Covenants with broken swords / November 15, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

As said many times, the readership of this blog is always surprising. Hence thanks! Already a few people have sent me interesting stuff to blog about, which is quite cool. I got recently, a collaboration of Aksel Sundström, from the department of Political Sciences of the University of Gothenburg in Sweden that I like to share.

He tackles corruption at enforcement level in fisheries, which is a complex and controversial issue. I grow up in a very corrupt country, and my job takes me top countries that do not rank high in corruptions indexes like Transparency International but then, I have spent the last 21 years of my life in a country is one of the less corrupt ones. So I can see the issue from different angles.

I like the fact that he is tackling the issue from a political sciences background and his research was done in South Africa, a country at cultural crossroads.

An important issue I always bring up when the issue of corruption is discussed, it is like tango, it takes two for corruption. The one accepting it and the one offering it… and it is in my opinion, a mix of cultural issues as well as power imbalances and risk management.

What I mean with risk? If the enforcer earns 100 and the issue at hand has a value of 1000, someone offers him 100 to look aside and if he gets caught no much happens… the incentive is clear. Now if the enforcer earns 1000 and if he gets caught he looses his job and gets publicly exposed… he is not going to accept 100 to risk 1000

If you expand this principle to other areas, is the same… I know people that are responsible for administering 5 million USD worth of catch access but earn lest that 40000 in a year… in no other area of management, you’ll see people earning less than 1% of the value of assets they manage… that is just not right and too much of a bait.

In any case here are some of the passages that I find more interesting of this article, and as my usual advice, read the original here.

Abstract
Insights into how corruption hampers law enforcement in the governance of common-pool resources are currently limited. This article develops our understanding of this process through confidential interviews with enforcement officials in South African fisheries. First, it outlines how inspectors become ‘‘blind and corrupt’’: They receive bribes from fishermen in the form of finance, food, or friendship, which they pay back through inadequate enforcement, information sharing, or involvement. Second, it shows that widespread bribery increases the costs of remaining honest: Inspectors face corruption in the judiciary, which makes the writing of fines useless because these disappear from bribery among clerks and judges in the enforcement chain. Moreover, they face corruption in their organization, where substation managers and actors in top management are engaged in bribery, sending signals that corruption has small consequences. The article concludes by discussing how corruption distorts regulations and the implications for governing the commons.

How to achieve cooperation that entails welfare for the collective, yet requires restrictions on the behavior of individuals, is a puzzle that continues to engage political theorists. Hobbes posited that covenants – promises to follow agreements of engaging in certain behavior – require an external agent to enforce such pledges with the threat of force ([1651]). Yet, research on governance of the commons has found numerous examples of when individuals manage to limit their use of resources without relying on enforcement by an outside agent (e.g. Ostrom, 1990). An illustration of self-organized institutions enforcing rules on common-pool resources (CPRs) – resources that are under rivalry and where exclusion is difficult, such as irrigation schemes or fisheries – are for instance herders on pasture lands who monitor each other’s behavior and successfully impose sanctions on those who break their pledges. The literature has therefore described the two situations of externally governed or self-governed enforcement of commitments as ‘‘covenants with or without swords’’.

When corruption is present in CPR regimes with government-imposed regulations, bribery may distort management. However, current literature lacks knowledge on how the presence of corruption affects public officials’ choice to enforce or not enforce regulations. The aim here is to contribute theoretically and empirically by exploring the mechanisms in which this process takes place.

In order to do so, the article poses two questions for research: First, in what way does corruption corrode enforcement of state-imposed CPR regulations? Second, in what way does corruption pose a further enforcement dilemma for inspectors in government authorities responsible for imposing CPR regulations?

Guided by these questions this study reports a qualitative exploration of these enforcement agents’ perceptions. The focus is on the enforcement of CPR regulations in a corrupt context, the fisheries law enforcement in South Africa. Confidential interviews where performed with public inspectors at the Compliance Directorate, of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). Also former inspectors – no longer facing risks for speaking openly – are interviewed, as well as former senior managers of this directorate and key stakeholders. The study offers a contrasting perspective to the literature on corruption and environmental outcomes where most studies use countries as the unit of study. Such a focus risks simplifying this relationship since single indicators hardly capture variation in levels of corruption and environmental health within countries and across sectors. This study follows the research vein of existing but scarce interest on the role of bribery in the governance of natural resources on the local level.

Discussion
This investigation provides theoretical nuances related to the first research question—in what way does corruption corrode enforcement. As fleshed out in these accounts, there are analytical categories that can improve our understanding of this process. Bribery involving resource users in this context seems to come in three distinct forms: finance, food, or friendship.

While these forms of bribes differ between each other – the first being monetary, the second being nonmonetary, and the third being an even more vaguely defined transaction – the three categories share that they all target inspectors to be blind to violations. These different forms of bribes illustrate that ‘‘corrupt behavior’’ – and more precisely, small-scale collusive corruption – may take varying shapes, ranging from material aspects to social practices. Moreover, the accounts suggest that the mechanisms in this process can be further nuanced analytically.

Enforcement agents seem to become blind in three different ways: Inspectors may engage in inadequate enforcement, practices that could include no monitoring at all, the intended misreporting of landings, or the systematic writing of faulty fines. They may also start to engage in information sharing, revealing details of secret operations. Finally, blindness to violations among such agents may take the shape of involvement, where enforcement officials take part in illegal actions through transporting goods, stealing catches, lending freezers for storage, or even poaching themselves.

Having found these mechanisms in the empirical accounts, it is also interesting to explore how they can be used to improve our theoretical understanding of this process. First, it can be noted that blindness could be understood through the work of Kahn et al. (2001). They make the conceptual distinction between temptations affecting a public official into two categories: shirking (the avoidance of duties) and corruption (the extraction of a bribe from an evader). The process of becoming blind and corrupt can therefore be seen as the process linking these phenomena. When an enforcement officer has received a bribe, this agent will shirk selectively to benefit certain resource users. Second, this more nuanced understanding of blindness to violations is important as it points to the fact that ‘‘not enforce’’ – one of the two choices of the state actor used in the game-like situations outlined by Gibson (1999) and Sjostedt (2014) – is a simplified understanding of defection in such interactions. It seems that blindness, rather than only a choice of not enforcing, consists of different strategies. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.

Here, I depict the three distinctive strategies that counter the choice to enforce regulations. Moreover, they differ from each other in their impact on other inspectors’ decisions, as there is possibly a rank order in how these different options affect management. Inadequate enforcement is the moderate obstacle for enforcement, affecting mostly the individual relationship between the inspector and a resource user. Information sharing on the other hand is understood as a larger impediment, potentially ruining other inspectors’ possibilities of enforcing regulations. Finally, the involvement of inspectors in poaching is perhaps the worst type of hurdle as it fundamentally turns the inspector into a complicit agent in the activities they should prevent. Moreover, the interviews inform us theoretically about the second question—how corruption becomes an obstacle in the inspectors’ enforcement work. First, inspectors face a context dilemma, making the writing of fines useless as these disappear from bribery among clerks and judges in the enforcement chain. Second, they face an organizational dilemma where substation managers and actors in top management of their own organization are known to be involved in corrupt behavior, thus further demotivating the inspectors. Signals from above indicate that it is accepted to enrich yourself and that there are few consequences if you get caught. This indicates that there are linkages from large-scale corruption that are important in order to understand the presence of small-scale practices of bribery.

Moreover, corruption in higher ranks of this organization renders whistle-blowing inefficient as inspectors risk telling someone involved in corruption. Also, becoming blind and corrupt gives advantages to individual inspectors as they become known among colleagues as people who can be included in shady transactions, sanctioned by substation managers. In tandem, the two dilemmas create disincentives to individual inspectors for honest behavior. Put differently, the choice of remaining honest and enforcing laws becomes much more costly for individuals when the presence of bribery has spread in the enforcement chain and in their own organization. In such settings it is more likely that enforcing agents will choose one of the defecting strategies discussed above. In relation to the findings of Akpalu et al. (2009) and de la Torre- Castro (2006) – showing that inspectors face social costs when enforcing regulations in a local community – this investigation helps us better understand bribery’s role in this relationship.

Much of the behavior that is analyzed in this article is taking place in a context with locally specific features. Yet, the key insights from this investigation are not necessarily limited to resources with the particular characteristics of the South African marine fisheries. The different forms of bribes discussed in this case – monetary as well as nonmonetary – may also be obstacles for enforcement in other settings where corruption is widespread. Moreover, the improved analytical depiction of the relationship between government inspectors and resource users may be used to better understand state-governed resource regimes with other characteristics, such as tropical forest reserves, where corruption may be a problem for management.

The insight that officers that enforce natural resource regulations are affected by corruption in the judiciary system as well as corruption within their own organization is also general enough to inform policy in a range of contexts and across various types of resource regimes. So what are the implications of these findings for our understanding of the governance of commons? On a more general level, the argument in this article was presented at the backdrop of the debate where scholars have depicted the choice of enforcement in CPR governance as one between covenants ‘‘with or without swords.’’ As a contrasting view this article has proposed that when bribery is prevalent in the agency imposing regulations on a CPR, this can be depicted as covenants ‘‘with broken swords.’’

