Energy transition of fishing fleets

As I’m still digesting the lessons of the Pacific Climate Awareness Workshop (CLAW) a couple of weeks ago, I thought of this recent excellent publication by the good crew of UNCTAD, led by my friend and colleague David Vivas Eugui Energy transition of fishing fleets - Opportunities and challenges for developing countries.

is all fuel

I know David from his work on fisheries subsidies, an area of my strong interest… Fuel is the single most important operational cost across all fleets, subject to the largest fluctuations across all cost categories and, hence, a major determinant in the change in fishing costs over time. Fuel makes up an average of 30% of operational costs, with variability depending on the age and condition of the vessel in the longline fleet here in the Pacific, and such is the focus of most subsidies… while I see an inevitable decline in the Longline fishery as the money isn’t there, yet its geopolitical value is immense for the DWFN (if you have a presence, you have rights) and LL are relatively cheap to subsidise (since they pay crew shit and they bunker at sea paying under-market value fuels not subjected to taxes

The reality is that Climate change is really impacting Pacific fisheries… but how much do fishing vessels impact the climate? What is their emission profile?

I questioned this in the past when I heard recreational fishers bragging about their allegedly minor environmental impact… they seem to cherry-pick out emissions.

On a good weekend, you may have 1000 recreational fishing boats out in the Hauraki Gulf, and let’s have a conservative average of 100HP per boat, which is 100000 HP… a longliner may bring 3 to 4000kg of fish on 400HP, and only 4 of those 1000 may bring 40Kg; hence the emissions per kg of fish are off the charts.

The basis of the publications is very sound, and I strongly suggest you read it, if you are interested in the overall impact of fishing in comparison to other forms of primary production.

I quote here the Executive Summary.

As more countries commit to net-zero emissions and include ocean-based climate action in their nationally determined contributions (NDCs), the energy transition of the fishing industry and its fleets is becoming a pressing issue. The fisheries sector is a contributor to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions because of its heavy reliance on fossil fuels.

In total, fishing vessels contribute between 0.1 per cent and 0.5 per cent of global carbon emissions, representing about 4 per cent of carbon emissions from global food production. Because of a lack of data, emissions from fishing fleets are estimated with different methods (bottom-up vs top-down). The International Maritime Organization (IMO) finds an increase in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions using a bottom-up analysis, versus a decline using a top-down (or macro) approach. Academic studies estimate that the world’s fishing fleets emitted 179 million tons of CO2 in 2011 and 159 million tons in 2016.

Asia has the largest fishing fleet, producing the most CO2 emissions, followed by Europe and Africa. Based on notifications made under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the European Union, Japan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have reduced the emissions of their fishing fleets by between 20 and 45 per cent over the past 20 years due to a reduction in fleet sizes and energy efficiency gains (e.g., in fuel use, efficient engines, lighter fishing gear, and smart navigation and fishing methods).

The IMO recently adopted a revised GHG strategy for global shipping (IMO, 2023a) that seeks to reach net-zero GHG emissions from international shipping close to 2050 and a commitment to ensure an uptake of alternative zero and near-zero GHG fuels by 2030. While not specifically targeting fishing fleets, the revised IMO GHG strategy is likely to accelerate the deployment of low and zero emissions technologies and fuels, and their related infrastructure in the fisheries sector. Any strategy for energy transition in the fisheries sector should be coordinated and build on that of the shipping sector because regulatory and technological developments are in a more advanced stage in that ocean economic sector.

To date the application of energy efficiency regulations to fishing vessels has been effective but rather limited. This is primarily due to their size, propulsion type and operational patterns. Fishing vessels that fall below certain tonnage thresholds or operate exclusively within a flag State’s jurisdiction are exempt from energy efficiency measures, but some larger fishing vessels may need to comply in the near future. The energy transition of fishing vessels, and fisheries in general, lag behind the decarbonization of the shipping industry, lacking global targets and implementation guidelines and related research and development (R&D).

The fisheries sector plays a crucial role in food security and livelihoods,  with more than 40  million fishers worldwide, many of them located in developing countries. However, due to volatile fossil fuel prices and increasing climate impacts, there is a need for urgent support to ensure a swift energy transition for the fisheries sector, with special attention paid to small-scale and artisanal fishers and female fisheries workers.

With agriculture and tourism, the fisheries sector is one of the three economic sectors most vulnerable to climate change. The main causes for concern are rising sea levels, warmer water temperatures and ocean acidification – and their impacts on fishing activities – particularly in least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing States (SIDS). While non-motorized fishing vessels are emissions-free, artisanal fishers face fish stocks decline because of climate change. They need public support to adapt to climate change and improve their livelihood. On the other hand, motorized fishing vessels need support in shifting to renewable and clean energy resources. This applies especially to small-scale fishers.

Policies to incentivize or mandate the energy transition of the fishing fleet cannot be designed without considering trade-offs and co-benefits.  For example,  increasing the fuel efficiency of engines may not improve fuel efficiency in terms of litres of fuel per ton of catch if overfishing continues. Canada and Norway, for instance, have the most fuel-efficient fishing vessels, while the European Union and the United Kingdom have lower fuel-efficiency, largely due to more intense competition for catches.1 Similarly, industrial fishing fleets, which are more fuel-efficient, can undermine small-scale fishers if they are allowed to compete in the same marine areas or fish for overfished shared resources.

The review of NDCs conducted in this study shows surprising results. It reveals that three major aquatic food exporters show no commitments on the ocean or fisheries-related matters.  In contrast,  countries such as Canada, Chile and the Russian Federation have committed to protecting ocean space and include climate mitigation and adaptation measures within marine protected areas. And, despite being a part of the most polluting region in the world, China and  Viet Nam stand out for committing to implement measures for energy saving, energy efficiency and emission reduction in fisheries as a means of mitigating GHG emissions. The review of regulations and agreements found little evidence of such measures being used in the fisheries sector.

At the European Union level, regulatory initiatives have been introduced to address GHG emissions from maritime transport. The inclusion of shipping activities in the monitoring, reporting and verification of CO2  emissions from maritime transport (MRV) Regulation and the Emission Trading System (ETS) of the European  Union,  may have some implications for the fishing industry,  albeit indirectly.  While fishing vessels have been excluded from certain reporting obligations and market-based mechanisms, the European Union has recognized the importance of fair contributions across all sectors to achieve climate neutrality and Member States are required to take necessary measures, including at the national level, under the European Union Climate Law, which has been directly applicable and effective since July 2021. This suggests there is potential for the future inclusion of fishing vessels in emission reduction measures, as well as potential taxation of energy products used for propulsion.

When zooming in on the fisheries sector, certain forms of (fuel) subsidies clearly contribute to overfishing because they expand the capacity of fishing fleets. According to data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and  Development  (OECD),  China is the biggest provider of fishing subsidies in value, followed by the United States of America, Japan, Canada and the European Union. About 80 per cent of all fisheries subsidies, including fuel subsidies, are directed to industrial fleets. Most LDCs and SIDS do not provide, nor do they have the financial capacity to offer considerable subsidies, particularly for industrial fishing. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Fisheries Subsidies Agreement reached in 2022 prohibits certain fisheries subsidies that contribute to illegal fishing and fishing on overfished stocks and is a significant step towards phasing out fisheries subsidies. However, negotiations are still ongoing for additional provisions under a comprehensive agreement to address issues related to overcapacity and overfishing, including fossil fuel subsidies. Phasing out fuel subsidies and shifting resources to support the energy transition of small-scale fisheries are essential to address overfishing and GHG emissions.

This study finds several alternative energy sources for fishing vessels at different levels of commercial development, such as green methanol, liquified natural gas (LNG), biogas, green hydrogen and wind propulsion. Each option has its challenges and opportunities. Green biofuels, made from non-food feedstocks or fish waste, stand out as the most readily available and mature fuel option for fishing vessels. Green methanol and LNG give rise to challenges in terms of retrofitting, safety and limited potential to fully decarbonize. Green hydrogen and green ammonia show promise but require further R&D to address safety risks, scalability, cost-effectiveness, the storage capacity of vessels and ports, and delivery infrastructure. Onboard carbon capture only shows promise in the middle to long term. Ultimately, the choice of alternative fuels depends on the specific technical requirements and capabilities of fishing fleets, the crew and the type of fishing activity, as well as coordination and cooperation across the world to ensure access to alternative fuels wherever a fleet may operate.

Another approach involves utilizing electric engines and hybrid engines, which can be powered by renewable energy sources such as solar panels. These engines offer a clean and quiet energy option. Electric engines are particularly suitable for smaller fishing vessels and short trips close to shore. Hybrid engines, which combine batteries, fuel cells and traditional engines, offer greater autonomy and flexibility for longer trips. This study also explores emerging wind propulsion as an attractive and carbon-neutral option for vessel propulsion for fishing and tourism activities through innovative technologies.

Energy efficiency measures, such as digital tools and optimization methods, can be integrated into fishing vessels to enhance performance and reduce energy consumption. While on-board carbon capture could play a role in maritime decarbonization in the long term, the technology is not yet mature and faces high costs. Overall, technological alternatives such as alternative fuels, electric engines, hybrid engines, wind propulsion and energy efficiency measures, offer potential solutions to reduce GHG emissions in the fisheries sector and contribute to the just energy transition. However, each alternative presents challenges and limitations, requiring continuous R&D to fully realize their potential.

Four case studies from diverse regions at different levels of development and with uniquely sized fleets offer valuable insights and can be found in Annex 3. For instance, the Ecuadorian experience shows efforts to measure the carbon footprint and introduce carbon-neutral production in the tuna value chain. The Asia-Pacific region focuses on clean energy and emissions targets but faces challenges related to capacity building, financing and regional strategies. In Europe, alternative renewable energy sources are not yet available for fishing fleets at a commercial scale and the region is focused on reducing energy consumption, improving efficiency and introducing circular economy schemes. The fourth case study provides an example from the private sector to achieve carbon neutrality by 2040 through emissions reduction and compensation.

Accelerating the energy transition of fishing vessels will require collaboration and cooperation among stakeholders, governments, international organizations, research bodies and the private sector. Enabling coherent strategies, sharing technological advances and introducing financial incentives are essential to achieve a just energy transition for fishing fleets, particularly in developing countries and for small- scale fisheries. Additionally, further research on sustainable fisheries management and ecosystem-based approaches, and their links to energy transition, is needed.

The transition should focus on a balanced approach that encourages trade and investment in a sustainable energy mix and promotes the incremental adoption of renewable technologies that mitigate impacts on small-scale fisheries and marginalized fisherfolk. The following are some of the economic and technological, trade, environmental and social considerations that are proposed and developed in detail in the report.

1. Economic and technological considerations
Develop and implement comprehensive national mitigation and adaptation plans for the fisheries sector, prioritizing a just energy transition that involves all stakeholders along the entire fishing value chain and national energy matrix.

• Building on the experience of the IMO and FAO, establish a globally harmonized system for data collection, monitoring and reporting of fishing fleet emissions adapted to small-scale and artisanal fisheries.

• Explore and adopt sustainable fuel options from circular economy practices, such as transforming fish waste and seaweed into biofuel or biogas for fishing vessels. Such transition implies retrofitting or adopting new engines and vessel design, efficient fishing practices and adequate port infrastructure.

