I get frustrated quite often when I see blank statements about fisheries, as if all oceans, all types of fishing boats, all flag states, and all areas of operations are the same. (Think if I was to say the same about agriculture, and say that the cultivation of Palm Oil in Borneo has the same social and environmental impacts that organic carrots in NZ).
High Seas Transhipment os a longliner in between 2 dodgy flag states, what you expect?
This is more so when we talk about the overlap between IUU fishing and labour abuses (which as presented in this prior blog occurs only in the minority of IUU cases)
I discussed many times, that in my experience, the weaker the flag state the higher incidence of issues will be, furthermore if vessels fish in HS that risk factor increases massively, add to that the type of gear (which relates to many of the vessels characteristics and expertise in crew needs) and you have a very good risk profile where to find problems… longline and squid jiggers flagged in weak flag states fishing in high seas (and transhipping there to a carrier from other weak flag states) and in particular in areas with limited or nil RFMO oversight (like the SE Atlantic of parts of the Indian Ocean) and that is where your worst-case scenarios will happen.
Yet that is my personal and professional experience, but I cannot prove that “scientifically”… so I love it when I read a paper that aligns and confirm my personal views… here is one: “Revealing global risks of labor abuse and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing”
Surely not coincidentally I have corresponded and interacted with 7 of the 8 authors, namely Elizabeth R. Selig , Colette C. C. Wabnitz, Henrik Österblom, Jessica Spijkers, Nathan A. Miller, Jan Bebbington & Jessica L. Decker Sparks, (but not Shinnosuke Nakayama) and they are alll at the top of their games (in fact, I blogged about a Jessica Sparks paper last week)
I was interviewed and had discussion with some of the authors about aspects that surely are part of this paper and I was very happy to read it, and see my perceptions being proved tight by people that is way more educated than me.
Also because the results align with our own local undwerstanding of what is the IUU reality in the WCPO and the FFA membership, which is the bit of the ocean my friends in the PICs and I work with and care for.
The only are where I maintain a doubtful attitude, (albeit the very well-grounded methodology they use) is around the impact that signing PSMA has on fleet dynamics. Signing PSMA does not linearly implies that the vessels is implementing PSM.
There are many reasons why a country may choose not to sign PSMA while still provide for good standards in PSM (for example RMI, PNG, Tuvalu just to name a few) on the other side of the coin, countries like Uruguay who has been documented receive vessels that have fished illegally in the south Atlantic was one of the 1st ones to sign PSMA, Vanuatu, a country with an difficult record in terms of flag state responsibility and IUU fishing, is a signatory, I worked in Mozambique and Myanmar (signatories) many times and I can assure you there are no even the minimum PSMA practices.
In my experience the non signing commitment has more to do with geopolitics, costs, etc, that with government permeability to IUU fishing, to be totally honest in many cases... laziness... as people can't really be bother.
And I worry that the focus on PSM (which is necessary) comes at the cost that flag states are not pulling their weight! The actions of a vessels are ultimately the responsibility of the flag state (and this paper proves that week flag states re more involved in IUUthis) and because many don’t really leave up to their resposnbilities, it becomes necessary for coastal and port states to pick up the slack (and get criticise or called “port of conviniences” if they don’t)… and the flag states what?
In any case is great paper that I recommend you read it!
I just quote a bit that I really like!
Understanding the factors that drive risk is important for designing effective policies, collecting relevant data in seafood supply chains, and identifying the stakeholders that need to be involved in reducing risk. Port risk scores were used to determine at-sea risk areas. We found fishing vessel flag to have the greatest impact on predicting port risk for both labor abuse and IUU fishing, followed by vessel gear type for labor abuse, and the interaction between flag and gear type for IUU fishing
And the Conclusion
Co-located risks at ports and similar risk drivers for labor abuse and IUU fishing offer opportunities for synergistic action across the range of activities needed to mitigate them. For example, across independent analyses for labor abuse and IUU fishing risks, flag states with poor control of corruption and Chinese-flagged fishing vessels were found to be related to higher risks for labor abuse and IUU fishing, reduced vessel visits to PSMA-ratified countries , and shorter port durations suggesting a need for greater focus on these vessels in port controls and inspections. Additional due diligence measures in company supply chains for vessels with these characteristics could also be prioritized, particularly in high-risk ports. Similar actions may also be needed for carrier vessels flying flags that are associated with high ownership by countries other than the flag state, and higher risk fishing vessel gear types that may have transshipped. Although the specific actions needed for reducing labor abuse and IUU fishing may be different, establishing transparency and accountability at port holds promise in reducing risks for both. Higher risk areas are challenges for governments, seafood companies, and other key actors to manage collaboratively. Remedies need to focus on addressing risk, rather than moving operations elsewhere, which would only displace risk and may be operationally difficult due to fuel efficiency and logistics. Instead, high-risk areas offer opportunities for greater stewardship by actors to reduce risk in places where they operate or have jurisdiction. Increased coordination can leverage the particular strengths of each actor, including enforcement and monitoring capacity, market-based or financial incentives, social norms and governance control, to focus on places our results suggest are at greatest risk. Previous work in fisheries has illustrated that collective action between diverse actors generates results. By wielding their respective powers, key actors can take concerted action across supply chains, create or improve regulatory frameworks, and catalyze change in industry behavior to reduce the risks of labor abuse and IUU fishing in global fisheries.