As Table 1 illustrates, the situation of widespread corruption in law enforcement can be contrasted to the situation with a government enforcer with no corruption present. Importantly, the process outlined in this article clearly shows that in situations with corruption, the likelihood of achieving sustainable outcomes for management of CPRs is severely decreased. When regulations – the policy tools that are meant to steer behavior of resource appropriators – are not enforced due to widespread bribery, this will increase the probability of a ‘‘tragedy’’ where resources are overharvested.

Then how can the path in such situations be reversed? The results from the empirical investigation speaks to a general understanding among studies on corruption where government agents find it difficult to act honestly when bribery is endemic within and outside of the organization. The literature suggests that bureaucrats’ incentives for corrupt behavior is affected by perceptions of other bureaucrats’ behavior in the organization. This echoes previous findings where individual refusals to engage in bribery in a highly corrupt context are perceived as futile It is also compatible with an understanding that corruption can be described as a social dilemma, where it is rational for actors to partake in corrupt behavior if ‘‘everybody else’’ is perceived as doing it.

This is most likely an important point as it is imperative to keep such considerations in mind when discussing ways to reform corrupt authorities. For instance, as accounts indicated, corruption at the top of this department may influence the behavior of street-level employees. Reform programs targeting bribery among local enforcement officers on the ground may need to consider strategies where corruption in top management is also dealt with.

Conclusions
This article focuses on a problem that has been somewhat overlooked when political theorists and empirically oriented scholars have analyzed the challenge of monitoring in the governance of CPRs. While research holds that corruption produces suboptimal law enforcement, studies seldom investigate the way this takes place, and the government agents enforcing regulations are rarely at the center of analysis. It is here argued that corruption in enforcing authorities risks leading to a situation of covenants with broken swords. In such a condition, bribery corrodes the effectiveness of sanctions for noncompliance.

Using original data this article outlines some of the mechanisms of this process and develops our understanding of how widespread bribery becomes an enforcement obstacle. It also points to improvements in the analytical depiction of the relationship between government inspectors and resource users under widespread bribery. Illustrating the destructive effects from corruption on governance of the commons, these findings resonate a big challenge for scholars and policy-makers. How to tackle the fact that CPRs around the world – for instance, the tropical forest reserves that are key in global efforts to store carbon and protect biodiversity – are monitored by institutions that are infested with corruption?

Future research therefore has several tasks on its agenda.

First, to get a better diagnosis of this problem, it would be worthwhile to analyze if this case is comparable to other contexts. The research on corruption in local governance of CPRs still relies on a scarce number of in-depth studies and may benefit from a comparative approach across CPR regimes with external enforcing authorities. A pertinent issue for comparative research would be to disentangle the institutional circumstances under which we may find a situation of covenants with broken swords.

Second, to get an improved understanding of cures for such situations, it is essential to explore if there are institutional remedies that are successful in reducing corruption. There is also a need to study existing or future alternatives for monitoring when corruption in enforcement authorities is widespread. It has been said that ‘‘when state agencies are involved in corruption and rent-seeking, bottom-up initiatives may improve monitoring’’.

A future discussion on governance of CPRs would profit from investigating alternatives or complements to strategies of state-run enforcement of the commons.

Marine pollution originating from purse seine and longline fishing vessels / November 4, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

Once in while we get in the news that some companies are fined for illegal waste dumping. In the pacific to my recollection is always in Pango Pango (American Samoa) last week an American based company was fined 1.6 millon USD, a few years ago NZ based Sanford endured the same issue in the same place.

Marine Pollution issues are “governed” by MARPOL 73/78 is the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978. ("MARPOL" is short for marine pollution and 73/78 short for the years 1973 and 1978.)

It was developed by the International Maritime Organization in an effort to minimize pollution of the oceans and seas, including dumping, oil and air pollution. The objective of this convention is to preserve the marine environment in an attempt to completely eliminate pollution by oil and other harmful substances and to minimize accidental spillage of such substances.

From my time in the fishing boats and from the workbooks I see from SPC/FFA fisheries observers that include a Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6 (See at the end of the post for an example). I assumed the issue must be substantial, even if nothing gets done with the findings (a bit like compliance issues). And unfortunately… I wasn’t wrong.

At last years WCPFC TCC (Technical and Compliance Committee) and group of SPREP lead by Kelsey Richardson presented a report on the issue. I quote it in the post… the original is here.

The report examines more than ten years of collected data on more than 10,000 pollution incidents by purse seine vessels and more than 200 pollution incidents by longline vessels within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of 25 Pacific countries and territories, and in international waters. The report finds that 71% of the reported purse seine pollution incidents related to Waste Dumped Overboard; 16% to Oil Spillages and Leakages; and 13% to Abandoned, Lost, or Dumped Fishing Gear.

When the category “Waste Dumped” was examined further; Plastics were found to make up the largest portion of total purse seine pollution incidents (37%). Only 4% of the incidents occurred in International Waters, while the rest occurred in the EEZs of Papua New Guinea (44%), Kiribati (13%), the Federated States of Micronesia (12%), Solomon Islands (7%), Marshall Islands (6%), Nauru (6%), and 19 other countries and territories in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.

While based on limited data, the report finds evidence that pollution from fishing vessels, particularly purse seine vessels, in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean is a serious problem and highlights the need for three initiatives:

Increased monitoring, reporting, and enforcement of pollution violations by all types of fishing vessels, especially longliners, which currently have a very low (5%) mandatoryobserver coverage;
A regional outreach and compliance assistance programme on marine pollution prevention for fishing vessel crews, business operators and managers; and
Improvements in Pacific port waste reception facilities to enable them to receive fishing vessel wastes on shore.

This report provides the first consistent and substantive documented evidence about the nature and extent of ocean-based marine pollution in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. These incidents were all reported by regional fisheries observers through use of the Secretariat of the Pacific Commission/Pacific Islands Foreign Fisheries Agency (SPC/FFA) Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6.

The pollution reports are overwhelmingly biased to the purse seine fishery, due to high levels of observer coverage in the fishery, which is mandated by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). Prior to 2009, observer coverage for the purse seine fishery was around 5-8%, increased to 20% in 2009, and to 100% required coverage from 2010 to the present (P. Williams, personal communication, March 18, 2015, WCPFC, 2009). By contrast, observer coverage of the approximately 3,000 longline vessels operating in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean is only 5% for the entire fishery as of 2012 (WCPFC, 2014).

There is also likely to be some bias in observer reporting particularly through some observers not reporting MARPOL issues, although the extent of this bias is not yet known.

The report is structured in seven sections.

Section I Introduction
Section II provides a background on ocean-based marine pollution.
Section III describes the history and structure of the SPC/FFA Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6.
Section IV describes and analyzes the pollution report data, including types, quantities and locations of pollution events.
Section V importantly highlights that pollution incidents by fishing vessels are not isolated to the purse seine fishery, but there is limited information and data for pollution activities by other fisheries, particularly the longline fishery, due to extremely low to no observer coverage in other fisheries. Thus, the pollution data analyzed in this report likely represents only a portion or snapshot of total pollution incidents by fishing vessels throughout the region.
Section VI addresses the need for revisions and updates to the current version of the SPC/FFA Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6, particularly the need for updates that more clearly communicate revisions to MARPOL Annex V which entered into force in 2013.
Section VII concludes the report and provides recommendations designed for a variety of stakeholders and policymakers to reduce incidents of marine pollution by fishing vessels in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. The report ends with suggestions for further data analysis and research.

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) is the strongest and most important international regulation to prevent sea-based sources of pollution, including pollution of oil (Annex I) and garbage (Annex V), arising from operational or accidental causes. Despite these regulations, there is limited actual monitoring of MARPOL, and, consequently, little information exists about illegal pollution activities by vessels at sea.

One study in Australia did find that in 1992 and 1993, at least one-third of fishing vessels with onboard observers did not comply with MARPOL regulations prohibiting the dumping of plastics overboard. Of the 14 Pacific island countries who are SPREP members, 11 are Contracting Parties to MARPOL Annexes I/II and V, and therefore have specific responsibilities to implement this important treaty to prevent pollution from ships, particularly in the forms of oil and garbage.

At the fourth SPC/FFA Tuna Fisheries Data Collection Committee in December 2000, SPREP submitted a request for fisheries observers to collect information on marine pollution. This resulted in the creation of the SPC/FFA Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6. Form GEN-6 was designed by SPREP in partnership with SPC and FFA as a tool to monitor fishing vessel violations to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).

Pollution categories were created based on MARPOL’s Annexes I and V which provide regulations for the prevention of pollution by oil and garbage by ships, respectively. SPC is responsible for maintaining and managing all observer data including the Form GEN-6 data which it started collecting in 2004. In March, 2015 SPREP requested access to the GEN-6 data from SPC and were provided with more than 10 years of data from 2003 through 2015.

Form GEN-6 documents marine pollution incidents by fishing vessels in three categories: Waste Dumped Overboard, Oil Spillages and Leakages, and Abandoned or Lost Fishing Gear. Each category has its respective subcategories, and revisions have occurred to improve reporting over the years, such as the addition of the category Abandoned or Lost Fishing Gear in 2009. Subcategories reported here are from the most current form, revised in March, 2014. Subcategories under Waste Dumped Overboard include: Plastics, Metals, Waste Oil, Chemicals, and General Garbage. Subcategories under Oil Spillages and Leakages include: Vessel Aground/Collision, Vessel at Anchor/Berth, Vessel Underway, Land-based Source and Other. Subcategories under Abandoned or Lost Fishing Gear include Lost during fishing, Abandoned, or Dumped.

