Effect of pelagic longline bait type on species selectivity by Francisco Blaha

As I wrote before, for my 2nd thesis (2000) I developed a bait for the longline fishery of snapper in NZ (that later became this paper), and had to get deep into the science of longlining and got to interact with the guru of this gear Dr Svein Løkkeborg, that still is, in my opinion, the person that understand at best the complicated events that have to happen from the moment that you set to the moment that you haul your fish on deck.

that was me once upon a time…

that was me once upon a time…

I based my thesis on the development of a bait for the longlining fishery of snapper (Pagrus auratus), using different proportions of industry surplus Greenshell™ Mussel (Perna canaliculus) and gurnard (Chelodinichthys kumu), which are known to be part of the snapper diet.

Both these species contain large amounts of glycine and alanine, which are known to stimulate feeding behaviour in snapper, and are substantial part of processing residues in the NZ industry, so I did the whole research diving into environmental chemoreception by fish, baiting technology and sausage-making process (best way to store bait), then tested the baits in a Snapper farm and working on small demersal longliners of the east coast of NZ.

I compared the results for 1000 hooks of my bait against the same quantity of hooks baited with control squid bait. And squid was 83.93% more effective compared to my bait… so that wasn't very good… although the catches with my bait were low, the selectivity for snapper over the standard mix of species with squid) was 29.25 % higher, which was very encouraging.

Since them… among my way too many interests are the chemistry, effectiveness, handling and price of bait (see here) but in particular against squid as bait… that it seems is mostly caught to then be used to catch more expensive fish. 

So when this paper “Effect of pelagic longline bait type on species selectivity: a global synthesis of evidence” by Eric Gillman and other researchers came trough my screen, interest was immediate. And while the article does not dwell on the topics I did, it touches close to the aim of my thesis, even if I aimed at a demersal species:

No studies were identified that found an artificial bait to be economically viable for use in pelagic longline fisheries. Developing an artificial pelagic longline bait that retains acceptable catch rates of market species but reduces catch risk of species of conservation concern warrants investment in research and development.

Furthermore, it does raise a key issue… catching more of all, or catching less but more specific?

They say: 

A related research priority is to investigate potential socioeconomic effects on pelagic longline fisheries from changing bait type. For instance, would it be economically viable for an artisanal fishery that currently catches squid to use as longline bait to replace this quasi-free bait source with purchased fish bait, and would the change in catch rates of market species caused by this change in bait type be viable? Understanding the ecological effects on the stock status of forage fish species, and socioeconomic effects on food security, from increased demand for these species for use as bait by longline fisheries, and estimating the conservation gains to species of conservation concern from reduced longline fishing mortality that could be achieved from changes in bait type, are additional research priorities.

Here is the abstract … yet read the original!

Fisheries can profoundly affect bycatch species with ‘slow’ life history traits. Managing bait type offers one tool to control species selectivity. Different species and sizes of marine predators have different prey, and hence bait, preferences. This preference is a function of a bait’s chemical, visual, acoustic and textural characteristics and size, and for seabirds the effect on hook sink rate is also important. We conducted a global meta-analysis of existing estimates of the relative risk of capture on different pelagic longline baits. We applied a Bayesian random effects meta-analytic regression modelling approach to estimate overall expected bait-specific catch rates. For blue shark and marine turtles, there were 34% (95% HDI: 4–59%) and 60% (95% HDI: 44–76%) significantly lower relative risks of capture on forage fish bait than squid bait, respectively. Overall estimates of bait-specific relative risk were not significantly different for seven other assessed taxa. The lack of a significant overall estimate of relative capture risk for pelagic shark species combined but significant effect for blue sharks suggests there is species-specific variability in bait-specific catch risk within this group. A qualitative literature review suggests that tunas and istiophorid billfishes may have higher catch rates on squid than fish bait, which conflicts with reducing marine turtle and blue shark catch rates. The findings from this synthesis of quantitative and qualitative evidence support identifying economically viable bycatch management measures with acceptable tradeoffs when multispecies conflicts are unavoidable, and highlight research priorities for global pelagic longline fisheries.

 

 

Not all is fisheries work in Majuro by Francisco Blaha

I miss being in Majuro… not been there for over 9 months, and is my 2nd home in the Pacific. I’m part of a community there, with work colleagues, my host family, and a bunch of water misfits that I got to know there: fishers, sailors, surfers and spear-fishers.

Yet as keen ocean paddler and swimmer, it really struck me that in one of the most beautiful and protected lagoons in the Pacific…. there weren’t any outrigger paddling canoes in the country to get out there enjoy the ocean and meet people after of before work, and compete in the Pacific Games.

So i decided to change that, and with the amazing support of some of my misfits friends and the support of the NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Northern Pacific Development Fund, we got it done!

Sadly I will not be there for the rigging and blessing of the canoes (Waka Ama as we call it in NZ), but I can wait to go back and get out there.

This article from the Marshall Islands Journal tell the story of the newly formed Majuro Ocean Sports Club

MIJ Sep 18 20 P15.jpg
we even have a logo

we even have a logo

Fisheries Observers and discards by Francisco Blaha

A classic by line we always had here in the pacific to suggest that is a good idea for longline vessels owners to increase observer coverage, is that observers are good luck on board, because observed trips consistently produced higher reported catches than non-observed, so when an observer is onboard, the vessel catches more fish!

Off to be very observant

Off to be very observant

This recent paper by Hunter T Snyder and James T Erbaugh on discards in artic fisheries seems to confirm the universality of that concept! 

The last paragraph of their discussion (read the original!) puts it quite clearly: 

 In Greenland, in a region with world-class fisheries enforcement, the underreporting of discards is extensive. Our findings that underreporting exists—be it intentional or accidental—underscores the need for fisheries managers and enforcement entities worldwide to understand the extent and the origins of underreporting. Improved understanding of how discards are produced is an important next step for minimizing discards and conserving marine resources. While command-and-control enforcement with fishery observers significantly alters catch reporting behavior, it is time to develop more inclusive, transparent, and collaborative approaches to deal with fishing fleets' waste of living marine resources.

This paper makes me reflect on something that has been lingering on the back of my head during these times of limited observer coverage due to COVID… while we can potentially assess statistically the estimated level of underreporting that does take place during these times (in comparison to other years)… I hope the level of uncertainty being caused does get reflected in the management measures being decided at the present.

Even if the whole set up seems to (falsely) assume that observers do not range along the spectrum of humans that go from the really moral ones at one end to the bluntly dishonest at the other... 

As an ex observer and a professional that has more than 30 years of interaction with observers, I’ve seen and experienced the best and the worst of the professional and personal attributes they have... yet is statistically indisputable that their presence on board increases compliance and in this paper proves it for reporting accuracy as well!

A schematic illustration of how skippers fish and report catches.

A schematic illustration of how skippers fish and report catches.

The “back end” needs of cameras on board (EM) by Francisco Blaha

I have been working on the side-lines of EM in the Pacific and writing about it for a while now… and I say EM (Electronic Monitoring) as it is more than just a camera like the ones in the dash of a car… is a combination of cameras, computers, GPS and gear sensors on vessels, and a lot more of systems inland as to provide data to help managers, scientists and vessel owners effectively manage fisheries.

With the suppression of observer coverage in the WCPO and politics in NZ, a lot is being written about EM internationally and nationally

this is the set up for 6 vessels that take 2-3 weeks trips each… it take in avg a 5 to 7 days to “observe” a full trip.

this is the set up for 6 vessels that take 2-3 weeks trips each… it take in avg a 5 to 7 days to “observe” a full trip.

The cameras onboard are just the visible tip of the iceberg when it comes to EM, this blog is just to explore some of the other key infrastructure and services that are needed for cameras/sensors on board to work as a solution. As with other technologies, I fear that the hyping in the current media discourse pinning them as the solution to multifaceted seafood value chain problems (from IUU fishing, birds/sea mammals conservation, labour issues and maritime crime) risks hyperinflating expectations on what his EM can offer, with potential operators then walking away because it does not deliver on the hype built around it.

Don't get me wrong EM is a great tool, is the next step in a road started by ER (electronic reporting) less than a decade ago and it would be ubiquitous in the next decade. Yet, to rush EM into the vessels at the present with all the logistic challenges we have is pushing the advances made by EM so far into the risk of failure and losing a lot of the good ground gained so far.

EMonitoring should be seen as what it is, one of a range of tools that can be used to monitor commercial fishing activities, in addition to onboard observers, port state measures, CDS, E-Reporting and the lot. A tool box full of different tools helps governments collect a wider range of data to help make informed decisions and combat illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing.

What are we talking about?

A camera e-monitoring system usually consists of wide-angle digital cameras, a GPS receiver, gear usage sensors, storage and processing devices, and a display screen. Sensors can collect data about boat locations and when fishing gear is being used. Cameras record imagery that can be analysed for determining the effort (number of sets, hooks or baskets), the total catch (species, approximate length, life status and fate) and other noticeable events (e.g. transhipments, crew behaviours). They are “closed systems” that do not allow for manual input or changes to data that is stored.

image by Archipelago Marine Research Ltd

image by Archipelago Marine Research Ltd

Sensor data can be sent in real-time via satellite to national Review Centres, and to regional databases, yet normally footage from cameras is stored on a removable storage device that are provided to a Review Centre once the vessel returns to port. There is flexibility around whether analysis is conducted at the national level and then provided to regional agencies or vice versa. 

image by FFA/WWF

image by FFA/WWF

A feedback report can be sent to the captain of the vessel, to ensure that they keep the systems maintained with cameras and sensors operating effectively. A trip report is sent to the fishery manager and compliance officers to alert them of any issues.

Where are we in the WCPO terms of EM?

Trials of EM systems for monitoring the activities of longline fishing vessels licenced to operate in the Pacific Island Countries and Territories began in 2014. There are now 73 longline vessels equipped with EM systems. The table below summarises the number of longline vessels per country equipped with an E- Monitoring System, the number of EM analysts trained and working, the number of review computers available and the number of analysed sets received in the EM database at SPC.

WCPFC-SC16-2020/ST-IP-08

WCPFC-SC16-2020/ST-IP-08

The EM records are mainly analysed by national fisheries authorities and sometimes by EM providers. Some of the resulting EM data (vessel, catch, set, haul and location details) have been sent to SPC and are available for its member countries to query and report on using the online tool DORADO.

 Currently for FIMS data is being received from a provider to the FIMS EM module. The EM data received is then displayed in FIMS and available for review. At this time the data does not relate to the video footage.

Standardised calibration and use of digital measuring tools are needed towards being able to use EM data (species and length) in stock assessments. These needs can be addressed through the establishment of an EM certification programme detailed further below

The EM application in the region focuses on identifying many activities. Cameras may identify interactions with bycatch species, and are especially useful when recording bycatches of protected species. The viewed data can also provide a secondary source of data, for example, to validate catch and bycatch logsheets.

The goal of EM is to provide a cost-effective monitoring solution capable of collecting data for scientific, management, and compliance purposes. Surveillance cameras installed on vessels have proven to be effective at recording crew and fishing activities, which can be checked for compliance with fisheries regulations. As such, camera monitoring that is integrated with Electronic fisheries information solutions (EFIS) can provide a useful means of validating vessel catch and gear reporting (hook numbers, use of wire tracers on longliners or FAD deployment and setting on FADs during the prohibition period).

The sensor data is especially useful in identifying steaming, setting and hauling. Sensors may also be inserted into hooks, or added to brails to weigh the fish on transhipment.

Cameras can also be an effective tool to monitor Health and Safety issues. A skipper can monitor crew activity from the deck. It may also be possible to detect any possible threat to observers, noting the loss of life of three PNG observers in the past four years.

EM has certain limitations and cannot replace the roles of other data gathering techniques entirely. For example, current camera technology does not offer an affordable and reliable means of identifying the sex, age and species composition of a catch sample. Some observations are difficult to make from camera footage/images, even with human input and specialist knowledge. Furthermore, camera setups (unless extremely elaborate) will generally have ‘blind-spots,' where the crew could discard bycatch, hide interactions with TEP species, or perform other IUU activities which could then go unreported.

As a result, while some see camera monitoring as a viable alternative to onboard human observers, others feel that on-board observers will remain necessary for the foreseeable future, at minimum to perform biological sampling and compliance monitoring where cameras are insufficient. The reality is that EM systems can complement the role of human observers and enhance overall observer coverage most particularly in the longline fishery.

