My last day (out of 223) in Majuro

Today was my last day under my present contract (an extension is on the way) as the Fisheries Advisor to MIMRA here in Majuro, and it was a busy one. We had 5 big purse seiners coming in this morning. This means that since the requested port entry a couple of days, my MIMRA colleagues went trough the whole PSM process we designed and implemented. Including the 5 integrated intelligence reports/boarding checklist. As all vessels are WCPFC and FFA registered port entry was granted.

Beau is in control.

Yet MIMRA boards all arriving vessels, three were completely clean trips and we collected the fishing logsheets and contrasted markings and info, yet the other 2 had issues, so we went on board to investigate and collect evidence. There were plausible explanations and evidence substantiating the explanations vessel masters had for the issues we found in the analysis. All vessels were authorised to port use.

The best thing of all is that I was just a total tourist, I just accompanied my colleague Beau Bigler (one of the best young officers I have worked with) who was totally in control of all aspects of the job. And this is quite impressive in the 2nd busiest fishing port for foreign fishing vessels in the world… we will finish 2019 as a record year with over 450 transhipments

It made me remember when we started this process in August 2017, and everything had to be explained and mentored… from the vessel arrival notifications to the serious intelligence analysis we perform around identity, licensing, operations/maneuvering and reporting for each vessel. Changing the way inspections and evidence collection was dealt and so on, it was like bringing a new language.

In total, I have spent 223 days in Majuro since 2017 and we boarded/inspected 257 vessels together. PSM was diffuse concept back then, today is an operational reality and the country is committed to signing PSMA.

Who’s next?

And PSM was 1 of 17 other elements in my workplan, along the months we got to have an inspection plan, a certification system, SOPs galore, we started the process to become an EU recognised sanitary authority, with help from NZ friends, we got o a corporate strategy and a tuna management plan, we work on in-country traceability, supported the MSC certification of the locally based LL fleet, got off all issues raised by the EU, develop a full set specs from boarding boats to tablets and safety gear for procurement by the WB, we set and signed at MoU with Thailand (1st of its kind in the world), we hosted TCC, move to new building, we took the lead on using scales for transshipment monitoring… among other many things… and yet still plenty more to do… most people have no idea how demanding is to operate a fisheries authority.

And at a personal level, I’m also very happy to have secured a grant from the NZ MFAT North Pacific Development fund for the establishment of the Majuro Ocean Sports Club based at the University of the South Pacific Marshall Islands Campus. The funds were used to purchase the equipment 7 outrigger canoes (waka ama) from NZ as to establish an Oceans sports club, initially focussed on outrigger canoeing, but also Ocean Swimming, Stand Up Paddling and Surfing for Majuro’s population.

Only after compiling my final report today, it becomes clear the extent of the work and activities achieved over this time. Needless to say, it was only achievable thanks to the support, trust and hard work of my MIMRA colleagues.  

I’m more than aware that I’m not the usual type of consultant and that I brought some unorthodox thinking, very unusual approaches (and terrible english) to the MIMRA table, yet management was always supportive, while the operational staff was happy to give it a go, even if their agendas are really full. 

So I really want to fully acknowledge and thank the backing of my colleagues (and now friends) among all MIMRA ranks for the support, logistics, facilitation, and enthusiastic participation during the last two years. Only with time you can create trust and be seen as someone working with you, and not just a consultant making reports.

As ex migrant fisherman, that had to start life from scratch in various countries, I’m unfortunately very aware that there is only one thing you cannot buy… an opportunity… it has to be given to you. 

And for the opportunity to do this job I’m truly thankful to NZMFAT and MIMRA management.

Iokwe Majuro… see you next year

when friends and work colleagues are one

Factors contributing to the choice of port for transhipment by Purse Seiners

Recently I was asked to think about what makes vessels to go to one port and not to another one for transshipment here in the pacific, as a continuation of what I wrote in the past about why we have so many transshipments here in Majuro, so I made a lot of questions to a lot of really kind people (thank you all!) plus my own experiences while onboard.

And here is the result, which I’m sure is imperfect, so I welcome all sorts of contributions… something I learned in fishing is to appreciate collective knowledge, as my first fishing master told me “no ones makes it alone”

I identified four main decision-making drivers in deciding which port to aim for transshipment. The factors considered by each driver change and can have very different weight from trip to trip, hence the decision making is a fluid process. The drivers are:

Fishing grounds and Licensing  

Denominated port in licensing conditions: some countries require that transhipments only occurs in their port as a licensing condition, this occurs normally for their own flagged vessels, or those fishing exclusively in their waters as part of chartering arrangements or JV. This, of course, overrides all other decision elements yet is a very crude tool and one that most operators do object.

Proximity to fishing grounds: Distance from fishing grounds to where carriers are available is an important factor, as the tuna trading companies attempt to place carriers in locations convenient to purse seiners based on current fishing conditions, as it is in both parties’ interest to complete transshipment as soon as possible after the purse seiner leaves the fishing grounds. Yet specific needs arising from the fishing trip, the sale of the catch, the logistics involved and the preferences of masters and vessel managers may dictate the use of another port, even if it is further from the ground. 

Specific needs arising from the fishing trip

Services access: Purse Seiners and carriers are complex vessels, there is an incredible amount of machinery and technology that needs parts and maintenance: from propulsion to electricity generators, to hydraulics, to refrigerate 900 tons of fish, to maintain the electronics, etc. While most repairs are done on board if land-based services are needed the preference would always be to those ports having access to well-stocked and capable staff ready to support a rapid turn around.

Helicopter base: While the role of helicopters onboard is coming to an interesting situation, as they compete now with drones and by the fact that most fish are caught on FADs with sonar buoys… they still an important element of the industry. The helicopters don't belong to the boat but are subcontracted by the boat owners from specialised companies, that provide the helicopter itself, the mechanic and the pilot to go onboard. Helicopters need a lot of maintenance, their own fuel, and their own “set up”. Yet the flight to repair base inside a country does require not only proximity to the vessel but also aerospace permissions. The combination of land facilities near the vessel and easiness in the facilitation of their operation while in port is an important driver in the decision making.

Health facilities on shore: While the evacuation of a critically injured crew member is governed by maritime and crew welfare rules, in non “life or death” situations most masters will have no qualms in steaming 24 or 48hs more to get the crew to the port offering the better facilities. 

Flights frequency and connections: a need for international frequent and varied air travel connections for key personnel (including vessel  manager) 

Master of the vessel

Safety of anchorage: the safety of the vessels is the ultimate responsibility of the master of both PS and Carriers. As transhipment occurs on the anchorage of the carrier a good solid ground for anchoring is key to the carrier that often has two Purse Seiners transhipping (one on port and one on starboard) and all depending on the carriers anchor, hence no dragging is paramount. Furthermore, dragging is a consequence of wind and swell exposure, therefore the more protected the anchorage area the better. Therefore, enclosed lagoons would always be preferred over open ones. 

 Quality of the agents: Agent plays a key role in the transhipment tuna world, and is a role not very well studied. They lease in-between vessel owners, captains, traders, carriers, and the line agencies and is their responsibility to have all sorted and can arrange for solutions of most problems arising while providing translation (since the bulk of the fleet speaks some Asian languages. Hence having a variety and quality of Agent’s staff that are available 24/7 is a very important driver

Regulatory reliability: Having all line agencies (immigration, biosecurity, customs, etc) lined up on vessel arrival (no time wasting) is an important element in the transhipment equation. This has to be a 7-day operation.

Easiness of access to shore:  having easy access to a wharf near the main facilities in town for crew influences a master’s choice. These facilities compromise not only food and entertainment but access to local SIM cards with affordable data plans for the crew to communicate with family

The reputation of the Fisheries Observers: with some exemptions vessels get onboard observers that are nationals of the port state where they are transhipping. Repeated bad experiences by the masters with observers (drunkenness, violence, corruption, etc) and/or repeated good experiences with observers from a certain nationality are known to fundamentally influence the master’s preference for certain ports. I have to admit that this one came as a bit of a surprise, but in hindsight makes total sense and totally explains why one of our less serviced ports (yet has some of the best and healthiest observers) get a lot of vessels,

Weak regulatory oversight: weak regulatory oversight in terms of Port State Measures best practices and IUU fishing by national fisheries administrations, can act as a perverse incentive for some skippers. This of course, is not something that states should pursue as an option.

Vessel manager

Costs: Cost is an important factor for vessels managers, the sum of anchorage, berthing, pilot, line agencies, transhipped volumes fees, as a supplementary influence on port choice; yet more expensive ports sometimes leverage this with better services, observers, etc. The cost of agents is also important here and relates to their quality as already discussed

Carriers require a license to operate in the port state (normally on annual basis) and if they have to operate in various states this can add to having them based in one port only.

Relationship with carriers: various options based on existing contractual arrangements with the carrier but also cargo space trading in between operators make the decision making vary from Purse Seiner trip to trip. As operators may offer space to a “rival” if that allows the carrier to be full and head towards the processing country, particularly when there is low stock in the canneries 

Easiness to do business: having a conductive, secure and low bureaucracy business environment is a big advantage for any country into attracting any form of use of ports, transhipments are no difference

Skilled Stevedores: Daniel Calvo Butron told me this is afctor on pther parts of the world, here in the pacific where asian fleets dominate, crew takes care of sorting and loading the nets sling for the transhipemnt so nt an issue for us.

The figures above illustrate the interaction between these areas and how they combine into the election of a transshipment port, which potentially can vary from trip to trip.

Very importantly you don’t need a big wharf for transhipments, just a good lagoon, yet having a wharf that facilitates the provision of services, unloading of fish and gear as well as facilitate inspection, for example, amplifies the benefits of some of the points discussed, but also the needs associated to it.

A big talk is always about the need for a big “net repair yard” on transshipment ports, yet that is only part of the picture, and we need to understand why ad if you need it

Fundamentals of Purse Seine nets design and their repair

Purse Seine nets design, architecture, and construction have had a substantial evolution in the last decades associated with progress on computational modeling. The net plan of a contemporary net of 3000 m long, 300 m depth and weigh and estimate 6 tons (net only), is presented below for illustration purposes.

Schematic diagram of the commercial tuna purse seine of braided knotted nylon netting with different large-mesh panels, mesh size is 300 mm, 450mm at the bottom, the number of vertical netting panel is 20, and the number of horizontal netting panel is 640. Source: Hao Tang et all, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2018.11.018

These complex designs arise from the understanding of the “adaptive” geometry needs associated with their deployment and hauling, and their “behavior” at depths of up to 300 m under potentially differential currents strength and direction. A schematic diagram of these shape sequence is presented below for illustrative purposes.

The sequential shape of the simulated purse seine gear from shooting to the end of pursing under a pursing speed of 1.3 m/s and current speed velocities of 0.11, 0.40, and 0.38 m/s for the three layers. Note that the seiner pulled into the center of the enclosed net area. Source: Hosseini et all, 2011. DOI 10.1007/s12562-011-0371-6

These advances have made the fabrication (and therefore the repairs) of Purse Sine nets becoming highly complex in terms of capacity, supplies and infrastructure needs.

 Like any other onboard gear, nets require maintenance, different level of repairs and replacement. The reasons for repairs vary yet common causes are wear and tear, bad weather, accidents bad maneuvering, the release of accidental capture, gear failures, etc.

Most usual repairs are done onboard while at sea, as shown in the picture below: 

Medium to major mends require big flat surfaces such as a wharf to extend parts of the net and allow for panels to be fix or replaced, in many cases it would also require a forklift to move the net around, in important to note that in this cases the net remains “integral” and only the parts to be repairs are “landed” while still “attached” to the vessel, hence the wharf and wharf face becomes unusable for other operations. Having a wharf were to extend the part of the net to be repaired, without having to unload the whole net, is a fair compromise solution in many ports that do not have the capacity to expand into a workable net yard (see next section) and/or cannot recruit a net master. The picture below shows one example of part of the net being repaired on a wharf. 

Critical repairs need a net yard with lifting gear, cut netting panels, twine, rings, floaters, etc. As it will involving the total unloading of the net and the removal of the net from wharf face as to liberate it for other operations and let the vessel go.

There are no standardised requirement of size for a net yard, but it can be described crudely as a football field next to wharf, the smallest operational yard in the region is 180x60m approximately of hard surface and incorporates the following facilities: Net handling equipment (hydraulic booms and power-blocks, heavy-duty forklifts, crane truck, etc), Winch house, Lighting, Materials store, Security fence & access restrictions. The picture below shows a panoramic view of a small net yard in the region, from the vessel perspective and then from the winch house one.

Yet equally important (and not always considered) is that they require the availability of a good Net Master ( a rare and exotic bread these days), able to understand the net plans and identify the parts of the net to be replaced, and in many cases adapt existing mesh to fit the needed parts.

 Finally, there are no guarantees on how many days a year a net yard works, as this will depend (among others) of: how many vessels are required to come, the capabilities of the net master, how much more competitive you are in comparison to Majuro and/or the nets going back to factory onboard carriers.

Transshipment Again and Again on the WCPFC meeting agenda

Not surprisingly transshipment is one of my favorite topics, and this week a new report commissioned by PEW and researched by MRAG was released to coincide with the WCPFC taking place in Port Moresby

have my income in the agenda too!

The report (as most of the work MRAG does) is very thorough and a good insight into the key businesses and processes driving transshipment and whether the current rules and monitoring requirements are effective in achieving the conservation and management objectives of WCPFC fisheries.

Obviously I’m too small of a fish to be visible on their radar because I don’t figure at all even if I been working and writing substantially over the years… I have a long way to go to reach the consultant’s upper leagues!

The only slight criticism I would have made the lack of more substantial separation of transhipment in port from transhipment at sea (a totally different beast), particularly when it comes to excuses of the longlining countries in opposing transshipment in port due to “Pacific ports being unfit for transshipment” due to excuses like lack of  ULT (Ultra Low Temp -50C or -35C for sashimi) freezing capacity, or lack of an EU authorized Competent Authority… these are totally inappropriate excuses because of the miss the basic point that if the fish touches the land…. then it is landing… not transshipment!

Transshipment occurs in between two vessels ed of story… no need to have shore-based facilities or sanitary authorities. In terms of having an EU authorized country, then containerization onshore would be an issue but nor for transhipping… that is such a basic issue that I already criticized in this other report.

I don't think enough differentiation and alignment were made in between transshipping defined as “vessel to vessel” and “landing and containerization”, this latest practice while sometimes referred to as transshipment, but is not. Furthermore, as soon as the fish leaves the boat and is landed (even if in a custom bonded wharf) all sorts of market access and trade implications arise.

If anything (from my experience) if you want to transship ULT fish in between vessels, is much easier (and more importantly safer) to do it in the protected water of a port, rather in the high seas where you are way more exposed to weather events and rain (at -50C freshwater drops causes marks on the fish skin affecting value). 

The other issue how little they explore on why vessels go to a port or to another to tranship and the role that masters, vessels managers, and just the trip characteristics have on this process (so I will write about this on my next blog)

In the meantime, I quote the executive summary only… but read the original… It is really worth reading if you have an interest in transshipment.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES       

The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention defines transhipment as “the unloading of all or any of the fish onboard a fishing vessel to another fishing vessel either at sea or in port.” In recent years, around 80% of purse seine product and 22% of longline product harvested in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention Area (WCPF-CA) has been transhipped on or near the fishing grounds (SPC data; WCPFC, 2018a).

While the practice of transhipment is a longstanding part of the WCPO fisheries landscape, relatively little is known about the ‘business’ of transhipment outside of the main players involved. This includes the key companies involved at all stages, the main factors influencing profitability, the extent of vertical integration and the economic impacts of transhipment regulation. Against that background, the Pew Charitable Trusts commissioned MRAG Asia Pacific to undertake a study of the ‘business ecosystem’ of transhipment in the WCPO. The main aims of the study were to provide an overview of the key businesses and processes involved in transhipment and the extent to which existing monitoring and regulatory arrangements are effective in achieving shared fisheries objectives.

Information to support the study was drawn from four main sources – (i) interviews with key stakeholders in the transhipment business (e.g. fishing companies, tuna trading companies, carrier operators, Pacific island businesses, regional secretariats), (ii) corporate database searches, (iii) the Global Fishing Watch website, which uses Automatic Identification System (AIS) data to track the movement of fishing vessels and (iv) other publicly available information (e.g. WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels’; WCPFC member Annual Part 1 reports, etc).

HISTORY OF TRANSHIPMENT               

The history of transhipment in WCPO tuna fisheries has not been well-documented to date but is believed to have commenced with catch consolidation amongst longliners on a rotational basis. At the industrial scale, most interviewees recalled that transhipment in the WCPO commenced in the mid-1980s. The rapid adoption of transhipment was influenced by the very high value of tuna in the 1980s, at the peak of the Japanese economy. For fishing companies, transhipment was a way of allowing fishing vessels to remain on fishing grounds to maximise profits in a bull market, while for trading companies transhipment was an efficient way of securing supply, and ideally beating the competition to fish at the source.

At the global level, the conventional reefer carrier fleet is both aging and contracting. Since 1980, around 774 conventional reefer ships have been built, of which 527 remain in service (Dynamar, 2018). Most vessels currently in service were built between 1988 and 1994, with very few new conventional reefers built since 2000. Of the vessels built between 1980 and 1990, close to half have been scrapped. The average age of scrapped vessels in recent years has been between 30-42.

In recent years, a key impact on the conventional reefer vessel market has been the rise in the use of reefer containers. Advances in technology and reduced freight costs compared to conventional reefers has seen the container sector increase its market share in the total seaborne trade of refrigerated foods from 50% in 2000 to 82% in 2017 (Dynamar, 2018).

we don’t mind you checking us out!

