I have interacted with Liam Campling over the years (usually, we are the two tallest people in the room), but I don’t claim to know him well. Yet I have always enjoyed reading his work in research or for FFA.
In the wake of my recent posts about tuna diplomacy and neo-colonialism, I read his article with interest. It focused on the “Geopolitical Economy of China's Distant Water Fishing Industry.” As usual with his work, it is thorough and well-researched.
I agree with much of it, particularly as he diplomatically hints (and I have been openly calling) at the hypocrisy by which the West views China’s fisheries expansion today, while forgetting similar strategies employed by other DWFNs in the recent past (and perhaps the near future?).
He wrote in the conclusions something I have insisted on for years (and that I wish I could write as eloquently as he does).
I maintain that understanding industrial fisheries and DWF fleets in particular requires a geopolitical economy lens that moves beyond ‘fish’. This includes several explanatory factors to do with power, production, property and real competition that play out in DWF such as subsidies, geopolitics, access and modern landed property, other forms of spatial competition and dynamics of concentration and fragmentation.
I quote the abstract below and a bit of a summary of the paper, which I recommend reading in the original form.
ABSTRACT
China is the home of the world's largest distant water fishing (DWF) fleet. Narratives of its expansion portray China as a voracious consumer of ocean resources, as a serial abuser of labour and as aggressively expanding into developing country waters in an 'extractivist’ drive that destroys small-scale fishers' livelihoods. Yet, what does taking a historical and relational view tell us about China's activities vis-à-vis other DWF nations? Is the relationship with coastal states an example of ‘neocolonialism’ or, as the Chinese party-state insists, ‘mutual benefit’? And should one read China's DWF fleet as a tool of ‘grand strategy’ directed from Beijing or as rational profit-seeking individual firms, opportunistically driven into new frontiers by the exhaustion of domestic resources? This article seeks to navigate these binaries to argue that China's DWF fleet is the most recent example in a long history of pelagic imperialism by advanced capitalist fishing interests, where fish are a raw material in a wider generative industrial strategy and fishing activity is a tool in geopolitics. It is argued that China's DWF fleet is best understood as a relatively coherent cluster of capitals in competition, set in a mosaic of variegated state-capital relations, in tension at different relational scales. The article also offers suggestions for future research on DWF industries.
China operates the world's largest distant water fishing (DWF) fleet, a sector often criticised for overexploitation of marine resources, labour abuses, and its impact on small-scale fishers and biodiversity. So the article examines China's DWF industry through historical and geopolitical lenses, comparing it to other DWF nations and exploring its role in global fisheries, industrial strategy, and geopolitics.
Historical Context and Comparative Analysis
China's DWF fleet emerged relatively recently compared to other DWF nations like Japan, USA, South Korea, TW and Spain. Historically, DWF industries have been driven by overfishing in domestic waters, prompting fleets to expand into distant waters. This pattern, termed "pelagic imperialism," involves state-supported industrial fishing fleets appropriating marine resources globally. China's DWF development mirrors earlier strategies by Japan and many Western nations, but with distinct differences:
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs): Unlike Japan's imperialist approach in the early 20th century, China's DWF operates within the legal framework of EEZs established under UNCLOS in the 1980s. (unlike USA until 1985, see here)
Economic Significance: China's seafood industry is proportionally smaller within its diversified economy than Japan's during its imperial era.
Geopolitical Strategy: China's DWF fleet is not tied to direct colonialism but plays a role in challenging the USA-led maritime power.
China's DWF Development
China's DWF industry has evolved through three key turning points:
1985 Initial Foray: The fleet was state-owned, with SOEs like China National Fishing Corporation (CNFC) leading the charge.
1999 Going Global Policy: This strategy aimed to support national champions and secure natural resources abroad, leading to significant expansion.
2011 Acceleration: The 12th Five-Year Plan designated the marine economy as a strategic industry, doubling China's DWF catch between 2011 and 2018.
China's DWF fleet operates under state direction, with SOEs playing a central role alongside private firms. Provincial governments, particularly Zhejiang, Shandong, and Fujian, have driven fleet expansion, creating tensions between central and local authorities. Despite efforts to cap fleet size, the industry has grown significantly, reflecting contradictions within China's state-accumulation nexus.
Economic and Geopolitical Dimensions
China's DWF fleet is a generative industry, supporting related sectors like shipbuilding, seafood processing, and logistics. It provides raw materials for China's export-oriented seafood processing industry, which supplies global markets. The fleet also serves geopolitical purposes, such as asserting China's claims in the South China Sea and enhancing its influence in international ocean governance.
Access to fisheries in other countries' EEZs is mediated through complex arrangements, often involving state support, industry associations, and decoupled Official Development Assistance (ODA). China's approach mirrors strategies used by other DWF nations, such as the EU, Japan, and the US. By 2018, Chinese firms had access to 111 EEZs across 96 states, leveraging geopolitical and economic tools to secure fishing rights.
Fragmentation and Competition
China's DWF fleet is not a monolithic entity but a fragmented industry comprising diverse firms with varying strategies. These firms differ in ownership (state-owned, private, or public), target species, fishing methods, and regulatory frameworks. Reflagging practices further complicate the fleet's composition, with vessels often adopting flags of convenience or complying with coastal state requirements.
The fleet's heterogeneity reflects broader dynamics of "real competition" among capitalist classes. SOEs dominate the industry but compete with private firms, creating tensions within China's multiscalar state. Future research should explore the differentiation among firms, their business strategies, and their integration into global seafood value chains.
Conclusion
China's DWF industry represents only the latest iteration of pelagic imperialism used by most DWEN, extending commodity frontiers globally and influencing geopolitics. While the separation between state and capital is blurred, China's DWF fleet exhibits relative coherence due to the compulsion of capital accumulation and the political authority of the party-state. However, internal contradictions and external geopolitical pressures are likely to intensify in the coming years.
The article calls for analysing DWF industries through a geopolitical economy lens, emphasising the need to move beyond "fish" to understand the broader power dynamics, production, and competition dynamics. Future research should focus on firm-level strategies, labour regimes, and the generative impacts of DWF industries on related sectors.
Acknowledgements and References The research benefited from discussions at various academic forums and from contributions made by multiple scholars. The article cites an extensive range of references, including studies on fisheries management, geopolitical economy, and industrial development.