Comparability of data EM vs Human

Lot of work has been one in the region by comparing the data obtained from the cameras with the data from traditional observers working in the same boat, and as my friend Malo Hosken (the SPC researcher on this topic) said: very few differences were noted between the overall species composition of the main tuna species between the two observer types indicating that the E-Monitoring footage is providing sufficient information for identification to the species level. There are several examples where it is evident that the species identification and catch coverage from the E-Monitoring video analysis are better than the on-board observer data.

One benefit of E-Monitoring is that it provides a means of reviewing footage of the video repetitively and by a number of people (e.g. including experts in species identification). With more time, further review of the data compiled from these trials could be undertaken to resolve differences between the on-board observer's record and the original E-Monitoring video analysis record to determine where the problem lies.

Furthermore, substantial advances are being made at the present regarding software tools that cannot only identify length but as well species, opening the door for fully automated analysis of video data. In these cases, the human observer analysing the footage comes only to resolve the events that the software hasn't. This technology has the potential of speeding up the analysis massively, allowing verified to enter the databases in near real-time at some stage.

EM service providers have been researching and developing software to use Artificial Intelligence (AI) solutions to aid in the analysis of EM records. Given that it is expected that more longline vessels will be equipped with EM systems, the need for efficient analysis of a growing volume of EM records means the use of AI software will be essential. However, for EM service providers to develop AI software which meet members’ needs, a large volume of EM records and corresponding EM data are needed. For example, if AI is going to be used in aiding the identification of species, at least 5000 images for each species are needed (at minimum).

These EM records and EM data are currently available and belong to the respective members who have produced them. There needs to be a discussion on how, collectively, members can benefit from ensuring EM service providers gain the records and data they need to pursue AI developments (which will result in proprietary software).

The Nature Conservancy (TNC) has launched an open library of training data to accelerate the implementation of AI in fisheries. For further details please go to: https://www.fishnet.ai/home

In early 2020, one EM service provider and one member country began trials of a Machine Learning Server. Equipped with an Artificial Intelligence algorithm, the Machine Learning Server points the EM analyst towards the start and end of setting and hauling operations as well as when a catch event occurs. This removes the need for the EM analyst to review video records where no activities are taking place, in turn augmenting the analysis rate.

A further challenge is environmental variability, which can make visual recognition difficult. Conditions at sea are particularly challenging – variable light, splash and spray, different vessel and background configurations. Similarly, fish may be in different orientations or stacked on top of each other – presenting additional challenges for accurate classification. This may make the use of AI more likely on belts and chutes as the technology is rolled out.

Finally, the market for EM systems is currently small, which makes it difficult for an EM vendor to make a large investment in research and development when AI may only have applicability to a small number of systems. And in cases when someone else is doing the video review (e.g., in a government center), the vendors have a little financial incentive to invest in AI development.

Despite these challenges, there is a lot of ongoing effort to advance AI for EM video analysis. While the hope is that it will eventually enable complete capture of species, length, and volume data, the next steps are going to advance in AI-assisted review (e.g., identifying key events). 

This all exciting stuff but it comes at a huge cost, since a lot of this technology is proprietary and system providers sell you the systems and the software but then you have to pay for updates, or they sell you the subscription… and you tied up to a continuous budget for it that can change… is not so easy

Footage delivery logistics

Live video footage through satellite transmission is not cost-effective at present, so footage is stored on a hard drive and sent monthly, or after each trip, to the provider for analysis. The Marine Instruments e-eye system does provide for an integrated Iridium modem, which allows for real-time data transfer. This also allows for less HD space needed for photos and longer periods at sea.

While there is provision for this facility in most systems, the cost of transmitting still frames, as opposed to live footage is still prohibitively expensive, and quite impractical because of the high volume required for transmission. 

Due to the size requirements of video footage, large on-board data storage facilities are required. Cameras film at 5 frames per second (24-30fps is movie standard), and use between 60 and 100 MB per hour of footage. A four-camera setup requires 240 to 400 MB per hour, which results in around 6 to 10 GB for each full day of recording. 1280x720 @ 24FPS on board (HD quality) and minimum recording capacity of the system is 13-14 weeks. 

Due to these dataset sizes, video surveillance footage cannot feasibly be sent in real-time via a satellite feed. Instead, it is usually transferred directly from the hard drive after retrieval. The HDDs are changed very easily onboard and can be examined at the control centre. Videos are stored onboard and encrypted. Videos are extracted locally from the encrypted HDD for analysis ashore by the owner or the Observer Program.

The process of hard drive data retrieval and footage review and analysis is currently relatively slow, taking a few days for dispatch, forensic recording, and then data viewing (~ 3-6 hours) depending on the recording requirements.

Since hard drive exchange is the most trailed option, it is the primary model being considered for video retrieval for current EM development efforts any form of EM implementation can expect complex logistics associated with this option due to the many ports across multiple countries with varying degrees of infrastructure visited by thousands of participating vessels.

For the EM system to work effectively, vessel owners and operators who submit the hard drive should have confidence that the data seen by the reviewer accurately reflects what was recorded on the vessel, as confirmed by a reliable chain of custody and supported by data encryption. 

In a place like NZ, this could be worked out, vessels could turn over hard drives to a dedicated collector stationed at each major port. These collectors could be trained staff affiliated with MPI or a 3rd party observer program.  

The collector should be able to meet vessels, swap hard drives, and upload video in a local office to transmit via Wi-Fi or physically pass off the hard drives to the appropriate centralized video review office. A locker system could also be used so that pickups and drop-offs would not require a person to be available the moment a vessel comes into port.

Hard drive retrieval methods do not limit the risks associated with mailing physical hard drives from remote ports with limited infrastructure.

There is a challenge for FFA or WCPFC secretariat to determine whether hard drives can be sent through certified mail services or via courier throughout the entire region. But even for papers this present challenge in the WCPFC, in COVID times without flights, this option is not available for most ports

Furthermore, vessels fishing in the HS that may not come to port for periods longer than a year would depend on the various carriers at sea to interchange HD, which is not realistic at the present.

Footage review

The time it takes to analyse footage is dependent on various variables. A present estimate (with the present level; of AI/Machine Learning capabilities is 1:15 (1 hour takes 15 mins to view/analyse), assuming the analyst is someone that knows how to operate the proprietary software and has a good understanding of the licence conditions, fish and species of special interest ID and fishing operations. Reality is that It takes time even in the best of cases…

At the present in the pacific, we have reviewers from third-party vendor and government fishery agencies.

Government Fisheries Agency video review has been undertaken by the fisheries with the support of external funding. This option can be attractive to states that prefer to maintain control of the video footage from fishing in their waters, and it can generate jobs for the local economy. This review option may also be attractive for at-sea observers who would be strong candidates to become EM analysts ashore in a review centre, although the jobs are quite different.

A data review centre is a complex operational system. Establishing such a centre will require countries to increase budgets, purchase review stations, hire and train staff, to review a huge volume of video particularly if it is centralised

If not centralised, there are inefficiencies to having different ports or regions set up their own review centre instead of consolidating the review process. Experience from pilots in the pacific has demonstrated the challenges of building efficient in-country review capacity, with cases of long backlogs, and difficulty getting local reviewers to meet the same level of review efficiency as third-party vendors. EM pilots have also shown a wide variation in the performance of national review centres, and this type of variability across a state or worst across RFMO member states could be detrimental to an EM program. 

The draft FFA Longline EM Policy commits the FFA Secretariat, SPC, and Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) to collaborate to provide technical support and training to EM review centres, a signal that there is a recognition of the challenge of building and operating these centres and that many countries will need assistance. One possibility to mitigate the cited difficulties is to create sub-regional review centres.

Third-Party Review – Other countries contract the service through a third party. This could be a commercial EM vendor or a quasi-governmental agency. Under this model, the government or industry contracts with a third-party entity to review the video and deliver processed data that meets the set of specified standards (e.g., data fields, quality, timing, review rates) (we have that at the WCPFC). This can be a more efficient way to handle the review of data as the government can act solely as a contract manager instead of building its own capacity to review EM video from scratch. If local jobs are an important concern, it may be possible to structure contracts to require the hiring of in-country reviewers. For low wage countries, the third-party approach could be more expensive than analysing the data themselves, but the start-up costs and inefficiency of building a review centre from scratch could limit the cost savings

Costs

To date, most of the costs for EM programs in tuna fisheries have been paid by NGOs and international organizations, but this model will not continue forever. Currently, much of the enthusiasm by coastal states for EM is related to the idea that in the future, industry will be responsible for paying most, or all, of the costs. The draft Regional Longline Fisheries Electronic Monitoring Policy formulated by FFA member countries states as a guiding principle: “User pays - full cost recovery as a default.” Many segments of the fishing industry feel that costs could be high and are also uncertain about how an EM program will affect their business. As the group that will be most impacted, they may believe that it is unfair for them to be entirely responsible for funding an EM program. This difference of opinion on who should pay for EM is seen by many as the most significant impasse for EM implementation.

Many reports on EM state that a major advantage of EM is its cost relative to human observers. However, human observers can have a cost advantage where observer wages are low (e.g., in Pacific Island countries national observer programs).

The costs of EM are also quite clear and immediate, while the benefits of EM can be more uncertain and diffuse. For example, there are costs of inadequate knowledge of fishing activity (e.g., depleted fisheries) but those costs are not very clear, especially in fisheries with limited data. 

EM costs fall into four categories:

  • Type 1: On vessel costs. These costs are associated with the installation and operation of EM hardware and supporting systems on board fishing vessels.

  • Type 2: Program administration and operational costs. These costs are associated with the administration and operation of the EM program, usually undertaken by national (or regional) fisheries administrations. These costs typically form the ‘core’ of the annual EM program budget, and would be a main focus for cost recovery.

  • Type 3: Policy and regulatory development costs. These costs are associated with the establishment of relevant regulatory and policy arrangements to support effective EM systems.

  • Type 4: Analytical costs. These costs are associated with the analysis of EM generated information to produce outputs in support of the administration and management of fisheries by national fisheries administrations (e.g., production of reports analyzing annual trends in EM information).

For example: the EM pilot project funded by FAO for the 50 tuna longliners based in Fiji operated for three years (2015- 2018). The total fixed and variable costs for the three years were US$986,575, which came out to US$6,577 per vessel per year. The pilot was able to review approximately only 44 % of the EM trips over the pilot’s duration.

Servicing EM Hardware Systems

The experience from EM pilots and fully implemented programs has contributed to improved reliability of EM hardware. Nevertheless, EM hardware may break or malfunction, so it is essential to have a good servicing plan in place that clearly articulates responsibilities and minimum levels of service. 

In the EM pilots, major repairs were often undertaken by EM technicians who needed to fly to the repair site – a time consuming and expensive approach. Even when only a phone consultation was needed, time zone differences between the vessel location and the EM vendor could result in significant delays.

With these challenges in mind, EM programs will need to set clear service expectations with the EM vendor, and ensure that maintenance issues are promptly addressed. EM vendors can use a variety of approaches to meet these requirements, such as training local capacity (e.g., marine electronic technicians), engineers, or deck crew to undertake common repairs, placing EM technicians in-region, or providing 24/7 remote consultation. 

Given the length and remoteness of many fishing trips in the region, empowering captains and crew to make EM repairs at sea will be important. This will include supplying spare parts, providing additional training on certain maintenance functions, and establishing communication protocols for technical support at sea. 

Equally important to creating a servicing plan is setting the obligations for vessels that experience equipment malfunctions. Vessel operators should be required to perform basic functions to keep EM hardware in working order at sea, such as ensuring that the lenses remain clean and that camera views remain unobstructed. If a system malfunction, operators should be required to report it immediately to management authorities. The vessel would then need to follow an agreed procedure when the EM system malfunctions. 

The strictest option would be to require vessels to return to port immediately. This would be a strong deterrent for intentional sabotage of EM systems, but could also place significant economic burdens on the fleet, and could potentially be a disincentive for fleets and flag states to participate in an EM program. 

Other options could include a risk-based approach, where vessels that have demonstrated strong compliance may be allowed to continue fishing, while less compliant vessels would be required to return to port. 

A limited number of exemptions for malfunctions may also be considered (e.g., a vessel can keep fishing for the first malfunction in a calendar year).

With some vessels taking trips several months in length and far away from port, the decision of how vessels need to respond to a malfunctioning EM system is likely to have a larger impact in the WCPO than in other EM programs in which trips are typically shorter and closer to shore.