CURRENT TRANSHIPMENT DYNAMICS                

As of March 2019, there were 418 ‘fish carrier’ vessels authorised under the WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels (‘the RFV’). Panama has the largest fleet of flagged carriers with 123 vessels, followed by the Philippines with 111 and Japan with 85.

Carrier fleets  

Other key flag states include Korea (31 vessels), Liberia (21), Taiwan (16) and China (12).   Seven other flag States have 19 registered vessels between them.

The average age of all registered carriers is 25 years. Over half the current fleet (52%) were built between 1980 and 1995, with only 17% of carriers built since 2010. Amongst the main flag States, China’s fleet is the newest with an average age of 2004 while Taiwan and Thailand have the oldest fleets, with an average year of build at 1978 and 1980 respectively. Of the main flag State carrier fleets, China, Liberia, Panama and Taiwan have the highest rates of high seas transhipment authorisation.

Of the 232 carriers on the RFV >1,000 GT in March 2019, we estimated 137 were active in transhipping fish from the WCPO in 2017-18. Of these, over half (75, 55%) were flagged to Panama. Of the remaining fleets, Korea had the next highest number of active vessels with 27 (20%) (owned by only 7 companies), followed by the Philippines (14 vessels, 10%) and China (9 vessels, 7%).

The average age of active carriers is 27-28 years. Around 65% of active vessels were built in 1991 or before, meaning the many are approaching the age when owners would consider scrapping them (Dynamar, 2018). Only around 12% of active vessels were built in 2000 or later.

Ownership and operational control arrangements for carriers involved in tuna transhipment in the WCPO are dynamic and varied, but can broadly be categorised into three main types:

• Charterer model – Under this model a chartering company leases a carrier vessel, owned and crewed by an independent owner. Two basic modes of charter are available – a time charter, under which the charterer leases the carrier for a defined period of time (e.g. one year) and a voyage/space (or ‘spot’) charter, under which the charterer ‘buys’ space on a carrier for a voyage at a time. The chartering model is the one favoured by each of the three main purse seine tuna traders in the WCPO (FCF, Tri Marine, Itochu) and is perhaps the most common operational model;

• Integrated fishing-carrier companies - a number of fishing companies own and operate their own carriers as part of an integrated supply chain. These companies tend to be larger, with a sufficient critical mass of catching vessels to justify their own carrier. Many also have interests in post-harvest processing facilities and use carriers as component of an integrated supply chain. Many of the newer carriers commissioned in the past decade have been commissioned by integrated fishing-carrier companies; and

• Logistics service provider - these companies tend to have no interest in fishing vessels – they’ve come into the tuna transhipment business from the ‘shipping end’, not the ‘fishing end’. Their main interest is in providing a commercial service to transport fish from the fishing grounds to processing facilities or to market.

The ownership and registration arrangements for carrier vessels are often deliberately opaque. Over time, there has been an increasing movement towards registering reefer carriers with flag States operating open registries, or so called ‘flag of convenience’ (FOC) states. Of the 232 carriers >1000GT on the RFV, 147 (63%) are registered to FOC States. Interviewees noted that the key factors driving the trend towards FOC states were favourable tax arrangements, discretion around company ownership and low compliance costs. In recent years, the presence of an approved EU Competent Authority (CA) has also emerged as an important consideration in the choice of flag State.

Purse seine transhipment

"In 2017, around 1,306 transhipments were reported in the WCPO purse seine sector, accounting for 952,151t of product (~ 79% of total purse seine catch).  Although a total of 33 ports hosted transhipments in the period 2015-2017, activity was highly concentrated around a number of key ports, mainly in the central Pacific.  Majuro was the key transhipment port, accounting for around 37% of all reported transhipments, while Pohnpei and Funafuti accounted for 16%, and 12% respectively.  Our estimates indicate that somewhere in the order of 110-120 carriers (>1,000GT) were involved in purse seine transhipments in 2017/18.

The main considerations involved in coordinating carrier fleets servicing the purse seine sector are described, together with a ‘typical transhipment’.  The key companies involved in purse seine transhipment in the WCPO in recent years are summarised including the main tuna traders, integrated harvester/carrier companies""and standalone carrier operators."

yea is a foggy world the longline one

Longline transhipment           

The factors affecting the profitability of a carrier trip were broadly the same across both longline and purse seine sectors, as well as between operators. The overwhelmingly dominant driver of profitability across both sectors was the time taken to fill up and unload.   Time can be lost at the fishing end - e.g. if another trader beats you to the fish, or the fishing slows down – or the unloading end – e.g. if offloading is slow and the trader has to bear the cost of demurrage. To that end, carrier operators/charterers (e.g. tuna traders, logistics service providers) work in very close cooperation with prospective fishing vessels in the planning of trips and must make careful judgements about whether sending a carrier is economically justified.

In 2017, around 1,306 transhipments were reported in the WCPO purse seine sector, accounting for 952,151t of product (~ 79% of total purse seine catch). Although a total of 33 ports hosted transhipments in the period 2015-2017, activity was highly concentrated around a number of key ports, mainly in the central Pacific. Majuro was the key transhipment port, accounting for around 37% of all reported transhipments, while Pohnpei and Funafuti accounted for 16%, and 12% respectively.  Our estimates indicate that somewhere in the order of 110-120 carriers (>1,000GT) were involved in purse seine transhipments in 2017/18.

The main considerations involved in coordinating carrier fleets servicing the purse seine sector are described, together with a ‘typical transhipment’. The key companies involved in purse seine transhipment in the WCPO in recent years are summarised including the main tuna traders, integrated harvester/carrier companies and standalone carrier operators.

In the longline sector, the key fleets involved in transhipment in the WCPO are the distant water bigeye/yellowfin and albacore fleets operating on the high seas. As at March, 2019, there were 2581 longline vessels on the RFV. Of these, 2,050 (79%) were authorised by their flag State to tranship on the high seas under CMM 09-06. Of the 18 States which flag longline vessels in the WCPO, only six authorise their vessels to tranship on the high seas: China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, USA and Vanuatu. Collectively, the Taiwanese, Chinese and Japanese fleets account for 83% of all high seas authorised longliners.

In 2017, the Taiwanese longline fleet accounted for around half of all high seas transhipments. China accounted for the next highest number (25%), with the Japanese fleet accounting for less than 2% of all reported events. The nature and operation of the main longline fleets involved in high seas transhipment in the WCPO are described.

The number of reported high seas longline transhipment events has increased by around 60% between 2011 and 2017 (at least some of which may be the result of better reporting). Much of the increase has come from the Taiwanese fleet (an almost four-fold increase in reported transhipment events between 2013 and 2017), with increases also evident in the Chinese, Vanuatu and Korean fleets.

In 2017, around 22% of the total estimated WCPFC-CA longline catch of the three key target species (BET/YFT/ALB) were transhipped on the high seas according to transhipment declarations received by the WCPFC. Bigeye recorded the highest proportion, at 42.2% of total catch, with albacore and yellowfin 18.9%, with at 11.6% respectively. The majority of reported high seas transhipments occur in tropical areas (20oN – 20oS) between 170oW and 120oW.

The number of carrier vessels receiving longline transhipments remained relatively stable between 18 and 27 during the 2011 – 2017 period, although the composition of flag States changed considerably.

Longline companies indicated there are substantial efficiencies associated with transhipment at sea, in particular reduced fuel costs and avoiding loss of fishing time associated with streaming to port. This was particularly the case for small vessels who have limited fish and fuel holding capacity and would spend proportionally more time steaming. Other benefits included cheaper bunkering and provisions, no licensing and port fees and less administrative paperwork and agent’s fees. Several large vessel owners advised that transhipment at sea was central to the operation being viable. Many longline companies told us they actively avoided transhipping in Pacific Island ports because of the higher level of compliance scrutiny involved.

The key companies involved in high seas longline transhipments in the WCPO are described, together with the dynamics of carrier fleet organisation.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE            

Broadly, the membership of the WCPFC can be split into three groups based on the extent to which they participate in, and ultimately support, high seas transhipment:

• ‘supporters’ of high seas transhipment - these countries, most notably DWFNs Taiwan, China and Korea, have fleets who rely heavily on high seas transhipment as part of their operational and economic model. Broadly these countries are strongly supportive of maintaining ‘properly regulated’ high seas transhipment;

• ‘opponents’ of high seas transhipment - these countries, most notably the FFA/PNA member countries, have no involvement in high seas transhipment (other than Vanuatu flagged vessels) and strongly support transhipment reform. Broadly, the basis for their position is three-fold: (i) they are concerned that weakly regulated and monitored high seas transhipment represents a significant weakness in the MCS arrangements for shared stocks in the region, (ii) they see transhipment at sea rather than in adjacent PIC ports as a lost opportunity to deliver economic benefits to PIC communities; and (iii) related to (i), they see high seas transhipment as a missed opportunity to undertake comprehensive (and cost effective) compliance checks on vessels in port; and

• The ‘others’ – these countries have a range of nuanced positions which don’t fit neatly into either group above.

Our discussions indicated that the response to any ban on high seas transhipments in the WCPO would be complex and difficult to predict with any certainty.

Taiwanese and Korean fishing companies indicated their vessels would return to east Asian ports (either their homeport, or Japanese/Korean market ports) rather than unload in PIC ports on the basis that (i) east Asian ports offer a range of services (e.g. cheap provisions/bunkering, technicians, etc) unable to be provided by PIC ports, (ii) freight costs would be saved by delivering fish direct and (iii) vessels would avoid the higher costs and stronger compliance regimes operating in PIC ports. Companies

were of the view that while ‘many’ operators would go out of business, smaller boats would be hardest hit given limited economies of scale and a higher proportion of steaming to fishing time. One operational response may be a contraction in fishing effort away from the more distant fishing grounds in the central and eastern Pacific towards more westerly grounds, closer to east Asian ports.

Some fishing base operators in PICs thought that a ban on high seas transhipment may mean many current high seas vessels would begin to make partnerships with companies like them who knew the ‘local scene’. One consequence then may be increased requests to reflag vessels to PICs, or alternatively register charters.

For vessels able to survive the shorter-term economic impacts, many longline companies thought there would be a longer-term market and operational correction– fewer fish being caught means higher catch rates over the longer term, as well as higher prices for fish, so those able to stay in the game may receive some longer term benefits. To that end, the impacts of a ban would be dependent on each individual operation’s capacity to adapt to the new environment. Longline companies also indicated that if PICs had better container services they would consider unloading in port, but to make in port landing attractive they would also need better support services – food, bait, fuel, etc.

At the carrier company end, all operators thought that a high seas transhipment ban would increase costs. In addition to a requirement to pay PIC license fees, carrier operators made the point that in the longline sector carrier companies are dealing with much smaller volumes than purse seine, making it operationally harder to coordinate a full load (even harder if the number of longline vessels reduces).

If a high seas transhipment ban saw a proportion of the longline fleet go out of business with many of those remaining choosing to offload direct to east Asian ports, there would likely be a contraction in the carrier market. The impacts are likely to be hardest felt by those operators who own, rather than lease, carriers given the capital involved. A contraction in demand may precipitate the scrapping of some carriers nearing the end of their productive life.

CURRENT MANAGEMENT AND MONITORING  

The main instrument regulating transhipment (at least on the high seas) in the WCPFC-CA is the Conservation and Management Measure on the Regulation of Transhipment (CMM 09-06).  Despite isolated successes, any clear-eyed assessment is likely to conclude the CMM has not achieved its objectives. Contrary to the intention to allow at sea transhipment only in limited circumstances, the number of vessels authorised to tranship on the high seas is almost double those that aren’t (2,355 Vs 1,229 as at April, 2019), the number of reported high seas transhipments in 2017 was more than twice that in 2012 (with the number of offloading vessels increasing by 90% over the same period, albeit at least some of this may be an artefact of better reporting), and the quality of information available to the Commission to independently verify reported catches remains very limited.

There is no doubt a range of reasons why implementation has not matched expectations, but three arguably stand out:

• Weak implementation of the observer program - although intended by CMM 09-06 to be a primary tool to verify compliance, the high seas observer program appears to be largely ineffective at the moment. There is limited use of standardised forms or manuals and only a fraction of data collected by observers has made its way to the WCPFC to date. Crucially, the absence of observer information on catch volumes and species composition limits capacity to independently verify information submitted in transhipment declarations.

• No agreement around guidelines for ‘impracticability’ - A key component of the CMM is a prohibition on vessels from transhipping on the high seas unless “it is impracticable for certain vessels … to operate without being able to tranship on the high seas…” Despite a number of attempts, no guidelines have yet been agreed around ‘impracticability’. In the absence of such guidelines, the CMM requires CCMs to apply interim guidelines, namely that a ban on at sea transhipment would cause significant economic hardship and the vessel would have to make ‘significant and substantial changes to its historical mode of operation…’. The fact that CCMs have paid limited attention to these interim guidelines is evidenced by the fact that more than 470 vessels on the RFV currently authorised to tranship on the high seas were built in 2010 or later – and therefore could not have had to make changes to their ‘historical mode of operation’. Moreover, the fact that five of the six CCMs who authorise their longliners to tranship on the high seas authorise >98% of vessels indicates that authorisation is being applied as the ‘default’ position, rather than after some ‘meaningful’ analysis of impracticability.

• No serious attempt to encourage vessels to tranship in port - In the spirit of encouraging vessels to tranship in port, paragraph 35 (v) of the CMM requires CCMs of both offloading and receiving vessels involved in high seas transhipment to “submit to the Commission a plan detailing what steps it is taking to encourage transhipment to occur in port in the future”. To the best of our knowledge, no CCM has submitted a plan.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS                 

There is little doubt that high seas transhipment faces challenges. Weakly monitored high seas transhipments have long been linked to laundering of illegal catches and broader IUU activities (e.g. Gianni and Simpson, 2004), while in more recent years serious concerns have been expressed around the capacity of at-sea transhipment to facilitate human trafficking, forced labour and other human rights abuses (e.g. ILO, 2013). These problems have led to increasing calls both globally (e.g. Ewell et al, 2017) and regionally (e.g. by the PNA) for ban on high seas transhipment.

For Pacific Island countries, their interest in high sea transhipment reform is strong and legitimate. Despite agreeing the WCPF Convention in 2004, which requires CCMs to encourage transhipment in port, and despite CMM 09-06 reinforcing the intent of the Convention, PICs have seen little practical progress from DWFNs to encourage transhipment in port. At the other end of the spectrum, DWFN fishing companies see high seas transhipment as a legitimate and globally widespread practice which generates efficiencies and forms an essential component of their operation. Subject to an effective management and monitoring regime, there should be nothing wrong, they argue, with businesses seeking the most efficient means to carry out their legitimate operations.

It is these polarised positions which set the scene for the upcoming review of the transhipment CMM. While on the surface there appears little common ground to be found, it is not inconceivable that both positions can be satisfied, at least to some extent. Getting to this future will require a range of reforms and investments, including:

CCMs should comply with the spirit of the WCPFC Convention to encourage transhipment in port.
Two main measures are required to demonstrate compliance with the intent of the Convention:

1. Those members who’s fleets currently tranship on the high seas should be required to submit tangible plans detailing the steps they will take to encourage their vessels to tranship in port.

2. WCPFC members should agree the circumstances under which it is impractical for a vessel to tranship in port.

Any vessel for which it is deemed impractical to tranship in port must be subject to a compliance regime that gives confidence that all transhipment activity is tightly controlled.
Key measures of an enhanced monitoring regime for high seas transhipments include:

3. Monitoring on all offloading vessels (e.g. longliners) (electronic monitoring or observers)

4. Examining the utility of EM on receiving vessels (e.g. carriers)

Measures to independently verify transhipment activity should be strengthened
A range of measures to strengthen capacity to independently verify transhipment reporting would be beneficial:

5. All CCMs which authorise vessels to tranship on the high seas should submit evidence of the processes andmechanisms they use to verify transhipment information submitted by their vessels.

6. Arrangements for the implementation of the transhipment observer program should be strengthened.

7. The Secretariat should consider additional measures to independently validate transhipment activity (e.g. inclusion of AIS data in transhipment analysis)

In addition to these core recommendations, observations are made around ensuring equivalent monitoring of fish transported via refrigerated containers and enhancing the attractiveness of PIC ports for longline unloading/transhipment. Observations are also made to improve the utility of carrier vessel information on the RFV.

Experimenting with dynamometers for monitoring weights of transhipped tuna

Knowing exactly how much fish a Purse Seiner really caught is not an easy task… nor for industry or for the for the fisheries authorities. Traditional scales are impossible to use on board, and the priority is getting to fish into low temperatures as soon as possible, since is fundamental for food safety and quality, particularly when you have a big set of over 100 ton in the water. So the captains and observers work on estimates… and while they are very good at it… still an estimate, and while a few tons of fish every set may sound like much… they do accumulate over the year among all the fleet.

Only once the fish is unloaded for “weight in” generally at the cannery, or sometimes before containerisation at port do we get to know the real/verified weights. Yet, this event happens weeks or months after the catching event, and the data (if it makes it back to us in the pacific) could take even more time.

The less time we have in between harvest events and the more accurate weights information, the better for all. Since weights per specie are fundamental and benefit all sorts of fisheries decision making, just to name a few: crew and skipper (catch shares on top of salaries), vessel managers (profitability and insurance), carriers (liability/insurance/payments, etc), science and regulators (stock assessments, target and reference points, under and miss reporting, etc) so… the more accurate the data, the better decision making.

But how can we do that before the fish leaves the region? Well, a Purse Seiner catches and carries about 800 to 1700 metric tons depending it size and age, and then it can take up to a week to transfer their catch to a carrier. It’s a slow process involving putting the frozen fish in nets on deck of the Purse Seiner and hoisting it into the carrier with a crane.