The form provides an area to report whether there was information posted on and around the vessel about compliance with the latest revisions to MARPOL, as an indicator of vessel and crew awareness of MARPOL regulations. It also includes a section for ‘Other comments’ where observers can add more details about the pollution event. The reverse side of the form provides notes which clarify definitions and reporting areas. At the bottom of the form it is clearly stated for the observer that under MARPOL regulations “It is illegal for any vessel to discard any form of plastics into the sea at anytime; It is illegal for any vessel to discard any form of oil into the sea at anytime and It is illegal for any vessel to dump any form of rubbish into the sea within 12 nautical miles of the seashore.”

Since recent revisions to MARPOL Annex V entered into force in 2013, dumping of almost all garbage types which were previously allowed beyond the 12 nautical mile zone referenced by this note are now prohibited.

In addition to comments, observers are provided an area on the Form GEN-6 to describe the different types of pollution per category and material (subcategory), as well as to describe quantities. There are no standard categorical options for observers to report quantities of pollution and quantities are reported as written comments by observers, which complicates data analysis.

*Table 1. Summary of Written Pollution Descriptions and Quantities as Reported by Observers*

Figure 1 shows the pollution incidents mapped by the latitude and longitude positions given by observers at the time of reporting. The incidents are overlaid on a colorized map that shows purse seine activity from April, 2013 through March, 2014, using FFA fishing vessel databases and Automatic Identification System (AIS) vessel tracks. The high numbers of incidents in these countries’ EEZs, especially in Papua New Guinea, is consistent with the fact that these EEZ waters are also highly active purse seine fishing grounds.

Figure 1. Purse Seine Pollution Incidents Mapped by Latitude and Longitude

Seventy-one percent of the purse seine pollution incidents were documented in the form of Waste Dumped Overboard, 16% as Oil Spillages and Leakages and 13% as Abandoned, Lost or Dumped Fishing Gear. When the subcategories under “Waste Dumped” were analyzed further and compared to total pollution incidents, Plastics were found to make up the largest portion of total pollution incidents at 37% followed by Metals (15%), Waste Oil (9%), General Garbage (8%), and Chemicals (2%).

See Figure 2 for a summary of the composition of purse seine pollution incidents by pollution types.

Figure 2. Percent of Purse Seine Pollution Incidents by Pollution Types, 2003-2015

When total pollution incidents from 2002-2015 were compared against total observer trips during this time period (with and without reported pollution incidents), there was an average of 1.2 pollution incidents for every trip undertaken by an observer aboard a purse seine vessel during these years.

When the total number of pollution incidents was compared more selectively against only observer trips with reported pollution incidents, there was an average of 3.2 pollution incidents for every observer trip with a reported pollution incident during this time period also.

Purse Seine Pollution Incidents by Flag States

Seventy percent of the total pollution incidents from 2003-2015 were reported by purse seine fisheries observers aboard vessels from Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs). Papua New Guinean flagged vessels comprised the greatest percentage of pollution incidents at 18%. It is interesting to note that more than 85% of the pollution incidents by Papua New Guinean flagged vessels occurred within the Papua New Guinea EEZ. By contrast, the next highest number of pollution incidents occurred by vessels flagged to Taiwan (16%), USA (15%), Korea (12%), Philippines (10%), Japan (10%), and China (8%).

Recommendations

1. Increase observer coverage and more data
Increased observer coverage aboard other fishing vessels such as longline vessels would provide more information about the amount and types of pollution by other fisheries, which fish more heavily in other areas of the Pacific not covered by the purse seine fishery. The current SPC/FFA Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6 is designed for reporting of pollution incidents aboard any type of fishing vessel. After necessary revisions and updates, covered in section VI, this would continue to be an appropriate form for use by an expanded observer program. The primary challenges anticipated for expansion of fisheries observers programs are financial, technical, and human resource capacity constraints, especially for some observer programs that are already struggling to meet full coverage requirements each year. Future efforts to decrease marine pollution from fishing vessels should include all fisheries and vessel types within the Western and Central Pacific region.

2. Reporting
SPREP should report the Form GEN-6 pollution incidents to member countries where the pollution incidents occurred and to the flag States whose vessels are responsible for the pollution violations. This will allow port States and flag States to follow up with appropriate enforcement mechanisms such as fines and penalties. SPREP should also report incidents to the Noumea Convention to be shared at the biennial Conference of Parties (COP), and to the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). Data and incidents will need to be further organized, quality controlled, and standardized to the IMO’s Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) reporting format.

3. Enforcement
Opportunities may exist for more effective enforcement of MARPOL and other anti-pollution regulations. If provided with documentation of marine pollution incidents and violations, member countries and port States, particularly those with high numbers of violations in their EEZ waters, could penalize violators through fines and restrictions. Countries could also prohibit operational dumping of wastes as a condition of their fishing licenses, with associated penalties and restrictions if pollution incidents do occur. This is another method to prevent pollution incidents from vessels by holding vessels accountable to their license requirements. Effective enforcement programmes send a message to fishing vessels that marine pollution is not acceptable.

Some fishing vessels, operators and crew may engage in especially severe pollution activities with full knowledge that such activities are illegal and harmful to the marine environment. In the case of particularly egregious or criminal polluters, a list of vessels and operators could be kept for records to ensure against repeat offenders. If certain vessels and operators prove to be repeatedly engaging in pollution events, steeper fines or criminal proceedings could be levied. Vessels could also be added to a marine pollution ‘blacklist,’ similar to the WCPFC’s blacklist for vessels who have engaged in Illegal, Unregulated or Unreported (IUU) fishing activities (WCPFC, 2010). Such a blacklist system could both serve to stigmatize vessels and owners, in addition to providing opportunities for more stringent and focused monitoring and regulation to ensure that such vessels do not continue to engage in illegal activities. A marine pollution blacklist could then be compared to the WCPFC’s IUU blacklist, to determine range and regularity of illegal activities by particularly problematic vessels.

4. Outreach and Compliance Assistance Programme
An Outreach and Compliance Assistance Programme should be developed within the Western and Central Pacific region through coordination and collaboration between regional organizations including SPREP, the Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), fishing and maritime industry representatives and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in consultation with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the IMO. The Outreach and Compliance Assistance Programme should inform ship masters, mariners, and ports about the proper manner for disposal of all garbage, wastes and pollution types generated onboard fishing vessels in the Western and Central Pacific region and the adjacent high seas areas.

5. Invest in expanded capacity of port waste reception facilities
Most Pacific island countries and territories have few if any waste reception facilities for ships at their ports, and many of those which are in place are inadequate to meet the needs of ships using those ports. Adequate reception facilities are defined by the IMO as those which “mariners use; fully meet the needs of the ships regularly using them; do not provide mariners with a disincentive to use them; and contribute to the improvement of the marine environment”. The facilities must also “allow for the ultimate disposal of ships’ wastes to take place in an environmentally appropriate way”. This lack of port waste reception facilities could provide further incentives for ships to dump waste at sea rather than store their wastes without anywhere to later responsibly dispose of them.

Given these challenges, the locations and availability of existing port waste reception facilities should be clearly communicated to all fishing vessels, with input from the IMO. SPREP has taken important first steps in this area through its Regional Reception Facilities Plan, which recognizes five Pacific shipping hubs (Apia, Suva, Port Moresby, Noumea, and Papeete) as regional centers for safe offloading of wastes from ships.

Areas for Further Data Analysis and Research

1. Specific pollution categories
Further data analysis should be undertaken of the specific pollution categories Waste Dumped Overboard; Oil Spillages and Leakages; and Abandoned, Lost or Dumped Fishing Gear. For example, an investigation into Oil Spillages and Leakages would likely offer a better understanding of how to improve data reporting fields and specific drop down menus to standardize observer descriptions and quantities of discharge during pollution incidents, in addition to a better understanding of conditions associated with spillages and leakages, and the number of oil spills which occur in fishing grounds. An investigation into the data collected on Abandoned, Lost, or Dumped Fishing Gear could include amounts of each subcategory which are lost, abandoned, or dumped, and types of gear per category, such as remnants of fishing gear discarded after repairs, and Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs).

2. Examination of the Abandoned, Lost or Dumped Fishing Gear incidents involving FADs
Within the comments and pollution description sections of the Abandoned, Lost or Dumped Fishing Gear category, numerous reports included the deliberate dumping of FADs either whole, discarding of damaged FAD nets, or retrieval of the GPS buoys before dumping of the old FAD. Lost or discarded FADs in the marine environment can be harmful to marine life through ghost fishing, entanglement and acting as habitat for the spread of invasive species, and have the potential to eventually wash ashore to coastlines and reefs as marine debris. An area for further data analysis is an examination of the Abandoned, Lost or Dumped Fishing Gear incidents that involve FADs.

3. Survey fishermen, crews, vessel operators, port authorities and observers about causes behind and drivers for pollution incidents
Surveys could be conducted of fishermen, crew, vessel operators, port authorities and observers to better understand the drivers of pollution incidents from fishing vessels, and identify solutions that address underlying causes. For example, interviews with and surveys of crews and vessel operators could explore motivations for dumping of wastes at sea, such as issues around convenience, time, and costs associated with disposal on shore. Interviews with and surveys of port authorities could investigate adequacy of port facilities to receive wastes from vessels, human resource capacity constraints, and time pressures to process vessels quickly through ports.