EM Policy

The importance of policy cannot be underestimated, as you need to compare apples with apples, be able to define for what purpose the data is going to be used. Know the limitations you have with it, particularly if you going used for compliance! Do the fisheries law have the needed strength to deal with this type of e evidence?  Do we need to think what ty[pe of prosecutable offences may not be covered by EM? I imagine based on some of the very hardcore lawyers I know from my fishing days, that they could drag prosecution for months based on technical issues if there was to be some crystallized sea salt in the lens particularly when it comes to undersize fish… and so on.

In October 2019, a regional workshop was held at FFA to draft the Regional Longline Fisheries Electronic Monitoring Policy. The policy was drafted with inputs from members, secretariats, industry and NGOs. The draft policy was presented at the 2020 MCS WG and FFC meetings and was adopted on 19 June 2020. The purpose of this EM Policy is to describe a regional framework that, inter alia: 

  1. supports collective action at a strategic level; 

  2. promotes a level playing field in relation to the implementation of EM and mitigates against market distortions; and 

  3. facilitates economies of scale for national and regional benefit.

EM minimum data field standards and training of analysts/observers

The adoption by WCPFC of ER and EM standards is expected to support and accommodate those CCMs that have commenced implementation of a range of EM and ER technologies in their fisheries and will ensure that the Commission's databases and systems are ready to exchange electronic data in an orderly and efficient manner.

The SPC/FFA/PNAO Data Collection Committee met in February 2020 to revise the draft DCC Longline EM minimum data fields standards. These standards are proposed for member countries to use when embarking on trials or implementation of E-Monitoring (EM) for longline vessels licensed to operate in members’ EEZs (and adjacent waters). These standards should be provided to the EM technical provider to ensure the minimum data fields specified within are generated from the EM system, according to the EM Protocol notes provided. These standards are in draft format and will be presented to the WCPFC Scientific Committee (SC16-ST-IP-07) and ER and EM Working Group meetings in 2020.

Standards for the training, assessment and certification of EM Analysts and observers using E-Reporting tools

Units of competencies for EM analysts and observers using ER tools were presented to the PIRFO Certification Management Committee in 2018 and subsequently adopted by FFC in 2018. To build on these, Members have identified that there is a need to develop curricula to guide the training, assessment and certification of EM Analysts (staff responsible for analysing EM records) and of observers using ER tools. Building from the success of the Pacific Islands Regional Fisheries Observer (PIRFO) competency development programme, SPC and FFA members support the concept that a training and development programme for EM Analysts and observers using ER tools be established within PIRFO programme.

Strengths, Challenges, and Opportunities for EM Tuna Fisheries

There have been numerous trials and fully implemented EM programs in the region. These trials have covered both longline and purse seine fisheries. From these trials, some general conclusions can be reached about the efficacy of EM as a monitoring and compliance tool

Strengths of EM

  1. Provides accurate data on the location and time of fishing activity.

  2. Accurately assesses the set type in purse seine fisheries.

  3. Accurately estimates total catch per set in purse seine fisheries.

  4. Provides good estimates of the catch of main target species in longline and purse seine fisheries.

  5.  Identifies most Endangered, Threatened, or Protected (ETP) species interactions.

  6. Incentivizes more accurate reporting of data in logbooks.

  7. Covers multiple views of the vessel at the same time, does not require breaks, and video can be reviewed multiple times.

  8. Is less prone to intimidation, bribery, or interference in order to falsify reported data.

  9. Review of much of the fishing activity can happen at high speed (e.g., >8x speed).

  10. A space efficient solution for longline vessels with limited room for a human observer.

  11. Can sometimes provide cost savings relative to human observers.

  12. Helps document conformity with management measures and international obligations.

  13. Scalable option to implement on various vessels with different gear types.

Challenges of EM

  1. Accurate estimates of non-target species in purse seine and longline fisheries can be challenging with EM depending on catch-handling techniques and camera placement

  2.  Identification of ETP species may only be accurate at higher taxonomic levels (e.g., shark or turtle, but not at the species level). However, additional or higher resolution cameras may be a solution.

  3. Accurate identification of juvenile tuna (e.g., small yellowfin and bigeye) is difficult, although this is similarly difficult for human observers.

  4. EM systems are not linked to fish aggregating device (FAD) buoy identification systems.

  5. EM is not currently suitable for biological data collection (e.g., sex identification, otolith measurement), which could be addressed by complementing EM with dockside sample collection.

  6. EM cannot be used to accurately assess the condition or life status of fish.

  7. Hard Drive Collection logistics are very complex and will hamper the application on HS vessels.

  8. Fisheries Legislation may need to be changed as to incorporate new forms of electronic evidence and even types if fisheries offences where EM evidence can be used.

Emerging Opportunities of EM

  1. EM has been explored to monitor labour practices onboard vessels, but no results of comprehensive studies have been published in the literature.

  2. EM is being explored as a tool to monitor transhipments.

In general, it is easier to extract detailed information about catch in longline fisheries where the catch is brought on board one fish at a time, but EM has proven successful in purse seine fisheries as well. In some cases where EM has not been able to match reported data from human observers (e.g., species-level identification of non-target catch), changes in catch handling procedures or additional camera views may be able to overcome these challenges.

Many of the design choices are operational or technical in nature (e.g., what hardware should be selected, how much footage should be reviewed), but perhaps the most important lesson from the development of other programs is that “[getting an EM program adopted] is a people challenge not a technical challenge.

The reality is that, like most new solutions, there will be opposition along the way. Industry members will likely have concerns about additional monitoring, privacy, the costs of the program, and a general fear of the unknown. Fisheries managers may be concerned about the cost and complexity of the program and whether they will be able to effectively manage it. These concerns are legitimate and have emerged in the development of most, if not every, EM program. These issues cannot be sidestepped, and stakeholders need to be integrated into the design process so that their concerns are recognized and addressed. In particular, the industry needs to be involved as they will be the ones most impacted and their acceptance of the program will be critical to its success.

There are real challenges to developing an EM program, and the characteristics of particular fisheries can make this a bit more complex, but these are solvable challenges. Yet, to rush EM into the vessels at the present with all the logistic challenges we have is pushing the advances made by EM into the risk of failure. 


References:

Roadmap for Electronic Monitoring in RFMOs by Mark Michelin, Nicole M. Sarto, Robert Gillett

Analysis of the costs and benefits of electronic tracking, monitoring and reporting systems applied in FFA countries and identification of the required legislative, regulatory and policy supporting requirements. Banks R, Muldoon G and Fernandes V.

 

NPOA-IUU and their roles by Francisco Blaha

I have been dealing with National Plans of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (NPOA-IUU) for a while now… 

let me see that plan

let me see that plan

I started in 2003 and 2004 when I participated while I was still working with industry in the consultations for New Zealand’s NPOA-IUU, one of the first ones prepared worldwide. During 2009/10, when serving as a Fishery Officer at FAO in Rome, among other tasks, he was involved in the evaluation of the operational impacts of the deposited IUU-NPOAs. During 2012-14 as part of his work for FFA’s Devfish II, I got involved in the development of various NPOA-IUU in the region as I worked across all aspects of fisheries MCS and regulatory compliance delivery, strengthening the operational aspects in EU yellow-carded countries, including capacity building in intelligence analysis, and the development of SOPs to assist with boardings, inspections and investigations. 

And even after all this, I still wonder what their real role in the operational side is… 

Let go through their “reason of being”… 

National Plans of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (NPOA-IUU) are developed following the International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing (IPOA-IUU) adopted in 2001 by the Committee on Fisheries of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). 

The IPOA-IUU is a voluntary instrument and is one of four IPOAs (Seabirds, Sharks, Fishing Capacity and IUU) that fit within the framework of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, also adopted by COFI in 1995, and it describes the broadly accepted principles and measures to prevent and counter IUU fishing at the level of states, regional economic integration organisations and regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs).

In light of the already existing measures to combat IUU fishing (i.e. policy, laws, institutional setup, working processes and law enforcement framework), and on the basis of principles and measures articulated in the IPOA-IUU, the objective of all NPOA-IUU is to formulate pertinent and achievable, additional measures, necessary to close gaps in the existing framework addressing IUU fishing, and to reduce in a planned and concerted manner the incidence of marine IUU fishing in a county to a minimum.

Which is all good… yet in all these years I’ve seen them gathering dust and not really being used by the frontline people… so they always fill to me as one of those things that you need to have because is expected that if you have one you a mature fishing nation… but the reality is that most of the ones I’ve seen are way too “wordy” and overcommit.

My experience is that no one really reads a report that is more than 30 pages or has the capacity to implement more than 15 recommendations in the short term.

And from my industry days, I’m very aware that: “there is only one thing worst than not having a piece of paper and is having one that you don't comply with”… so if you go overboard because is what is expected to be done… you are putting yourself to fail

NPOA-IUU have a long history in the Pacific, yet their presence has not always been noticeable. In 2005 the late Colin Brown (a good man gone to early) authored the FAO document “Model plan for a Pacific Island country - National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing”. 

This “Model Plan” for the elaboration of an NPOA-IUU was designed to assist Pacific Island States to give effect to the IPOA-IUU. The model incorporated the essential aspects and features of the IPOA-IUU, demonstrating how an NPOA-IUU might be drafted.

In seeking to address IUU fishing the model provides an introduction (with an important focus on the fisheries situation in the model country) followed by measures that might be adopted under the headings of all State responsibilities at the time (Flag, Coastal and State) as well as internationally agreed market-related measures, research, regional fisheries management organizations and the special requirements of developing countries. Many FFA members date their NPOA-IUU back to that document.

Then in between 2012 to 2014 and as a consequence of the EU Yellow Cards, FFA’s DevFISH II programme supported the update and redevelopment of many of these early NPOA-IUU, as to be able to facilitate FFA members to respond when questioned by the EU. 

Yet, while the earlier versions lacked depth in coverage of key MCS issues and capacities we have today, the newer versions are voluminous (i.e. 60 pages 38 action points for example), user-unfriendly and very complex, which turned off the target user groups from using it regularly. As a consequence, the documents stayed unused by officers in the compliance section, whom in principle should be using it as a working reference document.

These problems were exemplified in the words of a good friend and fisheries officer, saying that their NPOA-IUU seems to have been designed “more to be read by other countries, than to be used by us”.  

So as part of my work with MIMRA in RMI, I have re-structured their “old” NPOA-IUU, as to produce a more user-friendly document adapted to the needs and capacities of the operational users while incorporating the most updated information on the prevalence and extent of IUU in the region and our high level of collaboration with FFA, plus our cooperation with SPC, PNA, WCPFC market states and industry organisations.

So our new one has 30 pages and 15 action points while maintaining full compliance with the internationally accepted minimal components and format of FAO’s IPOA-IUU.

I personally live up to maxim that “the perfect should not get on the way of the good” and is better to start with 15 that you know you can achieve and not 38 that you can’t… once we get this 15 done, let’s bring the next 15. 

That more modest approach helped us with PSM… so let me tell you in a couple of years how with did with this one!!!

Another Vanuatu flagged longliner on a US Customs detention order for forced labor by Francisco Blaha

09279.jpg

Not long ago a I wrote about the US Custom and Border Protection Agency (CBP) withhold release order against tuna and tuna products from the Tunago No. 61 based on information obtained by CBP indicating tuna is harvested with the use of forced labour, including physical violence, debt bondage, withholding of wages, and abusive living and working conditions.

From the 18 august a 2nd Vanuatu flagged vessel, the “Da Wang” has now also been added… so far Vanuatu is the only flag state that is in that list. 

Thankfully none of the vessels is in the FFA list of good standing, yet they still in the WCPFO registry

While the vessels are Taiwan owned and operated, the factual reality is that what happens on those vessels competes to the flag state authority… the capacities of Vanuatu or their development status, are no excuse when it comes to flag state responsibility.

As I was told in the navy and the fishing boats many times… if you cannot live up to a responsibility don’t take it...

Vanuatu had already one of the 1st EU yellow cards, which was based substantially on the failures as a flag state (see the decision- last country).

One thing to keep clear is that Vanuatu is not a small player in fishing… it runs an open registry (with over an estimated -no one really knows exactly- of 100 vessels among fishing vessels and carriers). Furthermore, they are a contracting Member of IATTC, WCPFC, IOTC, ICCAT and cooperating non-Contracting Party to CCAMLR… hence their fleets is all over the world. Yet the last commercial landing in Port Vila was in 2014 and maybe a couple of pretending ones since then… but the vessels don come there… many of them use Suva as their port.