2. Trade, value chain decarbonization and trade-related infrastructure considerations

• Explore the need to develop specific Harmonized System codes for the latest renewable energy goods and related technologies.

• Incrementally phase out and ultimately prohibit fossil fuel-based subsidies to the fisheries sector.

• Incorporate carbon footprint criteria for fish and seafood products into voluntary standards or consumer seafood sustainability guides.

• Develop and implement effective measures on climate change adaptation, resilience building and disaster risk reduction (DRR) for seaport infrastructure on which fisheries activities depend; and improve access to affordable financing for developing countries.

3. Environmental considerations

• Develop and agree on a specific and measurable global emission reduction goal for fishing fleets and on effective regulatory measures that are applicable to fishing vessels.

• Include specific objectives for emission reduction and adaptation for the fisheries sector and fishing fleets in the revision and updates of NDCs and scale-up mitigation commitments (by major aquatic food traders and fishing nations).

• Bolster efforts to reduce fishing fleet emissions with effective stock and ecosystem management and restoration.

4. Social considerations

• Ensure that the shift towards renewable and sustainable energy sources promotes a just energy transition that also prioritizes the well-being, livelihoods and rights of fishers and their families.

• Revitalize the ratification and implementation process of the International Labour Organization’s (ILO’s) Work in Fishing Convention (C188) that ensures minimum working conditions, occupational safety and health and social security in the fisheries sector.

• Enhance fishing safety and prevent marine pollution by encouraging ratification of the IMO Cape Town Agreement and enforce the agreement to establish comprehensive safety standards for fishing vessels once it is in force.

EU’s forthcoming ban on products made with forced labour

A few weeks ago, when I presented the draft of the chapter on fisheries, I was commissioned for the forthcoming Oxford University Handbook on Human Rights at Sea, I wrote on the limited role that, so far, market states had on labour issues. I quote

happy to have a good contract

Markets States, on their side, have limited involvement at this stage, albeit the existence of a well-developed market access conditions framework. For instance, the European Union (EU) imposes market access requirements that depend on “official assurances” by the seafood safety and fisheries competent authorities of the processing and flag States of fishery products intending to access its market. These authorities must provide official certification regarding the food safety and legality of the catch for any product intended to be sold in the EU market. Unfortunately, the possibility of implementing a comparable method to ensure the enforcement of labour rights on board through the labour authority of the flag State has not been proposed.

While I woke up today to good news in these front from the EU, that paragraph still true.

A press release for the EU says that the Parliament and Council negotiators reached a provisional agreement on new rules that ban products made with forced labour from the EU market. 

The new regulation would create a framework for enforcing this ban through investigations, new IT solutions and cooperation with other authorities and countries.

Investigations

According to the agreed text, national authorities or, if third countries are involved, the EU Commission will investigate the suspected use of forced labour in companies’ supply chains. If the investigation concludes that forced labour has been used, the authorities can demand that relevant goods be withdrawn from the EU market and online marketplaces and confiscated at the borders. The goods would then have to be donated, recycled or destroyed. Goods of strategic or critical importance for the Union may be withheld until the company eliminates forced labour from its supply chains.

Firms that do not comply can be fined. However, if they eliminate forced labour from their supply chains, banned products can be allowed back on the market.

High-risk goods and areas

At Parliament’s insistence, the Commission will draw up a list of specific economic sectors in specific geographical areas where state-imposed forced labour exists. This will then become a criterion to assess the need to open an investigation.

The Commission can also identify products or product groups for which importers and exporters will have to submit extra details to EU customs, such as information on the manufacturer and suppliers of these products.

Digital tools and cooperation, including with third countries

A new Forced Labour Single Portal would be set up to help enforce the new rules. It includes guidelines, information on bans, database of risk areas and sectors, as well as publicly available evidence and a whistleblower portal. A Union Network Against Forced Labour Products would help to improve cooperation between authorities.

The rules also foresee cooperation with third countries, for example in the context of existing dialogues or implementation of trade agreements. This may include information exchange on risk areas or products and sharing best practices, in particular with countries with similar legislation in place. Commission acting as a lead competent authority may also carry out checks and inspections in third countries, if the relevant company and the government of the third country agree to it.

Next steps

The European Parliament and Council will now both have to give their final green light to the provisional agreement. The regulation will then be published in the Official Journal and enter into force the following day. EU countries will thereafter have 3 years to start applying the new rules.

Background

The forced labour regulation focuses on products and will not place additional due diligence requirements on companies that do not use forced labour in their supply chains. Nevertheless, it is often associated with the directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence that was provisionally agreed between Parliament and Council, but that has so far not been given a final OK from the Council.

So yeah, that’s good news. However, because it is not fisheries-specific, it falls short of requiring “official assurances” (as in food safety and legal catch) from the flag state concerning compliance with ILO C188 (Working in Fishing Convention), which for me, would be the way to go.

Yet, interestingly, it talks at the end of an area you read very little about: “due diligence” by operators.

We tackled that topic in a paper with Katrina Nakamura and Yoshitaka Ota back in 2021, and it is good to see that while not fully there yet… is being discussed.

Let's see where this leads. For me, it is all positive as long as it does not fall into the hands of private certifications…

The Pacific Climate Awareness Workshop (CLAW) on Fisheries Impacts in the region

Today is the 3rd day I'm involved at the Pacific Climate Awareness Workshop (CLAW) in Wellington. This is a 4-Day Course with Emphasis on Fisheries Impacts in the Pacific, Adaptation and Loss and Damage Advocacy.

It would be an understatement to say it is a sobering (and sometimes soul-crushing) workshop, and the learnings I get from here will be coming slowly to this blog over the following months.

It is not your right to buy a truck or fly for holidays….is this kid's right for a better future.

The workshop's premise is very sound: climate change impacts, sea level rise, and temperature are affecting Pacific islands in terms of their existence in the long term, and economic viability in the medium term, as climate change affects tuna distribution and abundance.

Lots have been discussed over a long time so far, yet we are facing an increasing scope of research from climate science that needs to come into fisheries science… which sometimes uses similar terminology with different meanings, which is already confusing for Anglophones and even more so for those that have English as 2nd, 3rd or 4th language as in the case of many people in the Pacific.

Hence, this workshop responds to the need to standardise language and concepts while having the latest information and research on climate change, fisheries and their interaction.

The meeting is organised by the Pacific Community (SPC) and the Pacific Islands Fisheries Forum Agency (FFA), with the economic support of the NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. And a splendid job has been done… they have brought together the top scientists and practitioners from the region and afar.

All the presentations have been great, and having the right and most updated info is excellent, even if it is pretty daunting.

I just put some of the many slides below for illustration…  

On the side discussions I asked my colleagues how they deal with climate doomerism, it must be extremely demoralising being on the monitoring and modelling end of this topic, particularly knowing how this affects people they know and work with.

I was told that “Climate doomerism is dangerous. Climate optimism is even worse. Hope is crucial in effecting change. Blind optimism is not”.

This makes sense to me… and brings me back to two of my favourite quotes that I use very often:

“We have two choices: to abandon hope and ensure that the worst will happen, or to make use of the opportunities that exist and contribute to a better world. It is not a very difficult choice.” Noam Chomsky

“Not everything that is faced can be changed, but nothing can be changed until it is faced”. James Baldwin

Why not a Flag State Responsibilities Agreement (FSRA?)

I spend most of our southern hemisphere summer break writing a fisheries chapter for the forthcoming Oxford University Handbook of Human Rights at Sea, a study around the mess that HS Longliners Transhipment is in the WCPO and a Sharks NPOA for RMI.

But last week was back on meetings and workshops, albeit unusual for me since it was in Auckland, just 40 minutes by boat from my home in Waiheke; this was for the FAO PSMA Regional Coordination Meeting - South West Pacific.

The PSMA (Port State Measures Agreement) has been a very successful one since it started in 2009 and has 76 parties today.

I have been a full believer in the power of PSM and have been setting up systems and supporting countries on its implementation for FAO and many other agencies. And I always maintained that there is a difference between becoming a party (signing it) and implementing it, it is the implementation that impacts IUU fishing, not ratifying the agreement and being on a website.

My work in RMI with PSM is completely aligned with PSMA and has proven effective against IUU, even if we have not ratified.

Yet I feel, to a certain degree, that we need to resource have good PSM in developing countries and, in particular, island states because of the overall failure of flag state responsibility.

A clear legal and jurisdictional framework for addressing labour rights on board fishing vessels has been stated since 1994 in Article 94(1) and Article 94(3) of UNCLOS. These articles assign a vessel's flag state with the responsibility for, inter alia, ‘administrative, technical and social matters’.

It is crucial to emphasise that flag State obligation is unequivocal, especially considering that UNCLOS, from its outset, is a “package deal” agreement where all its aspects are interdependent and cannot be agreed upon separately.

Following the advisory opinion of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission case, flag States must exercise due diligence and ‘not an obligation of result’. The flag State is responsible for exercising due diligence to ensure that vessels under their flag comply with all relevant standards under the “applicable international instruments".

Yet even after all that heavy-hitting referencing, internationally, we only have since 2014 the “FAO Voluntary Guidelines for Flag State Performance (VGFSP)” to provide guidance to strengthen and monitor compliance by flag States with their international duties and obligations regarding the flagging and control of fishing vessels.

Not the language… performance (instead of responsibility), guidance (instead of due diligence)… is all soft. How flag state keeps getting away with this…? is infuriating to me!

Yeah, it is great that Port State have a binding agreement… all for it! But what about Flag States? To an extent, I could argue that PSM is the “ambulance at the bottom of the cliff”.

Let me illustrate this with an example.

The Seishin, a carrier that operates in the HS, came to Majuro to get a new crew member. We did the intelligence analysis, and we found out that it had fish originating from 25 Longliners (flagged to 4 different DWFN) after transhipping in 8 defined locations in HS pockets and just outside the EEZ of other FFA members.

Following our PSM obligation (crew change is part of port use), we analysed each of the transhipments in the high seas and the activity of the donor longliners and then verified on board that all of them were declared on board (and yes, thankfully, they all were) in fact we found that the vessels had encounters with other extra two longliners, but these weren’t transhipment and the carrier master had the good transfer recipes, and the names and position recorded from the receiving vessels matched.

Yet it took us a day of work! Plus, 3 hrs in the carrier.  

One could argue that the carrier is acting like a “port”, yet we did not find any form of compliance assessment either by the flag state of the longliners authorising them to tranship by the flag state of the carrier. And they are irrefutably primarily responsible for the vessel's action in the HS.

Having a small island state has to take on the responsibility to assess compliance because none of the flag states authorise unloading from their vessels, which is just plain wrong and unfair. 

Where is the due diligence? And the proof of their obligation under UNCLOS (and all the rest)

So yeah… I’d like to see the same level of international scrutiny and support for a binding Flag State Responsibilities Agreement (FSRA?) as to PSMA (even if PSMA has six paragraphs on the role of flag states in it)

RMI's MIMRA working with Tuvalu Fisheries using the transhipment scales

I have been a fisheries consultant for almost 25 years. Obviously, I love it. But there have always been aspects of it that struggle a lot.

top crew

The first and most obvious one is the neo-colonial nature of it. While I try to distance myself from the general attitude around this (to separate myself from some other consultants), the job is based on the continuous identification of the colonial (now former colonial) “subjects” that need protection and guidance under a narrative that depicts local states as inadequate for providing the solutions. (It is even hard to digest while i write it)

I discuss this upsetting (for me, at least) issue openly with my colleagues; thankfully, they don’t see it that way. The best analogy I had was the one of having a foreign coach come to train your rugby team (something from which Argentina has benefited).