4. Identify appropriate laws, regulations and procedures by which countries and territories can monitor and enforce penalties against pollution incidents by fishing vessels
Enforcement of pollution incidents will largely depend upon existing national laws and regulations within port States where the incidents occur. Procedures for differing levels of enforcement will need to be identified within national contexts, which may be more complicated than prosecution based upon an observer’s report alone. Barriers to enforcement specific to different States can additionally be identified, as well as challenges experienced by vessels which may act as barriers to compliance. For example, vessels may only carry gear they are licensed for, and might be hesitant to retrieve abandoned fishing gear if it doesn’t meet their licensing requirements.

5. Overlay of purse seine marine pollution incidents with marine ecosystem information
Latitude and longitude data from the pollution incidents could be overlaid with regional and country specific marine ecosystem information such as ecologically and biologically important or unique areas, and migration routes for highly migratory, threatened, or endangered species. These overlays, such as between abandoned nets which can result in ghost-fishing and wildlife entanglement and highly migratory species like whales and turtles, could be used to show possible repercussions of the pollution incidents upon surrounding ecosystems and wildlife.

6. Fish sampling for plastic ingestion
Fish species consumed by Pacific islanders or sold commercially could be sampled for plastic ingestion to link plastic pollution with potential socioeconomic impacts, as much of the Pacific region is dependent upon healthy fish stocks for livelihoods and food security. This could identify an area of potential linkage between plastic waste dumped at sea and within fishing grounds by fishing vessels and ingestion by marine wildlife and fish later sold in commercial markets.

This is what a Gen 6 looks like

The tuna transhipment hub of Majuro / October 29, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

Very little is known about the Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI), even if they are at the crossroads of many of the developed world consequences... 4 colonial masters in less than 100 years (Spanish, Germans, Japanese and the US), then 2nd WW hotspot, followed by American imperialism, then nuclear tests and fallout, set up as tax heavens, FoCs (flag of convenience organizations), sea level rising and climate change, airlines duopoly squeezing fortunes of them, just to name a few...

However, its location and magnificent protected lagoon make it a fantastic transshipment hub for the Pacific tuna trade.

Last year they had 704 transshipments involving nearly 450,000 tonnes of tuna, which at the Tuna prices on the Bangkok market (that have started to weaken) to$1400/mt are worth 630 million USD, which is ridiculous when you consider that RMI annual budget is 90millon (U.S. aid and reparations accounted for 60% of it).

So every day millions of dollars worth of tuna are transhipped in the Majuro lagoon, while most Majuro's inhabitants live in tough conditions and the remoteness of the outer atolls makes mostly accessible only by boat, even if at any time they would be several helicopters on top of the purse seiners transhipping.

From the fisheries compliance perspective, their role is fundamental and is entrusted to the Oceanic Division of the Marshall Islands Marine Resources Authority (MIMRA). I have been their guest for this week.

The key issue is that for biggest part of the purseine tuna, this is the last stop before they leave the region forever, and by the nature of fishing, the verified weights (hence how much fish was actually caught) is only known at the dockside on the processing states, where the fish is weight in for payments and prior to processing. The rest is all estimates.

And as the processing nations for most of the WC Pacific Tuna (Thailand, Philippines and increasingly Ecuador) don't communicate back the weights per vessels, the transshipment weight estimations are our best opportunity to know how much was caught.

Furthermore, fish does not become illegal at the factories, is caught and unloaded illegally. And as all these movements occur here, RMI needs to be a responsible port state. Let me use my standard explanation: “A” steals a stereo from “B”, and then it goes to “C” house and sells it… “A” is a criminal and “C” is an accomplice, and “B” is the accuser. Pass this to the IUU fish world, “A” is responsibility from the Flag State, “B” is the Coastal State where the IUU fishing occurs and “C” is the Port State.

And while there is solid argument on question why a country with such a limited resources as RMI, is to take responsibility of controlling the operations of vessels from DWFN that ridiculously subsidize their industry and have abyssal level of compliance (Taiwan – 400millon US/year, China around 2 billons, including 1 million fuel subsidies per Purse Seiner).Taiwan – 400millon US/year, China around 2 billons, including 1 million fuel subsidies per Purse Seiner).

Well… that is a big topic… one that deserves its own discussion (not today). The reality is that many of the PICs do take the responsibility as fish is one of the few sources of revenue they have, and then the pressure from civil society and the EU that will point fingers and shame them with labels of non cooperating countries, or pirate ports or whatever.

And, since all vessels come and go from here, is a hub for the Fisheries Observers (in no many places in the world you will see guys with fisheries observer t-shirts in shops, walking the streets and so on). Hence the place is at the forefront of what we try to do regarding tuna fisheries in the Pacific. Not in vain, the PNA Office is based there.

Needleless to say MIMRA has only limited resources available, but very good people! Therefore in many ways RMI is a great place to test run the Unloading Authorization Code model, integrated into FIMS (wrote about this in the past), so I came here to scope the system design… and it has been great.

Catch monitors, mostly former or off duty observers... unsung heroes in fisheries

I’m exploring the opportunities of integrating various sources of data we already have: VMS, licensing, e-logbook and FFA compliance Index. The idea is that because vessels need to provide 72 hrs notice prior port arrival, we can use these data streams to remotely pre-assess the legality of the catch prior vessel arrival and then focus the limited resources in targeting those vessels with lower compliance indexes and add the observers notes on compliance, interactions with species of special interest and marine pollution that we receive on a daily basis via the e-Obs app. The aim is to focus arrival inspections on those that deserve it more, then we come on board with tablet App that is preloaded with the data of interest, so the inspection is not about finding problems and questions… but finding answers to the problems we already know, while keeping eyes open for the ones we may see.

And while the FAO Port State Measures Agreement in not compulsory, nothing stop countries from using some of the elements it has. In this case, pre-screening and denial of permission to transship or unload if IUU fishing has been detected. The biggest penalty you can put on a rogue vessel is not a fine… is not letting them unload.

But then, a fully hard-core attitude towards compliance, if not regionally adopted… will imply that the fleets will simply move to other regional hubs with a lesser incline or capacity to be a responsible port state. Transshipments generate good revenues ashore as well. Mike McCoy estimates in his 2012 transshipment study figures in between 9 to 14000 USD per vessel (not including fuel). So unless the system is implemented and maintained regionally, the fleet will move somewhere else that, while less convenient geographically, may let them get away with less scrutiny.

In any case, while a lot of these days here involve sitting and thinking, writing (hate it!), exploring data capabilities, designing App and screen interfaces, I also get to go on board and accompany the MIMRA crew and embed myself into their day to day activities… which is something I love!

And here is were my days on vessels pay back… you look at numbers and operations, and you know if bullshit is nearby… i.e. is no way that those drums with oil have been there since you left port a month ago… no fish slime, scales or rust on rims… no saltishness on the backside? Or you him to sign a paper that says that vessel xxx did a 300ton set in a day (and was able to freeze it!)… and then was able to transship 800 tons in less than 48 hrs… really!!

man on a mission (observers are the corner stone of fisheries management in the pacific)

So yeah… jobs like this one make my days happier… I’m trying to design something new and useful, using new technologies, to help improve traceability and levels of compliance. And I get to go up and down from boats, and I like that :-)

But the best of it, is that I get to hang out with cool people, like the young local fisheries deputy director Sam (check his other side as a local street artist that makes awesome t-shirts), Beau a young enforcement officer and ocean man (surfer, fisher, freediver, boatman, etc, etc) and lots of other people that are working hard to control this transhipment hub and let their people have a fairer slice of what is, after all, their fish.

You, ladies and gentleman, have my full respect.

Projected change in global fisheries revenues under climate change / October 25, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

Here is another of those (too many) studies I find interesting that has U. Rashid Sumaila as an author. This one takes an interesting angle since it goes to the business of fishing. As usually I recommend everyone to refer to the original.

Impacts of climate change on MCP and MRP by the 2050 s (average between 2041–2060) relative to the 2000 s (average between 1991–2010)

Global marine fisheries landings are estimated officially at between 80 and 85 million t a year since 1990, with corresponding mean annual gross revenues fluctuating around USD 100 billion annually. Accounting for unreported catches, a recent study estimated the likely “true” annual global catch to be about 130 million t.

The global fisheries sector supports the livelihoods of between 660 to 820 million people, directly or indirectly, which is about 10–12% of the world’s population, if the dependents of fishers are taken into account. Globally, fish also provides more than 2.9 billion people with 20 % of their animal protein needs and is a crucial source of micronutrients. However, along with other non-climatic drivers such as changes in markets, demographics and overexploitation, climate change is considered to be a major challenge that will significantly shape the future of global fisheries.

Several studies suggest that these non-climatic stresses and changes in management regimes may have a greater impact on fisheries than climate change in the short term, while increasing uncertainty in climate poses a major threat to world fisheries in the long run.