I helped with the removal of the Yellow card… yet I’m not sure how come they got away, to be honest… I remember they had a very smooth ambassador to the EU that obviously was doing a good job there… they got lots of money to develop their competent authority to gain EU market access… yet they never did much with that. They got to host an EU workshop on the impact t of ecolabels… even if they don't qualify to access to the EU. they signed PSMA, but haven done anything about it… and “hosted” a workshop wjhere nobody came after the 2nd day… and the list goes on

In any case, the EU was supposed to go back to visit them, on the back of the reissue of the yellow card they reissued to Panama… a country that shares many flag state (i)responsibilities issues with them.

While this issue relates to crew… something I feel very strongly about and I’m working on… I find it sadly ironic because Vanuatu very stringent on immigration when you arrive by plane and come to work for a couple of weeks at the request of their own goiverment and they charge over 300USD for a visa and ask you for a lot of papers…. Somehow you can go and work on a Vanuatu flag fishing boat without any paperwork or being accounted (or unaccounted) for…

As a member of FFA, they should be incorporating labour issues as part of their licensing procedures as explained here

In any case… they are also a key player in the of the biggest fisheries headaches we have in the region… transhipments at sea.

While the WCPF Convention expressly prohibits transhipment at sea (on the high seas and in a WCPFC Member’s territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by purse seine. For longliners and other vessels, however, the WCPF Convention only requires CCMs to “encourage their vessels, to the extent practicable, to conduct transhipment in port”. Furthermore, through a binding conservation and management measure (CMM 2009-06 the WCPFC prohibits longliners and other vessels from transhipping on the high seas except where CCM has determined that “it is impracticable for certain vessels . . . to operate without being able to tranship on the high seas.” 

CMM 2009–06 requires WCPFC Members to make vessel-specific determinations as to impracticability and submit a plan detailing the steps being taken to encourage transhipment in port.  And that is not happening…. In fact, over the last two years, just 3 CCMs—China, Chinese Taipei, and Vanuatu—accounted for 84% and 89% of those transhipments in 2015 and 2016, respectively and we are talking over 100 transhipments a year… I wrote about all this before. 

Anyway if we get hold on the transhipments situation, many collateral benefits associated with port transhipment come into game:

  • Under and Misreporting: FFA’s IUU quantification report identified “Unreported” as the main IUU issue in the region, having transhipment in port, under similar conditions of that PPS and with the use of scales will be a massive step towards compliance 

  • Observer Coverage: having LL coming to port is key to increase the agreed percentages of Observer Coverage

  • Electronic Monitoring: the main limitation for the HS vessels are maintenance of the equipment and the delivery of the footage ((hard drive based) to the national observer. Using carriers provides big delays and compromises the CoC for the hardware

  • Labour issues: these could be dealt in much more depth trough having the vessels coming to port

  • Safety: transhipment at the port are fasted and safer than at seas as a port are more protected to whether and swell

  • MARPOL: longliners coming top port can easily comply with their MARPOL obligations

So yeah… this is bad news for all of us in the region… and I wish there was something that could be done with Vanuatu ton rail them into better flag state performance and changing their stand on High seas transhipment…

 

The future of food from the sea by Francisco Blaha

There is an ambitious title for a paper!

One that will require quite a lot of credible authors to pull it off unscathed, particularly when is in the Nature journal. yet when you read many well-known names in the impressive list of 22 authors spanning the globe, you know that is the kind of effort needed to live up to the challenge of the title. Particularly when the results challenge the narrative that is all doom and as we still get bombarded with, they will not be fish in 2048!

the present of food of the sea

the present of food of the sea

I’m way to low in the trophic and brain capacity scale as to have a valid opinion on the accuracy of the conclusions, but I liked what I read and how they angled the premises of the paper.

I just quote parts of it, yet my usual recommendation is to read the original.

The abstract sets the paper in motion:

Abstract

Global food demand is rising, and serious questions remain about whether supply can increase sustainably1. Land-based expansion is possible but may exacerbate climate change and biodiversity loss, and compromise the delivery of other ecosystem services. As food from the sea represents only 17% of the current production of edible meat, we ask how much food we can expect the ocean to sustainably produce by 2050. Here we examine the main food-producing sectors in the ocean—wild fisheries, finfish mariculture and bivalve mariculture—to estimate ‘sustainable supply curves’ that account for ecological, economic, regulatory and technological constraints. We overlay these supply curves with demand scenarios to estimate future seafood production. We find that under our estimated demand shifts and supply scenarios (which account for policy reform and technology improvements), edible food from the sea could increase by 21–44 million tonnes by 2050, a 36–74% increase compared to current yields. This represents 12–25% of the estimated increase in all meat needed to feed 9.8 billion people by 2050. Increases in all three sectors are likely but are most pronounced for mariculture. Whether these production potentials are realized sustainably will depend on factors such as policy reforms, technological innovation and the extent of future shifts in demand.

The main part describes well the challenges and the approach 

Main

Human population growth, rising incomes and preference shifts will considerably increase global demand for nutritious food in the coming decades. Malnutrition and hunger still plague many countries and projections of population and income by 2050 suggest a future need for more than 500 megatonnes (Mt) of meat per year for human consumption. Scaling up the production of land-derived food crops is challenging, because of declining yield rates and competition for scarce land and water resources. Land-derived seafood (freshwater aquaculture and inland capture fisheries; we use seafood to denote any aquatic food resource, and food from the sea for marine resources specifically) has an important role in food security and global supply, but its expansion is also constrained. Similar to other land-based production, the expansion of land-based aquaculture has resulted in substantial environmental externalities that affect water, soil, biodiversity and climate, and which compromise the ability of the environment to produce food.

Despite the importance of terrestrial aquaculture in seafood production (Supplementary Fig. 3), many countries—notably China, the largest inland-aquaculture producer—have restricted the use of land and public waters for this purpose, which constrains expansion Although inland capture fisheries are important for food security, their contribution to total global seafood production is limited (Supplementary Table 1) and expansion is hampered by ecosystem constraints. Thus, to meet future needs (and recognizing that land-based sources of fish and other foods are also part of the solution), we ask whether the sustainable production of food from the sea has an important role in future supply.

Food from the sea is produced from wild fisheries and species farmed in the ocean (mariculture), and currently accounts for 17% of the global production of edible meat (Supplementary Information section 1.1, Supplementary Tables 13). In addition to protein, food from the sea contains bioavailable micronutrients and essential fatty acids that are not easily found in land-based foods, and is thus uniquely poised to contribute to global food and nutrition security.

Widely publicized reports about climate change, overfishing, pollution and unsustainable mariculture give the impression that sustainably increasing the supply of food from the sea is impossible. On the other hand, unsustainable practices, regulatory barriers, perverse incentives and other constraints may be limiting seafood production, and shifts in policies and practices could support both food provisioning and conservation goals.

In this study, we investigate the potential of expanding the economically and environmentally sustainable production of food from the sea for meeting global food demand in 2050. We do so by estimating the extent to which food from the sea could plausibly increase under a range of scenarios, including demand scenarios under which land-based fish act as market substitutes.

The future contribution of food from the sea to global food supply will depend on a range of ecological, economic, policy and technological factors. Estimates based solely on ecological capacity are useful, but do not capture the responses of producers to incentives and do not account for changes in demand, input costs or technology.

To account for these realities, we construct global supply curves of food from the sea that explicitly account for economic feasibility and feed constraints. We first derive the conceptual pathways through which food could be increased in wild fisheries and in mariculture sectors. We then empirically derive the magnitudes of these pathways to estimate the sustainable supply of food from each seafood sector at any given price21. Finally, we match these supply curves with future demand scenarios to estimate the likely future production of sustainable seafood at the global level.

I particularly like the four pathways they see as to sustainably increase food from the sea: 

  1. improving the management of wild fisheries;

  2. implementing policy reforms of mariculture;

  3. advancing feed technologies for fed mariculture; and

  4. shifting demand, which affects the quantity supplied from all three production sectors.

The analysis from these bases is quite deep and interesting, I recommend you follow it, otherwise here are the conclusions 

Conclusions

Global food demand is rising, and expanding land-based production is fraught with environmental and health concerns. Because seafood is nutritionally diverse and avoids or lessens many of the environmental burdens of terrestrial food production, it is uniquely positioned to contribute to both food provision and future global food and nutrition security. Our estimated sustainable supply curves of food from the sea suggest substantial possibilities for future expansion in both wild fisheries and mariculture.

The potential for increased global production from wild fisheries hinges on maintaining fish populations near their most-productive levels. For underutilized stocks, this will require expanding existing markets. For overfished stocks, this will require adopting or improving management practices that prevent overfishing and allow depleted stocks to rebuild.

Effective management practices commonly involve setting and enforcing science-based limits on catch or fishing effort, but appropriate interventions will depend on the biological, socioeconomic, cultural and governance contexts of individual fisheries.

Effective management will be further challenged by climate change, species composition changes in marine ecosystems and illegal fishing. Directing resources away from subsidies that enhance fishing capacity towards building institutional and technical capacity for fisheries research, management and enforcement will help to meet these challenges.

Increased mariculture production will require management practices and policies that allow for environmentally sustainable expansion, while balancing the associated trade-offs to the greatest extent possible; this principle underpins the entire analysis. We find that substantial expansion is realistic, given the costs of production and the likely future increase in demand.

We have identified a variety of ways that sustainable supply curves can shift outward. These shifts interact with future demand to determine the plausible future equilibrium quantity of food produced from the sea. We find that although supply could increase to more than six times the current level (primarily via expanded mariculture), the demand shift required to engage this level of supply is unlikely. Under more realistic demand scenarios and appropriate reforms of the supply, we find that food from the sea could increase in all three sectors (wild fisheries, finfish mariculture and bivalve mariculture) to a total of 80–103 Mt of food in 2050 versus 59 Mt at present (in live-weight equivalents, 159–227 Mt compared to 102 Mt at present).

When combined with projected inland production, this represents an 18–44% per decade increase in live-weight production, which is somewhat higher than the 14% increase that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the FAO project for total fish production during the next decade.

Under some scenarios, future production could represent a disproportionate fraction of the estimated total increase in global food production that will be required to feed 9.8 billion people by 2050. Substantial growth in mariculture will rely partly on public perceptions. Although there is some evidence of a negative public perception of aquaculture, it is highly variable by region and by context, and certifications and the provision of other information can help to alleviate concerns and expand demand.

These global projections will not have uniform implications around the world. For example, improved policies that shift the supply curve outward will decrease prices, but income-induced demand shifts will increase prices. Both effects increase production but have vastly different consequences for low-income consumers.

Bivalves may contribute substantially to food security by providing relatively low-cost and thus accessible food, because they have a high production potential at low costs compared to finfish production (Fig. 3). If all seafood is perfectly substitutable, bivalves could contribute 43% and 34% of future aquatic food under future and extreme demand scenarios, respectively (Supplementary Fig. 3)—which suggests potential large increases in production, provided demand is high enough.

Trade also has an important role in distributing seafood from high-production to low-production regions, and in overcoming regional mismatches in price. The rate of international trade of seafood products has increased over past decades, and 27% of seafood products were traded in 2016, although major economic disruptions—such as the COVID-19 pandemic—can jointly reduce both supply and demand of traded seafood. On the other hand, trade may become increasingly relied upon as climate change alters regional productivity.

Substantially expanding the production of food from the sea will bring co-benefits and trade-offs, and will require national and interregional governance, as well as local capacity to ensure equity and sustainability.

The improved management of wild fisheries can not only increase fish biomass, but also brings the co-benefit of improved livelihoods of fishers. However, there will be some short-term costs as overfished stocks rebuild to levels that support greater food provision.

As mariculture expands, interactions with wild fisheries and other ecosystem services (via spatial overlaps, pollution and so on) must be constantly addressed. Ambitious technical innovation (that is, the substitution of marine ingredients with terrestrial-sourced proteins) can help to decouple fed mariculture from wild fisheries, but will probably refocus some pressure on terrestrial ecosystems.

Climate change will further challenge food security. Estimates suggest that active adaptation to climate-induced changes will be crucial in both wild fisheries and mariculture. Climate-adaptive management of wild fisheries and decisions regarding mariculture production (for example, the type of feed used, species produced and farm sitting) could improve food provision from the sea under conditions of climate change.

We have shown that the sea can be a much larger contributor to sustainable food production than is currently the case, and that this comes about by implementing a range of plausible and actionable mechanisms.

