I have written in the past about the role of China in world fisheries, as it is a topic I’m keen to know more since its impact is literally the biggest in the world… and it looks like is bigger than we thought. This recent report by ODI has been doing the rounds in the fishing circles of social media. I don’t know much about the authors (Miren Gutiérrez, Alfonso Daniels, Guy Jobbins, Guillermo Gutiérrez Almazor and César Montenegro) and their affiliations or the think thank publishing it, but from what I read and the references cited it looks solid and well backgrounded.
Having tried to extract information from Chinese authorities (and not getting anywhere) during an MSC pre-assessment that I later distance my self from, I was keen to see how they went on the methodology. And they have a whole annexe on it!
Basically, to identify Chinese DWF vessels, they looked at records of vessels: registered with specific Chinese public agencies responsible for regulating DWF; registered with foreign governments; or inspected outside Chinese waters. Cleverly they also looked at vessels’ unique Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) transponders being detected as active outside Chinese waters on a sample of dates during 2018.
Yet reality with China is that you never know, base data is always sketchy.
I also like that they were clear on the four key questions they wanted answers:
How big is the Chinese DWF fleet?
Where and how is it operating?
Where are these vessels registered, and who is operating them?
What are the implications of the DWF fleet’s activities for sustainable development?
The results are pretty staggering… this number says it all: 16,966 vessels, China’s DWF fleet is 5–8 times larger than previous estimates. That is really significant… almost unbelievable. Surely there are people out there that is going to review those numbers.
Anyway, I add some of the key findings but, as always, read the original.
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China’s DWF fleet is the largest in the world, but little information is available about its actual size and the scale of its operations. It is also unclear whether the Government of China has a comprehensive overview of China’s DWF fleet; vessel ownership is highly fragmented among many small companies and the fleet includes vessels registered in other jurisdictions.
Key findings
China’s DWF fleet is 5–8 times larger than previous estimates. We identified a total of 16,966 Chinese DWF vessels. These include 12,490 vessels observed outside internationally recognised Chinese waters between 2017 and 2018.
Trawlers are the most common DWF vessel, and most vessels are in the Northwest Pacific. We identified 1,821 individual Chinese DWF vessels as trawlers. This is more than double the largest previous estimate of the number of trawlers in China’s DWF fleet. An analysis of 5,241 fishing manoeuvres for 1,878 vessels during 2017 and 2018 found that the most frequent area of operations was the Northwest Pacific. However, the most intense operations were squid fisheries in the Southeast Pacific and Southwest Atlantic."
Almost 1,000 Chinese DWF vessels are registered in other countries. We identified 927 vessels with Chinese owners, operators or other Chinese interests registered in other countries. 518 of these are flagged to African nations, where enforcement measures are generally limited, and where fishing rights are often restricted to domestically registered vessels. Just 148 vessels were registered in nations commonly regarded as flags of convenience. This reflects the limited incentives for adopting flags of convenience given the relatively lax regulation and enforcement of Chinese authorities.
The ownership and operational control of"China’s DWF fleet is both complex and opaque. Analysis of a subsample of 6,122 vessels found that just eight companies owned or operated more than 50 vessels. The majority of vessels are owned by small- or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Many of these may be subsidiaries of larger corporations for tax or regulatory purposes. Labyrinthine company structures and a lack of transparency are likely to hamper monitoring and enforcement efforts, and efforts to ensure those ultimately responsible for malpractice are held accountable."
At least 183 vessels in China’s DWF fleet are suspected of involvement in IUU fishing. Just 10 companies own almost half of these vessels, and several are parastatal companies. This implies that Chinese authorities have the opportunity to target their enforcement efforts efficiently and lead by example when it comes to enforcing and prosecuting IUU activities.
Recommendations
The Government of China can take steps to demonstrate global leadership on the governance of DWF, sustainability of global fisheries and combatting IUU. Steps might include:
improving the registration and transparency of DWF vessels, as well as owning and operating companies;
adopting higher standards such as ratification of the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA), as a flag state;
stricter regulation and enforcement of DWF operations; and
strengthening bilateral cooperation with states where Chinese DWF vessels fish.
Our findings also highlight the need for more effective regional and global action. International bodies and agencies can:
upgrade capacity for monitoring, information sharing and enforcement;
take proactive measures to disrupt IUU stocks from entering international supply chains; and
support governance capacity in coastal developing states.
More work is needed to explore the ecological, social and economic impacts of China’s DWF fleet in developing countries, and to investigate the behaviour of transnational companies engaged in DWF, particularly those registered in flag-of-convenience states and tax havens.