I justify my neo-colonial fears under the perhaps silly excuses that I have in all of my ancestries a long history of colonised people, and to an extent, I was on the losing side of a war between a full-fledged coloniser and a state that argued they inherited the Malvinas/Falklands from their colonisers after independence (two bald men fighting over a comb, as Borges put it). Also, as I’m older than most of my counterparts, I have definitively made more mistakes than then, so I’m here to help from my fuckups and not from my "enlightenment.”

The second aspect I struggle with is that many end-of-mission reports recommend continuing with assistance. For me, the proof of the success of my job as a consultant is not to be needed ever again in the area where I was working! If I have to come back to do the same or something similar, then I fail in 1) doing my job and 2) motivating and supporting the change that I was asked to foster.

There are more. But for another day...

Unfortunately, I have learned to live with the colonial aspect of it, and thankfully, I have had quite a few projects where the second aspect evaporates. Here is an example.

A couple of days ago, my friend and colleague Beau (top bloke!), whom I have been working with for over six years in the Marshalls, sent me a few pictures that made me very happy.

Back in late 2019, we worked out a selection process for scales to be used during transhipments to control the potential of misreporting (among other things) in Majuro by the transhipment monitors. We are all very proud of the job and have procured quite a few of those scales to operate with them.

This proved quite successful for us, and good ideas spread for themselves, so this week, on an interagency collaboration, the Tuvalu Fisheries Agency (I wrote about their work here) sent a couple of their officers to work in RMI with Beau, Melvin, Steven, and Stevenson on the way we use them and operate, so Tuvalu adapts their use to their reality.

This is totally sui generis among the agencies, with no consultant involved, just capable fisheries officers working with each other in a Pacific-led spirit of cooperation.

I absolutely loved it. And I really appreciated Beau’s gesture of sending me the pictures as a kind acknowledgement.

As I wrote in the past: “My Pacific colleagues are the present and future, while I happily fade into a past where those that “know best” have to be from somewhere else.”

scales in action

The use of influential power in ocean governance

I have been in contact with Bianca Haas through her work for a few years and finally met her personally last December at the WCPFC. Besides being a prolific researcher working in areas of my interest, she is a really lovely person with a curious mind, a great personality and a contagious smile.

Fishers… at once the source and first victims of power in fisheries

I just finished the first draft of the fisheries and aquaculture chapter for the forthcoming Oxford University Handbook on Human Rights at Sea, and her lead or collaborative work is referenced quite a few times.

In any case, while doing the research, I came across this little jewel of paper she led last year that touches on power in ocean governance, which is an area I have been very aware over the years, mainly through the opportunity of being invited to work with small countries on those forums and not being a native English speaker (a minority language in most international language). I have linked that to neo-colonialism and cultural bullying… and this paper by Bianca and fellow authors deals with these topics. It is a great read. I recommend you go for the original.

I've quoted the abstract and, the last paragraph of the Discussion and Conclusion below.

Abstract

Ensuring inclusivity, especially the meaningful participation of diverse actors, is a key component of good governance. However, existing ocean governance frameworks have not yet achieved an equitable and fair playing field and are indeed often characterized by inequitable practices. In this perspective piece, we argue that one of the reasons for this lack of inclusion are the existing power frameworks and ways in which power is exercised within fora nominally intended to foster inclusion and cooperation. By focusing on four case studies of basic ocean governance processes, we explore how influential and interactive power is exercised in intergovernmental meetings, international conferences, and regional negotiations. These case studies demonstrate how specific exercises of power that undermine procedural inclusivity influence decision-making and the setting of agendas, and exclude important voices from ocean governance fora. This perspective piece contributes to the existing literature on power by highlighting how power is exercised within fundamental aspects of ocean governance. This paper merely scratches the surface, and more actions and research are needed to uncover and, more importantly, reverse deeply-rooted and self-perpetuating power structures in ocean governance.

Discussion and Conclusion

The presented examples not only occur in a predetermined set of structures, rules, and guidelines, but also in the context of climate change, biodiversity, trade, security, and fishing, which influence these negotiations, meetings, and conferences. For example, some countries depend on overseas aid or trade agreements with other countries. To achieve their economic aspirations, aid-providing countries might use their power to influence negotiations in multilateral for a. Overall, these four examples demonstrated the different ways how influential and interactive power is exercised in ocean governance fora. Many more forms of power exercise can be experienced in ocean governance, and more work is needed to make power exercises and the resulting consequences visible, to develop strategies to empower actors, and to link the exercise of power to concepts such as colonialism, racism, misogyny, capitalism, or classism in ocean governance.

The evolving relationship between humans and sharks

Sharks are a reality to pretty much all fisheries in the world, at different levels of intensity… they definitively were to all the ones I worked.

Back when I started in the Atlantic, the fin trade wasn’t a reality, tho…. I became aware of it only once I got working in the Pacific in 1991.

I definitively a complex topic (as most things in fishery, actually), and another one where “one size does not fit all”

Yet as a long-distance ocean swimmer, surfer and spearfisher… there is a 2nd interest there for me.

heat map of my swimming, running and cycling in Waiheke in the last 10 years

“Aren’t you worried by sharks?” is a standard question I get asked when the conversation comes to my swimming (10 to 20 km on open ocean) I’m personally not worried too much in the area where I live, as do my fishing (in the gulf, no seal colonies nearby, and I’m almost 2m tall. I have logged almost 2000 km of swimming around Waiheke in the last 20 years and never had an issue… I fact, I’m more worried about people on recreational boats (as I was actually “bitten” by one)

So I spend time explaining the realities, assumptions, and complexities of the issue… and often use “we are not Australia” here in NZ.

And now I got an excellent further toll on my arsenal, and it comes by the hand of two colleagues in Noumea (where they do have a shark on people issue), Jed Macdonald and Lauriane Escalle. (I have mentioned Lauriane on blogs about her awesome FAD work, so it does not surprise me that her science mind is also excellent on this topic) 

In the latest (and consistently excellent) SPC Fisheries Newsletter, they published a fantastic article: The evolving relationship between humans and sharks. A review and discussion of current shark hazard management strategies to foster co-existence, that you can download from here.

The end of the introduction primes for great reading.

"We focus on this issue further here, motivated by a recent spate of human–shark interactions in New Caledonia, and the actions taken by local authorities to reduce the risk of further negative interactions. We first provide some background into the various roles that sharks play as ecosystem sentinels and cultural totems. Next, we dig deeper into the world of human–shark interactions and chart the evolution of thinking around methods to minimise negative outcomes. We then provide an evidence-based overview of current strategies available for mitigating the risk of negative human–shark impacts in nearshore environments, and conclude with a call for further research into solutions centred around understanding and coexistence between humans and sharks."

I absolutely recommend reading it, and I paste the article in its entirety below… but as said, download the original and keep it for future reference.

"a cheerleader like fisheries blogger Francisco Blaha"

I definitely must be the worst-looking cheerleader in the world then!

Good that I train fisheries inspectors on board for a living, imagine trying to be cheerleader looking like the way I do!

As many of you may know, I make a living as a qualified fisheries professional (2 postraduate degrees and 40 years of operational experience) for international organisations and Pacific Island countries… not as a blogger; it is just a hobby, no $ in it, I blog mostly to discuss things that i care about, papers i like, things i see wrong or missleading… and all of it from a absloute personal perpective! (is disclaimed right there in the blog)

In any case, it is a bit disappointing that I'm personally shunted for my honest and totally personal opinions by the people behind Accountability.Fish, whom I actually know personally and appreciate Ryan Orgera, who was great to me in 2018 when he coordinated as PEW officer an expert consultation I was invited to. and Steven Adolf with whom I have collaborated in the past for his excellent investigative reporting.

"I always play the ball, never the man"... I learned that in sports and i stick to it.

I had a similar type of attack by Paul Watson after the Seaspiracy movie, so I hope this time does not come with death threats like on that occasion. I only seen this published in the Ghana news, so I guess their press release wasn't widely received.

In any case, here is a screenshot of my Linkedin comment (back in December) that initiated this cheerleader slunt, so that you can judge for yourself.

My "40 years on fishing rant" in the latest INFOFISH Magazine

INFOFISH is an Intergovernmental Organization set up by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to provide marketing information and technical advisory services for fishery products in the Asia Pacific Region and beyond. It is based in Kuala Lumpur and has been hosted by Malaysia since its inception in 1981.

They publish the Infofish International magazine and organise and host many events, particularly the tuna forums, to which I’m graciously invited. They have often published some of my writings, and I appreciate it immensely since some of the things I say may not always be palatable to industry, governments, educators, and private certification businesses. So I’m fortunate to have their trust in my personal opinions, as no business relationship exists between us.

In September, I had a rant on the 40th anniversary of my 1st commercial fishing trip… it struck a chord in some people… but not the same in all of them… someone told me that they didn’t know that I was such a “communist”… I was surprised about that… I didn't know that communism was still a thing in 2023! I guess that if having a social conscience and caring about people less lucky than you makes you some soviet style ideologist… it is a sad indictment of our society…

Yet most of the feedback was positive like the one of the editors of Infofish’s international magazine asked me if it would be ok to edit and polish my rant for the January February 2024 edition.

So yeah… here it is… for whatever it’s worth… this link takes you to the pdf, and below are the article's images.

I hope you all had a great New Year.

The WCPO tuna fishery: 2022 overview and status of stocks

It is the time of year when SPC’s flagship tuna publication, “The Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fishery: 2022 Overview and Status of Stocks”, comes out. They are the data collection and science providers of the WCPFC.

The publication always has well-crafted graphs and tables, with some information immediately apparent and others requiring closer reading.

The news still talks about the collapse of tuna fisheries in the Pacific, that the (name your geopolitical nemesis, i.e China, the US, Korea, Japan, EU, etc) are taking all the fish, that the regional management organisations are secret, that we need ecolabels to know if fisheries are sustainable, and so on…

So…Do you want to rely on the multimillion-dollar spin industry for information, or do you prefer to read a document that links all the scientific evidence supporting their claims? This document includes an analysis of the fishery by species and fleet type, as well as the impact of climate change and much more.”

Like most things in life, there is good and bad news. Some things are going well, while others are not. However, if you look closely, you can see beyond the surface.

So, if you're reading this blog, it's probably because you're interested in tuna fisheries in the region. This publication is essential reading for any informed discussion.

What are the things I rescue?

The Good

The main tuna stocks are not overfished, overfishing is not occurring, and we need to keep working hard to make sure it will not occur.

 The Bad

Over the past decade, five species of billfish under the WCPFC-CA have been formally assessed. The Southwest Pacific swordfish and Southwest Pacific striped marlin were last assessed in 2021 and 2019, respectively, by SPC. On the other hand, the North Pacific swordfish (scheduled for assessment in 2023), North Pacific striped marlin (assessed in 2019), and blue marlin (assessed in 2021) were assessed by ISC. The stock status of these species is determined using the Kobe plot approach, which compares the overfished status relative to spawning stock size at MSY. However, there is considerable uncertainty in the estimates of F/FMSY and SB/SBMSY for all five species. Based on the assessment model grid medians, it is likely that the Southwest Pacific striped marlin and North Pacific striped marlin are overfished, while overfishing is also observed for North Pacific swordfish.