Changes in ocean conditions, including temperature, sea ice extent, salinity, pH, oxygen levels and circulation, lead to shifts in the distribution range of marine species, changes in primary and secondary productivity, and shifts in timing of biological events. Warmer temperatures may also lead to decreases in maximum body sizes of marine fishes. The combined effects of the predicted distributional shift and changes in ocean productivity under climate change are expected to lead to changes in species composition and hence global redistribution of maximum catch potential (MCP), with projected increases in MCP in high latitudinal regions and decreases in the tropics. These changes have large implications for people who depend on fish for food and income, and thus the contribution of fisheries to the global economy.

The changes described above under climate change are bound to affect the economics of fishing through changes in revenues (price x landings), costs (fixed + variable costs) and fisheries subsidies.

In this study, they tackle, as a first step in understanding the potential economic impact of climate change, focus on modeling the effects of climate change on revenues through changes in the amount and composition of catches. Price dynamics are affected by the interplay between the supply and demand of seafood products. The preference of consumers and the development of other food supply sectors such as aquaculture may also affect the future price of seafood and therefore have the potential to alter the economic impact under climate change. Here, price dynamics are incorporated as exogenous factors and the effects on revenues are explored by conducting different scenario analysis on prices. These scenarios describe how future development of other production sectors in the economy would likely affect seafood prices.

Specifically, changes in total potential catches may not directly equate to changes in revenues from fisheries. Firstly, climate change may affect catches of species that command different prices in the market. Secondly, even though potential catches are expected to increase in some countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs), the fishing sector of these countries may still suffer if they include a substantial Distant Water Fishing fleet (DWF) that operates in foreign waters that are impacted by climate change.

Conclusion

Their study highlights the impacts of climate change on society through its impact on revenues from fishing as a result of the interplay between ecology and fishing patterns. Our results suggest that the negative impact on MRP under the “faster aquaculture expansion” scenario is higher than the change under the “constant price” scenario. This suggests that we have to carefully consider development of aquaculture as a way to adapt to climate change impacts on marine capture fisheries.

The results also indicate that the countries that are most highly exposed to fisheries revenue impacts due to climate change have lower adaptive capacity to absorb these changes. We find that the projected impacts on revenues are relatively robust to climate and structural uncertainty, but not to the range of discount rates and prices explored in this contribution. Future work is needed to assess the full economic effects of mitigating or not mitigating GHG emissions.

Rough times for American Samoa / October 19, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

There have been hard time for the American canning industry as whole, but for a small "Pacific Country" like American Samoa (they have US passports, but not the same entitlements than the rest of their citizens) the recent announcement by Tri Marine that it would be closing the Samoa Tuna Processors factory, resulting in 800 layoffs, is particularly tough. There are not a lot of other jobs there.

The closure seems to be the result of numerous factors combining, the fleet was prevented from entering much of its prime fishing grounds for a several-month period earlier this year as the South Pacific Tuna Treaty expired and negotiations to revive it proceeded slowly. Even after the treaty was renewed, fishing was tough with the fish moving east, resulting in raw materials shortages at its factory.

And late last year, Tri Marine missed out on a federal tax break known as the American Samoan tax credit, which saved companies that had previously established production facilities in the territory millions of dollars, but didn’t apply to companies that had been built after 2006.

In January 2015, Tri Marine, opened a new USD 70 million tuna canning factory in the village of Atu’u. The Samoa Tuna Processors factory was equipped with state-of-the-art technology producing shelf-stable and frozen products that were marketed and sold to the U.S. through The Tuna Store, Tri Marine’s downstream distribution arm. Their outlook was on a business model of vertical integration between its U.S. flagged vessels, its processing facilities and its distribution channels, allowing it to market and sell “Product of the USA”-labeled tuna to its private-label customers.

The “Product of the USA” is a noble initiative, but the realities of tuna as a commodity food and the supply issues seems to been too much. As a major seller to private label food retailers, Tri Marine also had to convince its large corporate buyers that its tuna was worth a premium.

I know personally some of the top management in Tri Marine, and they are good solid people, committed to the Pacific... I'm sure it must have been a tough decision for them to make, not only at a commercial level, but at a personal level too. I really feel for them.

younger days when we will go to unload in Pago Pago

I have not been in Pago for many years now, but is hard to believe that the bustling place I knew is nonexistent now... our problem was how long it took to unload because the huge amount of boats waiting... now if that there are no boats coming with fish.

Interestingly, there are at least the 14 US flag tuna vessels (owned by Ocean Global Fisheries, Sea Global Fisheries and Pacific Global, collectively known as the Global Fleets) but these "American vessels" vessels do not operate at all in relationship to American Samoa, but align themselves with Taiwanese capital and trading operations so basically they catch for Thailand and not for the "home" country.

As usual, tuna fisheries are full of twists and complexities.

Trade Measures to Combat IUU Fishing / October 16, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

A few days ago I reported on a publication by my friend Gilles, as it goes, another of his works, (also with difficult birth) was published on the same day. This one deals goes on a Comparative Analysis of Unilateral and Multilateral Approaches to combat IUU fishing.

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a persistent and global problem that undermines the achievement of sustainable fisheries, being fish one of the most valuable renewable resource commodities exploited today, and a significant proportion of global fish production enters international trade (particularly from developing countries to developed ones), makes sense that trade policy should have a role in addressing the problem.

His paper describes and compares the apparent impact of multilateral and unilateral trade-related measures taken to address IUU fishing, including trade and catch documentation schemes and trade-restrictive measures that identify and sanction countries for perceived weaknesses in addressing IUU fishing.

I obviously recommend you read the original, in the meantime, I go over the Executive Summary to pick up, some key issues.

Key trade-related measures to combat IUU fishing fall into two distinct categories; trade restrictive measures (TREMs), sometimes referred to as “trade sanctions“ enacted by one or more market-states, and catch certification schemes, of which two specific variants (trade documentation schemes (TDS) and catch documentation schemes (CDS)) have been developed and implemented to date. This paper assesses the merits and limits of unilateral and multilateral approaches with regard to both types of instruments.

TDS have been used by a number of tuna regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) since the early 1990s. A key attribute of TDS is their capacity to detect flag of convenience (FOC) vessel operations. Trade measures taken on the basis of TDS appear to have led to trade in specific species from FOC states such as Bolivia or Honduras subsiding completely. The economic impact of these measures on FOC states has been limited since tuna trade bypassed these states both physically and financially.

The outcome has, however, profoundly influenced the IUU profile of global tuna fisheries; today, over 95 percent of IUU fishing operations in the most important tuna fisheries are perpetrated by legally registered and licensed fishing vessels, undertaking illegal activities such as misreporting or under-reporting of catches that can be eliminated effectively by well-designed CDS.

Multilateral CDS are operated by three RFMOs. These schemes provide a mechanism for certification (by the flag state) of the legality of the harvest of the species covered and are relatively simple to police and to enforce. These schemes—when well designed and implemented by relevant state actors along the supply chain—can be effective in eliminating under-reporting by otherwise compliant, registered, and licensed fleets.

Under-reporting of Atlantic bluefin tuna is believed to have fallen from double the total allowable catch (TAC) to close to nil when important market states—including Japan—started to enforce the relevant CDS. Imports of Atlantic bluefin tuna into Japan fell by 90 percent following implementation of the scheme. Importantly, there is a strong correlation between the introduction of the CDS systems and the beginning of recovery of affected tuna stocks.

In value terms, the price of illegal product under a CDS is diminished because it cannot be legally brought to market, severely reducing the financial incentives to engage in IUU fishing. Legally certified Patagonian toothfish has been shown to trade at prices 20–30 percent higher than non-certified product, and non-certified Atlantic bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean has been reported to lose 85 percent of its legal international market value.

While enforcement of a CDS is likely to cause short-term economic and social costs, the long-term economic and social impact of stocks recovering as a result are positive from both developed and developing country perspectives. Current impacts of multilateral systems are mostly limited to industrial fisheries and developed countries.

Only the EU currently operates a unilateral CDS, although a unilateral US system is poised to come online in late 2016. The EU system is paper based and does not operate a central data registry, impairing traceability and hence the exclusion of illegally harvested products from certified supply streams. No evidence of impact on trade has been detected since the system came into force. The US system is likely to differ from the EU system, notably by targeting at-risk species, and because of how data will be collected, submitted, and validated.

Unilateral CDS are inherently difficult to enforce since fisheries products may circulate through most of the supply chain without being covered by certificates. Most importantly, multilateral systems cover and protect entire fish stocks, while unilateral systems only partially cover many stocks. The potential for direct positive impact of multilateral systems on the sustainable management of individual stocks is therefore greater.

The EU also uses TREMs in the form of yellow cards (identification of non-cooperating countries) and red cards (ban on imports). Four countries have been red-carded since 2014. States can only become the object of EU trade measures in their capacity as flag states; port or market states that actively participate in the laundering of IUU products cannot be targeted.

These trade restrictions are applied broadly to all fish and all fleets of a particular country regardless of the IUU fishing that triggered the identification, which means they are more likely to have disproportionate impacts on small-scale fisheries. Small-scale fisheries are inherently unable to escape embargoes on their flag state, while industrial operators generally have the option of reflagging their vessels to avoid flag state-related restrictions.

The US has identified third countries involved in IUU fishing since 2009 in biennial reports submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Commerce. To date, none of these identifications has led to a “negative certification”—the equivalent of an EU red card. US TREMs can, however, be designed to target only fleets, species, and product types directly tied to the IUU fishing that has given rise to the identification.