I been thinking for a while that by weighing each the of the nets with frozen fish being moved across to the carrier we could get a much better estimate of the true volumes caught, and the work of the transhipment monitors could focus more on species composition than estimating the weights of the nets to the nearest 100 or 50Kg .

So I came with the idea of determining the weights using hanging crane type scales (called dynamometers) with wireless remote weight display attached to the hooks of the cranes used during the operation, as an opportunity to record accurate transhipment weight data and eliminate the challenges and issues relating to estimates. I played a bit with a couple of of very cheaps ones (220USD) here in Majuro and in Tarawa with quite good initial results, so it was time to get serious about it.

testing “el cheapo” a few months ago

So with the usual support of my friend (and kind of older brother) Hugh Walton from FFA and the usual operational support of my colleagues here MIMRA, I presented a project proposal to FFA and SPC to research the feasibility of the concept and to evaluate what type of hanging crane scales will do the job best.

Everyone was on board with the idea, and as a result, I spent quite a lot of time looking at crane scales and we decided to buy 4 different models, and then last week, as a team with Feral Lasie FFA’s PEUMP MCS Adviser, Malo Hosken SPC’s EM /ER Specialist (and good friend), plus MIMRA’s legends Beau Bigler and Melvin Silk (all in the pictures below), we tested the 4 different types of remotely operated electronic crane scales during the transhipment of the locally flagged PS Marshalls 201.

We evaluated each model against attributes such as precision, robustness and ease of use, battery performance / recyclability, price and connectivity, to name a few. And we are all quite happy… besides playing with amazing tech it was great to work with very professional yet relaxed crew… I personally totally loved it

Being Majuro the busiest transhipment port in the world and MIMRA one of the most forward-thinking fisheries administrations in the Pacific, it was just was the logical choice to do this research here. The results would benefit not only RMI, but the whole region as there is transhipment activity in Kiribati, FSM, Tuvalu, PNG and Solomons.

Now that we proven the concest and chosen the best scale, we will continue the work in 2020 with the general aim of standardising their use for monitoring the weights all tuna transhipped in the region, but equally important to improve the operational management and data acquisition process of the port monitor operations, using Majuro as the bussiest scenario.

The good thing about the job is that also it oppen other ideas of things that could be done on board (like putting one of these babies on the brailer, to check the weight comming on board) and many more that I shall write about once the report is approved by all parts

On weeks like this one, I think I have the best job in the world

loving my job while testing “el cheapo” model

FAO Guidance framework on social responsibility in fisheries and aquaculture value chains.

he is te reason why we have cheap tuna

It was a weird day… while I’m jumping in btween Purse Seiners here in Majuro, testing crane scales to find one that adapts the best to the job of giving us a much better handle of the volumes of fish transhipped in port in the pacific (results in a future blog). Back in Vigo, the FAO COFI Sub-Committee on Fish Trade (COFI:FT) has its meeting and they discussed the work I was involved with earlier this year on social responsibility.

It was weird because here I’m with Salim, the guy you see in the picture avove… I have 2 weeks more of work here before I go to my loved ones… he has two years more in his contract (out of 3 without going home). People like him who would be the ultimate beneficiaries and the main interested part of what was being discussed in COFI, yet he would never be there… in fact, most people there, never worked on fishing boats,they go home on the weekends, has a salary, etc… that detachment is totally unfair in my opinion.

They discussed this document, that outlines the process, development and proposed future work of FAO in the development of a Guidance framework on social responsibility in fisheries and aquaculture value chains, in accordance with the FAO’s mandate given by the COFI Sub-Committee on Fish Trade (COFI:FT) in 2017 and the recommendation by Members on future guidance on social issues during COFI in 2018. 

The guidance (as most things with FAO)  is voluntary in nature.

• is global in scope. All fisheries and aquaculture value chains are considered, covering upstream and downstream activities involving fish and fish products, including pre-harvest, harvest, and post-harvest.

•  is primarily addressed to any business actor to ensure socially responsible fish and fish products, regardless of its stage along the value chain, its size (self-employed, small, medium and large), its nature (private or public), and its nationality (domestic, foreign or multinational).

• should be implemented by focusing on any actor working in any capacity in fisheries and aquaculture value chains through the promotion of a human rights-based approach.

• can be particularly useful for governments in creating a positive environment and promoting socially responsible value chains, as well as for unions, civil society organizations, non- governmental organizations, associations, research and academic institutions, international organizations and all others concerned with the fisheries and aquaculture sectors.

But most importantly it consolidates internationally recognized principles to ensure social responsibility in fisheries and aquaculture value chains, it does not bring new ones (and we were very careful about that)

The objectives of this Guidance are: 

1. to improve social responsibility in fisheries and aquaculture value chains; 

2. to promote human and labour rights, including decent work; 

3. to facilitate compliance by presenting a compilation of relevant international principles; 

4. to serve as a practical instrument of reference to assist actors in establishing or in improving any framework required for the exercise of socially responsible fisheries and aquaculture value chains; 

5. to support the formulation and implementation of appropriate measures; 

6. to enhance transparency along the fish value chains, which can improve traceability initiatives; 

7. to strength interlinkages and exchange of information among the actors, particularly through collaboration and cooperation; 

8. to contribute to a more socially sustainable sector generating economic and environmental benefits to all; 

9. to assist actors in the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

General Principles 
This Guidance is based on international human rights anchored in the International Bill of Human Rights of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and instruments and standards of the International Labour Organization (ILO). 

This Guidance is based on the following general principles: 

1. Sovereignty of countries in complying with all relevant laws and regulations; 

2. Clearly and widely publicizing policies, laws, decisions and procedures in applicable languages and formats accessible and applicable to all, equally enforced and independently adjudicated (“rule of law”); 

3. Non-discrimination under law and policies, as in practice; 

4. Equality and equity based on a balanced and fair participation of all actors or interested parties; 

5. Differentiated responsibilities of actors in the fisheries and aquaculture value chain; 

6. Clear accountability of each actor throughout the value chain; 

7. Transparency, particularly in connection with preventing any form of corruption and fraudulent practices; 

8. Practicality, viability and clarity of measures or actions implemented by actors; 

9. Not creating unnecessary obstacles or barriers to trade. 

The following specific principles shall be observed to secure compliance with social responsibility based on this Guidance: 

1. Human rights and dignity: Recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable human rights of all individuals.

2. Labour rights: Recognition and respect of the core international labour standards setting out the fundamental principles and rights at work (i.e. freedom of association and effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; effective abolition of child labour; and elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation) and applicable international labour standards to ensure decent work in fisheries and aquaculture along value chains. 

3. Equity and justice: Recognition and promotion of fair treatment, equity and equitable rights for all, in particular for gender, age, ethnic origin, disability, sexual orientation, and for vulnerable communities and small-scale fishers, taking into consideration the national context. 

4. Non-discrimination: No actor should be subject to discrimination under law and policies, as well as in practice, including the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment or occupation. 

5. Respect of cultures: Recognition and respect of any traditional form of organization, local knowledge and associated practices, including traditional communities, small-scale fishers, indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, and religion or beliefs. 

6. Health and safety: Adoption of appropriate practices to protect the health, welfare and safety of actors in the activities along the value chains, including the prevention of threats and hazards. 

7. Transparency: Clearly defined roles and activities of all actors throughout the value chain. 

8. Consultation and participation: An active, free, effective, meaningful and informative participation of actors and groups of actors throughout the value chain in decision-making processes, including social dialogues. The engagement and support of actors affected by those decisions, including facilitating feedback and responding to their contributions. 

9. Gender equity and equality: Women and men shall fully equally enjoy all human rights in any sort of context while acknowledging differences between them. Specific measures shall be implemented in order to accelerate de facto gender equality, by empowering women, including leadership assignment. 

10. Recognition of small-scale fishers:  Having regard of their singularities, small-scale fishers shall enjoy all human rights in any sort of context, and in particular decent working conditions; access to information; labour, health and social protection. 

11. Distinctive aspects of child labour: Children shall enjoy the same human rights accorded to all people, but they also have distinct rights to protection according to their age. Every child has the opportunity to develop physically and mentally to his/her full potential at different ages and stages of development, including access to education. The work of any child (1) below the required national minimum age of work; (2) that poses work concerns when the child is too young, or (3) considered altogether unsuitable because of its detrimental nature or conditions, shall be abolished. 

12. Fair integration of migrant workers: Having regard their vulnerability, migrant workers shall enjoy all human rights in any sort of context, and in particular decent working conditions, access to information, labour protection and the necessary assistance and support from either their home or host country. 

The general and specific principles are interdependent, interrelated and interconnected, and shall be taken into consideration as a whole into a holistic approach.

Relationship with Other International Instruments 
This Guidance shall be used, interpreted and applied in conformity with the relevant rules of international law, including the obligations of States under international agreements to which they are a party.

Nothing in this Guidance prejudices the rights, jurisdiction, and duties of States under international law. 

This Guidance is complementary to, and supports national, regional, and international initiatives that address human rights and sustainable development.

Cooperation towards a Socially Responsible Fish Value Chain 
A socially responsible fisheries and aquaculture value chain is achieved when the private sector, governments, civil society, the United Nations system and other actors cooperate between them, all together, towards an effective implementation of human rights. 

The scale and ambition of the results associated with this Guidance are based on working in a spirit of solidarity, in particular solidarity with vulnerable actors and communities, small-scale fishers, indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities. 

Specific Activities of the Fisheries and Aquaculture Value Chains 
This Guidance also comprises a set of Appendixes elaborating on general and specific principles, taking into consideration the specificities of the fisheries and aquaculture value chains. 

These Appendixes provide complementary and specific measures and tools to facilitate compliance and to ensure social responsibility. 

Gender equity and equality, distinctive aspects of child labour and fair integration of migrant workers shall be explicitly present in each Appendix. 

The Appendixes to this Guidance constitute an integral part of this Guidance. 

For each of the following activities, a separate appendix will be developed: 

• Small-scale fishing 

• Industrial fishing 

• Aquaculture production 

• Processing 

• Distribution 

• Retailing 

The Appendixes are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, more than one Appendix should be used when there is a combination of activities. 

New Appendixes addressing additional activities in the fisheries and aquaculture value chains can be added after being submitted to the FAO Sub-Committee on Fish Trade (COFI:FT).

——
And while all this is in principle basic stuff that should be there already, surely it will be argued against by many… which saddens me…

In my case, my interest is not only professional but personal… you see the guy in the picture above, he can’t be at COFI to push for the FAO guidelines on social responsibility in seafood value chains. I was him once many years ago. I want for him what I had... a good job that could help me go forward in life, yet he will never have that opportunity. Is not fair

And maybe, my taking part is totally unrofessional… but I can’t help my self… Fishing has been my life for the last 37 years

For the record : Salim has a contract, gets paid regulaly, is well feed, can disembark anytime if he feel like, no violence on board, overall he is happy to have a job. We could argue exploitation (as in other industries) but not slavery at sea. My message: be thankful for your blessings!

This is me on deck... my happy place, with some of the most grateful and unpretentious people you’ll ever meet.

Alternative pathways to sustainable seafood

You gotta love a science paper that has this quote: “if a person only has a hammer, every problem starts to resemble a nail” 

Bey bro: Pretty much every Purse Seiner in the Pacific catching skipjack is MSC certified… so should be alright with this ones hei!

I had short but very interesting conversations with one of the authors of this paper, Megan Bailey (yet to know the others)… yet reading their paper seems like a familiar affair. I remember from ecology at university the concept of Guild,  which is any group of species that exploit the same resources, or that exploit different resources in related ways.

I’m a very different species to Megan and the crew at her lab in the Marine Affairs Program of Dalhousie University, yet I see things in very similar ways in the ecolabels arena even if coming pretty much from the other end of the fisheries spectrum. And is a great feeling when you see own formed ideas about ecolabels from the operational area (I wrote a lot about that) coming in parallel to the ones they see in academia.

 The paper also elaborates well on what relational seafood supply chains (RSSC) are, as it is a growing concept in the field and one that will metamorphosise in unexpected ways yet to be seem

 As always, please read the original (this one is for free!!!) … I just quote the bits that hit me the most.

Abstract

Seafood certifications are a prominent tool being used to encourage sustainability in marine fisheries worldwide. However, questions about their efficacy remain the subject of ongoing debate. A main criticism is that they are not well suited for small‐scale fisheries or those in developing nations. This represents a dilemma because a significant share of global fishing activity occurs in these sectors. To overcome this shortcoming and others, a range of “fixes” have been implemented, including reduced payment structures, development of fisheries improvement projects, and head‐start programs that prepare fisheries for certification. These adaptations have not fully solved incompatibilities, instead of creating new challenges that have necessitated additional fixes. We argue that this dynamic is emblematic of a common tendency in natural resource management where particular tools and strategies are emphasized over the conservation outcomes they seek to achieve. This can lead to the creation of “hammers” in management and conservation. We use seafood certifications as an illustrative case to highlight the importance of diverse approaches to sustainability that do not require certification. Focusing on alternative models that address sustainability problems at the local level and increase fishers’ adaptive capacity, social capital, and agency through “relational” supply chains may be a useful starting point

 Introduction

Abraham Maslow, an American psychologist from Columbia University, famously observed that if a person only has a hammer, every problem starts to resemble a nail. His point is that too much focus on a single instrument or approach is often problematic. A “hammer” can thus be defined as a tool or strategy that is excessively endorsed or deployed in situations where it is partially or wholly ineffectual. The hammer metaphor has been discussed in a range of contexts and disciplines, including within the realm of marine conservation (Koeller, 2011). Degnbol et al. (2006:535) equate hammers to a type of “tunnel vision,” theorizing that tools become hammers when problem solving occurs in disciplinary silos. We focus on the application of sustainable seafood certifications in marine fisheries and consider how certifications are becoming a contemporary hammer in the marine conservation and stewardship toolbox. Our intent is not to diminish the role that seafood certifications can play, since they have been shown to promote sustainability (Gutierrez et al., 2012). Rather by framing certifications as a potential type of hammer, we aim to bring greater attention to the importance of alternative approaches to sustainability that are distinct from as opposed to derivatives of them.

Expansion of Seafood Certifications

The theoretical basis for certifications is established on the idea that by differentiating “sustainable” seafood from “unsustainable” seafood, fishers that voluntarily engage in better fishing practices will be rewarded with higher prices for their catch. However, this economic incentive has not consistently materialized. Instead, consumers often express a preference for eco‐friendly seafood (Jaffry, Pickering, Ghulam, Whitmarsh, & Wattage, 2004; Wessell, Johnston, & Donath, 1999), but tend to be reluctant to pay more when they go shopping (Jonell, Crona, Brown, Rönnbäck, & Troell, 2016) or prefer locally branded products (McClenachan, Dissanayake, & Chen, 2016). Furthermore, price premiums that have been realized have not generally been distributed to fishers (Bellchambers, Phillips, & Pérez‐Ramírez, 2016; Pérez‐Ramírez, Castrejón, Gutiérrez, & Defeo, 2015). This makes the link between consumer behavior and economic reward for more sustainable production practices tenuous.

Although seafood certifications have other auxiliary benefits, including helping to better organize fisheries management, the gap between theory and practice has necessitated a range of “fixes” geared toward sustaining and increasing participation (Figure 1). Barclay and Miller (2018), for example, point out that the incentive structure for certifications has changed from one based on reward to one based on penalty. This shift is often interpreted as coercion by the fishing sector, which is reflected in the testimony provided by a fishing representative during a hearing on seafood certifications in the United States convened by the Marine Fisheries Advisory Committee: “We are participating in an MSC evaluation,” states the representative “… because we feel we've been forced into it” (MAFAC 2013: 102). The reorientation of certifications from reward to penalty has been facilitated, in part, by the emergence of alliances between nongovernmental organizations and large retail companies. Through these partnerships, major retailers such as Wal‐Mart that control many consumers’ access to food pledge to source exclusively from certified fisheries, whereby closing off markets to those who are not certified (Ponte, 2012).

Figure 1: Seafood certification programs are theorised to incentivise sustainable fishing practices by way of financial reward. However, certifications have not consistently created financial benefits for fishers. To address the misalignment between theory and practice, a series of “fixes” have been implemented (solid line) or proposed (dotted line), which have created their own challenges. Despite these investments, the success of seafood certifications remains the subject of ongoing debate

Using a conservation tool as a hammer

There is nothing inherently problematic with making deep investments in conservation tools. However, in the case of seafood certifications, these investments are being made despite legitimate concerns about their efficacy and execution (see Wijen & Chiroleu‐Assouline, 2019 for an overview). Furthermore, there is a general consensus that certifications do not work well in small‐scale fisheries or developing world contexts (see Gulbrandsen, 2010 for an overview). Indeed, despite targeted efforts to encourage these sectors to participate, only 8% of the fisheries that are certified by MSC come from developing countries (Duggan & Kochen 2016) and in regions like Latin America and the Caribbean only 4% of fisheries are certified (Pérez‐Ramírez et al., 2015). This represents a significant gap considering an estimated 37 million people participate in small‐scale fisheries (FAO 2012).

Moving beyond hammers

Recognizing that no one approach or strategy will be a panacea to global challenges or complex issues, caution should be taken in trying to apply useful conservation tools, such as seafood certifications or relational seafood supply chains (RSSC) , too broadly. While our focus in this paper is on seafood certifications, we posit that there are likely other hammers being used in fisheries and other natural resource sectors. Avoiding this tendency will require greater investments in designing, testing, and promoting alternative and legitimate approaches that offer solutions for the diversity of fisheries in operation today, and those that will emerge in the future.

Japan prepares its own CDS (and I’m on my way there!)

