I get often asked what is the main problem faced by fisheries… like of it was only one simple thing you can point out! I’ve written in extent about some of them: subsidies, climate change, geopolitics, poor flag state performance, CDS, labour issues, pathetic budgets for fisheries administrations, and so on… but the one that worries increasingly is that as a sector we fail to engage with new people and more importantly diversity among the people working in fisheries science, policy and MCS .
I think I have been one of the youngest consultants in fisheries in the region for over 20 years now … and that reflects very badly on us as a sector… if you were to try to design the stereotype of a fisherman, you wouldn't fall far from a big bearded man with sun and salt dry skin that is weary of paper pushers. So you’ll come not far from me… yet if my gender, age, and background represent the only good way to do things, then how come we are facing the problems we have? How hypocritical would it be of me to not try to bring in, listen to new voices, new perspectives, new ways to do things.
So as much as I can I take on supporting students working on fisheries issues (and I do this on a pro bono basis) this year I’m involved with 3 different masters and PhD students.
One that was just published, and I got quite involved as she was working on PSM in two countries I work with RMI for the last 3 years and Thailand (via FAO and Ocean Mind) is Chloé Gouache’s one.
Her thesis “Proposed Guidelines on Pre-Arrival Risk Assessments of Foreign Vessels: Using Lessons Learned to Strengthen Implementation of the UN FAO Agreement on Port State Measures” was also supported by the following colleagues and friends: Mark Young (whom I worked with at FFA, PEW and now IMCSn), Dawn Borg-Costanzi (whom I worked with at FAO and now PEW), Natalie Tellwright (whom I work with at Ocean Mind) and Sara McDonald (whom I worked with at Monterrey Aquarium)
PSMA is not prescriptive about the ways a risk assessment on arriving vessels should take place or how to effectively perform this risk analysis. The objective of her work was to attempt to fill this information gap and compile lessons learned from countries that have implemented a port inspection regime of which risk assessment is an integral part: Thailand and The Republic of the Marshall Islands. These lessons helped generate proposed guidelines for the implementation of the pre-arrival risk assessment of foreign vessels in the context of the PSMA. The goal for these guidelines is that they will help those countries that have become Party to the Agreement or are looking into ratifying the Agreement in the future and be used as a resource by port authorities.
It would be a substantial piece of work for MCS practitioners, let alone for someone coming from the outside… but maybe that fresh view from the outside coupled to listening and respecting those on the inside is why she nails it!
Chloé, I do hope you stay working in fisheries… we need more people like you!
I recommend you read it if you are interested in PSM implementation, in the meantime, I quote below her work closing remarks:
I- Importance of Regional Context
The regional context is key for the implementation of good Port State Measures. The Marshall Islands’ membership in the FFA, which made fighting IUU fishing a priority, allows the country to benefit from resources it uses every day to perform risk analysis on foreign vessels. But for the tools created and shared by the FFA to its members, implementing PSMs would be even more challenging the country’s port authorities.
In addition, experience from Thailand and the Marshall Islands shows the importance of having a consistent process including for the request of port entry. Both countries agree that a measure of success is how better prepared vessel agents are when asking port entry over time. A consistent process changes expectations and results in efficiency over time. This links back to the need for consistency in the implementation of Port State Measures among states and the requirement of documentation to prove legality before port entry. Further, in a regional context, the issue of a potential transfer effect from implementing more stringent measures than neighboring countries is reduced. With a consistent regional framework and implementation of PSM, it would be more challenging if not impossible for vessels to land their catch in another port to escape controls.
Regional frameworks and RFMOs in particular, also play a key role in cooperation. Those that maintain registries and tracking of vessels fishing in their region accessible to their members and non-member cooperating countries facilitate the risk analysis of port States on these vessels. It seems that for some RFMOs, states are keener to report and update the available tools than they do for the FAO tools.
In addition, RFMOs and other regional groups such as the FFA forbid certain behavior.
Among these measures, they both prohibit transshipment at sea, which allows for more oversight and control. Transshipments must occur in port, which contributed to the heavy vessel traffic the Marshall Islands receive. Indeed, tuna purse seiners use Majuro for unloading and transshipping tuna catches because the RFMOs in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean prohibit at-sea transshipping. At-sea transshipment is a particular risk because of the lack of oversight on fishing vessels that are not returning to port. Mandating that transshipments should occur in port, allows for implementation of risk assessment process such as those described in this report, as well as inspections of these fishing vessels, and control over the transshipment operations. By prohibiting certain risky behavior in their region and promoting robust MCS measures, RFMOs lower the risk of IUU fishing behavior.
II- Decision to Deny Port Entry
The PSMA empowers the port State to deny entry to vessels for which the risk of it having engaged in IUU fishing is too high, but if the port State has the capabilities and resources, the best scenario would be to permit entry into Port and conduct a full investigation, and, if warranted, impose sanctions. This would contribute to solving the problem rather than denying entry which would push the problem to another port State, which might not have the capacity to perform a full risk analysis or take appropriate enforcement action.