Similar to billfish, the bycatch of sharks (which includes both sharks and rays) is much higher in the longline fishery, ranging from 1.5 to 2.0 million individuals, compared to the purse seine fishery, which ranges from 50,000 to 100,000 individuals. The catch of sharks is generally associated with the fishery, although the numbers have been similar in recent years. A detailed species composition analysis is needed better to understand the impact of fishing on shark populations.

The status of silky and oceanic whitetip sharks is of particular concern, as assessments have shown that these stocks are subject to overfishing and, in the case of oceanic whitetip, is severely overfished.

 The worrying future

The projected changes in abundance and redistribution of these tuna associated with climate change could have significant implications for the economic development of Pacific Island countries and territories and the management of tuna resources at the ocean basin scale. In particular, larger proportions of the catch of each species are increasingly expected to be made in international waters.

Bad for fishers

Talked about this before… You see fishing effort in fleet sizes and number of hooks fished (bottom), for the longline fishery in the WCPFC.

In 1993/4 when I was fishing these waters, it was the heyday of LL in the WCPO, peaking into 5000 vessels. Today as you can see, there is only 1/3 of that fleet left (1600), yet they are soaking almost twice the number of hooks. How can that be possible? Deck and gear setting technology are almost the same… response: overworking crew.. workload has been duplicated.

 Since then, transhipment at sea has exploded (as I reported before), which allows the vessels to stay fishing longer and, sadly, massively increases the crew's workload.

The mess that is the DWN Longline fleet in the high Seas of the WCPO

One thing that merges clearly from the WCPFC meeting we just finished is the profound mess in almost every aspect that is the High Seas longline industry here in the region.

I’m not saying this as Longline “hater”; it is all the opposite… While all fishing gear have advantages and disadvantages (like everything else in life!) I have had a special thing for longline…. While in most gears, physics and oceanography (they are closely related), the longline has a lot of chemistry… is perhaps the most skilful and “scientific” of fishing gear I fished with. You need to understand and play with depth, currents, thermocline, primary productivity/temperature, target species chemoreceptors, length and spacing of branch lines, catch manipulation and quality, freezing physics and many more elements… 

it shouldt be so unsusal to see one of these coing to ports in the region

I explored the chemistry side in my thesis on the development of a selective bait for the Longlining Fishery of Snapper (Pagrus auratus) and maintained an interest in it over the years, as you can read here, here, and all over here, to mention a few…, yet always from the perspective of understanding how a longliner catches a group of fishes but never thought on how longlines fish as a group until I was asked to collaborate on a paper on their fleet dynamics.

This is the link for a big picture of the longline sector in the WCPO and their market dynamics (albeit a bit dated - 2017).

And while I am fine with the domestic and EEZ-based operations, the High Seas fleet is a total mess. Their problems come up in one way or another in almost EVERY session I participated while at the WCPFC plenary.

The very limited MCS coverage of the High Seas in particular, and the (here I go again) abuse of the impracticability exemption has many consequences, below are some of them, starting with the one that is at the root of many other problems: the abuse of the impracticability exemption Transhipments in the High Seas.

The abuse of the impracticability exemption Transhipments in the High Seas.

Reported high-seas transhipment events in the WCPO have more than doubled from 2011 to 2019. In 2021, 62% of vessels listed on the Record of Fishing Vessels were authorised to transship in the high seas, 85% of which are longliners.

I have been over this a lot over the years, and I explain it here, and is illustrated here, fixing this will cascade on a series of benefits all related to the topics below:

Sustainability of Sharks and billfish and general bycatch

The tropical tuna stocks in the WCPFC are healthy, which is good news from the Pacific Community-SPC.

Sharks and billfish are a different story.  As you can see in the table below…  The limited knowledge of these stocks and their poor status are the direct result of the failure of the DWFN to monitor and manage the high seas longline fisheries properly. The graphs below from the latest status of the stocks are self-explanatory.

 As per Seabirds… increasing observer coverage and EM would be a great start, but further bringing them to port would allow to apply PSM to the requirements of CMM 2018-03 on tori lines and weighed branch lines, also we have the capacity now to see if they were setting at night. The situation of some seabirds like the Southern Royal Albatross (Toroa) is threatened with most of the mortality coming from HS longliners., so we are reviewing the CMM since is not really working.

Misreporting

In 2016 and 2021, we proved with the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) IUU Quantification studies that misreporting, particularly in the LL fishery, is our biggest issue in the region. I quote: “MCS arrangements in place for the longline sector are weaker with lower observer coverage, a far higher proportion of effort on the high seas, and a higher proportion of the catch transhipped at sea which limits opportunities for port State MCS measures. Particular focus should be on strengthening measures to monitor and validate catch both on longline vessels and as it moves through the supply chain. Given the shared nature of stocks in the region, it is important that strong catch validation measures are applied across the full footprint of stocks, including on the high seas”

Overall, bringing them to port brings them under the purview of PSM… and that is only a good thing.

Crew issues

HS long liners rarely come to any port in the Pacific… I have seen vessels stay at sea for over 16 months… all reprovisioning and crew changes are done while transhipping at sea. No one has a mass balance of crew boarding and leaving. Any immigration status does not cover those vessels, so there is no really a verifiable identification of who comes on board and who disembarks when and where… that alone would already be, in my mind, a reason to close a fishery down on labour issues… yet it gets worst… (believe it or not)

As I pointed out here, the fishery has been declining in volumes and number of vessels over the years, but a more direct measure of effort (hooks fished) has shown a different trend. Total hooks fished in the WCPFC-CA increased from a level of 400 million in the mid 1970s to 600 million in the early 2000s to 800 million in the early 2010s. The peak year in hooks fished was 2012 at 888 million hooks; the level in 2021 was 612 million hooks, a decline of 12% from the 2020 level, and nearly 16% below the average of the previous five years.

And for me, this graph below (page 47 in the SPC WCPO status of the stocks) is indirect proof of the linkages of both.

You see fishing effort, in fleet sizes and number of hooks fished (bottom), for the longline fishery in the WCPFC

In 1993/4 when I was fishing these waters, it was the heyday of LL in the WCPO, peaking into 5000 vessels. Today as you can see, there is only 1/3 of that fleet left (1600), yet they are soaking almost twice the number of hooks. How can that be possible? Deck and gear setting technology are almost the same… response: overworking crew.. workload has been duplicated.

Since then, transhipment at sea has exploded (as I reported before), which allows the vessels to stay fishing longer and, sadly, massively increases the crew's workload.

Bringing the LL to port could help a lot with the overview of the labour conditions on board, and also give the crew the option to voice grievances.

Electronic Monitoring

I wrote about this in the past, the cameras onboard are just the visible tip of the iceberg when it comes to EM, and while some see camera monitoring as a viable alternative to onboard human observers, others feel that on-board observers will remain necessary for the foreseeable future, at minimum to perform biological sampling and compliance monitoring where cameras are insufficient. The reality is that EM systems can complement the role of human observers and enhance overall observer coverage most particularly in the longline fishery, which is barely struggling this year to push up to 10% coverage.

While “on board” internet prices are coming down rapidly, many LL fleets argue that “live video” footage through satellite transmission is not cost-effective at present, so the footage is stored on a hard drive that then needs to be sent to for analysis (not the best option for compliance). In any case, to pass HD to carriers at sea, to then be delivered to some analysis somewhere, adds an extra layer of complication and risks (I could easily corrupt the disk before passing them to the carrier and then claim they were working, and so on). Coming to port to tranship or unload is the best option, and perhaps we should require it as a licensing condition that if you don’t do live EM, you have to come to port with the HD… as not to be too draconian and give operators an option.

MARPOL

In 2021 a couple of friends (Alice and Robert) and I got awarded a contract for a study aimed to: 1) identify, then assess volumes produced board and then potentially dumped, and then 2) come up with practical and policy-based alternatives that are aligned to the regional framework (a WCPFC CMM) and the international one (MARPOL convention) while thinking laterally around how to do under limited enforcement opportunities. (see here)

As part of part 2, we proposed among others these resulting strategic points.

Either waste is dumped into the sea, or it is returned to port at some point, and in some form. MARPOL does not allow the dumping of any solid wastes considered in this study to be dumped into the ocean, including incinerator ashes, thus: All vessels should return with some quantity of waste to be off-loaded at port.

The issue of onboard waste management is fundamentally a logistical challenge; all of the materials that become waste were put on the ship either in port or during a carrier transhipment, thus: Existing reversed logistical pathways must be used. 

Pacific Island ports already have a domestic waste crisis and are, in very large part, unsuitable places to take foreign waste generated by overseas business operations. Therefore, aside from local-based fishing vessels, vessel waste needs to be returned to originating home ports, thus: Wastes from vessels of distant-water fishing nations should not be off-loaded at Pacific Island ports. 

Larger vessels are much better placed to have better waste management systems because they have more space, can operate small compactors to increase waste density, can operate safe and compliant incinerators, and can handle and stow larger waste containers thus: Carrier vessels must accept waste from fishing vessels. 

There is presently no way to control MARPOL compliance at sea or transhipments at sea… (EM has a potential role) for the proposals to work, longliners need to come to port and tranship their rubbish to carriers prior or after their fish… otherwise nothing is gonna work

So yea… this is not a comprehensive list, and surely there are more aspects that I’m not considering, but the above ones are already compelling.

So yeah… LL is a mess, I see an inevitable decline in the fishery as the money isn’t there, yet its geopolitical value is immense for the DWFN (if you have a presence, you have rights) and LL are relatively cheap to subsidize (since they pay crew shit and they bunker at sea), so is going to be around for a while, and we need to control it better.

Back from my first RFMO plennary

The objective of this Convention that established WCPFC is to ensure, through effective management, the long-term conservation and sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks in the western and central Pacific Ocean. and that is what they endeavour to do.

So it was very interesting for me to be in the plenary this last week in the Cook Islands. Sadly, there was not much advance in the 3 areas I work the most; MCS for LL had some lukewarm advances but nothing to rave about, the High Seas Transhipment CMM (I’m writing a blog after this exclusively on the mess that HS Longline is) and the rollover into its 4th year of discussion of the fishers' labour CMM.

RFMOs are complex beasts, each with its own complications and culture. If they didn’t exist, we would have to invent them.

I’m not arguing that RFMOS are a panacea to all fisheries issues, far from that …. but they are MUCH better than nothing! And there has been quite a lot of experience gained over the decades in designing them better and research on operating them with lessons learned.

The key advantage that an RFMO will immediately bring is that there would be a table where people will talk and agree to comply (at least on paper with rules). Some key tools relate to their fundamental workings: a science committee that assesses the stock status and agrees to conservation and management measures, a technical and compliance committee that set up the basis of a vessel registry, a VMS, a compliance monitoring schemes, an IUU list and so on...

They were designed with the common good in mind; we all work together to fulfil the objective of ensuring, through effective management, the long-term conservation and sustainable use of fish stocks.

So in principle, they are supposed to work as an antidote of what Hardin called the tragedy of commons… according to this concept, should a number of people enjoy unfettered access to a finite, valuable resource such as a fishery, they will tend to over-use it, and may end up wrecking its value.