This paper argues that the EU system of identifying countries is opaque and that the standards on which decisions to identify (or not to identify) specific countries are based are unclear. In the US, on the other hand, biennial reports to Congress provide detailed information on cited infractions, the reasons behind a country’s identification, and the reasons for an identified country’s positive certification.

The countries identified by the US and the EU are fundamentally different. Only three countries out of 51 identified appear on both lists. EU identifications are currently confined to Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and the South West Pacific; 48 percent are small island developing states (SIDS). US identifications are more evenly distributed between world regions and target more developed fishing nations. The largest number of identifications is of South American countries, closely followed by EU member states, which represent 25 percent of all US identifications.

EU identifications appear to have pushed some identified countries to improve frameworks for fisheries governance, but there is no clear evidence as yet that this has translated into actual reductions in IUU fishing. It is also not clear what tangible effect the US system has had on IUU fishing because no sanctions have been implemented to date. More broadly, however, the impact of unilateral TREMs on IUU fishing, and hence on fish stocks, may in fact be greater than that of unilateral CDS.

A unilateral identification and sanctioning process is likely to be more effective in changing the behaviour of countries if they export significant amounts of seafood to the market imposing the sanctions. If soft flag, port, and processing states can be pushed, through the application of transparent and fair trade-restrictive measures, into becoming more responsible, the impact of unilateral TREMs could be substantial.

In finishing, the paper provides the following conclusions and recommendations.

RFMOs should be supported and strengthened so that they can continue to deliver and expand multilateral solutions to the problem of IUU fishing in shared fisheries. Unilateral end-market CDS may protect markets from sourcing a wide range of illegally harvested products, but because they close off only one market to IUU products, they may have limited overall impact on IUU fishing and the sustainable management of individual fish stocks.

Policymakers looking to improve the effectiveness of multilateral and unilateral CDS could consider focusing on the following:

1. Systems should be based on a technically sound design which achieves verifiable traceability and encompasses supply chain operators at flag, port, processing, and market state levels in an even-handed manner;
2. Systems should be designed around a central certificate (or data) registry spanning the full supply chain to achieve verifiable traceability;
3. Verifiable traceability requires online electronic submission and validation of data within a centralised repository at every step along the supply chain;
4. CDS ought to be risk based and apply only to fisheries suffering from established and serious IUU fishing issues.

Policymakers looking to improve the effectiveness of multilateral and unilateral TREMs could consider focusing on the following:

5. Ensuring that TREMs are as species- and product-specific as possible, in order to address IUU problems with precision and minimise undue economic and social impacts;
6. Ensuring there are clear standards regarding what constitutes IUU fishing, clear rules and procedures for the identification of countries, and transparent public records on dialogues with potential targets of TREMs;
7. Designing TREM provisions in a way that allows countries to be identified in their capacity as flag, coastal, port, or market states, and to be sanctioned in t hose same capacities;
8. Using regional trade agreements (RTAs) as an avenue for enhancing the regulatory coherence in the design and application of unilateral trade instruments. Eventually, governments could consider adopting a multilateral approach to TREMs, for example in the World Trade Organization (WTO).
A further focus for work could be how to improve the coherence, and eventual multilateralisation, of various CDS initiatives. In this regard, policymakers could consider the following:
9. New and existing unilateral schemes ought to devise means for mutual recognition and equivalence of their certificates. Systems could then be aligned. The merging of unilateral CDS would eventually produce de facto multilateral systems, which could then be opened up for expanded end-market state membership;
10. The international community could assess the feasibility of the development and operation of global multilateral CDS systems, designed to apply to specific species of fish in need of protection from IUU fishing throughout their global geographic range.

Design options for the development of tuna catch documentation schemes. / October 14, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

Back in April, I wrote about an article that my friend Gilles Hosch wrote for Globefish. I also mentioned there that he was finalising a big study for the GEF - ABNJ - FAO initiative, and that I will post about it when published… well after a complex birth process here it is (click to download)

CDS have been a topic of debate for more than 16 years and continue to mean different things to different people. His book clarifies the nature of CDS and what they can achieve and identifies the factors to be considered in the design of such schemes as a management and monitoring, control and surveillance tool in tuna fisheries.

While we work in the same field, I have no issue to admit that he is "the" analytical expert on the CDS topic, and this book proves it. He gets to the bone of things and writes about it brilliantly. No one else I know (and it is my job to know) has spent more time and effort thinking and researching this topic out than he has.

I see my work to be on the implementation side of CDS in specific fisheries, the set up of the data streams needed to make it work and the capacity building to make them happen. As is bluntly obvious, I’m not a good writer… (I fact I hate it), but as in other aspects of my life, I force myself to do it, just because I’m bad at it.

Gilles can be a polarizing figure, and people in the fishing community may not agree with the scope and extent of what he proposes, but one must know that any CDS below the standards he sets in his book will be, literally, a substandard CDS.

Any e-CDS initiative based on whatever digital structure I have discussed in the past (here, here, link), would not do itself a service, if it didn't read this book from cover to cover first.

I have read his book at various stages of its development; and to me, it has become a compulsory reference at this stage…

At 131 pages, the book is not a light read, unless you are truly interested in the topic. However he set it up in a very accessible way, including the introduction, the book is structured into thirteen chapters.

Chapter 1 provides the introduction, establishing that the paper aims to provide technical guidance for tuna RFMO’s that may decide to develop CDS for commercial tuna fisheries in the future.

Chapter 2 defines the objective of a CDS as combatting IUU fishing, by creating markets restricted to the circulation of legally-certified tuna products. The potential for secondary CDS objectives is analysed, noting that the complex tasks of a CDS make it a tool unfit to pursue other objectives, without incurring the risk of overburdening and weakening it.

Chapter 3 establishes the concept of supply chain mapping, as a fundamental first step in designing a CDS. The supply chain and its complexities regarding product flows must be mapped out and understood, before the system can be designed. The chapter delves into the supply chain segments covering harvesting, unloading, distribution, processing and trade.

Chapter 4 is a key part of the paper regarding system design, as it presents the basic conceptual CDS framework on which all current unilateral and multilateral CDS are based. The concept presents a supply chain regimented into national and international supply chain segments, of which the former is managed through national rules and regulation, and the latter is directly subjected to the rules of the CDS.

Chapter 5 addresses the issue of estimated and verified weights, which is of particular importance to tuna fisheries. Current CDS do not provide adequate mechanisms to allow for the adjustment of estimated weights established at sea, and before unloading, into verified weights following landing and grading in a factory.

Chapter 6 is another key part of the paper regarding system design, describing the document system on which the CDS hinges. In electronic systems, documents are data assemblages – but in designing the system, it is easier to refer to “documents” to designate groups of data that have to be recorded and validated at given points along the supply chain.

Chapter 7 provides details regarding information to be recorded in certificates, for the full and the simplified catch certificates, and the trade certificate. It discusses the importance of the layout of certificates, even for electronic systems, so that printed copies can be easily read and understood.

Chapter 8 discusses a swathe of points related to the development of an electronic CDS (e-CDS), and the function of a central database – conceived of as a central online certificate registry. The location, architecture and parameters of the system are discussed, arguing that a single centralized electronic platform providing for global remote user access is the most solid option

Chapter 9 presents a number of key factors that must be taken into account when designing a CDS. These include the relevance of risk analysis, the coverage of species, products and types of fishing operations, document security, and the place of logbooks, VMS and observers in CDS.

Chapter 10 discusses oversight and enforcement in the CDS, and details how the principle of subsidiarity assigns enforcement mandates between centralised and least centralized authorities.

Chapter 11 looks at CDS development from a project perspective, detailing which elements should be taken into consideration when it is decided to develop a CDS, and how the project – overall – could be segmented and managed.

Chapter 12 takes a step back, and assesses what the consequences of individual RFMO CDS, covering but a fraction of any particular global tuna species would be. All current RFMO-based CDS cover an entire species throughout its global range, while all future RFMO-based tuna CDS would not.

Chapter 13 provides a model conservation and management measure for a harmonized tuna CDS established on the principles and options outlined in this paper; the model CMM can be used as a draft foundation text to establish a global tuna CDS harmonized between tuna RFMOs – or to develop a tuna CDS for a single tuna RFMO.

What impact this book will have on the development of future tuna CDS systems – including those efforts currently underway at the WCPFC – or the review and fine-tuning of systems already in place, I don't know… but I like to think I can recognize effort when I see it… and Gilles went to the bottom of a topic that is dear to both of us… and it is my hope that those tuna RFMOs engaged in the process of developing CDS will give this book well deserved attention.

What We Talk About When We Talk About Sustainable Fisheries? / October 9, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

I'm paraphrasing in the title, the name of a short stories book by one of my favorites authors (Raymond Carver), but I was really asking “When is a fishery sustainable?”. This is a great question recently analyzed by a group of heavyweight fisheries researchers. These days we either seem to read about “Sustainable” Fishing or IUU Fishing… and the IUU ones are much better explained.

Remind me when is a fishery sustainable?

What I found most interesting about this paper, is that in the attempt to answer that question, they review various elements of fishing management theory. I have seldom seen it explained in a comparative way. So as usual, hoping not to run into copyright problems, I quote here some of my favorite parts of the paper. But recommend that you go to the original!