  • The price mechanism—when it motivates improved fishery management and the sustainable expansion of mariculture into new areas—arises from change in demand, and acts on its own without any explicit intervention.

  • The feed technology mechanism is driven by incentives to innovate, and thus acquire intellectual property rights to new technologies. When intellectual property is not ensured, or to achieve other social goals, there may be a role for public subsidies or other investments in these technologies.

  • The policy mechanism pervades all three production sectors, and could make—or break—the ability of food from the sea to sustainably, equitably and efficiently expand in the future.

 

 

 

Responding to: Why I don't I don't subscribe to paid content by Francisco Blaha

I get a lot of questions via mail and social media, that in most cases I’m always happy to respond. One that I get from people working in paywalled media (who wants to use my content of photos) is why I’m against subscriptions to paid content… my standard response is below:

Always looking for fish or information :-)

Always looking for fish or information :-)

I totally understand you run a business and your livelihood depends on this... but you see, 30 years ago I was working on fishing boat earning 300USD a month. I manage to gain qualifications and progress in life thanks to studying and to many people that I knew but even more people I didn't, that provided me information, books (that's you FAO!), and training materials for free.

I started my blog as a sideline in my website (the blog option was part of the minimal package) so I started writing it for free and i always love making pictures of what is ee on board (and also said many times: no thanks to offers of paid sponsorship), mostly as a way to partly pay back all that free info and advice I was given... 

I work at the present with many fishers and fisheries officers in the pacific that earn less per month than the value of most paywalled fisheries news sites...

So I adhere to the principle that fisheries information should be free, otherwise the gap in between those that can access and those that by no fault of their own cannot pay for it will keep growing... and with that, we will see sustainability fall even further, since only the rich can afford to be informed and care, while the less fortunate, keep having their choices and options further and further eroded.

I'm totally aware that it is a total ideological stand, as the gap is too wide already for a one-man band like myself to make a difference, yet I’m a man of principles... so I don't subscribe to paid content.

Said so, I really appreciate your interest in my personal rumblings in the blog, and as long as I'm acknowledged as the source of pictures and contents I'm honoured for you to be using them... just let me know when you do as a matter of courtesy, that is all.

Yours in legal and safe fishing,
--
Francisco Blaha

While we worry about IUU, the real big issue keep coming in. by Francisco Blaha

is not them the real problem… is us

is not them the real problem… is us

And when you read: the combined catch of both tuna species is projected to decrease by ~10–40% by 2050 in the exclusive economic zones of Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu… is hard to swallow... I work with friends in all those countries

That is enough to disbalance the weekend, and made me question my self on what I’m doing?

Is already hard to deal with the IUU issues that are my work, yet they are quite minimal in terms of political clout in comparison… so the reversion of the drivers of climate change ain’t going to change anytime soon.

The demise of commercial tuna fisheries in the WCPO is not on the greedy and terrible fisherman as the usual narrative goes on or the lack of effort of the Pacific Island countries. Is on the worldwide medium and above social class almost insatiable hunger for more energy, cars, goods etc… while the cost of their greed is paid by those that don’t have those goods and facilities. 

So yeah… have a read on the paper and let’s look deep into ourselves… because this one is on us.

I just quote there the box for the pacific…

Across the 22 Pacific Island countries and territories (PICTs), models predict an eastern redistribution in the biomass of skipjack and yellowfin tuna — the two main exported fish species — by 2050). Under Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 8.5, for example, the combined catch of both tuna species is projected to decrease by ~10–40% by 2050 in the exclusive economic zones of Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu However, given the eastern redistribution, tuna catch is anticipated to increase in the exclusive economic zones of Kiribati and Cook Islands by 15–20% 

As several PICTs are tuna-dependent economies, the impact of climate change on tuna fisheries increases the vulnerability of these small island developing states. For instance, shifts in tuna distribution, and resulting increases in catches from international waters, are expected to cause proportional changes in government revenue received by small island developing states from fishing licence fees. These changes need to be considered by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission when governing the sustainable use of the region’s tuna resources, developing harvest strategies and allocating fishing rights to minimize the implications of tuna redistribution for island economies.

The projected 20–50% decrease in productivity of coral reef fish in the Pacific Islands region by 2050 under RCP8.5 is expected to influence the contributions of small-scale fisheries to food security in most PICTs However, rapid population growth in several PICTs is expected to have a greater influence than declining reef fish production on future availability of fish per capita. The rich tuna resources of the Pacific Islands region can be used to fill the widening gap between the total amount of fish that can be harvested sustainably from coral reefs and other coastal habitats, and that required for good nutrition.

 

CTEs and KDEs in seafood value chains by Francisco Blaha

I been writing and talking about CTEs and KDEs for while now. These concepts are not “new” they go back to a 2009 publication “Product tracing in food systems”, but I got working with them in 2015 thanks to Tejas Bhatt (we worked on this report - EPLAT). Then, I used them in two FAO publications, the Traceability for Compliance we co authored with Gilles Hosch, and the one I recently co-authored with Kenneth Katafono on Blockchain.

the very basic idea we developed on the EPLAT in 2015.

the very basic idea we developed on the EPLAT in 2015.

 The definitions are:

  1.  CTEs – “points within a business and along the value chain where product is moved between premises or is transformed, or is determined to be a point where data capture is necessary to maintain traceability”; and 

  2. KDEs – “the data elements required to successfully trace a product and/or its ingredients through all relevant CTEs”.

As any form of standardised validation and verification structure for data that is to be part of a traceability framework along the value chain needs to be based on regulatory oversight by the authorities in the different types of States, as the concept of “official guarantees” still holds strong in trade and social governance as does that of market access under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as well a key element around Catch Documentation schemes aimed to combat IUU fishing.

This highlights the importance of identifying CTEs in the value chain – from the point of capture to the final point of importation – where information is to be collected and of proposing measures to address weaknesses, inefficiencies and gaps.

In order to assist with stablishing those CTEs and KDEs, I been contracted now to write a further book for FAO based on identifying Critical Tracking Events (CTEs) and authoritative sources of Key Data Elements (KDEs) as well as supporting verification mechanisms in seafood value chains (both wild capture and aquaculture).

I been quite serious about the issue of diversity and gender balance in our sector, so I try to play a helpful role on those aspects. Furthermore, the usual audience of FAO books is in the global south, so I try to make sure that I have that perspective included. I’m also the first one to recognise all of my limitations, and an inside knowledge of aquaculture is one of them, hence I suggested FAO to work with other authors and suggested my college Yahira Piedrahita from Ecuador who has extensive experience in Latina America and India and I’m also very happy to work again with Vincent Andre who has lots of experience from living and working in Thailand and Indonesia.

Furthemore, I’m not only incredible thankfull to FAO for helping me as a fisheman that had a breack thanks to one of their trainings in 1987all the way to be wirting books for them, but also for being the living example of the need of diversity.

Anyway, this study will seek to provide technical advice to FAO member states in the development, enforcement and effective verification of traceability in seafood value chains (both wild capture and aquaculture origins) as well as evaluating the efficacy of their systems and identifying gaps for those with existing traceability systems.

The idea is to address these objectives through the set- up of a list of minimum requirements for seafood traceability with clearly defined: Critical Tracking Events (CTEs) along the seafood value chain, authoritative sources of Key Data Elements (KDEs) and supporting verification mechanisms. 

Yet is our hope that by identifying and documenting CTEs and KDEs and associated verifications the work will be supporting and easing FAO's Members States transition to either low-tech or high-tech digitally-supported traceability systems. 

This study will assist the operators and authorities to identify the data that needs to be traced and define the parameters of traceability. This information should be tracked, accurate and easily verifiable. This study will also assist the operators and authorities to achieve the «verifiability » of their traceability systems and traceback procedures. It is anticipated that the final report will serve as basis for future expert consultations to deliberate and adaptation

This is a big job since we have quite a wide hierarchy of information to go over, staring with multilateral sources, then regional and then private and NGOs… and even so, I’m totally aware that there would be sources but most importantly elements of reality that will scape… since no model will ever duplicate the complexities of reality… so wish us luck and strength!

 

MARPOL controls - another victim of COVID 19? by Francisco Blaha

I have written a bit with the general impact of COVID 19 on tuna fishing and compliance, as well as the what I think would a totally non controllable FAD closure. Yet it also occurs to me that the whole MARPOL will be unmanaged… 

L1100913.jpg

Normally I keep my posts around fishing and labour, but as a keen ocean user (long distance ocean swimmer, paddler, spear fisherman, sailor) the issues of plastics and MARPOL in general interest (and affects) me.

I wrote in the past on this issue and I’ve seen the disdain some vessels already have to MARPOL issues even with the observer on board… so imagine now.

The issue of plastic in longliners in particular is a massive one, and nobody is doing much about it… particularly with those operating on the high seas… (yeap the same where we have the highest incidences of unreported fishing, the worst cases of labour abuses, and surely MARPOL issues), while I’m one against generalisations I’m sure that all high seas longline vessels dump the plastic waste from bait boxes in the ocean every day.

Yes, I know, in principle under the WCPFC Commission Management Measure (CMM) 17/04 on Marine Pollution as of January 1, 2019, all fishing vessels operating in the WCPFC Convention Area are specifically prohibited from dumping any plastics into the ocean. Clause 2 of the CMM specifically states: CMMs shall prohibit their fishing vessels operating in the WCPFC Convention area from discharging any plastic (including plastic packaging, items containing plastic and polystyrene) but not including fishing gear.  

As far as has been ascertained, outside of Australia and New Zealand, only Fiji has licensing provisions which require the retention of plastic waste on board locally based and licensed vessels for disposal on shore, so for the rest is dumping as usual.

 Let’s do some numbers to illustrate the magnitude of the issue… 

A typical tuna longline vessel will set around 3000 hooks per set.  The hooks are baited via 10 kilogram boxes which contain 100 – 120 pieces of bait. The boxes are waxed cardboard and each has a plastic liner to contain the bait and two plastic straps to seal the box. Therefore, with each set using around 30 boxes of bait for each set of 3000 hooks there are 90 pieces of plastic generated, to make numbers easier lets assume only 1000 longliners setting every day (in reality there are more than that), that represents conservatively 90,000 pieces of plastic per day or 630,000 pieces of plastic per week and 2,520,000 per month, as well as 30+ pieces of waxed cardboard overboard for each vessel each day!!!

and i’m not even talking about old lines, broken buoys, and just plastic shit…

and i’m not even talking about old lines, broken buoys, and just plastic shit…

The standard argument is that there is just no means for high seas vessels to dispose of plastic bait box waste other than into the ocean. But we all know that in reality, if there is a will… there is way.

In the case of domestic based vessels, waste can either be disposed of on return from sea or prior to departure. Consider then scenario where bait boxes and emptied into bins (such as are standard storage containers on most vessels), then these bins can be stored with 3 boxes of bait per bin and stowed in the freezer to be used as required.

There would also seem to be potential for this to apply to carrier vessels loading bait for delivery to longline vessels, but this could involve the large plastic bins commonly utilised for fish holding on vessels and in ports

Another option is for the suppliers of bait boxes could be encouraged to use waxed paper box liners and bind boxes with twine or tape which can be more easily stowed on board with the bait boxes and liners being burnt.

The reality is that the current measures lacks provisions for enforcement and current practices for plastic disposal at sea cannot be allowed to continue and new mitigation strategies are urgently required for widespread adoption.

But again, Flag State responsibility is totally lacking as usual… and is up to coastal and port state to take actions… via Electronic Monitoring (EM), and another reason to clamp at sea transhipments!

 

 

Unilateral Trade Measures, defining IUU Fishing and the “Concerns” with China by Francisco Blaha

I’ve on the quiet end of blogging for the last few weeks, as I’m going through some emotional struggle and work reshuffling. But then a paper come out that wakes me, so I take a break and quote some of the pearls I read.

looking beyond the horizon on trade restrictive measures

looking beyond the horizon on trade restrictive measures

The paper is “Unilateral Trade Measures and the Importance of Defining IUU Fishing: Lessons from the 2019 USA “Concerns” with China as a Fishing Flag State”. I have corresponded with the author Arron N. Honniball in the past and is obvious that we align in views yet he works at a level that I just look from below.

The topic is one of much interest to me and I wrote a lot about it: TREMs (Trade Restrictive Measures) associated with IUU fishing… a tool that both the EU and the US apply but in very different ways.

paper does not has alink yet, but from all accounts Arron is good man, and I’m sure he would be happy to share the paper if you ask nicelly. I just quote the intro and bits I loved from the conclusion. But please read it all.