So far, so good… yet I see in the way they work that the tragedy of commons still applies, but on a more nuanced level, not as “individuals” but as those representing the member states.

I guess that as part of human and institutional nature when it comes to the geopolitics of fisheries, it does not seem a rational choice to exercise voluntary restraint when acting on behalf of a country– if they did, the other countries would merely take advantage – even if the predictable result is a tragedy for all… so a delicate game is played.

And of course, this is not any sort of moral issue by the people in the room; I know their hearts and intentions are in the right place, yet they have a job to do and a line to hold.

I noticed the situation during the meeting, but with different dynamics between the Pacific Island countries and the DWFN…

Fisheries in this region are, after all, of the Pics. My Nauruan Friend Monte Depaune said something to me many years ago that was illuminating: “for non-Pacific Islands and Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN) the issue of tuna sustainability is one of long-term financial benefit. However, for coastal States PICs it is also an identity and food security issue, one that DWFNs have less trouble with, as they can leave… but PICs cannot”. 

So the level of cohesion, unity and, to an extent, “altruism” inside the Pacific Islands block is quite high, yet even so, the 2 subgroups in between FFA (PNA and the newest South Pacific Group - SPG) have sometimes very different interest… albeit not always as different as in-between PICs and DWFN.

Yet the point I’m making is that the common interest of the RFMO is to close the door to newcomers (less pie to share for everyone) and then to try to concede the less possible to the common good by defending their sometimes minimal (in comparison to the whole value of the fishery) interest to the extent of wreaking the common good.

They do this either by suggesting non-committal language, applying for exemptions and footnotes, or diluting language to the point of reading more like policy than conservation and management measures (CMMs).

And inside these setups, countries play some 3D chess, where all sorts of horse-trading go in and shrug negotiation strategies, which are unique to watch and be part.

Yet it all feels a bit like we are using a Teetotum (a six-sided die to play "put and take"), the sides of the die are- "Put one", "Take one", "Put two", "Take two", "All put" (every player puts in) and "Take all"… where most use “put one” and  “take two”.

But as I said in my last post: I can only admire the delegates and the policy advisors of FFA and PNA for their stamina and chess-type strategies to achieve their objectives. This respect and admiration extend to the people in the WCPFC secretariat and the chairs of the working groups… they keep it going and focused after hours of discussions with very different views over the same issue… I finish the day exhausted… I don’t know how they do it… full respect.

The same goes for the science crew of SPC; they get the role of the oracle at short notice, with queries on the potential impacts of new proposals during negotiations.

I have heard many voices talk about the failure of RFMOs, particularly in the high seas… I don’t think is correct. RFMOs are an institution that works inside an intercountry framework based on diplomacy, tradition and geopolitics…  so if there is a problem not on the institution itself, but on the bigger picture

In any case, it was great to be there, and I’m very thankful for the elassos learned, yet that work is not my cup of tea. I see my work closer to the fishery itself in operational and research areas.

Musings of the 20th WCPFC Plenary here in Rarotonga

To say that I’m “enjoying” the 20th WCPFC plenary may not be fair to the concept of “enjoying”.  My 1st skipper told me that either you should be earning money or learning… if you are doing both: bingo! This is definitely bingo time for me!

it is like a multi player sport

I was invited to be here by my boss in the Marshalls as I was involved during the last few years in the working groups and then in SC and TCC… so an analogy would be I have been mincing the meats and working with different mixtures of spices and see how they work… now I’m here seen how the sausages are made!

I can only admire the delegates and the policy advisors of FFA and PNA for their stamina and chess-type strategies to achieve their objectives. This respect and admiration extends to the people in the WCPFC secretariat and the chairs of the working groups… they keep it going and focused after hours of discussions with very different views over the same issue… I finish the day exhausted… I don’t know how they do it… full respect.

As well as the games the DWFN plays by not wanting to move and using their “pressure” to stall change… right now, for example, we have recommendations from SC and TCC for increasing observer coverage for Longline from 5% to at least 30%... this is supported by all of FFA/PNA, NZ, EU, Australia and Canada… yet resisted by China and with the silent complicity of Taiwan, Korea and Japan.

In any case, the intervention of the day was from my friend Bubba Cook, who is here representing WWF (he is surely the most respected NGO representative in the region)

“We would like to align with the previous comments about observer coverage from New Zealand, PNA, and fully agree with the EU on this being the single most impactful issue to improved fisheries management and the role of this commission.  Observer coverage has implications across data gaps and information lapses and all the associated analytical difficulties.  One of the delegations earlier this week made the point that the need for the best available science justified a delay for action on another item.  We already have the best available science for observer coverage, which has been confirmed repeatedly by the SC and the TCC.  5% observer coverage has never been enough; it’s not enough now, and it never will be enough.  So, for those members that have dug their heels in on improving observer coverage, you are openly and flagrantly denying the best available science.  In one respect, I agree with China, “why not 100%?” We certainly think that is appropriate. 

So, while one sector bears the conservation and compliance burden with 100% observer coverage and is even implementing a pay rise for observers, other sectors are stagnant or possibly even moving backwards.  We should accept nothing less than a step change in improvement in minimum observer coverage on that point alone because the PS fishery is justifiably upset about the compliance burden they carry.  Whether it's human or EM, it's time that the longline sector pulled the weight they’ve offloaded off on the purse seine fleet for 17 years.  With that, we support the actionable dates that the US, AU, and NZ suggest."

As per the “NGOs” (including academia, MSC, etc.) present here in the meeting, it is a mixed bunch, and you have different levels of engagement, specialisation, and collaboration. Yet, as one friend made me notice, they have one common factor: they are almost all Westerners, as you see in the picture to the left.

(and I’m saying this fully conscious that I’m not from the Pacific and primarily from Eastern European ethnic origin)

So, I’m not passing judgment here; it is just that it is fully evident in the forums where I participate. And all of them are opinion holders… not stakeholders.

Yet, on the other side, one ex-fisherman is among them, and I respect that.

As for the rest, there are industry representatives yet, but I am not sure if any have been a fisherman themselves.

Yet what is very clear is that there are no fishermen representatives… I know having a WCPFC Fisherman's Association would be like herding cats. Primarily because of the way the crewing system is set up; however, it really stings me that they are the only not represented group in a multi-billion dollar sector built on the back of their existence.

The 20th Regular Session of the WCPFC in Rarotonga

I have been fishing and working in the WCPO since 1991, so I pre-date the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) that was established by the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF Convention) which entered into force on 19 June 2004.

remember us! we are the reason why you are at thses meetings!! no fisherman, no fishing!

Yet while I have been involved in issues around compliance, science and management for almost 20 years, I only recently got involved in the process of meetings that make up the working of the WCPFC… the intercessional working groups (IWG - I’m involved in 2: labour standards and transhipment), the Science Committee (SC) and the Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC)… however until now, never been to the “big meeting” the Regular Session of the Commission… here everything that has been chew and digested in the WG, that then was feed into SC and TCC, gets adopted, kicked for subsequent years or not pursued further.

As with all RFMOs, things are decided by consensus… even if, in the WCPFC case, there is a vote option.

In any case, I'm very much looking forward to being part of the big meeting that will take place in Rarotonga (Cook Islands), where I will be part of the RMI delegation.

Yet the meetings of the WCPFC are preceded by an annually well-lined-up series of preparatory meetings on specific topics by the regional organisations (FFA, SPC, PNA). In these meetings, the policies are formulated, advice is provided and discussed, scenarios evaluated and so on. All this takes place along culturally established sit-downs, negotiating agreements, face-to-face discussions, trust-based consensus building, and so on. Being the Pacific, all is well framed by sharing food, drinks, and stories.

During COVID, that well-oiled routine that had built up for many years disappeared. The travel ban took all that away, and all were based on virtual meetings; the simple fact is that we all needed to learn a new “way to do things” without much preparation and the very variable quality of the internet, which makes some of these meetings very frustrating.

To an extent, it is excellent to be in face-to-face meetings again, yet I also worry about the emissions geared up by all of us getting there.

One can argue that the WCPFC, the youngest of all the tuna RFMOs, is also the most successful, as all the key tuna stocks are in the green, as you can see in the 2022 overview and status of stocks.

Status of the stocks

Of course, it has the “weakness” of any RFMO, which is the slow process of consensus… but I would rather have it that way than the mess of not having an RFMO (look at the South Atlantic!)

There is a lot of unfair talk about the “secrecy” of the WCPFC…. I think it is quite the opposite… all the documents are available online, as you can see from the links above.

Only a couple of compliance reporting meetings are closed to observers (NGOs and multilateral organisations)… these are the sessions where countries present their compliance status. Things are discussed between countries… we have had bad experiences with NGOs running their agenda at the expense of the smallest members, so I understand the reluctance in this area.

There is a lot of pressure on the decision-making, and some NGOs use their online presence to represent their interest as opinion holders, which sometimes does not reflect the direct needs of the Pacific Islands, the real stakeholders in the fishery… I wrote last year on the issues of harvest strategies, which is piling up again this year under the banner of “keeping the stocks green” (in reference to the status of the stocks)… yet it is evident that the interest of those behind this campaign is “to maintain the blue” (the MSC logo)… and you all know I have a VERY dim view of the private certifications business and their neo-colonial ways.

In my case, I’m here as part of my work with RMI and focus on the discussions around the areas I work the most: Compliance, the abuse of the “impracticability” exemption on the Transhipment CMM and the fisher’s labour rights.

It says a lot to me that we have been going for almost 3 years with the Labour rights CMM (I had a bit of a rant on that recently)… yet on the other side, we are the only RFMO at least discussing it.

Furthermore, the WCPFC is run by colleagues and friends I greatly respect, particularly Lara and Rhea, who, besides being excellent professionals, have been very kind with their advice and trust towards my work.

So yeah, I am very much looking forward to the pre-meeting gathering and the meeting itself.

Working in Guinea Bissau

I have generally kept my work based in the Pacific Ocean as I’m already very conscious of the impact of long-distance travel on emissions and my general health.

partt of the local fleet (picture by my colleague H da Silva)

On the other side, as a Portuguese speaker (I grew up on the border between Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil), I have worked in most former Portuguese colonies since they are pretty unique.

So when I was contacted with a very good offer to come to Guinea Bissau, I was initially hesitant as it is the other side of the world. I find working in Africa quite confronting and infuriating regarding the impacts of colonisation compared with the Pacific.

The place has a very tortuous history going back centuries, from being a stage in the slavery trade to the present positioning as a narco-state use in the conduit of cocaine to Europe. A lot of that info is here if you are interested.

My presence here is related to their manifest interest in accessing the EU market for their fisheries… EU market access is quite a complex matter I have dealt with substantially in the past (in fact, I wrote a manual that is still being downloaded almost a decade later), since it involves separated seafood safety and legal catch certifications (with their associated systems and authorities). Having experience and post-graduate qualifications in both fisheries and food science, I have been very fortunate to have worked with many countries on both systems, either separately or at once.

While both regimes are as different as the work scope of a Seafood Safety Inspector and a Fisheries Officer, there should be synergies between both certifications, so they should be tackled together, particularly when a country starts from scratch to access the EU market.