Abstract
Despite the many scientific and public discussions on the sustainability of fisheries, there are still great differences in both perception and definition of the concept. Most authors now suggest that sustainability is best defined as the ability to sustain goods and services to human society, with social and economic factors to be considered along with environmental impacts. The result has been that each group (scientists, economists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), etc.) defines “sustainable seafood” using whatever criteria it considers most important, and the same fish product may be deemed sustainable by one group and totally unsustainable by another one. (i.e. Hoki in NZ)

We contend, however, that there is now extensive evidence that an ecological focus alone does not guarantee long-term sustainability of any form and that seafood sustainability must consistently take on a socio-ecological perspective if it is to be effective across cultures and in the future. The sustainability of seafood production depends not on the abundance of a fish stock, but on the ability of the fishery management system to adjust fishing pressure to appropriate levels. While there are scientific standards to judge the sustainability of food production, once we examine ecological, social, and economic aspects of sustainability, there is no unique scientific standard.

Everyone talks about sustainability—but how do we define it?
Various layers of government have legislated mandates; international policy-makers and environmental non-governmental organizations (eNGO) have made statements, and consumers have formed opinions. Do they all talk about the same thing?

Perhaps the most widely used definition comes from the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), commonly known as the Brundtland Commission: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”

The creation of ecosystem-based fisheries management (FAO 2003) was an attempt to define best practices that blended the concerns of the conservation community and fisheries managements agencies. At approximately the same time, eNGO-issued consumer seafood guides proliferated, offering a simple appraisal of whether or not the fish you had planned for dinner was sustainable. NGO guides have become an important force in retailers’ choice of what they will sell and subsequently a powerful tool for marketing particular seafood.

Many perspectives on sustainability extend beyond biological resources to social and economic sustainability of dependent human communities.

There clearly is a divide between those who define sustainability in strictly ecological terms and those who focus on people. As we will see later, almost all definitions used in the context of seafood sustainability have dealt only with environmental protection. We argue against a purely ecological focus to sustainability and that seafood sustainability (and sustainability more broadly) must take on a socioecological perspective if it is to cope with global change and be effective across cultures, social drivers, and with the increasing number of uses of the ocean.

Defining sustainability
There is now a multitude of meanings of sustainability and how to define “sustainable” seafood. A common theme to all discussions on sustainability is living within limits and the capacity of natural ecosystems to indefinitely produce the goods and services we want. For example, Murawski (2000) discusses how ecosystem-level sustainability implies “systems are managed for the highest net benefits to society consistent with other biological objectives.” Any population, or system, that is harvested to maintain forever maximum sustainable yield or near it would meet many definitions of sustainability. If future generations wanted to return such a population to an unfished state, they would have the option of ceasing all harvest, and in theory, the population would return to its preharvest condition. Now consider a fishery where the annual exploitation rate is higher than would produce long-term maximum yield so that the population fluctuates at a lower level than would produce maximum yield. If such a fishery can be sustained indefinitely, then it too would seem to meet the Brundtland definition; future generations could choose to harvest at a lower rate and the population would increase. This could be called “sustainable overexploitation”.

Major differences in perspectives on sustainability revolve around the extent to which the use of a resource modifies other components of the ecosystem. In a fishery that is harvested to produce long-term maximum sustainable yield, fish abundance will be lower than it would be if not harvested at all. However, add to this scenario the unintentional catch of another species, commonly called bycatch. If the level of unintentional catch is low enough, the impact of this fishery on the bycatch species may simply be to reduce the mean abundance of the nontarget species, but if the unintentional catch is too high and the bycatch species has a low reproductive rate, that species may go locally or even globally extinct. In this case the targeted fish species is sustainable, but we will have eliminated options to take benefits from the bycatch species for future generations.

Much of the controversy over sustainability appears not to be centered on the potential for long-term yield of the resources but on how much alteration to the ecosystem we are willing to accept. Fishing undoubtedly changes the trophic structure of an ecosystem, and fishing one species may make other species more or less abundant even if not threatening local or global extinction.

Groups concerned with the status of seabirds, for instance, may consider fisheries that reduce bird food availability beyond some point to be. In view of this, how do we measure the environmental sustainability of marine ecosystems?

Single-species population dynamic
The theory of exploited populations suggests that the mean abundance of the population will decline as the exploitation rate increases and that the long-term mean yield will be maximized at an intermediate exploitation rate. Managers seeking to maintain long-term MSY search for the exploitation rate with the highest long-term harvest, but in theory almost any exploitation rate that does not lead to extinction of the population or cause a flip to an alternative enduring state is sustainable (in the sense that they can be maintained indefinitely). Flipping into a permanent alternative state would deprive future generations of the potential benefits from the species. In many places, exploitation rates above the level that would produce MSY are called “overfishing”.

As fishing mortality is increased, sustainable yield initially increases, then beyond some point it declines. This simple relationship is derived for a logistic growth model, but can be shown to result from a wide range of life histories and population dynamics. For instance, age-structured or size structured models provide a similar relationship, the abundance declines with exploitation rate, and yield is maximized at an intermediate value. It is an exceedingly reassuring view of how populations behave, because the exploitation rate can be reduced at any time and the population will rebuild to its higher levels and can, in theory, rebuild to its unexploited state if harvesting is stopped.

However, there are many ecological relationships that can provide different perspectives. The ones of most concern are thresholds or tipping points (Kelly et al. 2015) in either population size or exploitation rate that lead to irreversible changes. Perhaps of the greatest concern are mechanisms known as depensation that can lead to a threshold population size below which the population might never recover. Concern about possible low abundance thresholds and the long recovery times to rebuild stocks from low abundance has caused management agencies to attempt to avoid low levels of abundance. Large-scale meta-analysis suggest that there is little evidence for depensation, although it certainly cannot be ruled out in individual cases. Thus, while the weight of the evidence is that stocks depleted to low abundance will generally recover if fishing pressure can be sufficiently reduced, provided the environment has not changed, almost all past considerations of fisheries sustainability have suggested that there are lower limits on abundance below which stocks are not considered sustainable.

Fishing exerts selective pressures on stocks, and one of the most ubiquitous and striking examples of life history responses to fishing is the lowering of the age and size at maturity of heavily exploited stocks. Fishing increases the total mortality rate, individuals are less likely to live to older ages, and individuals who delay reproduction until older ages are unlikely to survive to reproduce. This is almost certainly an evolutionary response to fishing pressure. The impact of such changes is twofold: the long-term yield available at any exploitation rate will be lower than the simple logistic theory, and the higher exploitation rates otherwise considered sustainable could lead to extinction of the population.

There is a considerable literature documenting major changes in fish stock abundance unrelated to fishing, and recent meta-analysis suggests that irregular and often abrupt changes frequently occur in the key parameters (recruitment, somatic growth, and natural mortality) either from natural or anthropogenic causes. These abrupt changes are often called regime shifts, and such shifts can alter aspects of ecosystem dynamics and the sustainability of exploitation. For instance, if a stock shifts into a less productive regime because of changing ocean temperatures or a decreased food supply owing to fishing, the sustainable yield and exploitation rate that would maximize longterm yield may both decline. While this does not mean the stock is no longer “sustainable”, it does mean that sustainable management in an unproductive regime will need to be different than management in a productive regime. If a population shifts into a more productive regime, previously unsustainable exploitation rates may become sustainable.

In summary, all the single-species evidence available suggests that species can be sustained across a range of fishing pressure and that stocks will rebuild when fishing pressure is reduced, unless there have been externally induced changes in the environment or a tipping point has been crossed. Stocks may be sustainably overfished in that they can sustain exploitation rates in excess of those that would produce MSY and recover to MSY levels (and beyond) if fishing pressure is reduced, but whether such overexploitation is desirable is a societal matter.

However, few fisheries catch a single target species; many fisheries capture a broad mix of species.

Multiple species caught in the same fishing gear
The theory of mixed stock fishing can be divided into two parts: the technical interaction due to the fact that multiple species are caught with the same fishing effort and trophic interaction that considers the predator–prey and competitive dynamics of ecosystems.

The theory of management and maximization of sustainable yield from mixed-stock fisheries has received ongoing consideration. The problem occurs when two (or more) stocks being jointly harvested have different optimum exploitation rates. To illustrate with a simplified example, we assume we have a productive stock where MSY would be achieved at a harvest rate of 30% per year and an unproductive stock where MSY would be achieved at 10% per year. If both stocks have the same potential yield, then long-term MSY is achieved by applying a harvest rate slightly higher than would maximize the unproductive stock so it would be slightly overexploited. However, if the potential yield of the unproductive stock is small in comparison with the productive stock, then long-term yield will be maximized by overfishing the unproductive stock, and, depending on the relative optimum exploitation rates and abundance, the long-term yield may be maximized by fishing so hard that the unproductive stock goes to local extinction.

This is a problem for nearly all mixed-stock fisheries, since there are almost always some unproductive and productive stocks in the mix of what is caught. Trying to capture the potential of the productive stock while protecting the unproductive stock has been an ongoing management concern in a wide range of fisheries, both within and between species.