Introduction

On September 19, 2019, the USA’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) publicly released its 2019 biennial report to Congress, Improving International Fisheries Management, identifying Ecuador, Mexico and the Republic of Korea as states whose vessels are reportedly engaged in illegal, unreported or unregulated (IUU) fishing activities under Section 609(a) of the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act. 

The biennial identification of foreign states is the first step in the USA’s unilateral  three- step identification and certification procedure which analyzes the enforcement of international fisheries law by foreign states. The USA will take measures against any state receiving a negative certification, including the closure of U.S. ports and U.S. markets to that state’s fishing vessels, catch and fishery products.  Additional economic sanctions may also be imposed. The USA is not unique in imposing such trade measures. The EU, as well as numerous Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs), also identify non- cooperating or non-compliant states that may be subject to comparable trade measures.

Nonetheless, unilateral measures in pursuit of a global common interest, i.e., “ending” IUU fishing, may raise questions of legitimacy, sufficiency or coherence if domestic laws and policies substantially differ from their purported international law and policy basis. Systemic differences may first and foremost arise from different definitions of IUU fishing. Unlike the EU’s practice, which largely follows the inter-national law “definition” of IUU fishing in the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU), the USA has prescribed a definition of IUU fishing that is fundamentally different in scope. To highlight this difference and its legislative impact, this article first intro-duces the USA’s identification and certification procedure (Part II). More specifically, this article addresses the consequences and acceptability of the U.S. definition of IUU fishing as not including vessels engaged in illegal fishing in the waters under the jurisdiction of a foreign state.

A novel section in the OMNV Report to Congress entitled “Concerns with China’s Fishing Practices” is then both demonstrative of such a legislative gap and the currently hobbled U.S. response (Part III). When the USA implements the identification and certification procedure, the U.S. definition of IUU fishing precludes consideration of alleged widespread illegal fishing by Chinese- flagged vessels in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of foreign states. States have a certain degree of flexibility in defining IUU fishing. However, this practice demonstrates that the current definition results in an identification and certification procedure that is inconsistent with U.S interests and is insufficient to address the USA’s global policy objectives and responsibilities. The lessons learned should promote U.S. legislative reform and equally assist other market states in designing unilateral measures that properly address a global common interest.

The OMNV Report to Congress also raises concerns with IUU fishing by stateless vessels with the “characteristics” of Chinese flagged vessels (Part IV). The identification and certification procedure seeks to address poor governance by foreign states. Given the lack of an attributable flag state for vessels without nationality, state- to-state trade measures targeting flag states should exclude IUU fishing by vessels with-out nationality. Any possible trade measures against a flag state on the basis of the “characteristics” of stateless vessels is inappropriate.

This article concludes with the way forward for the USA and other states adopting unilateral trade measures to combat IUU fishing (Part V). Wider lessons on ensuring transparent and unbiased implementation of market state measures are also raised.

Finally, this article focuses on China because it is the subject of the new “concerns” section of the OMNV Report to Congress. An independent IUU Fishing Index also ranked China as the worst performing flag state in 2019 (excluding landlocked states).1 But, it is not the objective of this paper to address the factual basis of NOAA’s concerns, nor the Chinese response. The arguments below concern the appropriate substantive design of trade measures. These design arguments do not affect the market states’ procedural discretion in implementation, nor suggest China must be identified.

Parts of the conclusions (some jewels there)

Designing state- to-state trade measures to exclude flag states facilitating illegal fishing in foreign EEZs was seen as unnecessary and inconsistent with international and national interests. From the international perspective, it excludes the most well defined and universally accepted form of IUU fishing, which is also subject to multilaterally agreed flag state obligations. If unilateral trade measures are building on the primary responsibility of flag states, they should first and foremost apply here. (love this one!)

Moving forward, the USA should amend the identification and certification procedure to include flag states responsible for illegal fishing in foreign EEZs. This will remove an unnecessary and discriminatory distinction in the design of U.S. trade measures combating IUU fishing. If necessary, the USA may then still exercise its discretion in implementation to focus identifications on fishing activities that directly infringe upon U.S. fisheries interests. Any question of identifying flag states for IUU fishing by stateless vessels with “characteristics” of that flag state should be dropped. If the USA wishes to make progress here, it will need to follow the EU’s example and design trade measures that address coastal states, port states, market states and states of nationality that are facilitating IUU fishing.

For the EU moving forward, the non- cooperating states procedure follows the IPOA- IUU definition of IUU fishing. The critiques of bias or discrimination in EU trade measures therefore result not from design, but implementation.127 This is in part due to the initial audits and informal dialogues remaining confidential. Commentators and states only have access to the EU’s reasoning in the more limited cases of a foreign state being issued a pre- identification notification (“yellow card”). Perhaps the EU has or is engaging China in confidential dialogue. The lack of transparency on which states are subject to continuing informal dialogues or have implemented reforms necessary to avoid a yellow card therefore increases the perceived discrimination. It would be in the interest of the EU and its partners to follow the transparency evident in the Reports to Congress. Similar to NOAA’s “concerns,” the EU could list its ongoing informal dialogues and omit any substantive details that could jeopardize the process. Informal dialogues that conclude in a yellow card being unnecessary could then be reported in detail similar to NOAA’s reporting on states considered but not identified. These minor reforms would greatly improve procedural transparency and shed further light on how states interpret their obligations to combat IUU fishing in international law.

Finally, whether trade measures are substantively and procedurally fit for purpose and whether they should then be implemented against a foreign state are separate questions. The difficult and potentially controversial task of identifying states - including if this should include China-is left to NOAA

FAD Closure and FAD Free in the Time of COVID 19* by Francisco Blaha

As an ex fisherman, I’m always ready to remind the people that seem to think that we are all dodgy criminals and even assassins, that as in any group of people in front of a set of rules your will have really hardcore dodgy, moderately or occasionally dodgy and totally straight and honest fishers.

so much investment in echo-sounder FADs and not using it while not one is looking… really?

so much investment in echo-sounder FADs and not using it while not one is looking… really?

Real dodgy and totally honest generally make up a small portion of a given population. The real assholes do undertake IUU activities no matter what, while the honest will not engage in IUU fishing under any condition. Hence any compliance-related scheme will have limited effectiveness in the dodgy group, but an affirmative impact in the honest ones.

But then, the moderately or occasionally dodgy (the biggest group), on the other hand, will only bypass regulations if the potential economic gain is high enough to cover the potential penalty they may face given the size of the penalty when caught, but more importantly, the probability of being caught. 

Why am I saying this? Because today 1 July FAD closure at the WCPFC starts. I have written a lot on FADs and the fact that during FAD closure, the presence of observers is the key dissuasive stop for many people to take shortcuts… but without observers, the temptations are almost ridiculously high.

In my opinion, the tuna fishery survives because FADs…I’m no economist but I hang out in wharves and boats a lot! During FAD fishing a trip up to full boats would be around two weeks on a variable average (I’ve seen 7 days to 18-20) now during FAD closure we talking 20 to 40 days… with MASSIVE differences in fuel consumption (even if fuel is cheap now) and sometimes you see boast outside for 40 days and come 50% full. 

And is not like they pick up all the eFADS during the closure,  they still there operating and the vessels, vessels owners and traders still get the info, and with no one on board to give an independent oversight, the temptation is too big for the moderately dodgy and even for the hardcore honest. What is the point of maintaining a stand if you losing money?… but with those disincentives… being honest means also being stupid!

Under normal circumstances, FAD fishing during FAD closure does happen, even if observers act as a deterrence. The most common cause of observer denouncing they have been offered money is around FAD closures... And is important to note that observers which are also human, range like anyone else on theirs morals and approach to corruption, so is not hard to infer that if some denounce corruption attempts, some will take it and keep quiet. In any case, all that is out of the window at the moment, since there are no observers on board.

In Majuro during FAD closure, and as part of our Ports State Measures - Arriving Vessels Intelligence analysis (AVIR) we use manoeuvring analysis (speed pre-fishing set, time of the day, course changes, track shape and prior activity) and if we have doubts, when the vessel is in port and based on the loading log that most of the engineer keeps, we instruct the monitor to check the presence of species that aggregate and cannot be found in a free school set. e.i. the aptly named Triggerfish

Others like Yellowtail, Wahoo, etc can be normally separated on deck, but the triggerfish is too small and gets frozen with the rest, so if we see it during the loading of the nets in the holds or on deck... alarms bell ring... Of course, we don't have monitors during transhipment either at the moment!

 A couple of months ago pre-visioning this mess, we discussed with my RMI friends that a very good intelligence tool, that could help us lot (in RMI, but also in the rest of the members) would be an analysis on data available for the last 5 years (as an arbitrary number) during FAD closure of some parameters that can help boarding officers/MCS guys to see if the data provided prior arrival of the vessel for that period falls inside the normal distribution.

The initial parameters would be:

  • sets per day,

  • days at sea in between unloadings,

  • speed prior to the set (you normally chasing the school fast as it moves) 

  • distance travelled at night (during FAD closure you drift at night -with some exemptions- yet on FAD fishing you go to the next

  • sets before dawn, sets after sunset - (FAD free set only happen during the day, because you have to see the fish - the full moon can help.... but is very unusual)

  • and some more I keep quiet (so I can still have a job!)

To get these data, it would have required us to dive deep into SPC’s TUFMAN 2 database, that maintains vessel but also observer data. Yet nor we or SPC had the time and people available to help in compiling, analysing and presented the data in a risk evaluation friendly format… which was a pity and a lost opportunity.

Furthermore, very few vessels are coming to Majuro since it has some the most strict vessels arrival conditions in the region.

Most of the vessels are transhipping now in ports where very little PSM best practices are followed, no one does manoeuvring analysis or even intelligence analysis… and there are no observers.

With the present COVID reality…. I sadly believe that the 3 months WCPFC FAD closure would be a total failure this year. 

I’m not a friend of the Ecolabels at the best of times, but the fact that they maintain a certification that is FAD free dependent, during these times is beyond disappointing and for me just adds to the long list of grievances I have against them.

And this is not just now… since there are no observers and monitors… the whole certification is just based on self-reporting. In Majuro, we have not monitored a single transhipment or offloading since March, yet they still are getting emails of vessels transhipping/unloading MSC fish in the lagoon. 

Begs the question who is verifying these transhipments as a third party, or even when the vessel is making free school sets at sea for that matter. Seems that the “integrity” of some of the MSC unit of certification was the “official” monitor’s verification of the chain of custody, but now, who knows whats going on. 

So yea… not cool… and not much we can do to from the regulatory perspective… 

 *Love in the Time of Cholera is a 1985 novel by Colombian author Gabriel García Márquez that earn him a Nobel price.

so much investment in echo-sounder FADs (around 3000USD each) and not using it while not one is looking… really?

so much investment in echo-sounder FADs (around 3000USD each) and not using it while not one is looking… really?



 

Fishing for Success - Lessons in Pacific Regionalism by Francisco Blaha

If you have any interest in tuna in the pacific and don't know about PNA (the Parties to the Nauru Agreement) then you don't have an interest in Tuna. Yet I agree is not an easy organization to understand and it hard to see how it fits in the already complex matrix of institutions (FFA, SPC, WCPFC) that support and regulate tuna fisheries in the WCPO.

my first full page boook cover

my first full page boook cover

I personally admire the leadership they brought in terms of maximising the rent of the resource use to the 8+1 member countries and supported many times their Vessels Day Scheme (VDS) as a management tool in the case where ports were not yet in the position to be “licensed fish receivers” to count and allocate catches with precision to quota owners.

For the record, I do not agree to the full flagged support of the MSC certification, but this is based on the issue I have with the ecolabels in general (based on the fact that they are hypocrisy at best and neo-colonialism at worst) but not with PNA or any of its members.

At its core, PNA emerged from a shared vision for self-determination through an unwavering commitment by ‘the right set’ of people at the helm of the fisheries organization at the time who had a clear understanding of the regional environment and its culture to ensure that this collective fishing initiative not only took hold but thrived. Furthermore, the organization had great leader Dr Transform Aqorau and a group of very envisioning assessors like Les Clark.  