After training many people worldwide on the sanitary and catch certification aspects separately, I passed all offers on that line of work to them. Over the last 8-9 years, I focused on MCS, PSM, CDS and fishers’ rights… which are the areas I feel I can help.

Yet, as this project here requires tackling both areas at once (which requires understanding both parts) and is to be in Portuguese… it seems that the number of people able to do this job is very limited… so it felt very ungrateful with life and with the intergovernmental organisation that contacted me not to help if I can

So here I am in a country I have never been to before. Yet, it is offering me an opportunity and the task to be part of their team to tackle a challenge that, if successful, could provide much economic benefit to the country instead of just being a coastal state where others with EU market access come and fish.

This is going to be a long project as there is a lot to do; however, it has the advantage of having highly trained professionals (mainly in Portugal, Brazil, and Cuba) and a “can-do” attitude that is contagious, and to whom I’m very grateful for their trust.

There is no way I can rightfully express the level of infrastructure challenges the country faces as a consequence of colonialism, post-colonial war, and instability. Yet, as in most countries where I work, I try to portray beauty in the best way I know, colors and images, so here is what my eyes have seen so far.

So my work here would be in blocs over the next 2 years to minimise transcontinental flights and operate for a few months in the year here, while the rest of the time, I work from home… the Pacific.

The Loopholes of the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Agreement

For a long time, i been writing about fisheries subsidies , and when I asked what the main problems of fisheries are, my standard answers were fisheries subsidies and people’s inequality. Both are the root of the most known problems (overfishing, overcapacity, IUU, labour abuses, etc.)

so many boast not fishing… how they survive (part of the answer is subsidies)

So I was very positive (and even spoke at WTO events) when the subsidies agreement was signed… yet as with all these agreements (as with CMMs in RFMO) what we agreed to is the lowest common denominator… and you only see the holes later on.

I read the text, and found some things, but waited for my more thoughtful friends to dig deeper and either conform or expand my views.

In this article, my friend Brad Soule and his colleague Christine McDaniel went deep and showed some of the holes behind the good intentions… now, it is not good to have an agreement; it is all the opposite, yet we need to be aware of the embedded shortcomings.

I find it unfair when the media and commentators’ discourse pinpoints the solution to multifaceted seafood value chain problems (from IUU fishing, seafood safety and species fraud to labour issues) on the WTO subsidies agreement (is just a piece of paper). As this risks hyperinflating expectations on what the agreement can offer, with potential operators then walking away disappointed because it does not deliver on the hype built around it.

So yeah… read the original, I quote the intro and the conclusions below.

After more than a decade of meetings and work, an agreement to “end fisheries subsidies” under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was adopted in June 2022. The agreement will enter into force once two-thirds of WTO members formally accept it. With 164 member states, that means 110 is the number needed. As of this writing, 43 have formally accepted the agreement. Members have decided to continue negotiations and discussions on outstanding issues, leading up to the WTO’s 13th Ministerial Conference in Abu Dhabi in February 2024.

The WTO agreement [1] aims to directly tackle government subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and overexploitation of fish stocks along with other goals. Nearly 90 percent [2] of the world’s marine fish stocks are now fully exploited, overexploited, or depleted. Agreeing to stop using taxpayer dollars to drive down global fish stocks to unsustainable levels sounds like an obvious positive step.

How to implement and enforce the agreement may be as important as the agreement itself. One of the overarching, laudable goals of the WTO agreement is encompassed in Article 3.1: “No Member shall grant or maintain any subsidy to a vessel or operator engaged in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing or fishing related activities in support of IUU fishing.” Article 4 prohibits subsidies regarding overfished stocks, and Article 5 makes clear that the prohibition on subsidies pertains even to areas outside of the jurisdiction of coastal members (i.e., the high seas). But the devil is in the details. In this issue brief we identify several loopholes that should be addressed in the implementation phase to ensure the effectiveness of the agreement.

Loophole #1: No Investigations 

Loophole #2: Weak Penalties 

Loophole #3: Weak or Opaque Science Management

Loophole #4: Lack of Transparency

Conclusion

It is not our intent to say that the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies cannot be effective, but the probability of success for this agreement depends on effective implementation and enforcement. It is one of the last major international agreements related to fisheries in the pipeline of treaties and agreements that followed the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea in the 1980s, along with the Intergovernmental Conference on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (often called the “high seas” treaty) in 2023. These agreements have sought to improve ocean governance and have espoused goals related to the sustainability of fishery resources, yet the resilience and sustainability of fisheries has continued to deteriorate.

The WTO process can be slow and complex, which does not align well with industrial fishing technology that is capable of diminishing fish stocks on a rapid scale. Few today remember the pollock fishery of the Central Bering Sea, which would be one of the largest fisheries in the world if it still existed. Overfishing led to the collapse of the pollock fishery with “a lack of knowledge about populations biocomplexity added to the confusion of how best to manage the harvest.” [9] Although a “moratorium” on fishing in that area was declared in the 1990s, the fishery collapsed completely and has never recovered.

Transparency and accountability, however, can counter these forces. In the absence of a means to compel compliance, it is critical for interested parties, wherever they are in the world, to have unfettered access to information on the operation of this agreement, no matter how limited that information may be. Implementation must also be designed to require a realistic level of government enforcement, as resources will ebb and flow. [10]

People need to be able to connect the dots. Transparency and accountability will enable individuals, civil society, and businesses to exercise the tools at their disposal to make informed decisions about how they pressure governments or make purchases, or provide feedback to businesses that purchase seafood from subsidized fishing.

The probability of the agreement’s success depends on effective implementation and enforcement. In the short term after ratification, the relevant government agencies and nongovernment organizations should collaborate on designing ways to ensure robust reporting by all members in all countries across all aspects of the agreement, and easy access to that reporting in the public domain. It may be the best we can do to build the case for further agreements. Hopefully, many of our shared natural resources will last long enough for those agreements to come.

Port State Measures Before and After Study

Last year, the good people from MRAG (with whom I have worked in the past) asked to collaborate on this study PEW contracted them to do, and it has finally been published.

doing good PSM is the challenge, not just signing the agreement

Of course, PSM is an area of fundamental interest for me, and I have worked (with different levels of intensity) in 3 of the 5 ports analysed (Majuro, Bangkok and Montevideo), so I provided my technical inputs but also local knowledge on whom to contact as to get on-site knowledge.

Of course, it is good to read the whole document for the details of each port! Yet I will quote the analysis, main messages and recommendations:

For most case study ports, the introduction of PSMs has had relatively little impact on the natural dynamics of port usage

For four of the six case study ports examined here, the implementation of the PSMA (or PSMs) appeared to have relatively little impact on port usage by foreign fishing fleets. This is largely because the choice of port for foreign fishing vessels is primarily driven by commercial and other imperatives, which tend to overwhelm any possible ‘disadvantage’ associated with stronger port controls. For example, in the case of Bangkok, the number of port visits changed little between the before and after periods, largely because Bangkok is the main hub for the processing of canning-grade tuna from the WCPO and demand from canneries remains strong.

Carriers continue to use Bangkok despite stronger port controls being introduced in 2016 because ‘that’s where the canneries are’. While alternative ports for tuna processing exist within the region, these don’t have the same dominant market position of Bangkok. In the case of Majuro, the number of port visits is largely influenced by the distribution of fishing effort within the WCPO purse seine fishery. As an attractive port for transhipment, Majuro will be used preferentially when fishing effort is concentrated in the central and eastern parts of the WCPO (typical during El Nino periods), but will see fewer port visits when fishing effort is concentrated in the western parts of the WCPO (typical during La Nina periods). The introduction of stronger PSMs in 2017 will have little influence in the context of these more dominant macro trends. For Montevideo, the number of Chinese squid jig vessels and Panamanian flagged carriers declined across the study period, although these trends commenced prior to the implementation of the PSMA and were most likely driven by unrelated factors. Chinese industry sources advised that the trend away from visits to Montevideo was mainly driven by lower squid catches in the SW Atlantic, combined with an increase in the number of Chinese- controlled carriers (flagged primarily to Panama and China), directives from squid companies to preferably use Chinese ports (to reduce the risk of crew absconding in foreign ports) and an increasing domestic demand for squid meaning more squid were transhipped at sea and transported directly back to China. Other carrier visit trends by flag occurred primarily as a result of reflagging, and thus were also unrelated to PSMA implementation.

In other cases, the lack of a strong ‘signal’ in foreign fishing fleet behaviour around the time of PSMA implementation may be also partly driven by the incremental implementation of PSMs over time. For example, Namibia is a member of a number of RFMOs that each have PSM-related CMMs. Many of these require similar (or identical) measures to the PSMA and were implemented well before Namibia acceded to the PSMA in 2017. To that end, any adjustment in foreign fishing fleet behaviour may have happened well before practical implementation of the PSMA. This lack of a clear signal associated with incremental implementation is also likely to be true of other ports, with few going from ‘0 to 100’ on PSMs overnight – most PSMs are introduced incrementally over time as capacity builds and industry is allowed periods to ‘get used to’ new arrangements.

For many ports it may also be true that the lack of a clear change post-PSMA is driven by a view amongst the vast majority of foreign fishing vessels that they consider themselves compliant with relevant fisheries laws and therefore have nothing to fear from entry into PSMA ports.

Broadly, these results should provide confidence to most States considering acceding to the PSMA that the Agreement can be implemented without ‘scaring off’ foreign fishing fleets and forgoing important economic activity associated with FFV port visits.

But, in some cases, new PSMs can have a big impact

The most notable example of a PSM-related impact amongst our case study ports was the response to Peru’s requirement to install and operate an approved VMS system, as well as submit VMS data for the previous six months, for all vessels wishing to enter Peruvian ports post-2020. In this case, the introduction of the VMS requirement led to the complete abandonment of Chimbote port by the Chinese high seas squid jig fleet – which had used Chimbote since 2017 as an important port for hull maintenance with up to 129 visits annually – as well as a significant decline in the use of Callao port by both Chinese and Korean squid jig fleets. While the VMS requirement was introduced in the same year as the COVID pandemic, advice from Chinese industry sources confirmed that opposition to the VMS requirement was the main driver of behaviour. Our analysis indicates that these vessels continued to fish in the same areas, but either remained at sea during our study period (with catch likely transhipped at sea) or returned to Chinese ports for maintenance. In the case of the Korean jig fleet, the VMS requirement contributed to a substantial change in fishing pattern. In this case, industry advice indicates that the VMS requirement, together with low CPUE in the south east Pacific, led to the fleet fishing solely on the Atlantic side of South America (abandoning the typical ‘squid route’ seasonal migration from the Atlantic side to the Pacific side for the second half of the year). Interestingly, other foreign fleets to whom the VMS requirement did not apply – e.g. the tuna longline fleet – continued to use Peruvian ports (principally Callao) in the same manner throughout our study period.

The VMS requirement was originally introduced in response to concerns around high seas vessels switching off AIS and fishing in Peru’s EEZ. While the extent to which the VMS requirement contributed is unknown, independent analyses have highlighted changes in Chinese jigging fleet behaviour in the period after the requirement was introduced (GFW, 2020; 2021b). In particular, there were fewer vessels with AIS irregularities leading to confusion over either identity or location in 2021 compared to 2020, and perhaps more importantly the fleet appeared to have introduced a self-enforced buffer zone adjacent to the Peru and Ecuador (Galapagos) EEZs. While 2020 AIS data showed the fleet fishing right up to the EEZ boundary, the closest AIS record for 2021 was 10nm and 150nm from the Peru EEZ and Ecuador (Galapagos) EEZ boundaries respectively.