Fish is soul food for the Japanese citizens, and it is an integral part of the Japanese culture as it  comprises more than 40% of animal protein consumed each year. Japan is the 2nd largest seafood importer after the EU, but the biggest in terms of a single country. The main suppliers to the Japanese market are China, the United States of America, Chile and Thailand, while the top imported products are shrimp, tuna, salmon and trout. Japan’s fish exports are marginal in comparison, with the total value of Japanese imports 8 times greater than that of its exports.

Hopefully it says what I meant… (love my infographics tho)

Japan is also the world's largest market for high value species, importing 470,000 tons of tuna every year, and of course, this high import rate makes it vulnerable to the inadvertent import of IUU fish (as any major Market). Yet interestingly, Japan does not have operational market access requirements for it seafood, not for IUU fishing nor for seafood safety.

Yet in terms of the IUU side, things are to change as the Fisheries agency and the parliament (DIET) have been discussing the need to have some form of unilateral Catch Documentation Scheme as the EU CCS and one could argue the US SIMP supposed to be (see here for details).

They have been quite interested in due diligence and learn from the shortcoming of both systems and trying to not make the same operational mistakes, which is awesome.

Hence my trip there, I been invited to give a seminar at the DIET and to have some talks to people of the Fisheries Agency.

I have to find my way the 2nd member’s office building and (horror!) wear a suit and tie!

There is quite few people involved in these process, so I don't really know a lot of the way they are going, but I’m very interested to help.

So far the signs are positive, the idea is to:

• Base it on FAO's guideline on the catch documentation scheme (even if it is unilateral)

• Use the EU model principle of involvement of the government (yet may not only be flag state, but hopefully coastal and port state have a role)

• Be electronic

• Initially targeting species selected based on a risk-based approach (not all species will be included at once as target), with the aim of increasing the target gradually

• Target species selection and criteria designing for the species selection will be conducted by a newly establishing task-force under the Fishery Policy Council.

• The idea is not to violate the WTO’s rule of non-discrimination among domestic and import products, as the new fisheries law, established the end of last year, says most of the major domestic fisheries need to report their catch information anyway.

 Apparently some concerns  around “what if the amount of seafood that processing companies deal decreases due to this CDS how do you (gov't) compensate?" was raised, in a very polite and calm manner. Which is in principle very interesting, yet this has not happen (meaning not changes in volumes imported) in the EU with almost 10 years of implementation or the US so far… without noticeable changes in the traded volumes entering the EU, either the present EU system is not working or there is no IUU fishing… I think the answer is obvious… (references below) 

In any case, I’m very exited to go there… with Japanese efficiency all presentations were sent ahead of time and translated (as you can see on the translated part of one slide of my presentation)

Anyway, form the industry side, is again another requirement to comply with… like if the EU and the US ones weren’t enough! So hopefully Japan (with or without my help), does something practical and effective on their CDS… as that would be a novelty!

——-

One of the basis of setting the EU CCS up was that figure that 20% of the fish traded is IUU, hence if the CCS scheme would be effective we would have seen a lowering on imports. A 2014 DG MARE commissioned report[1] on finding 56 recognises that: “The analysis was specifically designed to report trends in the volume of several species codes identified in the CN. With the information used (analysis of trade statistics, Member States analysis and discussions with EU traders), the results showed that no impact on trade in relation with the IUU Regulation can be detected”

Furtherer, an later OCEANA report found that because Spain’s better systems trade increased in Portugal and other countries with less stronger systems.

On the other side, then have been some rejection and some issues with certificates, yet they relates mostly with problems with the certificate (the piece of paper) and represent very little of the full volumes entering. 

A EU parliament commissioned report (2) concluded: “Furthermore, the monitoring and supervision of the EU IUU Regulation by the EC to date has been opaque, patchy and incomplete. Until this is improved, accountability will be limited, and the required checks and balances will not be in place. There are existing provisions in the EU IUU Regulation that are not being instituted at all (e.g. alerts), and those that are being instituted are not being recorded (e.g. SLOs, audits, biennial reports) nor being standardised (e.g. training, procedures). This applies to actions with respect to EU MS (section 4.3.3), actions with respect to third countries and transparency and the availability of data generally (section 4.3.4). No information is available on the reasons and number of rejected or blocked consignments since the entry into force of the EU IUU Regulation. This makes it impossible to evaluate the actual impact of this Regulation on the imports of IUU FAP into the EU”

[1] https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/sites/fisheries/files/iuu_regulation_final-report_en.pdf (STUDY ON THE STATE OF PLAY REGARDING APPLICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) NO 1005/2008 OF 29 SEPTEMBER 2008, ESTABLISHING A COMMUNITY SYSTEM TO PREVENT, DETER AND ELIMINATE ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING (IUU REGULATION) SPECIFIC CONTRACT NO)

2.http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/513968/IPOL-PECH_ET(2013)513968_EN.pdf. COMPLIANCE OF IMPORTS OF FISHERY AND AQUACULTURE PRODUCTS WITH EU LEGISLATION

The EU yellow cards Ecuador

The EU has been quite silent on the Yellow cards front for a while, but the came up with one that was on the talks for a while now.

I have to disclose that I’m quite partial to Ecuador, I worked there a lot during the last time they had problems with the EU, this was in 2007 in regards their market access issues around the seafood safety side, and we pulled it off by restructuring the way the Competent Authority for those issues operated.

Then I was there again in 2011, to assess their issues with the EU IUU Catch Certification Scheme, and it does not surprises me that some of my recommendations then are in line the reasons why the yellow card came to them 8 years later.

Manta (the tuna capital of the America’s) in the background.

Seafood to Europe is BIG business for Ecuador, they are the 2nd biggest exporter of Tuna and the 1st one in shrimp, so their industry has big influence in politics. But furthermore, massive EU capitals and companies have strong presence in the tuna industry.

I wrote in the past that is was quite suspicious that being the IUU definition well standardised, somehow the EU focused their trade related measures (TREMs) on the Pacific Islands, while the US on Ecuador and Central America…

So I guess the political winds changed and they rightly focus now in that region… there studies that link IUU levels with general transparency of the country… and it was quite remarkable that no country in Latin America (not the most transparent societies) was yellow carded.

The good news for Ecuador is that in the same way we did with the sanitary side in 2007, when they are against the wall, they are fast to change. And the reasons behind the yellow card are not too dissimilar to the ones that we (I was involved from the beginning) had to deal in PNG, Philippines, Solomon Islands and then Thailand… and we got out of it! So the solutions and systems have been tested before… now is up to them to find the political will and assume the costs that this will incur.

In their (as usual self laudatory) press release the EU outlined their key areas of concern… in any case they are right… Ecuador needs to pull its game on the following areas:

• The legal framework in place is outdated and not in line with the international and regional rules applying to the conservation and management of fishing resources.

• Law enforcement is hampered by this outdated legal framework, inefficient administrative procedures and a lenient approach towards infringements. As a result, the sanctioning system is neither depriving the offenders from the benefits accruing from IUU fishing, nor deterrent.

• There are serious deficiencies in terms of control, notably over the activity of the tuna fishing and processing industries.

• These deficiencies undermine the reliability of the traceability system upon which the certification of the legality of the catches is based.

Reframing the sustainable seafood narrative

I been criticised for many years now on my opinions on ecolabels and private certifications. I don't object to their alleged objectives (of course we all want sustainable and safe seafood) but mostly their implementation methods and the fact that they are a just one more business with standards drafted by the rich, but paid by the poor. I said once that I don't participate in that whole “certifications world” because I think they are “at best hypocrisy and at worst neo-colonialism. I know is quite extreme, but it passes the message… furthermore I’m not an academic that write nice papers and has the “credibility” of universities or institutions.

Yet, I correspond with them, mostly answering questions “from the field” perspective. So is nice to see my opinions also expressed into wider perspective with much nice words and arguments in some scientific papers written by much smarter people than me. 

 This is the case of this paper, written by quite a few well know authors even if I only corresponded with 3 of them (Michael F. Tlusty, Megan Bailey, and Simon Bush). I’m actually sometimes envious of academics with salary jobs, as they get paid to go to congresses, teach, write articles like this one, while I come from a more operational background and as a self-employed scientist, writing papers and going to congresses is a cost that is hard to justify… I wish there was a halfway path.

The abstract already set the tone, so quote it and also some of the parts that resonate the most to me, but as I always read the original! (if you don't have access via institutions, there are “grey” alternatives, or better ask the authors for a copy.

Abstract
The dominant sustainable seafood narrative is one where developed world markets catalyze practice improvements by fisheries and aquaculture producers that enhance ocean health. The narrow framing of seafood sustainability in terms of aquaculture or fisheries management and ocean health has contributed to the omission of these important food production systems from the discussion on global food system sustainability. This omission is problematic. Seafood makes critical contributions to food and nutrition security, particularly in low income countries, and is often a more sustainable and nutrient rich source of animal sourced-food than terrestrial meat production. We argue that to maximize the positive contributions that seafood can make to sustainable food systems, the conventional narratives that prioritize seafood's role in promoting ‘ocean health’ need to be reframed and cover a broader set of environmental and social dimensions of sustainability. The focus of the narrative also needs to move from a producer-centric to a ‘whole chain’ perspective that includes greater inclusion of the later stages with a focus on food waste, by-product utilization and consumption. Moreover, seafood should not be treated as a single aggregated item in sustainability assessments. Rather, it should be recognized as a highly diverse set of foods, with variable environmental impacts, edible yield rates and nutritional profiles. Clarifying discussions around seafood will help to deepen the integration of fisheries and aquaculture into the global agenda on sustainable food production, trade and consumption, and assist governments, private sector actors, NGOs and academics alike in identifying where improvements can be made.

1. Introduction
In this paper we argue the sustainable seafood narrative needs to be reframed to more accurately represent the present and future role of seafood in global food systems. Doing so can create greater coherence between state and NGO attempts to steer seafood sustainability. Sustainability in a broad sense is operationally defined as production that balances socio-economic benefits while maintaining environmental integrity now and into the future (Asche et al., 2018; Kuhlman and Farrington, 2010; Tlusty and Thorsen, 2016). However, the study and measure of sustainability is often reduced to a narrow, and usually environmental, single-factor dimensionality (Béné et al., 2019, Fig. 1), such as stock status and management effectiveness, or habitat impacts of fish farming. Such reduction opens up opportunity for strategic positioning, where the sustainability claims will differ based on the definitions and metrics specific to NGO, industry, and / or national interest groups. The political nature of such decisions means that completely overcoming such conflicts is unlikely. Nevertheless reframing some of the misleading narratives that shape the choices of different sustain-ability metrics can help redirect sustainability agendas (and their me-trics) to be more aligned and ultimately more effective. In the rest of this paper we reframe three key misleading narratives for sustainable seafood. First, seafood's role in creating a healthy ocean needs to be reframed into a vision that integrates seafood sustainability within a broader global food system framework (Fig. 1). Second, the focus of improvement needs to be reframed beyond the narrow scope of producer practices and extended to broad issues that may arise at other or multiple nodes of the value chain (Fig. 1). Third, ‘seafood’ is a broad category, and this needs to be acknowledged as a heterogeneous cate-gory of food with equally heterogeneous environmental, nutritional and social impacts. The rest of this perspective paper discusses the role, focus, and categories of seafood, emphasizing how they need to re-framed to best integrate fisheries and aquaculture products into the global agenda on sustainable food production, trade and consumption.

2. Avoid the ‘healthy oceans’ trap
Ocean health is a global public environmental good. Although marine fish stocks and a large portion of aquaculture are dependent on healthy oceans (Kleisner et al., 2013; Naylor et al., 2000), it is un-realistic for the seafood narrative to create a direct causal link between the implementation of better practices by fishers and fish farmers alone and improved ocean health. We argue that framing seafood Second, the ocean health narrative draws attention away from a suite of non-ocean-health issues, including the linkages between aquatic and terrestrial food production systems and impacts from freshwater aquaculture. The most prominent of these are aquatic-terrestrial linkages are through feed. Agricultural products are used in aquaculture (Froehlich et al., 2018; Newton and Little, 2018; Troell et al., 2014), and conversely, marine ingredients provide inputs for terrestrial live-stock production (Shepherd and Jackson, 2013). Similarities in land feed-crop use, water use, and effluent impacts mean that fed aqua-culture has more in common with terrestrial animal agriculture than with capture fisheries (Roberts et al., 2015). Fuller recognition of the links to terrestrial systems and their environmental implications will require NGOs and policy makers to move beyond ‘ocean health’ perspectives. As we argue in the following section, this will also require a more systemic understanding of seafood sustainability that extends far beyond the practices of fishers and fish farmers alone. sustain-ability primarily in terms of ‘ocean health’ can blur the role of seafood in global food systems in two ways.

First, NGO performance indicators largely target the effects of fishing and fish farming that include unregulated and unreported fishing, destructive fishing methods, the conversion/loss of coastal habitat, and use of marine ingredients in aquaculture (see for e.g. Agnew et al., 2009; Naylor et al., 2009). While critical, the ocean has a myriad of increasing threats beyond, but impactful to, seafood including but not limited to dead zones, plastic litter, acidification and climate change, and changes in ocean circulation (Vázquez-Rowe, 2020). We argue that the sustainable seafood movement, and all its actors, needs to broaden its scope regarding sustainability dimensions included in standards, assessments and campaigns, in order to substantively contribute to ocean health and food systems.

3. Improvements throughout the entire value chain
The sustainable seafood narrative has been overly narrow in its approach by offloading action for improvement on the shoulders of producers (Bailey et al., 2018; Bush, 2017). This productionist bias (Fouilleux et al., 2017) places a major burden on fishers and farmers frequently located in low-income countries, while actors located throughout the rest of the seafood value chain receive far less attention and pressure to improve.

4. Embrace the diversity of seafood
The ‘seafood’ in the sustainable seafood narrative encompasses around 2500 species (FAO, 2018; Hornborg et al., 2016) across all trophic levels from primary producrs to top carnivores, spanning sea-weed, finfishes, mollusks, crustaceans, cnidarians, echinoderms, am-phibians, and reptiles, that can all be harvested from the wild or farmed on land, including freshwater or in the sea. This multitude of species is typically represented in reports as crude sectoral categories (e.g. fish, farmed fish, trawl fisheries) or as a single animal-source food (fish) next to beef, pork, and/or chicken (Clark and Tilman, 2017; Poore and Nemecek, 2018; Tilman and Clark, 2014). The reality is that assessing the environmental impact and/or nutritional benefits of seafood re-quires a more detailed consideration of different combinations of species, production, and processing techniques he bulk of research and advice by sustainable seafood programs is focused on those few species groups traded on international markets largely destined for consumption in high income countries (Ward and Phillips, 2008). Likewise, consumption patterns within high income countries do not follow global production patterns (Jonell et al., 2019). In the U.S., ten species account for 84% of all seafood consumed (National Marine Fisheries Service, 2018). Within aquaculture, shrimp, pangasius, tilapia, and salmon, are the groups that are particularly popular in high income countries (Belton and Bush, 2014) yet represent only ∼24% of global aquaculture production by mass (FAO, 2018).

5. Conclusion-reframing the sustainable seafood narrative for greater inclusion into the global agenda on ecosystem and human health

By highlighting the interdependence between aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems and placing seafood in the wider food system we can better understand and act in response to the varied role that fisheries and aquaculture production plays in the equitable delivery of high quality low-impact food for human consumption. This is a specific case of a broader call to equally address impacts of all food production to de-termine linkages underlying a better understanding of the true cumu-lative impact of our current food system (Halpern et al., 2019). Ap-plying a food systems approach to seafood could enable the development of more effective state regulations and private-voluntary tools to promote more sustainable production along the entire supply chain (Bailey et al., 2018). This would help NGOs, industry, govern-ment and academia alike to move beyond the simple equating ‘sus-tainable seafood’ with ‘ocean health’ and allow for integration of sea-food into wider policy debates centering on planetary health, food equity, and human nutrition.

Overall, we identify three direct benefits of taking a ‘seafood sys-tems approach’, building on our arguments above.

First, conventional narrow narratives that prioritize ocean health need to be replaced with broader, more comprehensive visions of sus-tainable seafood production. NGOs and businesses communicating im-provements in sourcing need to address outcomes honestly. Importantly, a systemic approach will move research and policy alike beyond proximate impacts of seafood production. Instead it can enable us to understand the contributions that a full seafood system makes, alongside those from agriculture, to a set of common challenges in-cluding climate change, eutrophication, etc. along with linkages of seafood production to the wider context of each other (i.e. fisheries and aquaculture) and inter-connected terrestrial systems. From this per-spective species/production/supply system combinations of seafood should move to appropriate metrics that facilitate comparison not only with one another, but also with terrestrial animal and crop production.

Second, there is a need to broaden the focus to advance beyond the productionist agenda that identifies producers, primarily in low income countries, as being mainly responsible for seafood sustainability. Instead, research and policy should expand sustainability problems and solutions away from a fixation on production and producers, to include trade and traders, processing and processors, and consumption and consumers. In that sense, a food systems perspective would highlight better the interlinkages between these practices and actors, showing that positive social economic and environmental changes can be made along the value chains that can affect sustainability.

Third, seafood should not be treated as a single broad aggregated category in sustainability assessments, but rather should be recognized as being differentiated based on varying production systems, edible yields and nutritional profiles. Communication of the benefits and im-pacts of seafood must adopt a nuanced approach that better accounts for the potential environmental and social consequences of this im-portant food, and the ways in which environmental externalities can be reduced through the consumption of lower impact foods. Discussing fisheries and aquaculture products as part of a food system will increase our ability to develop lower impact future food solutions and create a more food and nutrition secure future (Hicks et al., 2019).

