servitude is specifically articulated in Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [19] – _and thus progress towards a ‘best practice’ _of eliminating forced labour, debt bondage, human trafficking, or modern slavery in a supply chain is in contravention of this and other international conventions. Further, the notion of movement towards human and labour rights improvements creates artificial benchmarks that facilitate colonialist and oppressive comparisons (i.e., FIP A in Europe has less forced labour than that FIP B in South America) and prioritizations. This begs the question of how much forced labour is a supply chain actor willing to tolerate in the name of progress? If a FIP reduces the number of cases of forced labour from 50 to 49 cases per year that could arguably constitute progress; yet, at the same time many supply chain actors will declare they have zero tolerance for forced labour. It is impossible to have both zero tolerance and continuous improvement policies, again a false dichotomy.

Fish or fisher first in FIPs?
FIPs are often applauded for the diversity of their geographic scales [4], but this actually creates challenges for labour and human rights governance. Because FIPs always start from a boundary of the fishery, with human and labour rights being added-on, a FIP is typically not tied to labour governance models and regimes as their governance model follows fish, not people. The foundational International Labour Organization’s Work in Fishing Convention (ILO C188) provides a comprehensive framework for regulating work on fishing vessels [1]. While a flag state does have to ratify C188, and uptake has been slow, a buyer can still request that a vessel owner provide working conditions equivalent with ILO C188′s minimum standards under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) article 94′s obligations of conduct, which is widely ratified. Instead, FIPs make no such demand from buyers. They are neither aligned with, nor seek to enhance mechanisms to ensure that the flag state is compliant with its social responsibilities under UNCLOS. This may actually be perpetuating the aforementioned voluntarisation of binding international conventions, weakening access to labour justice. Without being tied to established labour governance models, this further limits opportunities for remediation – a guaranteed labour right and requirement of ILO C188, not a voluntary or best practice option.

Conclusion
FIPs seek to incentivize sustainable fishing through enhanced commercial market access, effectively to benefit retailers, importers, processors, and others in seafood supply chains – _but with little or no, involvement of workers or labour unions. The beneficiaries are the private sector and the producers with direct links to supply chains, rather than those working onboard the vessels. NGOs also benefit through reputational and financial gains if FIPs are successful. At present, FIPs cannot contribute to a decent work agenda since there is no current mechanism for the inclusion of the needs or necessary improvements in conditions for workers or the input of labour unions into the improvement of the fishery in a legally binding manner. FIPs have no tripartite structure and are voluntarising hard fought human and labour rights, providing a ‘get-out’ for seafood buyers. Interventions that solely focus on increasing fishing profitability can actually increase fisher/worker vulnerability. FIP proponents must broaden the scope of benefits delivered directly as part of a decent work agenda, going beyond the scope of what is considered ‘rational investment’ _by private sector actors in the supply chain. There is no business case for ending exploitation, so this is not the correct means to approach the problem. Market-based pressures can be effective (see worker-driven social responsibility programs), but they cannot be effective as currently conceived in FIPs because they are not binding on retailers and lack fixed benchmarks. Instead of investing in more FIPs, financial investments from retailers would be better used supporting price premiums that are guaranteed to be passed to workers’ _wages. While all businesses must be required to engage in HRDD in a way that is meaningful for and inclusive of workers, a voluntary FIP option distracts from that requirement. The need for a structure wherein actors at the top of the supply chain financially and logistically support improvements throughout, cannot be conflated with FIPs’ false notions of continuous progress. FIPs, as currently designed, will only yield benefits for companies and their NGO partners – not the fishers they purportedly intend to help.

Added to this paper is the fact that I’m back in Majuro after almost 3yrs of absence, and very happy to be back in reality. My 1st boarding was this beautiful vessel under the command of my friend Josu.

It is quite incredible… only once before I been to a vessel with such a good level of comfort, safety, maintenance, care for the crew, first aid room with telemedicine, internet for communication, solid salaries, food, and so on… everything is clean, and people is genuinely happy on board.

And if these guys can fish and make money… then why is the rest of the fleet is sooo crappy and pay shit to the crew…

Don't tell me that is subsidies… because the subsidies they have by the flag state are less than the rest of the fleet of the countreis and devided amon at leats 20 nations.

It makes me really happy for the people on board this vessel and sad for the rest of the vessels in the fleet I get to board… most of them very shitty while being certified or on FIPs.

 See for your self the conditions