In addition to what could be considered positive developments, a number of unintended consequences may have resulted. For example, the exit of the Chinese jigger fleet from Chimbote has reportedly had a significant impact on the local economy for whom vessels making up to 129 visits annually at an average of 12 days each made an important contribution. We understand this has led to a level of opposition to the VMS requirement from local business owners. Some analysts have speculated the choice to remain at sea for longer periods amongst the jig fleet also risks a higher level of labour rights abuses.

There is limited evidence of a shift from PSMA designated to non-designated ports

One of the possible consequences of implementing the PSMA was a shift by fishing fleets from PSMA- designated to non-designated ports (either non-designated ports in PSMA Parties, or ports in States not Party to the PSMA) in order to avoid stronger port controls (or to avoid any additional administrative burden). This was particularly the case for fleets with higher risk of involvement in IUU fishing. The available evidence from the case studies indicates that broadly this hasn’t happened. As discussed above, in most cases fishing fleet behaviours around port usage have been driven by natural commercial dynamics around the port/fishery, with relatively few changes that could be explained primarily through the introduction of PSMs. In some cases, this may have influenced in part by relatively few inspections being undertaken (e.g. Montevideo).

When changes did occur – for example, the exit of Chinese and Korean flagged squid jiggers from Peruvian ports following the introduction of the VMS requirement in 2020 – the results were mixed. Some vessels appeared to remain at sea for longer, others returned to home ports (particularly during the height of the COVID pandemic), while others called in to both PSMA and non-PSMA ports. While the return to home ports, where PSMA measures do not automatically apply to domestic vessels, could theoretically reduce inspection coverage of these vessels, it is not yet clear whether these are longer term trends.

Of course, our case studies sample only a very small fraction of PSMA-designated ports internationally andeach port has its own dynamics. On that basis, it’s possible that fleets in other ports may have responded differently, although the risk of vessels shifting to non-designated ports should only reduce in future as more States accede to the PSMA.

There was limited impact on the operational aspects of port usage – e.g. time in port, time at anchor

Another possible consequence of the introduction of stronger port inspection regimes and the requirement for advance entry request under the PSMA was a change in the operational efficiency of using ports – for example, extending the duration of port visits and time at anchor waiting for port entry approval. The available evidence from the case studies indicates no substantial change in the operational aspects of port usage following PSM implementation. Broadly, time in port and wait times at anchor remained relatively constant in the periods before and after PSM implementation (with the exception of time spent at anchorage in Bangkok).

This, again, is likely largely driven by the natural operational dynamics of the port (e.g. the time taken for a carrier to fill up hasn’t changed post-PSMA), and also by the considerable efforts of port States (for all of whom the economic activity associated with port usage is very important) to make the PSMA process as efficient as possible. For example, in several cases (e.g. Bangkok, Majuro) port States have developed electronic platforms, accessible online, to manage port entry requests and data submission requirements as well as coordinate local agencies.

In the one port for which there was some evidence of change – Bangkok – the median length of carrier visits to port was shorter and wait times at anchor were longer. There are a range of non-PSMA factors that could contribute to this result (e.g. smaller average transhipment volumes resulting in faster unload times), although it is also plausible that wait times at anchorage are slightly longer because vessels now have to wait for approval before entering port, while port visit duration may be shorter partly because onshore processes (e.g. inspection teams, unloading logistics) have had slightly longer to get themselves organised. Nevertheless, Thailand’s DoF noted that unload volumes are the key driver of time in port, and because data on these is not available pre- and post-PSMA they cautioned against drawing strong conclusions around the impacts of PSMA processes on the duration of time in port.

AIS should be complemented by other data sources and local knowledge

The emergence of publicly-available AIS data together with sophisticated analysis through ‘big data’ platforms in recent times has offered unprecedented insights into global fishing patterns and fleet behaviour. In this study, AIS has proven an extremely useful tool to examine the practical impacts of the PSMA. However, AIS coverage remains patchy for some fleets and areas, particularly in the earlier years of our datasets. To that end, supplementing AIS data with other sources of information – e.g. publicly available port visits records, transhipment volumes – has been important to gauge the completeness of the AIS dataset as well as fill in gaps where necessary. For most ports, AIS data appeared reliable enough to be a reasonable reflection of actual trends in fishing fleet behaviour, although for Montevideo we substituted AIS data for a groomed version of official port records as our primary dataset.

The other essential element to ensuring best use of AIS data in studies such as this is to use local knowledge. In practice, there are a myriad of commercial and operational factors which influence fleet behaviour, port usage and PSM application across FFVs which may not be evident from trends in AIS data alone. To that end, involving local experts and stakeholders to help interpret any trends is essential in gaining an accurate understanding of the factors driving fleet dynamics.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Much of the analysis in this study focused on changes in fleet behaviour in response to the implementation of PSMs and the underlying drivers, rather than examining the effectiveness of the PSMs themselves. To that end, our recommendations below focus on observations and learnings that should assist the conduct of similar studies in future, as well as other similar work that might usefully be undertaken.

1. Monitoring of PSM impacts – for countries interested in implementing the PSMA (or stronger PSMs) and keen to monitor any practical changes in fishing fleet behaviour, AIS offers a potentially valuable and cost-effective dataset. A framework of indicators similar to those used here can be tailored to examine changes in the main issues of interest (e.g. changes in total numbers of vessel visits, changes in flag States, changes by vessel type, duration of vessel visits). One of the main challenges in these types of ‘before and after’ analyses is that PSMs are often implemented incrementally and the point at which key measures ‘start to bite’ is not always well-recorded. To that end, countries interested in analysing changes in fleet behaviour post-PSM/PSMA implementation should maintain clear records of key dates of implementation so that trends may be analysed in the appropriate context.

2. Complement AIS with other available data – As discussed above, the increasingly widespread use of AIS technology across the global fishing fleet and the emergence of big data platforms including Global Fishing Watch offer previously unavailable opportunities to track and analyse patterns in fishing fleet behaviour. The value of these insights should only improve as AIS data coverage and technology improves over time. Nevertheless, this study highlights that AIS data coverage is better in some fleets, areas and ports than others and can be patchy, particularly the further you go back in time. To that end, future studies using AIS data to analyse changes in fishing fleet behaviour should complement AIS with other relevant data (e.g. fisheries/port agency official records of port activity) to gain insights into the completeness of the AIS dataset and asses the confidence with which conclusions can be drawn. Caution should be exercised when AIS is the only available dataset.

3. Use of local experts – The factors driving port usage by fishing fleets are complex and often dynamic. While AIS data is potentially extremely useful in identifying and analysing trends in fleet behaviour, the drivers underlying trends may not be evident from AIS data alone. To that end, stakeholders knowledgeable in the dynamics of the port should be engaged to assist in the interpretation of results.

4. Monitoring global implementation of the PSMA – in addition to examining trends in fleet behaviour at the individual port level, AIS data has potential utility in monitoring implementation of the PSMA at the global level. For example, AIS data could be used to track the proportion of port visits by FFVs to designated ports under the PSMA versus non-designated ports (either ports in non-party States, or non-designated ports in party States). Similar trends could be tracked for other relevant indicators (e.g. proportion of visits by hold capacity) or geographic region (e.g. FAO areas, continents). Clearly there would need to be confidence that the underlying data provided an accurate representation of actual visits, but assuming this was the case, indicators of PSMA implementation might be published in relevant publications including the FAO’s periodic State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture reports.

Ecolabels and labour standards certification as agents of neo colonialism

I’m starting research into my long-held belief that the private certification model (such as eco-labels and crew labour standards), with explicit NGO support, fundamentally extends the neocolonial dependency model. Transnational private certifications reinforce longstanding global relations of domination by creating certification “brands” that have much in common with the colonial-era extraterritorial empires.  

Qe are bad because we a poor

In this research, I came across this jewel of a paper from 2012 - A new extraterritoriality? It focuses on the Aquaculture Stewardship Council (yet includes the MSC in its analysis). It highlights some words that echo my position regarding “white saviours” and the colonial roots of ecolabels and labour certifications.

Some of the key concepts I will use are presented below.

The authors show how the territorial practices in the certification standards replicate aspects of the legal extraterritoriality of the colonial period and how these new forms of extraterritoriality create disaggregated and variegated sovereignty scapes. Key shared features include the identification of subjects that need protection, a narrative that depicts local states as inadequate for providing these protections, and the creation of territories where imperial states provide these protections during the colonial period, and certification agents for transnational eco-certification."

The authors turned to colonial-era extraterritoriality in part because this comparison does more than raise questions about the role of government and the remaking of sovereignty. It also helps them highlight how transnational eco-certification can replicate and reinforce longstanding global relations of domination by creating an eco-certification empire, which has much in common with the colonial-era extraterritorial empires.

Much like an extraterritorial empire, the eco-certification empire does not aim to displace state rule through direct colonisation. Instead, it acknowledges the existing legal system and then creates certification territories, where certification agencies claim rule-making and rule-enforcement authority in ways that pre-empt government authority. These territories contribute to creating a variegated sovereignty in which the state does not have exclusive or absolute sovereignty. We have also shown how there are parallels in how transnational ecolabels seek to protect valued subjects and in how transnational ecolabels is justified through a narrative of deficient states. What has changed is that it is no longer the subjects of Christian countries that are protected but endangered non-human species, local communities, workers, women, and children. Finally, the new extraterritoriality is partial-it does not challenge the legality of state regulation of fishing while at the same time claiming the right to assess whether fishing follows state regulations and to add more regulations.

They also think that it is essential to consider how primarily Northern-based transnational eco-certification actors may be replicating imperialist patterns in identifying subjects in the South that need protection and taking on the role of providing that protection while dismissing or ignoring national or local actors.

Landscape and Opportunity Analysis in the Pacific Tuna Sector

I was involved in an extensive study last year, and the report has just been published. I am generally weary of big across a sector (landscape type analysis)… in Spanish, we have a saying that states, “he who grasps at too much... adjusts too little” (el que mucho abarca… poco aprieta)…. And I tend to be a floor operator.

hopefully it helps them… they are the resources owners

Yet, the team included some friends and people I respect… and the idea was that I would be a “ground truther” so I was pretty happy to be part of it; while unusual, it was actually a good experience… I took it on as: “one needs a big map. to get to small places”  

This project aimed to improve value retention from Pacific tuna resources by being pragmatic and innovative in product/service delivery. The final report is here if anyone is interested.

I quote the executive summary, but is worth having it as a “macro” reference for whatever work people do in the region.

Tuna is a key driver of the Pacific region’s economic growth and there is already coordinated efforts underway between Pacific Island countries to maximise returns while sustainably managing tuna stocks. However, these efforts will need to be accelerated to counteract factors such as climate change, an increasingly complex regulatory environment and emigration of the working-age Pacific Island population. At the annual Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) officials meeting in May 2021 (FFC118), a mandate was given for a landscape analysis of the Pacific tuna sector to be completed. The focus of the analysis was to consider long-term opportunities and constraints, focusing on feasibility and commercialisation of a short list of opportunities. The Australian Centre of International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) has jointly funded this project with FFA on a 50/50 basis.