The success of the PNA is a stellar example of the unswerving commitment by resource owners to take control of their fishery rights on their own terms and conditions. Since its establishment, the agreement has grown from strength to strength — a testament to the political strength and ownership behind this industry shown by the eight PNA states. The fact that they have transformed the value of economic returns from the tuna fishery from US$60 million in 2010 to around US$500 million in 2019 is no mean feat, especially when it relates to small island developing states. 

I have known Transform for many years now, and we share a love of books and self-empowerment based on the fact perhaps that we grow up in rural setting in developing areas even if in two very different countries. I’m a bit a rara avis in the consulting world in the pacific.  I wasn't born in a former colonial power (i.e. English, Australian, American, or NZ), nor a native English speaker, nor a full-blooded European, and I went from commercial fishing to development, from a fishing boat to a university… not the other way around. While this may have baffled many people at Transform’s level, he always was very kind and respectful to me… I remember asking him about accommodation in Majuro for a mission and he said come and stay at my I’m not going to be there, so I spend 2 weeks at his house working and going over his very impressive bookshelf (in my culture if someone trust with his home is a huge honour, one not to be taken lightly). Furthermore, I was also his guest at ancestral land in Rakutu, Solomon’s western province, near Noro (my favourite fisheries port in the world, and what fishing should look like in the pacific), where we shared stories of our native cultures, common visions, cava and tea in the outdoor kitchen no too different to the one in the place I grow up.

So last year when Transform asked me if I could contribute some photographs for the book he was writing on his 1st hand account of the development of PNA under his leadership I was totally honoured, and even more when I see my pictures in the cover and back cover as well as all through the text, plus his very kinds words in the acknowledgements. 

So yeah! If you want to understand PNA boat from the inside… this is the book and is written by the captain itself!

 

COVID as a boost to Transhipment over Landing and Containerisation? by Francisco Blaha

There is something I love about English and is that it can be quite literal sometimes… Transhipment (in between ships), landing (lands), containerisation (you put it in a container)… no one should get confused about the meaning of those!

port transhipment is here to stay for while i reckon.

port transhipment is here to stay for while i reckon.

With the carrier fleet ageing and getting smaller many people were predicting the slow demise of in-port transhipment, and the rise of landing and wharf side sorting and containerization. The number of containers with tuna arriving in Bangkok has increased a lot over the last years, as from the processor side is great for production planning as they know they have 20—25 tons of one species and one size there… so is easier than having to sort at factory arrival. The cynic in me also says that since the introduction of PSM in Thailand, is much harder to bring in fish of dubious origin by carriers, as they fall under their PSMA responsibility… while if the fish was containerised abroad, then it corresponds to the responsibilities of the country where the landing happened.

Yet the COVID situation has pushed back the “traditional port transhipment” as a safe bet and maybe extends the life of carriers for a while incentivising the constructions of some new ones. If we didn’t have them, they wouldn't be any canned tuna in the market by now. And if there something that conservative industries (like fishing) have learned, is not to have all your eggs in one basket, and without no vessels landing in most pacific island ports, very little containerisation is taking place.

Around 520 carriers are in service worldwide, most of them built between 1988 and 1994, with very few new conventional reefers built since 2000. Of the vessels built between 1980 and 1990, close to half have been scrapped. The average age of scrapped vessels in recent years has been between 30 to 45 years old... so many vessels are getting to the end of the working life. 

In the  WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels, there are around 420 ‘fish carrier’ vessels authorised. Panama has the largest fleet 123 vessels, then the Philippines with 111, Japan with 85, Korea with 31, Liberia with 21, Taiwan with 16, China with 12, then other smaller States (including Vanuatu and Kiribati) have around 20 registered vessels between them…. so is not a small fleet. Of the 232 carriers on the register above >1,000 GT in March 2019, an estimated 140 are active in transhipping fish from the WCPO. Of these, over half were flagged to Panama. Of the remaining fleets, Korea had the next highest number of active vessels with 27 (owned by only 7 companies), followed by the Philippines (14 vessels) and China (9 vessels).

With few processing facilities handling purse seine fish in the region, transhipping is the most common way to getting the fish from the grounds to the processing centres in Asia (Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines) and Ecuador.  The big 3 trading companies (FCF, Trimarine and Itochu) charter carriers and place them in the in a few ports (Majuro, Pohnpei, Rabaul, Funafuti, Honiara, Kiritimati and Tarawa) depending on shifting fishing grounds and licensing conditions. Some companies (mostly from Taiwan and Korea), operate their own carriers in conjunction with their vessels. How they choose where to tranship is described here

Landing, sorting and containerisation is enticing for processors and provides some benefits for the ports where it happens (like Majuro, Kosrae (FSM), Apia (Samoa) and Noro (Solomons), as it provides employment opportunities, furthermore it facilitates monitoring by the port state authorities in terms of legality (not unload unless proven legal as we do in Majuro) but then also volumes and species… since containers have a maximum loading capacity (20-25 tons, depending on freight company) and fish classified before loading. 

Yet on the other side, from the EU market access, only fish landed in the Solomons (at the moment) can maintain eligibility for the EU market even if processed in an EU authorised country from the sanitary perspective… RMI, FSM and Samoa are not authorised from the EU perspective… so if fish touched the wharf, it loses eligibility… this a bit ridiculous tho… but so its… so a Taiwanese PS can tranship in Majuro’s lagoon to a Panamanian carrier, and that fish is ok the be processed in Bangkok for the EU market. Yet if it touched the conveyor of a loader in Majuro’s wharf, even if for the 5’ before is in a refrigerated container, it cannot be processed and go to the EU…

So in RMI, for example, we are setting up a food safety body (the CA-Competent Authority) that needs to be equivalent to an EU member country (ie systems equivalent to those of Luxembourg), even if we never are going to process anything there that will do directly to the EU (too far and too expensive) for the few minutes that fish is going to be in the wharf… quite bizarre… but that is bureaucracy for you!.

Even if containerization can be done very fast 1 hr per contains and with two star loaders you could be in doing 400 tons a day, and employing locals.

The next thing that this also requires a good port with sufficient electricity to maintain the containers refrigerated and a good container vessels port, depth, facilities and schedule… other than Noro, is quite hard to find that combination in the Pacific at the moment. 

And while not all governments where transhipment takes place takes place seems to be in the position to cover these additional responsibilities and costs., sometimes being conservative pays… Under the present COVID 19 scenario… even if they had those rather expensive items and infrastructure, they could not be using it at the moment…

Putting all these issues together, transhipment seems to have getting a secure investment boost for a while longer… as I’m sure this is not the last pandemic we will face.

Further Explanation on the EU Market access side!

I had few people asking me to know more about the EU status from the sanitary perspective of the transhipment country vs the landing country, so here is and addendum

Under transhipment (in between two vessels) as long as the vessels are from EU authorised countries and are listed as approved by the flag states (https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/sanco/traces/output/non_eu_listsPerActivity_en.htm#) it does not matter where it happens and there is no requirement for the port state to be and authorised country (i.e. Majuro/RMI). From the EU IUU Catch Certificate side, the port state has to sign Section 7

Now if that fish is landed and put into containers (this is not transhipment!) then the country HAS to be authorised. so if the fish was landed and containerised in Kosrae (FSM), Majuro (RMI) of Samoa, it becomes not elegible for the EU market. So the processing establishment in any EU authorised cou ntry (like Thailand, Vietnam, etc) has to separate this non EU elegible fish from the EU elegible one (see page 31 of the publication below for details). The EU IUU Catch Certificate is totally blind to the port of unloading (incredible but true!), so there is no involvement of the port state in the case of landings that then will be processed somewhere else… the flag state has to (somehow) validate the legality of the catch without involvement or counter validation of the port was landed (and the coastal state/s where it was fished), then a copy of that Catch cert will go to the processing state and processing statements will be produced there for the volumes processed.

For how the EU sanitary and IUU systems works (or shopuld work) you can always refere to this boocledt I wrote in 2016. EU Market Access a Fishery and Aquaculture Products.

The manner with which the rules are ‘fitted’ to the system” by Francisco Blaha

Working in fisheries development infrastructure and compliance, any paper that starts with ”Understanding why institutions fail is a major concern for natural resource governance. In systems where resources are managed locally, failure is often attributed to the rules poorly fitting the social-ecological system. But what might also bring failure is the manner with which the rules are ‘fitted’ to the system

Local fisherman in Kiritimati

Local fisherman in Kiritimati

Is written by 3 authors of which I know one (Andrew M. Song). As a bit of an challenging (I say that as a good thing) paper, as it based in traditional markets in Greenland and uses Cybernetics (the science of control and feedback)  … it argues that the conceptual development of institutional failure could be made more tenable with cybernetics. In this case, the study and process tracing of a ‘market’ institution (an open-air fish market in Greenland), and they show how recently implemented European food safety regulations have generated unintended negative consequences, limiting Inuit access to marine foodstuffs, altering the social characteristics of food exchange, and giving rise to underground markets for marine foods.

What resonate to me is what I’ve seen so many times… well intended “western development programmes/experts” come with contemporary solutions to almost inexistent local problems… then the solutions don’t work… the investment stays idle… then of course the faults is of the beneficiaries and rarely donors assume the responsibility.

The last paragraph is spot on. 

Together, our study augments a key message posited in studies of institutional failure in environmental governance That is, that top-down, panacea thinking is not just inadequate; it can also be dangerous to the public. Institutional arrangements — including regulatory controls – that apply in European settings will not necessarily produce similar outcomes in Greenland. Ultimately, the success of these rules, we argue, hinges upon the will and capacity of communities to accept changes in the trade and market systems for marine foods, and importantly, the capacity of government to observe and evaluate how they govern natural resources. Given that open-air fish and meat markets have been a site of food governance in Greenland for over 60 years, the institutional failures set forth in this case underscore that legitimacy is key for social-ecological fit. Cybernetics shows us how legitimacy stands as a crucial measure of a community’s willingness to comply with the rules that govern them..

 The paper is here… always read the original

China’s Distant Water Fishing Fleet by Francisco Blaha

I have written in the past about the role of China in world fisheries, as it is a topic I’m keen to know more since its impact is literally the biggest in the world… and it looks like is bigger than we thought. This recent report by ODI has been doing the rounds in the fishing circles of social media. I don’t know much about the authors (Miren Gutiérrez, Alfonso Daniels, Guy Jobbins, Guillermo Gutiérrez Almazor and César Montenegro) and their affiliations or the think thank publishing it, but from what I read and the references cited it looks solid and well backgrounded.

Screen Shot 2020-06-04 at 2.46.59 PM.png

Having tried to extract information from Chinese authorities (and not getting anywhere) during an MSC pre-assessment that I later distance my self from, I was keen to see how they went on the methodology. And they have a whole annexe on it!

Basically, to identify Chinese DWF vessels, they looked at records of vessels: registered with specific Chinese public agencies responsible for regulating DWF; registered with foreign governments; or inspected outside Chinese waters. Cleverly they also looked at vessels’ unique Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) transponders being detected as active outside Chinese waters on a sample of dates during 2018.

Yet reality with China is that you never know, base data is always sketchy.

I also like that they were clear on the four key questions they wanted answers:

  1. How big is the Chinese DWF fleet?

  2. Where and how is it operating?

  3. Where are these vessels registered, and who is operating them?

  4. What are the implications of the DWF fleet’s activities for sustainable development?

The results are pretty staggering… this number says it all: 16,966 vessels, China’s DWF fleet is 5–8 times larger than previous estimates. That is really significant… almost unbelievable. Surely there are people out there that is going to review those numbers.

Anyway, I add some of the key findings but, as always, read the original.

—-

China’s DWF fleet is the largest in the world, but little information is available about its actual size and the scale of its operations. It is also unclear whether the Government of China has a comprehensive overview of China’s DWF fleet; vessel ownership is highly fragmented among many small companies and the fleet includes vessels registered in other jurisdictions. 

Key findings

  • China’s DWF fleet is 5–8 times larger than previous estimates. We identified a total of 16,966 Chinese DWF vessels. These include 12,490 vessels observed outside internationally recognised Chinese waters between 2017 and 2018. 

  • Trawlers are the most common DWF vessel, and most vessels are in the Northwest Pacific. We identified 1,821 individual Chinese DWF vessels as trawlers. This is more than double the largest previous estimate of the number of trawlers in China’s DWF fleet. An analysis of 5,241 fishing manoeuvres for 1,878 vessels during 2017 and 2018 found that the most frequent area of operations was the Northwest Pacific. However, the most intense operations were squid fisheries in the Southeast Pacific and Southwest Atlantic."