In the Marshall Islands for example, port authorities are empowered to grant port entry and eventually delay port use pending the clearance of all risks. As an example, in 2020, the Marshall Islands charged a Korean fishing vessel for fishing in its waters without a valid license.
For this to be possible, there is a need for national legislation that forms the basis to prosecute such behavior when the illegal activity occurred in waters beyond national jurisdiction. The Lacey Act in the United States for example creates a basis for prosecution of international trafficking of wildlife. This includes, among other behavior, illegally taken commercial fish. The Lacey Act requires accurate labeling of all wildlife shipments entering the country and criminalizes most types of trafficking of wildlife, including fish that have been “taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation” national or foreign law. Violators under the Lacey Act can face a range of penalty including civil fines, forfeiture of wildlife and equipment, and criminal penalties, including fines and incarceration.
But these decisions also have a cost, the cost of unloading the catch, and keeping it in bonds to conserve it pending investigation, or the cost of the investigation itself and the possible court proceedings. In practice, some decisions are based on economics and capacity. In Thailand, investigations can be so costly that even if the recommendation would be to allow vessels to enter port to investigate, the costs are potentially so high that the decision can be made to refuse port entry rather than using government funds.
It seems that there is a lack of incentive to take enforcement action. When a vessel presents a high risk of having engaged in IUU fishing activities, there is no incentive for a port State to spend resources and funds on a thorough investigation, conserve the catch in the meantime and prosecute that vessel. Therefore, the solution to deny port entry might be the one that makes the most sense financially. This must be taken into consideration in the cost of becoming party to the PSMA. There are financial consequences for a country to implement more stringent controls. An option could be granting port entry and imposing higher fines that would cover the cost of the investigation, thereby incentivizing port States to take enforcement actions.
Complying with new laws and regulations can increase production costs for port States. As a result, international suppliers must also agree to eventually increase their price. There is increased demand from seafood companies across the globe for expanding seafood traceability, including through the ratification and implementation of the PSMA, which should put further pressure on governments to become Parties to the Agreement. This, however, also includes supporting the change and potential associated costs.
Another issue of denying port entry is the potential transfer effect of vessels going to a port that enforces fewer controls, which allows catch from IUU fishing into the market. However, increased concern from seafood buyers and seafood industry for port state controls would offset the interest to go somewhere else.
III- Container Vessels
The Port State Measures Agreement includes an exception in its scope for container vessels. As such, the Agreement does not apply to:
“container vessels that are not carrying fish or, if carrying fish, only fish that have been previously landed, provided that there are no clear grounds for suspecting that such vessels have engaged in fishing related activities in support of IUU fishing.”
Likewise, the IOTC PSM Resolution’s scope of application is to all vessels not entitled to fly the port State’s flag that request entry to their designated ports, with the exception of:
“Container vessels that are not carrying fish or only fish that has been previously landed”.
Therefore, containers vessels are currently out of the scope of the PSMA, as long as fish they transport have been previously landed. Movements of containers have increased over time because of many factors including aging carrier fleets, or improved efficiency. As a result, containers are increasingly used to move fisheries products to market.136 This exception in the Agreement has created a potential loophole and provides for opportunities for IUU fish to land and make its way to market through container vessels, thereby circumventing some reporting obligations.
The lack of definition of the concept of “landing” in the PSMA, also leaves room for interpretation and inconsistencies between port States. A 2016 FAO document for the Implementation of Port State Measures provided a proposed definition of landing as “to begin to offload fish or to offload fish from any vessel in port or at a dock, berth, beach seawall or ramp, but does not include transshipment”.
Under this definition, some catch in container vessels might not have been properly landed and should be covered by inspection.
Often times, catch would be directly unloaded on the container vessel and no documentation would prove that it was properly landed. In addition, container vessels do not use fishing ports but cargo ports that do not enforce Port State Measures because of that loophole. Such use of containers can therefore circumvent PSMs when there is an assumption that the fish has been landed before.
A 2020 UN FAO study on transshipment also highlighted a practice called “transshipment in transit” where fish is directly transferred to containers without any monitoring or control, blurring the line between landing and transshipment and “in fact not defining it as either the one or the other”. During these operations, port authorities have no insight on whether the catch has been previously landed and no effective Port State Measures can be applied.
In addition, new issues are emerging with the use of containers. Some carrier vessels are now carrying containers themselves to reduce the landing costs. The fish is stored directly in containers on the carrier before being transported to port and transferred to a large container vessel. These are charging lower transport rates. The UN FAO transshipment study highlighted in 2020 that unless clear port procedures are developed, there is a risk that carrier vessels will “switch to operating as merchant vessels that transfer containers to another merchant vessel in a free zone, instead of as vessels engages in “fishing related activities” for the purpose of the PSMA”.
This is also an important aspect of defining international transshipment guidelines and will have to be considered in the near future in implementing the PSMA. It seems that offloading fish to containers should be considered as landing or transshipment and be within the scope of the PSMA.