This paper is not the first to call for consideration of seafood within a food systems context (Béné et al., 2015; Olson et al., 2014). However, the continued lack of food system approaches to seafood sustainability continues to raise concern among the seafood research community. Many of these production systems and supply chains have laudable attributes that can be leveraged to help improve the environmental and social impact performance of food systems globally. By developing a seafood systems approach, fisheries and aquaculture can be main-streamed into the global agenda on ecosystem and human health. While such inclusion is not a panacea for all impacts that arise from producing food, it will contribute toward a more food-secure future.

Current status of the DWFN Purse Seine Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific

I get asked a lot to "explain" in a training brief, "how" the tuna Purse Seine fishery operates in the Pacific...and in particular the Purse Seine one, I normally refer them to a 2015 blog entry I did on “the canned tuna industry in the pacific”, which was based on a excellent a great publication by my friends and colleges Hamilton, McCoy, Campling et all "Market and Industry Dynamics in the Global Tuna Supply Chain" published by FFA/DevFISH II in 2011. Now this publication by FFA has been updated (Market and Industry Dynamics: Western and Central Pacific Ocean Distant Water Tuna Purse Seine Fishery) by my friends and colleagues Dr. Elizabeth Havice, Mike A. McCoy and Dr. Antony Lewis (who recently wrote a similar work on the longline fishery).

I just quote below the executive summary, but this the type of publication people like me uses a lot as reference for years. Is compulsory reading, if you have any interest on the who does what in terms of DWFN Purse Seine in the region.

The purpose of this report is to provide industry and market intelligence to Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency members regarding the current status of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) distant water purse seine tuna fishing industry. This report largely focusses on six major distant water fishing nation (DWFN) purse seine fleets operating within the WCPO – Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, US and the Philippines. Cross-cutting and fleet-specific industry dynamics are identified, and where possible, implications for PICs are drawn out. 

WCPO Distant Water Purse Seine Fleet Overview 

The Japanese pioneered tropical purse seine fishing in the WCPO, developing a commercial fleet in the mid-late 1970s. Several US purse seiners operating in the EPO commenced experimental voyages into the US-Pacific Trust Territory in the mid 1970s; by the early 1980s, the US purse seine fleet had shifted to the WCPO. Around the same time, the Philippines, Taiwan and Korea commenced purse seine fishing in the WCPO. China was the last Asian distant water fleet to enter the WCPO purse seine fishery in 2001. 

From 1990-2006, the total number of purse seine vessels operating in the WCPO was relatively stable, ranging from 180-220 vessels. From 2007, vessel numbers increased gradually, when the vessel cap was replaced by a limit on fishing effort under PNA’s Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme (VDS). In 2015, purse seine vessel numbers peaked at 308, but have since declined steadily to 271 vessels in 2018. The number of Pacific Island domestic vessels (i.e. Pacific Island-flagged, chartered and locally-based foreign vessels) has gradually increased since the mid-1980s, reaching 126 in 2018. 

In the mid-1980s, when the WCPO purse seine fishery was first developing, annual catch was 400,000- 450,000 mt, accounting for around 40% of total WCPO tuna catch. In 2018, total purse seine catch was 1,910,725mt, accounting for 70% of total WCPO tuna catch. The WCPO fishery is essentially a skipjack fishery, accounting for 65-77% of purse seine catch; yellowfin accounts for 20-30% and bigeye only 2-5%. 

WCPO purse seine vessels target skipjack and yellowfin in free-swimming schools and around man-made drifting fish-aggregation devices (FADs) and floating logs. There are long-standing concerns about high levels of incidental by-catch of juvenile bigeye and yellowfin by purse seiners fishing on FADs. While stock assessment results indicate both WCPO bigeye and yellowfin stocks remain healthy, the recommended scientific advice is that management measures which reduce fishing mortality of fisheries that take juveniles should continue to be considered. 

The majority of purse seine catch in the WCPO is supplied to canned tuna processors in Thailand. Raw material is also supplied to canned tuna and cooked loin processors in American Samoa, Central/ South America, Philippines, Korea, China, Vietnam and Japan. Around 100,000 mt/year is processed by plants based in PNG, Solomon Islands, and Marshall Islands. The largest markets for canned tuna remain the EU and US. Purse seine-caught skipjack from the WCPO is also used to produce the Japanese product, katsuobushi. Purse seine vessels with ultra-low temperature (-45 to -55°C) freezing capability also supply yellowfin for lower-grade sashimi products. 

There are a range of developments and key issues which have impacted the WCPO purse seine fleet – some have emerged in recent years, others are long-standing: fleet expansion, Pacific Island countries’ fleet development aspirations, FAD management, sustainability, traceability and labour requirements, fisheries access, market access, EU-IUU Fishing Regulation, fish and fuel price fluctuations and changes to fisheries management and regulation. 

Taiwan 

The Taiwanese fleet and Taiwanese capital are major players in the WCPO. Since 2004, Taiwan Government has instituted a limit of 34 Taiwan-flag purse seine vessels. At the time of writing, there was also an estimated 29 Taiwanese beneficially-owned purse vessels operating under PIC flag (90% flagged to PNA countries), bringing the total fleet to 63 vessels. Fourteen vessels with significant Taiwanese investment also operate under US-flag. 

Taiwan’s purse seine vessel ownership is primarily family-based; most of the larger family-owned operations also own and operate vessels in other fisheries, notably, distant-water longline and squid/ saury fisheries. The purse seine fleet (Taiwan flag and beneficially-owned) is relatively young, with between 50-60% of vessels less than 10 years old, four of which were constructed in the past 2-3 years. 

In 2018, the Taiwan distant water purse seine fleet catch was around 193,000mt and ranged from 160,000-237,000 mt between 2013-2018. The majority of fishing takes place within PNA EEZs, with only 95 high seas days allocated to Taiwan flag vessels by WCPFC. Taiwan’s purse seine fleets, whether flagged in Taiwan or elsewhere, are essentially transhipment fleets that do not deliver directly to processors; the majority of catch is sold to global marine products trading company FCF and is delivered to Thailand or other major tuna processing centres for canning. 

Taiwan has faced considerable criticism from NGOs and others on the crewing conditions of its distant water fleets. Most of the criticism has focussed on distant water longliners, but the purse seine industry also feels some of that pressure. Some segments of the Taiwan fleet have sought commercial advantage by obtaining MSC certification. 

Korea 

The Korean distant water purse seine fleet is modern, efficient and largely profitable; Korean vessels are the highliners of the WCPO purse seine fleet, with average annual catches of over 10,000 mt per vessel. Total catch by the Korean flag vessels ranged from 246,000 – 270,000 mt/year between 2014- 2018. The fleet fishes over a wide area of the WCPO, but with an increasing proportion of catch taken in eastern areas in recent years when El Niňo conditions have predominated. Fishing in high seas is restricted by the WCPFC to 207 days per year. 

In 2018, the Korean-flag fleet consisted of 27 vessels and has been relatively stable for some years. Since 2013, the number of beneficially-owned Korean vessels involved in PIC joint ventures has grown to 14 in four countries, taking the total Korean-owned fleet to 41 vessels. The re-flagged vessels have typically been replaced by newly constructed Korean-flag vessels. Korean onshore investment in PICs has been limited, despite proposals developed for PNG and Solomon Islands. For the Korean flag vessels, 17 of the 27 vessels (63%) are less than ten years old. By contrast, the PIC-flagged joint venture fleet is ageing, with 12 out of 14 vessels (85%) over 20 years old. 

With the exception of one vessel, the Korean flag vessels are all owned by three large companies; two of which are vertically integrated into processing, whereas the third supplies two separately owned Busan-based canneries under contract. All companies have diverse interests beyond tuna fisheries.

The fleet tranships nearly all of its purse seine catch in PIC ports. A portion of the transhipped catch is returned to Korean ports for delivery to five domestic canneries for processing (120,000-130,000 mt/year), with the balance (~ 170,000 mt) going to canneries in other countries, primarily Thailand, Vietnam and Ecuador. Most Korean purse seine companies are reported to now have at least some of their vessels fitted with PS-special ULT refrigeration capability to produce lower-end sashimi markets in Korea and Japan. 

Sustainability certification and ecolabelling have yet to gain much traction in the domestic processed fish market. However, there are some moves from fishing companies to obtain third-party sustainability certifications (MSC and Friend of the Sea) for export markets. 

Japan 

The Japanese fleet, early pioneers of industrial purse seine fishing in the WCPO, is no longer a dominant fleet, but remains a stable presence. The Japanese fleet has been relatively stable in terms of vessel numbers in recent years, as a result of government restrictions on distant water vessel numbers (capped at 35 since 1997). The fleet is comprised of 28 Japanese-flagged vessels and five vessels operating in joint venture under the FSM flag; the majority of the vessels are older and smaller than competing fleets from China, Taiwan and Korea. Historically, the Japanese Government has strictly regulated the size of the vessels. However, this policy has been relaxed in recent years, allowing for several larger vessels to be constructed (1,800 GT). The Japanese purse seine fleet is an ageing one, with 17 of the 28 active DW vessels (61%) over 20 years of age. Ownership is quite diverse, with two companies owning five vessels each, and the remainder of the companies owning 1-3 vessels each. The Japanese distant water purse seine fleet continues to operate primarily in the western part of the WCPO; it only has 121 high seas fishing days. 

The Japanese tuna industry historically was involved in onshore investments in processing, founding two important Pacific Islands processing plants that are still operational today (though no longer with Japanese involvement): Soltuna in the Solomon Islands and PAFCO in Fiji. However, presently, those in the Japanese fleet have expressed little interest in either onshore investments or in further joint-venture operations. 

The Japanese fleet primarily returns to Japanese ports to offload, and as such, does not rely on PIC transhipment ports. Though the Japanese Government has relaxed requirements to compulsorily offload in Japan, the fleet largely retains the practice. The additional costs of returning to Japan ports to unload for most of the fleet are claimed to be partly offset by the reduced VDS access fees (fewer fishing days required), and access to better maintenance and repair facilities needed for the ageing fleet than available in Pacific Island ports. 

The Japanese-flag fleet caught 177,000mt in 2018. The fleet continues to supply the Japanese market, which includes a broader range of product types in comparison with other fleets. These include: katsuobushi, sashimi and canned tuna. All Japanese vessels now have varying levels of purse seine special capacity for storing a portion of catch for sale to higher value markets. No Japanese purse seine fisheries are known to be seeking MSC certification or participating in PNA’s MSC program, likely a reflection of limited domestic consumer interest in eco-labelled product.

China 

Since the early 2000s, the Chinese purse seine fleet has grown considerably through a combination of new construction and acquisition of used vessels. Vessels are either wholly or substantially owned by large state-owned enterprises or by private sector companies. There are currently fifteen vessels in the China-flag fleet operating in the WCPO, and an additional six beneficially-owned Marshall Island flag vessels, three of which were constructed in 2019. Fourteen of the fifteen China-flag vessels are currently chartered to Kiribati. The six Marshall Islands-flag vessels are associated with the Pan Pacific Foods Ltd. loining plant in Majuro, Marshall Islands. The total catch of the Chinese-flag and beneficially-owned WCPO fleet could be in the order of 150,000 mt/year based on current vessel numbers. 

China government subsidies given to distant water tuna fisheries for operations (mainly fuel), replacement vessel construction and the building or expansion of overseas bases have encouraged increases in the fleet. As long as China requires a certain percentage of catch returned to China for processing by vessels receiving subsidies, and fishery access in PICs is available to Chinese purse seiners through bilateral agreements, joint fishing ventures and chartering, it is unlikely that Chinese firms engaged in the WCPO purse seine fishery will make any further large investments in processing in Pacific Island countries. The Chinese government’s financial support for the establishment of bases has been primarily taken up by its longline industry in FSM, Marshall Islands, Kiribati and Samoa. 

Recently, the fleet has been fishing mostly in eastern PNA EEZs - Kiribati, Marshall Islands and Nauru. China has only 26 high seas fishing days; however, the Marshall Islands-flagged vessels have unlimited high seas access. With the exception of small volumes delivered to Pan Pacific Foods in Majuro, catch is transhipped in PNA ports. The production of China’s purse seine fleet is closely linked to China’s tuna processing industry, which processes purse seine-caught tuna into loins for export and cans for both foreign and domestic markets. There is currently no production of ULT PS-special yellowfin within the fleet, although two vessels have ULT capability. The 10% tariff imposed by the US on loins imported from China was increased to 25% in May 2019. It is believed that the net result of these increases is greater export of Chinese purse seine-caught tuna to Thailand. So far, the domestic market in China for canned tuna has not taken off despite efforts to encourage growth. 

In recent years, China has been making a concerted effort to be seen as a law-abiding participant in the WCPO purse seine fishery. Harsh penalties have been instituted for infractions of China’s domestic laws, WCPFC management measures and other requirements. 

USA 

The US fleet has long been active in the WCPO. Since the 1980s, its fishing activities in the region have been facilitated by the US Multilateral Treaty, which provides the fleet with access to all FFA members’ EEZs for up to 40 vessels. Prior to the introduction of the VDS in 2007, the US fleet had declined from 40 vessels to around 12-14, largely due to increased competition from lower-cost Asian distant water fleets. 

As the VDS was designed to limit fishing effort and increase access fees for all distant fleets fishing in PNA EEZs, the US Treaty appeared to offer a refuge from uncertainty, as its terms continued to offer unlimited fishing access in all Pacific Island Party EEZs for pre-negotiated fishing license fees. To take advantage of this opportunity, owners of approximately 16 vessels – primarily from the Taiwan fleet – were added to the US flag in joint ventures with US citizens around 2010. This reinvestment, along with US flagged vessels that had previously left the WCPO and returned to the Treaty, revitalized the US fleet to 40 operational vessels. By 2017, however, that number declined with 34 US vessels active in the WCPO. In the coming licensing period, a total of 31 US flagged vessels are expected. Eight vessels have been recently announced as being sold, citing uncompetitive conditions operating under the US flag and a lack of support from the US Government. If the sales are concluded, the US fleet will be further reduced to around 23 vessels. Operators within the US fleet have developed several responses to cope with changing access conditions under the US Treaty – purchasing some bilateral days in favour of multilateral fishing days, maximising high seas and US EEZ fishing days, re-engaging in the EPO fishery and leaving the US flag (through vessel sales and/or re-flagging). However, the future of the US Treaty remains uncertain. The fleet’s total catch volume has steadily declined alongside vessel numbers – in 2014 total catch was almost 313,000 mt; by 2018 this had declined to 165,000 mt. 

The US fleet has two distinct operating models, with one segment of the fleet (the ‘old’ fleet) typically fishing further in the eastern portion of the WCPO to serve American Samoa’s processing sector (and for some, also EPO processors). The other segment (the ‘new’ fleet of Taiwan-built vessels) fishes throughout the WCPO and operates under a transhipment model, delivering to processing plants in Thailand and the rest of Asia and occasionally, Central/Latin America. The eastern high seas is a significant fishing ground, particularly for the ‘old fleet’, with 1,270 fishing days allocated. 

Several non-state regulatory issues – including eco-labels and shifts in design to non-entangling and biodegradable FADs – are now firmly on the radar of US vessel owners. Vessels in both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ fleet hold MSC certifications for free-school caught skipjack and yellowfin. Members of the US fleet are taking note that social responsibility, particularly concerns over labour standards are gaining attention, though formal regulation is still in its infancy. 

Philippines 

The Philippine tuna industry was among the first to develop on a large scale in the WCPO. Today, the beneficially-owned Philippines purse seine fleet of 91 vessels is collectively the largest in the WCPO in terms of vessel numbers, with a total annual catch of over 300,000 mt. It is comprised of domestic purse seine vessels which fish mostly within Philippines and High Seas Pocket 1, Philippines flag vessels fishing mostly in PNG under distant water or locally-based foreign access arrangements and PNG-flag vessels beneficially owned by Philippines companies operating under charter to PNG-based canneries. These vessels are owned by four Philippines companies. In general, the Philippines flagged fleet is comprised of older vessels which are relatively small in size in comparison with other fleets, making it a relatively less efficient fleet. 

Diverse Philippines tuna industry presence remains at the heart of the large PNG tuna sector, with around 60 locally-based foreign, PNG flag vessels and distant water purse seine vessels and ownership of four of the six operational canneries in the country. All of the fishing companies are key suppliers to canneries in the Philippines. Most of the plants in the PNG processing sector continue to operate well below capacity, despite the global sourcing component of the EU Rules of Origin, given that affiliated vessels export high volumes of catch to the Philippines. After several false starts and a crowded investment space, there seems little appetite to expand the Philippines involvement to other PICs, other than bilateral or multilateral fishing access. 

Whilst the Philippines distant water fleet has not made a concerted as yet to move towards MSC certification, Philippines PNG vessel owners as a group are moving towards certification, independent of the existing PNA/Pacifical MSC certification.

and you think you have hard job

Implications for PICs 

Fleet dynamics have largely settled out following the significant increase in fisheries access prices associated with the PNA Vessel Day Scheme. Issues surrounding vessel day price and conditions vary fleet by fleet. High cost operators express concern about the increasing price of fishing days. Some lower cost operators note that fishing day prices have affected their bottom lines, but expressed more concern over consistent availability than price per se. There is continued concern about inconsistency on the definition of a fishing versus a non-fishing day. 

Increasing cooperation among PICs and the PNA, in particular, has generated impacts beyond the increases in access fees. First, it is evident that VDS is driving a continued need for improved efficiency in vessel design and fishing. This kind of capacity and effort creep is an expected outcome that PICs will continue to encounter as they work to collectively increase control of the fishery. 

