I made it abundantly clear that I struggle with private certifications in the seafood world at all sorts of levels, seafood processing, ecolabels and crew labour for many technical reasons and some principle ones.
Instead of paying the certification, just pay me more and respect my rights as if was on land
In a nutshell for me, private certifications/voluntary standards create a parallel system instead of supporting the organisations that are supposed to do the job.
And it gets worse, since the origin of this movement is based on the assumption that food safety, fisheries and labour administrators (in particular those from developing countries) are not doing a good enough job, yet many times during my work with many fisheries administrations in the Pacific I have spent 2-3 days responding to the questions of the consultants that have come to ‘assess’ the situation for certification... so in effect, they come for data to the people and institutions that the ‘consumer’ does not trust!
That irony for me is mind-blowing. If you really want to help, why not just support the official institutions in the countries whose job and whole existence is to deal with those issues, instead of creating a parallel system where the money goes to private organizations from rich countries instead of fishers and workers from poor ones.
So when I read in the title of a paper “Worker-less social responsibility: How the proliferation of voluntary labour governance tools in seafood marginalise the workers they claim to protect” I get immediately interested!
The paper is spearheaded by Jessica Sparks, with whom I have corresponded and chatted over the last years and also Chris Williams who I recently interacted too. I think the paper is a ‘must-read’ if you have an academic, practical or commercial interest in the labour topic in fisheries, and I dully recommend you read the original, has it has excellent comparative tables along with all the commercial options (pun intended) out there.
I quote the Abstract and the Conclusion
Abstract
In response to labour and human rights violations on board fishing vessels, the private sector is increasingly relying on market-based solutions in the form of voluntary, non-governmental social governance tools to improve working conditions for fishers. While the proliferation of these tools is relatively recent in fishing, there is substantial evidence from other sectors that these voluntary standards fail to transform working conditions. Yet, there remains an insistence on using market-based solutions to mitigate labour abuses in fishing despite the problem being a market failure. Using a human and labour-rights based analytical paradigm that underpins worker-centric processes, we constructed objective criteria to assess several voluntary standards against. Failing to include workers and commit to meaningful remedy, findings from the analysis suggests these voluntary nongovernmental social governance tools are not able to ensure that human and labour rights are respected in a way that is consistent with state and international regulation or rigorous human rights due diligence. As a result, there is an urgent need for a transformational shift in the sector away from a worker-less reactive and adaptive corporate social responsibility strategy of doing less harm toward a fundamental commitment to redistributing power through a worker-driven social responsibility paradigm.
Conclusion
The hydra of non-governmental social governance tools being produced will be an ineffective means for increasing respect for and improving human and labour rights within seafood supply chains in the absence of transformations in the following areas:
1) the business models of seafood businesses;
2) the long supply chains within the seafood industry;
3) worker participation in the governance of seafood supply chains; and
4) the widespread adoption of ILO C188 and similar laws and conventions by fishing nations.
The tools assessed in this research have been developed by bodies that have vested interests in the continuation of a social responsibility culture that does not ensure accountability, nor create real liability for those exploiting fishers. These bodies avoid measures that would make seafood supply chains transparent and traceable and keep failing to give workers or their representatives a seat at the decision-making table or in the verification processes.
While for those operators who already respect their workers, these tools can provide a benchmark to maintain good practice, unfortunately, for those who do not, these tools are a minor and easily circumvented (and voluntary) inconvenience, which can provide public relations and financial benefits to the companies, with no benefits ‘trickling down’ to workers. For criminal operations, these tools pose no significant threat at all.
The working conditions of fishers should be regulated along the same general principles as other shore-based industries as well as being comparable to working conditions in the merchant marine, with adequate consideration being given to addressing the special conditions which apply to fisheries.
The conditions of work for fishers should, as a general rule, be the result of collective agreements and negotiations between vessel owners and trade unions or fishers’ organisations that fulfill similar functions, and be fully in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the core labour standards adopted by the ILO and reflect the principles set out in the ILO’s Decent Work Programme. National law should, depending on national labour market traditions and customs, supplement the conditions set out in such agreements.
Even in the ideal circumstances, voluntary non-governmental social governance tools are an adaptive strategy to do less harm. Instead of increased investment in these voluntary tools, seafood brands and retailers need to encourage the sector’s movement toward a more transformational, transparent, and worker-centeric approach, such as worker-driven models of labour participation, monitoring, and remediation.