GLOBAL TUNA SECTOR

Fish is expected to become an increasingly popular source of animal protein over the next decade, driven primarily by its lower carbon footprint compared to other sources of animal protein and a growing middle class who are health conscious and time poor. Tuna is one of the world’s highest value fish in capture fisheries production, prized for its nutritional content and versatility in terms of end use across biomedical, food, feed and industrial sectors. Tuna is suitable for the significant proportion of the population who do not eat pork, providing an alternative source of protein.

Growth in global tuna landings has steadily increased at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 1.97 per cent over the period 2012 to 2018, with Pacific flagged states experiencing the highest growth rate in landings during this period, i.e., where a vessel is flagged/licenced/registered. The value of the global tuna market for food products was US$42.2 billion in 2022 and is projected to reach US$50.2 billion in 20282. Canned tuna is by far the dominant shelf-stable product while also offering the greatest opportunity for value addition based on dock value of tuna compared to the final consumed end value of tuna product.

PACIFIC ECONOMIC AND SOCIOECONOMIC LANDSCAPE

Pacific Island countries (PICs) are some of the most economically and environmentally vulnerable countries in the world. Natural disasters have resulted in estimated average economic losses to the region of US$1.075 billion per year – equivalent to nearly 5 per cent of the combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for Pacific small island developing states. The region’s business environment has also progressively deteriorated with Papua New Guinea the only country to improve its ease of doing business score since 2014.

Health, education and standards of living have improved in the past two decades across the Pacific region. However, urbanisation and the increased availability of cheap, processed foods through imports has contributed to staggering rates of non-communicable diseases, a key cause of death between the ages of 30 and 70. Furthermore, the Pacific is experiencing ‘brain drain’ due to more attractive work opportunities outside the region.

PACIFIC TUNA SECTOR

Tuna is a crucial resource for PICs and is an important part of the cultural heritage of the region. For some PICs, the tuna resources within their exclusive economic zones (EEZ) represent their only significant renewable resource.

Tuna fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) have contributed approximately 53 to 58 per cent of global tuna catch over the past decade for albacore, bigeye, skipjack and yellowfin tuna1. Purse seine catch volumes within the WCPO have steadily increased over the past few decades, while conversely, longline catch volumes have decreased.

The Pacific tuna sector is export driven, with most processed exports comprising intermediate productsdestined overseas for processing into final product. Key markets are Thailand, the European Union (EU), Japan and the United States (US). Most processing within the Pacific region occurs in Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and American Samoa. Notably, Fiji’s onshore processing volumes significantly exceed catch volumes in national waters.

Increasing pressure to ensure sustainable management of fisheries is creating greater tension between two somewhat conflicting definitions of ‘sustainable stocks’ – biologically sustainable versus economically sustainable for businesses operating in the sector.

This is evident in the expansion of marine protected areas (MPA), despite recent studies finding that large-scale MPAs have limited conservation benefits for Pacific skipjack and bigeye tuna1. For example, Fiji has committed to expanding its MPA to 30 per cent of its EEZ2, resulting in many Fiji harvesters concerned about their future viability.

VALUE CHAIN OVERVIEW

The following key barriers and critical success factors were identified in the Pacific tuna value chain with respect to PIC businesses:

Key barriers

• Businesses are typically concentrated on a single value chain segment/function.

• Constrained by high costs of entry, high operating costs and challenges with achieving scale.

• Lack of infrastructure, particularly port facilities.

• High shipping/air cargo costs; infrequent and indirect routes to markets; lack of cold chain.

• Challenges with securing skilled employees, as well as cultural constraints of workers not used to the demands of modern work (e.g., regular working hours).

Critical success factors

• Vertical integration – To improve the flow of information, certainty of supply/offtake and manage other risks.

• Diversification – Distant water fishing nation/foreign companies are generally part of heavily diversified conglomerates.

• Scale – The Pacific’s high-cost operating environment, particularly for logistics, power and water, means that scale is vital to operating profitably.

VALUE CHAIN SEGMENTS

Harvesting
The harvesting value chain segment has the highest risk profile with significant costs involved in purchasing, repairing and maintaining vessels, and a limited resale market. Subsidies are a key issue, distorting the market by allowing distant water fishing nations (DWFN) harvesting from the WCPO to operate below break-even point.

Localisation of the harvester workforce is a challenge with senior positions generally held by expatriates. Recruiting and retaining deck crew is becoming increasingly challenging, faced with competition from opportunities with better working conditions (e.g., other types of vessels such as cargo/container vessels and labour mobility schemes in Australia), as well as a lack of career paths.

There is also limited and/or inconsistent fishing-specific training available from local training institutions.

Processing
Processing volumes in the Pacific have increased but the vast majority of processing is primary only, with secondary processing occurring outside of the region. Securing a steady supply of tuna is a key factor impacting throughput and therefore the profitability of processing operations, with many processors operating below capacity. 63 per cent of the Pacific tuna workforce is employed in the processing and ancillary segment1, with women estimated at 70 per cent of the processing workforce.

End markets
The Pacific region’s key export markets are Thailand, Philippines, EU, US and Japan. Exports to Thailand and Philippines are mostly whole round tuna, while cooked loins are primary exported to the EU, US and Thailand. The regulatory environment is becoming progressively complex and stringent, making it increasingly difficult for Pacific exports to compete in the global market.

Regional consumption of tuna varies from country to country, although an overall theme is that consumers are driven primarily by price.

Services
Key services to the Pacific tuna sector are:

• Transport – Air freight and sea. The cost and frequency of transport is a key factor impacting the cost structure of the Pacific tuna sector.

• Finance – Limited finance options within the region. DWFN/foreign companies rely on non-bank financial support, such as a from a parent company or majority shareholder.

• Training – Limited competency-based training for deck crew available from local institutions, resulting in a high reliance on crew from overseas (e.g., Philippines, Indonesia).

• Infrastructure and associated services – Limited infrastructure, facilities and expertise in the Pacific region. Parts are expensive given that they need to be imported in.

Crewing can also be considered a service but has been captured under ‘harvester workforce’ in this report.

INCLUSIVE INNOVATION PATHWAY OPPORTUNITIES

A key finding from this project is that businesses need to be vertically integrated, diversified and operating at scale in order to be competitive, given the high-cost operating environment in the Pacific – attributes that are virtually impossible for PIC businesses to achieve. Yet these challenges are not new – they have beleaguered the Pacific tuna sector for decades.

The aim of this project was to use a different lens when tackling the challenge of improving value retention from Pacific tuna resources. Given the Pacific’s inherent constraints, the approach was to be pragmatic regarding the product/service being considered but innovative with respect to how it could be delivered.

Innovation requires both creativity and strategic thinking, but timing is often just as important as the idea itself. The opportunities shortlisted in this report consider short-term benefits while also looking towards the future, addressing foundational factors that need to be addressed now to strengthen the sector’s long-term viability.

The five shortlisted opportunities fall into two categories – products and enablers. An additional section called ‘Looking to the Horizon’ considers early-stage innovations that may deliver benefits to the Pacific tuna sector over the medium- to long-term.

PRODUCTS

OPPORTUNITY 1: Health and wellness inputs
Creating intermediate products for the health and wellness industry. The next step for the Pacific region is producing hydrolysed protein powder from valorised tuna processing waste. This is a valuable input for food manufacturing and the nutraceutical industry, with modest equipment and skill requirements.

OPPORTUNITY 2: Fish meal, aqua, animal feed
Fish meal, aqua and animal feed production to support the Pacific local food system. The next step for the Pacific is valorising tuna processing waste into high-quality fish meal and optimising the production process. This involves low equipment and skill requirements and is a critical input for aquaculture development in the Pacific region, supporting food security.

ENABLERS

OPPORTUNITY 3: Cold chain development
One of the key constraints to growth of the Pacific tuna sector and tuna product innovation is cold chain logistics and infrastructure. For tuna, the next step is to determine the minimum viable production volumes for Opportunities 1 and 2 and associated cold chain requirements. However, a broader assessment of cold chain development opportunities across the Pacific is recommended, recognising that PNG’s current state of cold chain development is more advanced than most other PICs.

OPPORTUNITY 4: Attracting and retaining local talent
To secure a pipeline of Pacific Islander talent as the sector becomes increasingly sophisticated (see ‘Product’ opportunities). The next step is raising the awareness of career opportunities in the tuna sector and future-proofing the Pacific fisheries training network.

OPPORTUNITY 5: Collective approach for small businesses
To achieve the critical success factors of integration, diversification and scale. The next step for the Pacific is to explore opportunities for taking a cooperative approach (e.g., vessel food provisioning) and sharing resources (online second-hand equipment market), as well as development of a Pacific food innovation hub.

LOOKING TO THE HORIZON

POSSIBILITY 1: Community-owned infrastructure
Co-financing infrastructure through models such as a cooperative.

POSSIBILITY 2: Output financing innovations
Assessing financing innovations in other sectors/parts of the world, which could be adapted for the Pacific tuna sector.

My take on the latest news on labour abuses un the US / EU seafood

I have been asked by a few people what I think of the article by Urbina et al. on the “human rights” of tainted seafood in the US and the EU, and so on… so here I go

Crew memeber in a USA flagged vessel at the time, now re-flagged to a pic for convenience

The sad reality is that I don't really see anything new there, unfortunately… if you work in food production wich includes fisheries, that has been the reality for a while.

I tend not to take part in commenting and sharing on those articles, as most of what I read there comes from what I see as a White Saviour perspective, where we have some crusaders that are against everyone, even those that are going through the appropriate channels of change… (indignation and writing does not change per se much)

But also, I don’t part take of the present anti-China rhetoric prevalent in the USA… this is a world problem… so I don’t buy into the hypocrisy of saying is only them..

I have seen it in the agricultural fields of the southern USA states and in the USA-flagged vessels in the Pacific… So when I read it, I had to think about that Bible passage that says: “He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone”….

It is the same with most DWFNs like Korea and Taiwan (albeit they are doing better), or unfortunately, our smaller Pacific Island countries that flag the vessels of those DWFNs like Vanuatu or Nauru here.  

The picture above was taken on an, at the time, USA-flagged PS, and he was earning 350USD a month, no catch shares, and a 3-year contract with no going home.

Corporations have pushed the model over the last decades.

This is not to say that China is not particularly bad; it is also now the biggest. Yet we forget it was the West (particularly the USA) that sent most of its manufacturing to China for cheap labour just a few decades ago, and now that they are doing the same with others (and, of course, worst in the case of minorities) the USA get on the high moral ground?

I’ve seen that movie before… does not finish well…

The whole thing has become a human tragedy and is the fault of all of us… And something I learn is that you don’t fix a problem by pointing fingers at others. If you (and your country) use inequality to increase profits, you are guilty… and that includes me.

Even we in NZ (a small, well-regulated, and rich country) now have someone in jail for slavery in the food and wine industry.

USA and others could lead by example by giving crew on board their vessels a work visa and minimal labour protections, just as in the factories in their territory. Instead of hiding all our obligations of due diligence behind the industry of labour certifications and eco-labels … that is going the same way… more and cheaper than the competition, and as such, just selling a screen.

I'm unsure if all this is what those who asked me wanted to read… So I’m sorry if it isn't… Is the advantage of not having totow a line and being self employed… this is own (and surely wrong) opinion.