A second is that recent years have also seen modifications in fishing access relationships and dynamics. The VDS and the FSMA are important examples of these, but additional innovations have emerged in turn. For instance, the US Treaty has created a wider range of geographically specific fishing day options and some vessels have begun to participate in new sub-regional pooling arrangements with PNA members and Tokelau. As the price of fishing access under the VDS continues to increase there are further opportunities for such innovations. Notably, fleets are also beginning to think ahead to the spatial changes to fish stock distribution expected to emerge as the effects of climate change continue to develop, which also might forge new access relationships relating to an increase of fish biomass in the eastern high seas areas. 

A third major dynamic that has emerged is growth in PIC-flagged and domestically registered vessels. This change has been driven by the potential opportunities for beneficial access relationships generally. More specifically, it also offers potentials for reduced fishing access prices compared to the VDS, other flexibilities such as exemptions from FAD closures and plays a role as an agent for the construction of new vessels for foreign states that otherwise have high seas effort limits and capacity limits on fleet size. Access relationships are influenced by considerations such as the prices and terms of access, as well as fish abundance and market access concerns.

The 15th meeting of the WCPFC Scientific Committee

Every year the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC gets together for a few days where the delegates of each member country, get to review the latest science relevant to the management of migratory species in the western and central Pacific Ocean (WCPO), and make formal recommendations to the WCPFC meeting held in December each year.

This is the big meeting for my friends in the scientific team of the Oceanic Fisheries Programme (OFP) of the Pacific Community (SPC). OFP is the WCPFC’s scientific and data management services provider, as the reported in the latest SPC Fisheries Newsletter.

The OFP papers and presentations to this meeting provide the backbone for important discussions on scientific aspects of the largest tuna fishery in the world. It is also the key path­way through which OFP’s work translates into concrete outputs for Pacific Island communities. The OFP team was heavily involved in presentations and working groups for all four themes reviewed by the SC: data and statistics; stock status; manage­ment issues; and ecosystems and bycatch mitigation. 

SPC – in collaboration with FFS – provided the latest tuna catch information for the WCPO. The provisional tuna catch for 2018 was estimated at over 2.7 million tonnes, with a delivered value of just over USD 6 billion. This catch level was the second highest on record, and represented just over 80% of the to­tal Pacific Ocean catch and 55% of the global tuna catch.

Given the impact of our new knowledge on bigeye growth on the estimated status of this stock, there has been great interest in improving our understanding of the biology of all tuna stocks in the WCPO. The latest ageing results devel­oped in collaboration with the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation in Australia for both bigeye and yellowfin tuna were presented to this meeting of the SC. While there is still more work to be done, this new information will feed into new assessments of both of these stocks that are scheduled for next year. 

This year, new stock assessments were presented by SPC for WCPO skipjack, southwest Pacific striped marlin, and WCPO oceanic whitetip shark. 

The skipjack assessment benefited from a new understand­ing of the stock’s biology that was provided by Japanese col­leagues. Similar to bigeye tuna last year, this changed our perception of the status of the stock slightly, but it contin­ues to be in the ‘green zone’ of our ‘Majuro plot’ (i.e. not overfished, and not subject to overfishing) (Fig. 1).

This assessment will form the basis for further work in 2019 to inform the WCPFC as to whether the interim target refer­ence point for the stock (the level the stock should be at to achieve what managers want from the fishery) should be adjusted.

In the discussions on management issues, SPC scientists presented work to support the ‘harvest strategy’ approach to tuna stocks. This approach focuses on longer-term ob­jectives for fisheries and stocks, and aims to move away from annual short-term decision-making. This work is ongoing, and the latest developments in the framework for skipjack and South Pacific albacore were presented.

A key future development is a consideration of the con­sequences of managing the fisheries of one stock on other stocks caught in the WCPO. This ‘multispecies’ issue was the focus of two different SPC papers, which highlighted the interactions that need to be taken into account when developing both target reference points for bigeye and yel­lowfin tuna stocks, and when developing harvest strategies for these stocks and key fisheries.

Two SPC-led analyses related to fish aggregation devices (FADs) in the WCPO were presented.

The first, in col­laboration with the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA), evaluated the latest information from the PNA FAD track­ing programme. It presented the spatial pattern of FADs, whether areas of higher FAD densities had different tuna catch rates, and the fate of FADs, particularly those that drifted outside the main fishing grounds of the companies that owned them and eventually beached on shorelines or coral reefs.

The second, in collaboration with industry partners Tri Marine and South Pacific Tuna Corporation, presented preliminary analyses of the patterns of tuna ag­gregation below FADs, as estimated by echosounders fitted to drifting FADs. Echosounder use on FADs is now wide­spread throughout the fishery, and has the potential to pro­vide novel and valuable information for scientific analyses. Insights into the pattern and rate at which tunas may aggre­gate around newly deployed FADs, trends just prior to fish­ing set events, and the spatial pattern of biomass estimates were presented for the first time. 

Ongoing tagging of tuna around FADs, to examine how long individuals remain around FADs and their behaviour while they remained there, has begun to identify some of these patterns in relation to factors that influence tuna aggregations such as local FAD density, moon phase and time of day at the FAD. This exciting work has already provided some interesting results that may help identify new mitigation measures for the catches of small bigeye and yellowfin in sets around FADs.

Finally, reflecting the fact that target tuna are not the only marine species caught during fishing operations, we developed estimates of annual seabird mortality using the latest information collected by regional observers. Bycatch estimates in the purse-seine fishery were very low (approximately one mortality per year). In longline fisheries, for which mortality estimates were higher, the spatial pattern of incidences was examined for the most recent years, where enough observer information was available. Increasing the coverage of observers on longline vessels would help improve these calculations and highlight approaches to further reduce impacts.

In addition to SPC’s work, contributions were also presented by our scientific colleagues who work across the Pacific, including an assessment for North Pacific striped marlin by the International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific Ocean, alternative assessment approaches for sharks by Dragonfly Consulting, es­timates of shark release mortality by the United States, and a report from a workshop on the issue by the Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction project, work on biodegradable FAD designs and ecosystem indicators by the Eu­ropean Union, and safe release guide­lines for birds developed by New Zea­land scientists. 

Next year’s proposed assessments for SPC include bigeye and yellowfin tuna. Further work for OFP in 2019 includes the WCPFC’s Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC) meeting, and the WCPFC meeting to be held in Port Moresby in De­cember, where the SC’s and TCC’s recommendations are reviewed and translated into actual management measures and regulations. 

At personal level, I have known and respected immensely the work of my colleagues of SPC’s Oceanic Fisheries Programme (OFP) since I came to the Pacific, and when people read tuna doom news (saying more or less tuna is getting extinct!) and then ask me about it… I refer them to their work because is top class and unbiased.

To be clear, I’m not saying everything is perfect… far from it. But thanks to the work of A LOT of good people that are trying really hard, things are not doomed in the Pacific. And when I read those doom news like this one, I feel like they are spitting on the work of the best people we have

Help us find out how tuna age and how fast they grow and win USD 100

My Friend Caroline Sanchez at SPC is a remarkable woman in many aspects, yet this time I’ll focus other work with tagging as reported in the SPC Fisheries Newsletter.

Since 2006, the Pacific Tuna Tagging Programme, endorsed by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission and implemented by the Pacific Community (SPC), has been organising fish tagging events annually. On this year’s pole-and-line tagging cruise through Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Federated States of Micronesia, tunas labelled with conventional white tags also received an injection of strontium chloride to validate the deposition rate of the increment formations (often called growth rings) that are observed and counted in fish otoliths as a way to estimate fish age and growth.

Otoliths are small ‘ear stones’, calcium carbonate structures located on either side of the head. They allow fish to find their balance and perceive linear acceleration, both horizontally and vertically. As otoliths grow, they incorporate chemical ‘markers’ from the water (such as calcium, strontium, and other elements and stable isotopes). The concentrations of these markers reflect both the environment the fish swims through, and intrinsic processes such as physiology and metabolism. Once a marker is incorporated into a growth ring, it remains there permanently, providing a time-stamped chemical record of the fish’s experience. By counting the growth rings on otoliths, scientists can estimate the age of a fish; however, the periodicity of ring formation needs to be validated. The external application of chemical markers during tagging events has proved to be a useful method in this regard.

Strontium chloride (SrCl ) and oxytetracycline (OCT) 2 markers have been widely used to validate increment formation in tunas (Wild and Foreman 1980; Wexler 1993; Wild et al. 1995; Clear et al. 2000). SrCl2 is often preferred over OCT because of public health concerns; the United States Federal Drug Administration prohibits the use of OCT in wild fisheries, whereas SrCl2 is a mineral that occurs naturally in seawater, and is regarded as safe for human consumption (Sax and Lewis 1987). SrCl2 is even used in toothpaste to reduce dental hypersensitivity! Importantly, both strontium and chlorine are present naturally within otoliths, and previous studies using SrCl2 for mark-recapture experiments on tuna have shown that SrCl2 did not induce mortality (e.g. Clear and al. 2000).

Prior to the tagging cruise, a SrCl solution was prepared 2 at SPC’s laboratory. Onboard the tagging vessel, the injec- tion procedure is quite rapid. Following capture, the fish is placed on a tagging cradle and the scientists use a self-filling dosing syringe designed for continuous injection. To identify fish that have been injected with SrCl2, a white tag is placed behind the second dorsal fin. After injection in the muscle, the SrCl2 is then metabolised and incorporated into the otolith structure. The strontium readily substitutes for the calcium in the otolith matrix, and the SrCl2 injection leaves a distinct mark on the otoliths that is clearly visible under a scanning electron microscope. When a marked fish is recaptured, and knowing its time at liberty, the number of increments counted on the otolith after the mark can then be compared with the number of days since the fish was tagged, providing a validated increment deposition rate. This information can then be used to age other fish of the same species, thus providing crucial data on age structure of tuna populations, which is necessary to accurately estimate stock status through the assessment models.

At the end of August 2019, 215 skipjack and yellowfin tunas had been injected with SrCl2, and SPC is aiming to tag 1000 fish. To be able to extract and analyse otoliths from tagged and re-captured fish, SPC scientists will need the entire fish. This also provides scientists the opportunity to collect other biological samples: the stomach, muscle, liver, gonads and the dorsal spine. A full set of analyses can be undertaken on the same fish; for example, measuring mercury and/or isotope concentrations, and analysing stomach content and conducting genetic analyses. To preserve the quality of the samples, following capture onboard purse-seine and freezer longline vessels, SrCl2-injected fish must be kept frozen at all times, whereas fish from ‘fresh’ longliners can be sampled upon arrival at port. Since 2009, biological sampling training, including otolith extraction, has been provided by SPC, and in each major port, samples can be collected by observers, port samplers or fisheries officers.

If, by chance, you encounter a white tag on a tuna, please contact SPC directly. We need to maximise our chances of extracting as many sets of otoliths as possible. New posters, which have been translated into several languages, are now available at www.spc.int/tagging. The finder of a fish carrying a white tag will be rewarded USD 100. In addition, the fish will be bought from the fishing vessel or the cannery where it was found at a price of USD 10/kg (weight of the whole fish, not gilled and gutted). And, finally, observers will be rewarded USD 50/fish to help in the coordination and collection of samples.

For more information:

Caroline Sanchez. Senior Fisheries Technician. (Tag Recovery and Biological Sampling), carolines(at)spc.int

Deconstructing the excuses that hinder an agreement to end harmful fisheries subsidies

I know I rant a lot against subsidies… but a man has to have his principles, and I really despise subsidies… I would only consider them if they were use to supplement the exploitative wages that crew from developing countries get paid.. and even so I would need to think a lot about it.

Crews worldwide would love just to access a mere 1% of the estimated 34 billion USD a year their bosses get

In any case, my reference in terms of subsidies Rashid Sumaila (who is always very generous in sending me copies of the article) got another nice and short paper with Andres M. Cisneros-Montemayor as lead author. The deconstruct the key myths around subsidies, right in time for the WTO negotiations.

As usual read the original, i just quote here my favourite parts:

Globally, ~US$34 billion in subsidies are granted to marine fisheries,  and fully 64% of these are capacity-enhancing—otherwise known as “harmful”—subsidies including for fuel, vessel construction, and gear replacement. The most important effort to discipline these harmful subsidies is the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) commitment—mandated since 2001 and due December 2019, and reiterated in the UN Sustainable Development Goal 14.6—to reach a multilateral and legally binding agreement to eliminate subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfished stocks, and to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fisheries . These may seem like logical and quite low bars, and yet the political, economic, and operational complexities of fisheries around the world do pose real challenges to plucking even these low hanging fruits.

To succeed, WTO negotiators, supported by their national experts, must resolve these challenges. Amidst these discussions, however, some points used to argue against reforms are questionable at best and myths otherwise. Here, we bust some of these myths with the aim of helping WTO negotiators and their ministries avoid such distractions so they can focus on the real issues which must be addressed. These include avoiding loopholes that would negate a truly effective agreement; highlighting types of beneficial subsidies that could be allowed and that could better support artisanal and subsistence fisheries; and the many synergistic relationships between fisheries subsidy disciplines and existing trade, environmental, social, and economic policies and legislation. The following are some particularly distracting arguments against subsidy disciplines that we have encountered, with concise rebuttals based on existing evidence.

Myth 1: Capacity-enhancing subsidies are needed to compete with large fishing nations
The top 5 subsidizing maritime countries provide an estimated $19.3 billion per year (including both beneficial and harmful subsidies) to their fisheries, four times the total amount budgeted by all of the lower income nations combined. Low-income developing countries simply cannot outspend major fishing nations to win a race to fish that only leads to the infamous Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome where everyone loses. To truly level the playing field, a subsidy discipline agreement is needed that curtails capacity-enhancing subsidies that cause overfishing, enable encroachment into other regions, and sustain fleets which would not otherwise be profitable.

Myth 2: Capacity-enhancing subsidies are important for alleviating poverty
Many governments argue that they need to provide capacity-enhancing subsidies to help poor fishers and thereby alleviate poverty.

This argument is self-defeating for several reasons. First, capacity-enhancing subsidies are known to deplete fish stocks, thereby eroding the resource base that coastal communities depend on, increasing poverty as a result. Second, fuel subsidies—the most common type of capacity-enhancing subsidy—are a highly inefficient form of support; for every dollar spent on fuel subsidies, there is only a 10-cent increase in income for fishers . Third, subsidies in all countries are mainly granted to the large-scale industrial sector, with 84% of total subsidies allocated to them instead of artisanal fisheries that support the vast majority of fishing livelihoods.

This means that removing and/or redirecting capacity-enhancing subsidies would support artisanal fisheries, improving their economic viability. Investments in infrastructure, public health, local governance, and alternative livelihoods would have added benefits across coastal regions, including for women, youth, and processing workers that benefit little or not at all from subsidies granted to fishing firms.

Myth 3: Assessing if overfishing is occurring should not be a condition for providing subsidies because there is limited capacity to manage or monitor stocks
Perhaps more importantly, any capacity-enhancing subsidy will have negative effects on fisheries and the environment if management and monitoring capacity are lacking, so this should perhaps preclude their use ex ante. That aside, there are multiple ways to assess the general state of stocks, some of which can be completed rapidly and with very little information (see, for example, datalimitedtoolkit.org). Official and total estimated catch are also available for each of the world’s Exclusive Economic Zones, from 1950 to 2016, and can be freely downloaded at seaaroundus.org, and biological data for all species at fishbase.org.

Myth 4: Overfishing only affects national interests, so an international agreement is unnecessary
Many fish stocks inhabit and move between multiple nations’ waters and/or the high seas; due to changing distributions as a result of climate change, new transboundary stocks are expected to be present in 35% of nations by 2100. International cooperation is thus essential for fisheries management, particularly when both marine species and fishers chasing them move across regions and jurisdictions. Beyond fish catch itself, legal or violent conflicts—including military actions—can be triggered by overfishing in neighboring regions and over 530 international conflicts over fisheries have been recorded since 1974; everyone has a stake in sustainable oceans.

Myth 5: A strong agreement is undesirable because subsidies may be needed for potential future expansions or fisheries development
Based on the history and current status of fish stocks , it is highly unlikely that there are significant unexploited stocks in most countries. Around the world, 33% of stocks are officially assessed as overexploited, 60% maximally exploited, and 7% in development. If a new, potentially profitable stock were found, investment should come from the fishing sector with the collaboration and oversight of management and monitoring institutions.

The fact that most stocks are now overexploited or maximally exploited is indeed in part due to large capacity-enhancing subsidies in previous decades that fostered overcapacity and contributed to overfishing and IUU fishing, with negative effects on the environment, fish production, and fishing incomes. While the harmful effects of capacity-enhancing subsidies are well known, they are often politically expedient and difficult to get away from even when fishing communities themselves recognize their negative impacts. And yet, there are many policy alternatives with better outcomes. These involve the decoupling of the goals of supporting coastal development and addressing poverty from outdated and harmful strategies to attempt to increase fish production; transparency and collaboration between policy planners and fishery stakeholders are key for success.

Far from constraining nations’ policy space, an agreement that limits the use of harmful subsidies can enable nations to design—in collaboration with the fishing sector—new forms of investment that can be actually beneficial for fishing communities, national economies, and marine ecosystems, both now and in the future. 

Back from another mission in Majuro

Was a short but busy time in Majuro for my 3rd visit of the year under my position as Offshore Fisheries Advisor with MIMRA, a position I have since August 2017.

My much younger colleagues on all things boarding: Beau and Melvin. Awesome guys to work with.

Is hard to misjudge how time consuming support to small fisheries organisations can be, as there are only a few people that pretty much need to do everything! Furthermore, insider knowledge from industry is hard to source to support fisheries authorities. So very few international organisations are in the position of NZMFAT with the vision and capacity to attach advisors in long term contracts with an organisation like MIMRA. I’m incredibly lucky to have the trust of my contractors and my local counterparts… working in Majuro is one of my most rewarding jobs as a consultant.