  • Almost 1,000 Chinese DWF vessels are registered in other countries. We identified 927 vessels with Chinese owners, operators or other Chinese interests registered in other countries. 518 of these are flagged to African nations, where enforcement measures are generally limited, and where fishing rights are often restricted to domestically registered vessels. Just 148 vessels were registered in nations commonly regarded as flags of convenience. This reflects the limited incentives for adopting flags of convenience given the relatively lax regulation and enforcement of Chinese authorities.

  • The ownership and operational control of"China’s DWF fleet is both complex and opaque. Analysis of a subsample of 6,122 vessels found that just eight companies owned or operated more than 50 vessels. The majority of vessels are owned by small- or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Many of these may be subsidiaries of larger corporations for tax or regulatory purposes. Labyrinthine company structures and a lack of transparency are likely to hamper monitoring and enforcement efforts, and efforts to ensure those ultimately responsible for malpractice are held accountable."

  • At least 183 vessels in China’s DWF fleet are suspected of involvement in IUU fishing.  Just 10 companies own almost half of these vessels, and several are parastatal companies. This implies that Chinese authorities have the opportunity to target their enforcement efforts efficiently and lead by example when it comes to enforcing and prosecuting IUU activities.

Recommendations

The Government of China can take steps to demonstrate global leadership on the governance of DWF, sustainability of global fisheries and combatting IUU. Steps might include: 

  • improving the registration and transparency of DWF vessels, as well as owning and operating companies;

  • adopting higher standards such as ratification of the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA), as a flag state;

  • stricter regulation and enforcement of DWF operations; and

  • strengthening bilateral cooperation with states where Chinese DWF vessels fish.

Our findings also highlight the need for more effective regional and global action. International bodies and agencies can:

  • upgrade capacity for monitoring, information sharing and enforcement;

  • take proactive measures to disrupt IUU stocks from entering international supply chains; and

  • support governance capacity in coastal developing states.

More work is needed to explore the ecological, social and economic impacts of China’s DWF fleet in developing countries, and to investigate the behaviour of transnational companies engaged in DWF, particularly those registered in flag-of-convenience states and tax havens.

Webinars, working groups and outrigger canoes by Francisco Blaha

My last Thursday and Friday were quite busy, imn fact I been really bussy for the last 5 weeks actually! And this has has been a very pleasant surprise. To be honest, when this all COVID debacle started I was a bit worried how would I maintain my income, yet many opportunities arise, and goodwill was shown again to me by many people and organizations, to whom I’m truly thankful

my last slide in my webinar.

my last slide in my webinar.

For a while now the good people of SeafoodSource was keen to have me doing one of their webinars on the fishery here in the western central pacific. I responded that my views are normally from the sea level… views from the wharf. That for the higer picture they should go to the really important people. Yet they like that angle and so “View from the wharf” was born.

But I was hesitant… I wanted to make sure, that I don't play the role as the foreigner (semi-white man) that talks about the pacific, on behalf the "locals", as having it seen back where I was born (by colleagues on my dad, unfortunately), I always been pissed off by that attitude! Even if invited by my colleagues during meetings, I try to stand behind them and support if necessary… but never talking on their behalf.  

So it was a delicate situation for me personally… So I consulted with 3 different Pacific colleagues I uphold with maximum respect because of their mana… to see if was ok before saying yes.

 Thankfully all of them were fully encouraging, which gave good reassurances… particularly when one them told me: “I never seen you talking for me… if anything you talk with me”… at the time something must have fallen on my eyes because they got quite teary… 

Anyway, it went really well…  even if it started at 6 am for me! over 500 people subscribed… and many made many questions that I, unfortunately, could not answer because of time… so if you are reading this and I did not answer… I’m sorry and please email it to me. 

The presentation recording and slides can be access from the following links
Handout Link: https://divcomplatform.s3.amazonaws.com/www.seafoodsource.com/images/d76dda9ad9573ace0a75675801451a32.pdf
Recording Link: https://divcom-events.webex.com/divcom-events/lsr.php?RCID=5800325bba835e1a486411f982b6aba4

Then from the presentation straight to the online FFA MCS working group, that is one of the many meetings we do in the region that moved online. Here is wehre the planning, discussion frameworks, new issues are discussed amnong the MCS practicioners and then send to the bosses. so is always draining

Then on Friday, I went to check on the other project I’m working on the Marshall Islands and it has nothing to do with fisheries! 

Here is the story… around 18 months ago, while waiting to debrief the NZ Ambassador to the Marshall Islands (that is based in Honolulu) on my work… I found a leaflet in regards the “North Pacific Development Fund – NPDF” that NZ MFAT has, and is primarily aimed at supporting small-scale development projects or activities of non-government organisations and community groups engaged in development activities on a non-profit basis. 

Now… Majuro lagoon is majestic on whatever definition you want to use… I and as waterman that does ocean swimming, surfing, spearfishing, outrigger and stand paddling, traditional sailing and whatever other floating distraction you put in front of me I’m a bit dismayed on how little water activities we have in Majuro… Every day when I cycle back from work to the house of the family I’m staying wit, I said to my self: man if there was an outrigger canoe club here…. it would be perfect after work thing to do.

So my only two neurons connected for once, and I thought about starting an outrigger and ocean sports paddling club aimed at promoting healthy lifestyles, youth activities and safety at sea. So, talked to my local and some NZ friends based in RMI and everyone was in, so we formed the “Majuro Ocean Sports Club”, then made a proposal and applied for the fund… and we got it!  

In the best pacific way, it took time, but the funds allowed us to buy four new 6 man canoes (waka ama as we say in NZ), 2 new single ones and one 2nd hand 3 man racing one. So on Friday I dashed up to Moana Nui were they were made (north of NZ - Tutukaka coast) to see them finished them prior delivery to the freight forwarders, to then be containerised and make their way to Majuro

Needless to say…. I’m VERY happy! I paddle a lot here in NZ and paddling is one of those sports that you do alone but in community, you don't have to pass a ball or anything like that… Is open to all ages and genders, is outside in the ocean, it fosters bonds in between people and you can be a social paddler or the most hardcore competitor and still come back to the beach with a smile and enjoy the company of like-minded people.

I guess it ties up with what I was saying before when talking about the webinar… I don't go to visit Majuro, I live there for 1/3 of the year, I have friends I work with, I go surfing with, and now we will paddle as well. I don't do stuff for people… I do stuff with people. 

And honestly I can’t wait to be out there! And another aspect to thank NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade… not only they keep me busy with my work as Offshore Fisheries Advisor, but now also given me as part of the community the option of a healthy lifestyle and a further connection to the ocean! 

The Price of Fish - An award winning feature of the NZ Geographic Magazine by Francisco Blaha

To say I find most media coverage on fisheries issues totally appalling would be an understatement*, doom sells… but does not help. So when I see (what in my opinion is) a good article on fisheries issues, I think it should be celebrated and promoted.

Frame of a picture in the article by Richard Robinson

Frame of a picture in the article by Richard Robinson

This article The Price of Fish in the NZ Geographic Magazine by Kate G Evans with pictures by Richard Robinson won the Environmental/Sustainability award at the 2020 NZ Media Awards, it shows that hard truths can (and must) be presented yet in a constructive and not demeaning way.

Problems get fixed with toolboxes and patience, not hammers and fingerpointing, as my friend Andy Mckay said: “There are plenty of problems to fix without making it harder for everyone at the same time”

Enjoy the Price of Fish in this link (and subscribe to an excellent magazine if you like)

*and when it comes to articles on the deaths of observers and the immediate assumption that it had to be murder because it was on fishing boat, and ALL fisherman are assassins, add gut wrenching to appalling.


Defining the stock structures of key commercial tunas in the Pacific Ocean: Current knowledge and main uncertainties by Francisco Blaha

I was an aspiring fisheries scientist back in the last century in Argentina, but the affair didn't lasted, you had to be very ingrained in the institution as to get a full-time job, and thanks to the union for at-sea workers, I was making the same money as sampling technician… so my work focused on sampling and data acquisition for my stock assessments colleges.

So I’m aware of the amazing amount of work they do, at the time we were just starting to work on modelling based on Virtual population analysis (VPA) as a cohort modelling technique.  I soon established that I did not had the right “connections” to get into the fisheries institution and if I had to spend the rest of my time at sea, sampling for others, I rather go back fishing in warmer seas even if I loved the job and the little I helped in modelling.

Then, while I was fishing in the Pacific (92 to 95) the level and sophistication of modelling and the mathematical understanding required, took off exponentially… by the time I came to NZ it was a different world, and I knew I’ll never catch up… so I moved on. I’m not complaining at all, but I wonder sometimes how would have that B side sounded if I had followed that path.

In any case, the whole point of the story is that I have massive respect for the people that do this line of work, and I’m very lucky to know some of the best in the region… so when a paper on the topic for WCPO tuna come up… I stretch my brain and make the best effort to dive into them. 

Fig. 1. Distribution and magnitude of total catches for skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye and albacore tunas in the Pacific Ocean between 2009–2018 by 5° square and fishing gear: purse-seine (blue), longline (green), pole-and-line (yellow) and others…

Fig. 1. Distribution and magnitude of total catches for skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye and albacore tunas in the Pacific Ocean between 2009–2018 by 5° square and fishing gear: purse-seine (blue), longline (green), pole-and-line (yellow) and others (pink).

In this particular (and massive) paper “Defining the stock structures of key commercial tunas in the Pacific Ocean: Current knowledge and main uncertainties” quite a few people from SPC I know and respect are among the authors and is crucial reading if you are a tuna head and what to know “where we are at” on the main 4 tuna species we catch.

I quote here the abstract and the conclusion. But as always: read the original (the discussion is excellent!)

Abstract
Tunas are the focus of significant fisheries in the Pacific Ocean, where landings of four species – skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis), yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares), bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus) and albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga) – constitute approximately 70 % of the global tuna catch. Stock assessments for skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye tunas in the Pacific Ocean currently assume eastern and western stocks. For albacore tuna, separate North Pacific Ocean and South Pacific Ocean stocks are currently assumed. In each case, these geographic definitions reflect the historical development of fisheries management across the Pacific rather than biological considerations.

There is widespread agreement that uncertainties surrounding the stock structures of these four tuna species could have important impacts on the population dynamics models used to assess their status and inform management options. Knowledge of stock structure is also essential for improved modelling of the effects of climate change on tuna distribution and abundance and associated implications for fisheries.

This paper reviews current knowledge and understanding of the stock structures of skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye and South Pacific albacore tunas in the Pacific Ocean, by exploring available literature relating to their biology, movement and spatial dynamics. As a guide for future research in this area, we identify the main uncertainties in defining the stock structure of these four tunas in the Pacific, including i) spawning dynamics; ii) the degree of spawning area fidelity and localised residency; iii) the provenance of individuals in, and proportional contributions of self-replenishing populations to, fishery catches within the Pacific Ocean; iv) linkages with adjacent ‘stocks’; v) the effects of climate change on stock structure and proportional contributions of self-replenishing populations to fisheries; and vi) the implications of improved knowledge of tuna stock structure for stock assessment and climate change model assumptions and fisheries management. We also briefly propose some approaches that future studies could use to address these uncertainties. 

Conclusions
Although current assessments of skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye and South Pacific albacore tunas within each of the WPCFC and IATTC Convention Areas typically assume that each species forms a single stock, several lines of evidence reviewed here identify the potential occurrence of multiple stocks of each species within the Pacific Ocean basin at varying spatial scales. To better define the stock structures of Pacific tunas, and the underlying mechanisms by which spatial structuring occurs, additional research is required into uncertainty needs to be reduced in understanding of spawning dynamics (including any potential fidelity to particular spawning areas), origins and mixing of post-juvenile assemblages, and the proportional contributions of spawning units to mixed fisheries assemblages.

More powerful and cost effective genetic and genomic tools, in particular NGS approaches and modern molecular markers such as SNPs, combined with complementary approaches based on otolith chemistry and parasites and well-designed electronic tagging experiments, provide a promising way forward for testing specific hypotheses regarding uncertainties around the presence of self-replenishing populations and their contributions to harvested assemblages. It is recommended that management strategy simulations and climate modelling, based on various hypothetical scenarios of stock structure, be thoroughly evaluated for each species to determine how an improved understanding of stock structure would influence the management of tuna stocks and implementation of adaptations to reduce the impacts of climate-driven redistribution of tuna species on island economies.

Awesome job guys, thank you!

Awesome job guys, thank you!