Anyway here is very short brief of what we did

Following on our Fisheries Port Operations Management strategy aimed to prepare our self for ratifying PSMA, we prepare the ToRs for the setting of a 2 new positions: a Port Operations Coordinator and Monitors and Data Entry Coordinator as well as a code of conduct for transhipments monitors.

We also started the testing of Hook Type Crane Scales with Wireless Remote Display for increasing the accuracy of our transhipment monitoring scheme, a video of the operations can be seen below.

I was ask by PEW to present and then be on a panel on PSM at the forthcoming Ministerial Conference on Fishing Vessel Safety and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, organised by IMO and the Government of Spain, Torremolinos, Málaga, Spain, 21-23 October 2019 to explain what we did in RMI as a model of the best practices for the region, and alternative to sign and then do... since we decided to do and then sign. 

While honoured, I don't think is right for a consultant to be representing the country he/she work with (even if invited by their counterparts). I'm all for supporting for behind... but talking for them is a big no in my book... So I facilitated my counterparts to go and present what has been done by themselves… I just helped a bit with some ideas.

I also prepared a self-assessment framework for assessment needs on MCS. The objective is to guide policy and training development for MIMRA on the MCS side, potentially supported by a MFAT OFA in the case of programme support renewal. 

I also further provided mentoring on Arriving Vessels Intelligence Analysis (AVIR) using VMS, FIMS and FFA data. The focus of the mentoring was on recognising vessel behaviours for FAD and non FAD sets, as a the mission took place during FAD closure  

A big part of my time there was taken on a topic I use to work a lot many years ago training people in the pacific: EU Market Access. I worked on the topic for over 10 years, wrote books about it! and trained many of my colleges here… so they are in charge now (it would be a very sad reflection of my training capabilities if I still work on the same area and do not step aside for my colleagues to take over). Yet what is do is to backstopping in case they need specific support, but I’m not doing the main job. 

So I been supporting my friend Aquina Rodgers, the former head of CA from PNG whom I trained 20 years ago when I’m started consulting, and we worked ever since. She is in charge of the incipient sanitary CA (Competent Authority), as we try to gain access to the EU market.

So I did and extensive review and critique of the 168 pages draft Industry Standards. And I drafted a contact letter to be sent to the EU to initiate the process to be included in the list of Commission Decision 2006/766/EC (Commission Decision of 6 November 2006 establishing the lists of third countries and territories from which imports of bivalve molluscs, echinoderms, tunicates, marine gastropods and fishery products are permitted) under section VIII: Fishery Products.

There are big hopes on this complex process.

I also provided support to mi colleagues to MIMRA for TCC and in particularly for the working group co-chaired in between RMI and US. My help focused was specific to the many various aspects of “Impracticability” as an exemption to the WCPFC’s Prohibition on Transhipment on the High Seas.

Outside work stuff it was my 2nd consecutive birthday that is spent in RMI, and my colleagues got a nice cake and made me feel like part of their work family… the human side of work is for me as important as the work one (or more)

You want a good MCS job in the Pacific? Compliance Policy Advisor for FFA

Good jobs on the MCS area in the Pacific do not abound, so here is the opportunity to bring new thinking to the biggest fishery in the world as part of FFA, a very unique and world respected regional fisheries organisation.

You may help us to bring something like this to reality.

The purpose for this role is to: "further the development of strategic fisheries compliance policies of FFA Members at regional, sub-regional and national level. A particular focus of the position is providing advice to Members on compliance and Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) issues in the context of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC).

And that is not small task, but you’ll be part of great group of people lead by really clever and switch on management. All what you need to know about this job is here, go for it… and see you soon somewhere.

The only negative that I can think about this job is that you may need to deal with me a few times over the year… and I’m not a pretty face (but I always travel with my coffee maker, and make the best -only- meeting espresso in the region)!

The set of minimum terms and conditions for crewing employment conditions in the Pacific

I recently I posted about FFA’s groundbreaking move to add crewing and labour aspects to their harmonised conditions of licensing, and how an important this move is, since for 1st time access to fishing (normally just fisheries domain issue) is from now formally linked the crew rights and welfare.

This is a massive advance on this front, as it bring the legality of contracts and on board conditions to the forefront. It does nothing to what is think is the exploitation (the action or fact of treating someone unfairly in order to benefit from their work) of crew… what I mean here is that is great that the shit money they earn is legally protected, but does nothing to the fact they earn shit … but that would be a topic for another blog.

yei! our shit salaries are legally protected! but this is great start!

In any case, James Sloan (whom we wrote this piece) and Kevin Chand wrote this excellent piece published on James’ bulletin that I’ll quote here, but please spend time exploring James’ work as it is top class.

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Declining fish stocks result in increased fishing efforts to make up the shortfall of catches and this often leaves fishing vessels operating beyond economic and ecological sustainability. Subsidized fishing fleets often backed by national governments are one way to skirt this economic inconvenience.

Tragically, another alternative is cost-cutting on the human side of commercial fishing. This results in poor working conditions for fishing crew, forced labour, slavery and even human trafficking. This forms a hidden subsidy of sorts for IUU fishing that impacts those directly responsible for catching fish and tainting the seafood that is supplied globally. The Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) which was established with the mandate to assist Pacific Island Countries manage their fishery resources is taking measures to address this oft-neglected aspect of fisheries.

FFA members lay claim to some of the richest tuna stocks globally. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states have sovereign rights to manage their 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This means that the right to issue licences and on what terms and conditions lies with these states and within their EEZ. In this legal bulletin we consider how the FFA is implementing a decision of its members to use licence conditions to better regulate working conditions on fishing vessels that operate in its waters.

What is forced labour, modern slavery and human trafficking?

Under the Forced Labour Convention, forced or compulsory labour is defined as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the threat of a penalty and for which the person has not offered himself or herself voluntarily.” This definition includes traditional practices of forced labour, such as vestiges of slavery or slave-like practices, and various forms of debt bondage, as well as new forms of forced labour, such as human trafficking.

In the fisheries sector, crew are particularly vulnerable to forced labour. This stems from a variety of reasons and include the remoteness of the work with fishing vessels being out at sea at sea and far from home for prolonged periods coupled with lax regulation and oversight by virtue of being flagged to a jurisdiction (Flag State) with poor employment regulations. This can further be exacerbated when the crew are migrant workers who may not speak the same language as their Captain and fellow crew. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) imposes a duty on all Flag States to effectively exercise their Flag State jurisdiction. This basically means that Flag States have an obligation to enforce the laws of their country on vessels flying their flag. Flag States who do not meet their obligations undermine international cooperation allowing these types of exploitative conditions to manifest, these States are often known as Flags of Convenience.

FFA’s Minimum Terms and Conditions in relation to crewing employment conditions 

Licensing terms and conditions are an important tool in regulating fishing in FFA member EEZs. The terms and conditions are standardised across the FFA member waters through the Harmonised Minimum Terms and Conditions (“MTCs”), providing an effective tool in regulating fishing access to their waters. They implement regional fisheries management requirements and set standards aimed at protecting fisheries resources and maximising benefits from these fisheries resources. MTCs generally cover monitoring, surveillance and control of fishing vessels and establishing fisheries management initiatives.

In May 2019, and following a FFA initiative to consider the specific issue of labour conditions on vessels fishing in its EEZs (which was also deterring Pacific governments encouraging greater employment of Pacific Islanders on fishing vessels), the Forum Fisheries Committee (FFC) adopted amendments to the MTCs. The amendments applied conditions to the employment of crew on foreign fishing vessels that are licenced to fish in the waters of FFA members. These amendments were derived from the ILO Work in Fishing Convention (No. 188) that aims to ensure decent conditions of work with regard to minimum requirements for work on board; conditions of service; accommodation and food; occupational safety and health protection; medical care and social security.

The amendments are made to two parts of the FFA MTCs Annexes. It amends Section 5.2 of Annex 4 Procedures for the Operation of the FFA Vessel Register as it relates to the criteria for withdrawal or suspension of “good standing”. Good standing on FFA’s Vessel Register is a requirement for foreign fishing vessels who wish to be issued with or hold a fishing licence. This amendment indicates that good standing may be suspended if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel violated the terms and conditions of access, by failing to comply with license conditions regulating employment, vessel safety and crew numbers. It then proceeds to list these crew employment conditions. These conditions include obligations where the Operator shall:

• be responsible for the health, welfare and safety of the crew for the duration of their contract

• ensure that a written contract is signed with the crew prior to employment in accordance with the newly included Annex 6 which includes particulars of the crew agreement

• Observe and respect basic human rights of the crew in line with international standards

• Take all reasonable steps to ensure that the crew are not assaulted or subject to torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment and treat all crew with fairness and dignity

• Be responsible for the provision of health protection and management for sickness, injury or death in a work-related capacity

• In the event of a death notify the authorities, preserve the body for an autopsy and arrange for repatriation of the body to the nearest appropriate port

• Notify the crew’s next of kin in the event of an emergency

• Provide decent and regular remuneration to the crew

• Provide repatriation of the crew to point of hire and all related costs

• Ensure the crew is given regular periods of rest

• Be responsible to ensure the vessel is safe in accordance with accepted international standards on vessel safety; the safety of the crew on board and the crew are trained in occupational safety and health awareness

• Provide travel costs, insurance, safety equipment and tools, appropriate habitable accommodation, sanitary facilities and suitable food at no cost to the crew

• Not deduct any crew wages for any expenses related to work

The second part of the MTC amendment adds Annex 6 Particulars of Crew Agreement and provides the minimum details required for crew employment contracts. This includes inter alia, details like the particulars of the crew (name, date of birth, birthplace), next of kin, name of fishing vessel, wages or share basis, benefits, terms for contract termination and rights of repatriation.

Case Study: Fuh Sheng 11

In May 2018, a Taiwanese vessel called the Fuh Sheng 11 became the first vessel apprehended under the ILO Work in Fishing Convention in Cape Town, South Africa. While initially detained because of signs the vessel was unseaworthy, upon inspection a long list of labour conditions on board were discovered and included a lack of documentation, poor accommodation, insufficient food, and poor safety and health conditions on board. Taiwanese authorities failed to sanction the vessel initially, however after further investigation by the Environmental Justice Foundation, where the crew reported physical abuse and shark finning, Taiwanese authorities eventually sanctioned the vessel. Subsequent investigations uncovered forced labour and other forms of illegal fishing include shark finning and killing of turtles and dolphins on other Taiwanese flagged vessels.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The above case is relevant because it shows the connection between forced labour, IUU fishing and vessel safety and the need for increased and harmonised port state control and inspection, and the effective exercise of Flag State responsibility to detect and enforce against IUU fishing and other related crimes. While this case study may feature foreign vessels, it is important to note that countries like Fiji are frequently visited by many of these foreign flagged vessels. In Fiji, for example, 94% of all foreign fishing fleets that visit our ports are either Chinese, Taiwanese or Korean. This exposure also increases the external risk of forced labour abuses happening in our waters. Without robust port measures geared towards identifying the signs of exploitative conditions much like those advocated by FFA MTCs, the chance of casting a blind eye to these offences happening so close to home are very likely.

Beyond this, there is more that we can do in terms of increasing transparency in the fisheries sector. This includes understanding who is ultimately responsible for IUU fishing and forced labour practices. Onshore Ultimate Beneficial Owners, or shareholders who hide behind multiple shell companies need to be identified and linked to the illegal activities that they perpetuate at sea through their investments and the profits that they reap. Flags of convenience and ports of convenience are another avenue through which bad faith operators engage and survive. The lack of regulation and enforcement creates a black hole for illegally caught fish and the associated crimes.

It is clear from the Fuh Sheng 11 case that instances of forced labour, IUU fishing and vessel safety are linked and this brings on a corresponding need for a multi-pronged effort that addresses this complex but intrinsically connected problem. There are three international instruments that address these three issues in the fisheries sector. For forced labour there is the ILO Work in Fishing Convention, for IUU fishing there is the Port States Measures Agreement, and for vessel safety there is the Cape Town Agreement.

The following is a table showing the state for ratification in the Pacific.

Note for the ILO Work in Fishing Convention and the Port State Measures Agreement, equivalent measures are currently being developed regionally via FFA. In the case of the former it is via the latest amendments to the MTC’s on crewing employment conditions. In the case of the latter, this will be done through the New Zealand Government funded Pacific Islands Port State Measures Project under which a regional port State measures framework was endorsed at the 110th Annual Officials Forum Fisheries Committee Meeting (FFC110) in May this year.

It should be further noted, that the cases of Australia and New Zealand are different because Australia’s fishing fleet capacity is such that it is not obliged to licence foreign vessels to fish in its EEZ, as it is able to capture up to its own Total Allowable Catch. In the case of New Zealand, it introduced legislation in 2014 requiring any foreign fishing vessel that wants a licence to fish in NZ’s EEZ to reflag its vessel to NZ thus submitting to the jurisdiction of NZ law, including labour conditions.

For the MTCs to work effectively it is necessary for a few things to happen, first, all FFA members have to implement the MTCs via local laws or as a condition of fishing licences. This is to ensure that they have the power to enforce any breach of nationally implemented licence conditions. As well as this there will need to be discussion and technical training across enforcement agencies and their regional partners to work together to enforce the MTCs. It is notable that FFA is providing assistance on training and implementation of MTCs in the region to support these efforts. Further, all FFA Member States must cooperate in sharing information particularly in identifying foreign vessels in breach of MTCs warranting a suspension of good standing 

Ecolabels... the french government has its own ideas

I have made my views on ecolabels very public on this blog over the years, one of my key objection is that the have hijacked the retailers into the “need” of having a private certification that is to be paid by the producers, in the name of the consumer.

I’ll have no issues if the ecolabels would be supported by consumers, as most NGOs do, get their money via donations of concerned citizens and the offer their certification for free fo fisheries around the world.

I find it ironical, when the evaluators of the ecolabels com to the fisheries organisations i work with, for tons of data and information, when in reality the whole thing started by a combination of NGOs seeking to correct what in their view is ineffective state governance… exactly the ones the assessors are visiting all the time.

I wrote last year about a paper I read that articulated quite a few of my high level doubts in way i could have never written my self, the paper is called "Evolution and future of the sustainable seafood market",

The origin of ecolabels was based on two general assumptions:
1), that information is key in driving consumers to select environmentally sustainable sources of seafood, and 2) resulting shifts in demand will, when transmitted down the value chain to the production sector, provide an economic incentive for improved fishing practices and fisheries management.

The proliferation of these claims and ecolabels has now led the sustainable seafood movement to a crossroads. More than 30 seafood guides and certification programmes developed which contribute to a crowded ‘seascape’ of consumer facing advice with bring to over 120 certification for fisheries and aquaculture… This 2019 publication identifies and analyse over 120!

But there is in fact limited empirical evidence that substantial changes in consumer demand for sustainable seafood have occurred (see the bibliography of paper mentioned above). Producers are also directly affected because they incur the costs of complying with different seafood programmes aligned to different importing markets. Incentives for compliance also remain unclear, given there is little evidence that price signals are seen by producersor that any changes in demand have resulted in substantial environmental improvements.

In addition, the proliferation of sustainable seafood programmes appears to lead to a number of potential challenges that remain less clearly articulated in the literature. The effect depends on the degree of heterogeneity in the labels and the overall objectives of the schemes. For example, a previous study demonstrated that the presence of several standards initially can be beneficial as the scope of an environmental problem is unknown and public recognition is poor, but over time fewer labels are preferable as environmental performance improves. Others have shown that there can be virtuous competition or a ‘race to the top’ between schemes as they refine their claims and methodologies to be the best in class. Conversely, a ‘race to the bottom’ may ensue if schemes seek market share over performance, as to keeping them self with a job

The reliance on guides and ecolabels to provide a signal of ‘measurable’ sustainability and to alter consumer demand with a goal of changing producer behaviour highlights two interrelated coordination failures in the original theory behind this. First, a vast body of literature indicates consumers prefer and are willing to pay more for ecolabelled seafood in several rich countries’ markets. However, it is increasingly unclear whether consumers actually demand more, or drive retailers’ demand for sustainable seafood. Second, it is not clear that any existing retail-level price premium is transmitted through the supply chain to producers to create an incentive for environmental improvements.

The weak transmission of price premiums from retail to producers is further challenged by the highly international and complex nature of seafood supply chains. Overall, 37% of global seafood production enters international markets, and 78% is estimated to be exposed to trade competition. Moreover, although global shares of exports from developed and developing countries are approximately equal at about 50% each, import shares are highly skewed. Developing country imports only account for 22% of global seafood trade, whereas developed countries import 78%. In spite of apparent demand in developed countries for certified sustainable seafood, the weak transmission of price signals that underpin the market-based theory of change.

Furthermore, I see it as further imposition from rich countries (who are not much an example of good fisheries management - otherwise they would not be importing so much seafood) over poorer countries, which makes me feel like either hypocrisy or neo-colonialism.

Against this scenario, here come the French government, with a public ecolabel promoting sustainable fishing (peche durable), combining a high level of requirements environmental (resource and habitat), to ethical requirements and quality of product.

Their public ecolabel “Peche Durable" meets the wish of the fishing industry to have a sign of quality to promote sustainable fishing including environmental, economic and social requirements. In July 2019, a first French fishery, located in Sète (Hérault), was certified.

This ecolabel follows the guidelines of the FAO on the eco-labeling of fishery products, enriched with new criteria (social and quality criteria) in order to focus on all the pillars of sustainable development.

An eco-abel commission has met regularly since 2012 to define all the criteria of the ecolabel reference system and the control procedures. This benchmark has been put into public consultation, and takes into account the comments of environmental NGOs.

The repository primarily concerns the candidate fisheries, then the operators of the marketing chain, from the first sale to the consumer.

To be certified, fisheries must comply with 4 requirements of the eco-label, verified by a certification audit:

• Ecosystem: Ensure that fishing activity does not significantly impact the ecosystem, ie the targeted resource but also the non-target species and the habitat in which the fishery is evolving.

• Environment: Ensure that fishing activity has a limited impact on the environment. The criteria include the reduction of the use of fossil energy as well as the management of waste or the prevention of pollution.

• Social: Ensuring a satisfactory level of living and working conditions on board ships for crews. Criteria include safety and crew training.

• Quality: Ensure a high level of freshness of eco-labeled products.

the fisheries go trough an impartial and transparent certification system: control is carried out by certifying bodies accredited by COFRAC, (the national accreditation body), each of these bodies acting in total and impartiality, in accordance with international certification standards (ISO 17065).

And their label is open to the international community, although registered in the French law, this label could apply to fisheries candidates from all countries.

Requirements for candidate fisheries::

These prerequisites (PR) must be verified prior to any certification process by the auditee.

PR1: The exploitation rate of the target stock must correspond to the MSY

PR2: There is an international management framework to maintain the precautionary stock concerned by the request for eco-labeling.

PR3: Fishing activity does not jeopardize the populations of marine species affected other than the targeted stock.

PR4: The flag State of the ship is a signatory to the International Labor Organization (ILO) agreements concerning the working conditions of fishing vessels.

PR5: States implement a strategy to obtain a good environmental status of the environment by 2020.

PR6: The loss of fishing gear must be reported to a management authority as soon as it is noticed

The requirements are divided into 4 themes: Ecosystem, Environment, Social, Quality. Each theme is broken down into principles that are themselves broken down into criteria. In total, the repository includes 36 criteria.

If you practiced french have a look here into their conditions, and they totally makes sense… and if you have to have one, this one will be my bet.

And this, again, represents what i like the most of the french… they excel at doing their own thing.

Said so, still an ecolabel, and as the authors of the paper cited above… I firmly believe we need to move on from that

Fisheries related Marine Pollution consulting opportunity with us in the Marshalls

Are you part of an organisation that has expertise on fisheries related pollution (focusing on plastics, water quality and management of fishing-related contamination)?. Come and do a project with us in the Marshalls, while getting paid by the World Bank

Your future workplace?

The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) has received financing from the World Bank toward the Pacific Regional Oceanscape Program (“PROP”) and intends to apply part of the proceeds for a Marine Pollution Project under that Program. Associated consulting services are sought as described below. 

We need a: 

1. A comprehensive assessment of: 

• the coastal fisheries pollution load (focusing on plastics, Majuro Lagoon water quality and management of fishing-related contamination). 

• adverse impacts on fish health 

• adverse impacts on human health from consumption of fish 

• main pollution sources affecting coastal fisheries 

2. Recommendations for viable management solutions for addressing coastal fisheries pollution; 

3. Programme for rapid implementation of recommendations 

The outcomes fits Subcomponent 2.1 (f) of the RMI Pacific Islands Regional Oceanscape Programme (“PROP”): Development of a two-year coastal fisheries pollution management program comprising a comprehensive assessment of the pollution load, adverse impacts on fish health and humans as well as the main pollution sources affecting coastal fisheries; recommendations of viable solutions for halting coastal fisheries pollution; and begin implementation of these recommendations within MIMRA’s mandate and the budget envelope earmarked for this program. 

The documentation and ToRs are here: http://www.rmimimra.com/media/attachments/2019/09/11/reoi-tor-marine-pollution-study.pdf

The best qualified firm to carry out the services will be selected in accordance with the Consultant’s Qualifications Based Selection (CQS) method set out in the Regulations, and based on the following criteria: 

• Demonstrable general experience in the past seven years of undertaking environmental assessments preferably in fisheries and water quality subject areas, in relation to small Pacific Island states, with a proven record of successful projects, following international good practice and internationally recognized methodologies.

• Evidence of successfully undertaking assignments of a similar nature to the methodology described in the TOR.

• Evidence of successfully undertaking similar assignments in the Pacific Region, preferably in the North Pacific.

• Efficiency and effectiveness of methodology proposed to undertake project tasks set out in the TOR.

• Management structure, including defined accountabilities, to ensure timely provision of deliverables in accordance with the TOR.

Expressions of interest must be delivered in a written form to the addresses below by email no later than 26 September 2019, 5:00 pm Majuro time. 

Marshall Islands Marine Resources Authority 
Zheng Qing, PROP Deputy Project Coordinator 
Tel: +692 625 8262 
Email: qzheng@mimra.com 

Division of International Development Assistance 
Garry Venus, Safeguards Specialist 
Tel: +692 625 5968 
Email: gazza700@gmail.com 

And cc the following: 

Marshall Islands Marine Resources Authority 
Yolanda Elanzo, PROP Project Manager 
Tel: +692 625 8262 
Email: yolanda.elanzo@gmail.com 

SALT's new website is full of good stuff

I think that there are many interpretations of what traceability is as people that think about it… there are so many private and official initiatives that is hard to keep account. 

have some good SALT

And many start partly from people trying to promote their view generally associated to some commercial objective like private certifications, or as part of NGOs or other organizations… as there is the view that the one mandate by food safety and or fisheries organizations in the countries of origin are not enough, but also that there is no connectivity among different players in the value chain

Under this scenario of hundreds of efforts around seafood traceability, many are not at all aware of each other, not interested or nor able to learn from one another. 

Enter my friends form SALT (whom I worked in the past)… they are the: “Seafood Alliance for Legality and Traceability” (SALT). They are a global community of governments, the seafood industry, and non-governmental organisations working together to share ideas and collaborate on solutions for legal and sustainable seafood, with a particular focus on traceability–the ability to track the movement of seafood through supply chains.

SALT founding partners saw a need to bring people and ideas together since progress in this field had been thwarted by the disconnected endeavours. SALT’s goal is to gather these organizations into a cohesive community, working together to make seafood traceable.

They launched their new website with an amazing array of resources for people with interest in the topic to find what is going on, where and what resources are available.

This way SALT facilitates learning events for people to connect in person, and maintains this traceability website to encourage online connections. SALT believes that sharing traceability knowledge virtually and in-person will spark creative solutions.

I particularly like their dive “deeper section”where you can run queries on types of resources, regions and topics.

So yes dive deeper and spend some time there, is good stuff and they are lovely people.

The complex world of transshipment in the WCPFC Convention area

After a substantial amount of work my friends at PEW published yesterday a very good report: “Transshipment in the Western and Central Pacific - Greater understanding and transparency of carrier vessel fleet dynamics would help reform management”. This is very good insight (disclaimer I was honoured to be one of the external reviewers) on the realties and shortcomings of the longliners high seas transhipment management in the WCPFC.

And a usual, as this report proves, the main beneficiaries of the status quo are the ones opposing any changes every-time the issue of transhipment at sea is raised at the WCPFC meetings, because are the ones doing most of the transhipments: Taiwan, China, Panama, South Korea, Liberia and Vanuatu… being the last one very disappointing as it a member of FFA.

And while the knee jerk reaction is to blame RFMOs, reality is that the can only go as far as the members allow them too, so if you get upset by what you read here… act at your government level to put pressure during the meeting discussions, or just don’t buy fish caught by any operators related to those countries.

I just quote key parts of the report, and the well substantiated recommendations… yet have a go at the original as is very well illustrated and with rock solid references.

As a ex fisherman for big part of my life, I can tell you that as a regulator, if you don’t know the facts and figures… you can claim ignorance, but if you know the facts and then ignore them, then you are just incompetent.

The complex world of transshipment in the WCPFC Convention area

RFMOs are administrative bodies made up of governments that share interests in managing and conserving fish stocks in a region. These include coastal States, whose waters are home to the managed stocks, and “distant water fishing nations,” whose fishing fleets travel to areas where those stocks are found. At least 13 RFMOs actively manage fish stocks on the high seas, and some of their areas overlap. Of these, five (including the WCPFC) are tuna RFMOs, which manage fisheries for tuna and other large, tuna-like species such as swordfish and marlin. Together, these five manage fisheries in about 90 per cent of the Earth’s oceans.6 

The WCPFC is the largest tuna RFMO, covering about 20 per cent of the planet’s surface. It comprises 26 member governments, seven cooperating non-members and seven participating territories (collectively referred to as CCMs). Decisions are binding on the CCMs and require unanimous consent. Article 1(e) of the WCPFC Convention7 defines fishing vessels as “any vessel used or intended for use for the purpose of fishing … including carrier vessels.” Therefore, carrier vessels operating outside the jurisdiction of the nation whose flag they fly in the WCPFC Convention area must be authorized and listed on the WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels (RFV). 

The WCPFC defines transshipment as “the unloading of all or any of the fish on board a fishing vessel to another fishing vessel either at sea or in port.” Notably, the Commission asked CCMs to encourage their vessels to transship in port. It then developed procedures for CCMs to obtain and verify data on the quantity and species transshipped both in port and at sea in the Convention area, and procedures to determine when transshipment covered by this Convention has been completed.

A large proportion of potential at-sea transshipment events appear to have taken place involving carrier vessels flagged to Panama. This was followed by South Korean-flagged carrier vessels. Chinese Taipei, Liberia, Vanuatu, and China also had carrier vessels that appeared to have been involved with at-sea transshipments. Five of these six flag States had carrier vessels that reported high seas transshipment events in 2016, with China the only CCM whose flagged carrier vessels did not report any. Unfortunately, China did not provide any information in its Annual Report Part 1 that could be used to corroborate the number of its carrier vessels involved with high seas transshipments.

Key findings 

This study found that the WCPFC’s management of transshipment in its Convention area is compromised by a lack of reported information on transshipment, coupled by non-compliance with reporting requirements and non-standardized reporting responses by CCMs on carrier vessels and their activities. This is exemplified by the following findings related to transshipment monitoring based on analysis of AIS data and publicly available reports: 

• At least five times as many carrier vessels operated in WCPFC Convention area waters in 2016 than the 25 vessels that submitted high seas transshipment reports to the secretariat. Very little information is available on the remaining vessels’ activities. 

• A strong possibility exists that more at-sea transshipments occurred than were reported to the WCPFC by carrier vessels themselves or relevant flag and coastal State authorities. 

• Unauthorised carrier vessels probably carried out transshipment activities in WCPFC-managed waters that included, in part, the transfer of WCPFC-managed species. 

These findings are reinforced by the following findings related to transshipment reporting and data sharing: 

• Data gaps, anomalies, and non-standardized responses by CCMs in their reports on transshipments by carrier vessels provided to the WCPFC impede accurate auditing, increasing the risk that transshipment activities go unreported and unverified. 

• The WCPFC “fished/did not fish” reporting metric must be linked to and consistent with VMS data and verified by the WCPFC secretariat to provide any kind of reporting and auditing value.

• Transshipment reporting requirements by the WCPFC, IATTC, and NPFC lack lack consistency and effectiveness, increasing the likelihood that this activity will not be reported and tracked. 

• The absence of a data-sharing agreement between the WCPFC and the IATTC on transshipments by carrier vessels heightens the likelihood that unreported transshipments occur, especially by those operating in the IATTC/WCPFC overlap area or in both Convention areas during the same voyage. 

• The lack of a data-sharing agreement between the WCPFC and the NPFC increases the risk that transshipments by carrier vessels authorized by both RFMOs may go unreported. This could cause both to inaccurately count species caught in waters they manage, affecting their stock assessments. 

As such, the entire regulatory framework requires significant strengthening, standardization, and harmonization, regardless of whether current reporting requirements are being complied with. 

Recommendations

This study identifies several pronounced monitoring and control issues associated with transshipments in the WCPFC Convention area. The Commission should prioritize addressing these findings to ensure that its management of these activities is not compromised. Given the gaps and anomalies in reports by the five fleets that conducted the most transshipments in WCPFC waters and their flag States—and the yellow cards the EU has issued to these States—the Commission should also consider implementing the best-practice guidelines below. 

Addressing these findings and implementing the guidelines would also help the WCPFC’s science provider, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, obtain more complete information on transshipments, which its members could use to improve fisheries management. The Commission should consider placing a ban, or at least a short moratorium, on transshipment at sea in WCPFC waters until it can take these actions. 

Best-practice guidelines for transshipment reporting 

To make transshipment reporting more complete and uniform, WCPFC and CCM national authorities should: 

• Require all transshipments to be reported to the relevant flag State, coastal State, and port State, as well as the WCPFC secretariat, in a standardized format, using IMO numbers as each vessel’s primary identifier. 

• Update WCPFC transshipment notification, declaration, and reporting forms to include the type and format of data in standards to be developed by the FAO. At a minimum, the WCPFC should require that reporting include details on the amount and type of by-catch that vessels transship, consistent with the information outlined in Annexes A and C of the FAO’s Port State Measures Agreement. 

• Mandate that all WCPFC-authorized carrier vessels intending to transship in the Convention area provide electronic notification of their entry into WCPFC waters to the relevant flag State and the secretariat. That notification should include confirmation of the vessel’s compliance with near-real-time VMS reporting and observer requirements. 

• Require that all authorized fishing vessels intending to transship—offloading as well as receiving vessels— submit electronic notifications at least 24 hours beforehand and that they post declarations within 24 hours after the event to the relevant flag State, port State and coastal State, and the RFMO secretariat. They should send the notification before reaching the first point of landing for the catch, regardless of where the transshipment occurred. 

• Mandate that observers on board the offloading and receiving vessels submit electronic reporting forms to the relevant flag State, coastal State, and port State, and the RFMO secretariat within 24 hours after each transshipment.

• Task the secretariat to conduct periodic audits of transshipment and carrier vessel activities, including CCM reporting, using a combination of the public and non-public data it holds. 

Best-practice guidelines for transshipment monitoring 

To make monitoring more effective, WCPFC and relevant CCM national authorities should: 

• Require an observer (human, electronic or a combination) on board both the fishing vessel and the carrier vessel for all at-sea transshipments. Also, minimum standards must be set for what information the observer collects. 

• Ensure that all carrier vessels authorized to transship in WCPFC waters have access to trained and certified carrier observers from either a national program of CCMs or the Pacific Islands Regional Fisheries Observer program. The WCPFC Regional Observer Program should certify these national carrier observer programs and give them a clear mandate to collect information and data for scientific and compliance purposes. 

• Require that all vessels authorized to engage in transshipping activities have an operational VMS on board that relevant flag and coastal State authorities and the secretariat can use to monitor the vessel’s movements in near-real time. 

• Mandate that carrier vessels have a backup VMS unit in case their primary VMS malfunctions or fails and require that vessels return to port immediately if the primary VMS unit continues to malfunction or has failed. 

• Given the complexity of transshipments in the WCPFC Convention area, consider requiring that vessels use AIS as an additional monitoring tool, which would make their activities more transparent and close gaps in overall vessel monitoring. 

Best-practice guidelines for transshipment information sharing 

To ensure effective data sharing, the WCPFC should: 

• Establish and harmonize transshipment data-sharing procedures among relevant flag, coastal and port States with the WCPFC secretariat. 

• Revise information-sharing memorandums of understanding between the WCPFC and IATTC secretariats to require the sharing of all transshipment-related information, including declarations and carrier observer reports. The agreement should also allow the IATTC to send the WCPFC secretariat reports from IATTC observers on carrier vessels who witnessed transshipments on the high seas in the WCPFC Convention area involving WCPFC-managed and caught species. 

• Establish an information-sharing memorandum of understanding with the NPFC secretariat to require the sharing of all transshipment-related information, including declarations and observer reports, especially when carrier vessels on a single voyage transship species managed by both organizations.

Conclussion

Transshipment of catch between vessels plays an enormous role in the WCPFC tuna fishery. As this study described, the WCPFC authorized 625 carrier vessels in 2016 to transship inside the Convention area. At least 140 carrier vessels—flagged to 11 different CCMs—operated in a manner consistent with taking on tuna and other catch from fishing vessels either in port or at sea. However, only 25 vessels reported this activity on the high seas in Convention waters. 

This discrepancy reflects insufficient reporting by carrier vessels, a problem that is exacerbated when data in vessel transshipment reports don’t match what is submitted by States. Not only is it likely that more at-sea transshipments occurred that year than authorized vessels or flag States and other CCMs reported to the WCPFC, but unauthorized carrier vessels also probably transshipped in the Convention area, taking on WCPFC-managed species. 

This finding, through Pew’s review of public WCPFC reports and AIS data, makes clear that the Commission’s monitoring of transshipments in its waters is inadequate, especially when they occur at sea. Improving this function of the Commission is critical: Misreporting or non-reporting catches results in the laundering of millions of dollars’ worth of illegally caught fish each year. 

Enhanced monitoring is also necessary to thwart the illegal activities associated with transshipment, including drug and human trafficking and violations of labour standards for fishing crews. Vessels that transship at sea often stay away from port for months, and their crews have reported substandard working conditions and even slavery. 

Establishing clear rules for transshipment in the Convention’s waters can help ensure a strong, legal, and verifiable seafood supply chain for the species it manages and reduce the likelihood that illicit activities will occur. Likewise, if all WCPFC flag, coastal and port States implement the best-practice guidelines, then all the Convention’s stakeholders—including the fishing industry and consumers—can be assured that transshipment is an effective and secure way to transfer fish from the sea to land. 

It is hoped this initial study represents just a starting point for making vessel operations in the WCPFC more transparent. With continued research, analysis, and action, the WCPFC could become a model for effective transshipment management for other regions of the globe.