The response of some fisheries managers has been that all stocks that are assessed must be fished at rates less than that which would produce maximum sustainable yield (FMSY) resulting in substantial lost yield overall. While some would hold such lost food production acceptable, those concerned with food security may not find it so. Consequently, a number of solutions that try to meet both expectations by reducing exploitation rates on unproductive stocks while allowing harvest of productive stocks have been proposed and implemented. Core habitat for the least productive stocks can be closed to provide a refuge. Gear modifications can be found that reduce the relative effectiveness of gear on the least productive stocks. Finally, individual incentives have been provided to fishermen to find time, places, and fishing methods that minimize catch of unproductive stocks, such as individual vessel quotas on both unproductive and productive stocks. Using the concepts from single-species management discussed earlier, any fishing policy that may overfish unproductive stocks but allows them to recover in the future would meet the Brundtland definition of sustainability.

None of this, however, takes into account resilience to external perturbations such as climate change, and there is growing evidence that the long-term productivity of a mix of stocks depends on maintaining the portfolio of stocks over time, so that while short-term yield may be maximized by severely depleting unproductive stocks, stocks that are unproductive during one regime may be the productive stocks of the next environmental regime.

Ecosystem dynamics
Model results Fish stocks do not exist in isolation, affected only by removals from fishing; species in a marine ecosystem interact through predation and competition. Thus, if we fish a single species, the abundance of prey of that species would be expected to increase, whereas the predators of the target species might decline because their food supply is reduced. These interactions are assessed in the ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) or ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM).

A range of ecosystem models that consider these trophic relationships have been used to evaluate ecosystem-wide impacts of fishing. While the implementation of these ecosystem models differs in many ways, a common result is that the ecosystem-wide yield behaves much like a single-species model. As exploitation rate increases from zero to higher levels, long-term ecosystem yield increases, eventually reaching a maximum, and then as exploitation rates increase further, the total yield declines.

A modeling study by Garcia et al. (2012) found that when fishing broadly across an ecosystem (exploiting all non-microfauna, including jellyfish, macroalgae, small-bodied pelagics such as krill, finfish, and even high-trophic-level species like marine mammals), not only was the sustainable catch of this entire assemblage of species much higher (1.5–2 times greater than for selective fisheries typical of North American, Australian, and western European nations), but there was little if any decline in that yield until the exploitation rate was very high. The entire shape of the curve was (typically) more skewed to the right than seen when focusing on traditionally targeted finfish; this did mean, however, that when exploitation rates rose very high, the declines in catch were precipitous. There was always a biodiversity cost of high exploitation rates, with some of the traditionally preferred species disappearing and being replaced by other species that can sustain very high exploitation rates. However, the rate of loss and replacement was not so rapid when fishing broadly across the ecosystem than when selectively targeting traditional finfish. This is because the application of pressure across much of the system was not as destructive for system structure and connectivity as the selective removal of specific nodes.

Trophic models show the same basic trade-off that is found in mixed, single-species models; if you want to maximize the yield from a mix of stocks, the less productive stocks will be overexploited. Moreover the tension between objectives for different components of the ecosystem will remain (e.g., between targeting small pelagic fish and allowing for consumption by species of conservation concern).

Consideration of alternative harvesting regimes (e.g., balanced harvesting) is a growing area of research because there is a need for open discussion of what different patterns of fishing mean across objectives — e.g., intentionally shifting to targeting smallerbodied and more productive forage fish— and whether that is considered desirable by society. Even if concepts like balanced harvesting are found to be sound and desirable in theory, the practicalities involved are quite challenging, not the least of which is re-educating the palate (and markets) of more selective cultures and addressing the economic considerations of fishing fleets. Not all harvested biomass is equally sustaining (or attractive) to all people, further highlighting the social and economic aspects of sustainability.

Empirical results
It has been well documented that ecosystems subjected to intense fishing pressure show strong declines in abundance of the target species (Thorson et al. 2012). Ecosystems subjected to strong fishing pressure also show declines in mean size of targeted species, diversity of species, and a shift towards more productive species. But, interestingly, there is growing evidence that ecosystems do not show declines in sustainable yield when yield is made of up a range of taxa and trophic levels. Ultimately, it should be possible to completely deplete all species in an ecosystem, but within the range of fishing pressures seen in studies it has not happened.

There has not been a meta-analysis of the relationship between fishing pressure and ecosystem-wide yield, but there is certainly evidence that yield (as measured in kilograms) can be sustained and potentially even maximized at very high fishing pressures.

The structure of ecosystems under extreme fishing pressure will be highly modified (e.g., much reduced biodiversity), and the landed catch in such situations may not be desired in all cultures. The market for these fish may be limited and of less economic value than the yield that would be realized if fishing pressure were reduced and the ecosystem shifted back to species with higher market values. The history of such intensively modified marine systems is quite short in comparison with our experience and acceptance of highly modified terrestrial systems, and we know little about the long-term dynamics of such highly perturbed (and simplified) systems.

However, evidence from nearshore marine ecosystems (e.g., coral reefs, kelp forests, seagrass meadows, and other coastal seas) suggests that system simplification due to overfishing can modify their structure substantially (e.g., causing shifts from kelp forests to barrens or reefs to algal-dominated states), which increases the vulnerability of such systems to the impacts of other human activities such as eutrophication due to excessive catchment run-off, invasive species introductions, and climate change.

Forage fish impacts
Another ecosystem impact of fishing is the potential reduction in marine predator abundance (fish as well as birds and mammals) when low-trophic-level fish, often called forage fish, are exploited. As they are fished more intensely, there may be less food available for high trophic levels and the abundance of the predators may decline. This is a rather straightforward impact of ecosystem interactions — reduce the abundance of the food and the species that eat that food will be less abundant. These models suggest that fishing forage fish is certainly sustainable by the Brundtland definition, but it does have impacts on other species that may be highly valued or in some cases may be legally protected. The situation is further complicated by indirect ecosystem effects. For example, modeling work done by Smith et al. (2011) found that predators of competitors of targeted small pelagics could benefit from fishing small pelagics.

Bycatch and ecosystem impacts of fishing gear
Two further impacts of fishing on ecosystems are bycatch of nontarget species and impacts of fishing gear on benthic habitats. Bycatch, particularly of birds, mammals, turtles, and sharks, has become a major concern of most fisheries management agencies and brings an immediate warning “not to eat” in consumer guides. The international ban on high-seas drift-netting, declared in the early 1990s, was one of the highest profile management actions to ensue. The bycatch of dolphins in the eastern Pacific purse seine fishery for tuna caused major declines in several populations, and strong pressure, including the introduction of the “dolphin safe” label, was put on the fishing fleet to reduce bycatch. It was strikingly successful. The kill of dolphins declined from 133 000 in 1986 to 2600 in 1996 through a number of changes in fishing practices. By the 1990s the mortality rate of dolphins by purse seining was comparatively negligible (well under 1% per year), and populations began to increase. However, one way the dolphin catch was avoided was by moving to fishing floating objects called FADs, which has resulted in considerable bycatch of other species. (And is a practice not considered sustainable under MSC)

Two other well-studied examples of bycatch affecting threatened, endangered, or protected species are turtles caught in a variety of fishing gears (and seabirds caught by longlines. In both cases the bycatch caused major reductions in population abundance, potentially leading to extinction, and in both cases technical measures were taken to dramatically reduce bycatch mortality. These positive changes in fishing practice have generally taken place in developed countries with legal frameworks that protect the nontarget species and central governments with sufficient funding to monitor and enforce changes. In many other fisheries in the world, bycatch of these same or related species continues with likely negative impacts on the species.

Much of the annual global catch of marine fish is caught by gear that is dragged along the bottom of the ocean, particularly bottom trawls, dredges, and Danish seines. These gear types are well documented to modify benthic flora and fauna. The negative effects to the benthic ecosystems are considerable on hard sea floor that is rarely subject to natural disturbance. However, there is considerable evidence that on soft sea floor that is subject to natural disturbance, there are few if any long-term negative effects of alteration by fishing gears, and in some cases fisheries productivity may be increased. While trawling changes marine benthic communities, that in itself does not mean that these fisheries are unsustainable.

The system must be considered as a whole. For instance, if there are area closures to protect key, vulnerable, or representative species, the system as a whole can remain sustainable in structure and function even if individual locations are impacted by fishing gear. The dynamic nature of ecosystems, both in time and space, is in part why sustainability must be thought of as a process not a simple stock target — it is far more like juggling than throwing darts at a bull’s-eye.

There is mounting evidence (largely modeling, but with a growing database of empirical observations) that both seafood production and broader marine ecosystem form and function can be sustained at a wide variety of fishing pressures, including some very high levels of fishing. Although the highest exploitation rates likely come at the cost of a dramatically transformed and potentially less resilient ecosystem, this would make these systems less sustainable by many definitions of sustainability, but, as stated above, it is not yet clear where one would draw the line between a sustainably and an unsustainably exploited marine ecosystem. It is also unclear what level of ecosystem transformation could be considered sustainable.

We live at a time when there is still room for such debate for marine ecosystems, in contrast with terrestrial systems where near complete ecosystem transformations and ecosystem simplification with highly productive exotic species are the norm in agriculture and are broadly accepted. While food security means that we are unlikely to dramatically change our agricultural system, we can still learn from the history of agriculture and what shaped it. First and foremost among those lessons is that to ignore social and economic pressures is to put considerations of environmental sustainability at risk.

Social and economic sustainability
The three pillars of sustainability include economic growth, environmental protection, and social development. Almost all seafood guides and certification schemes consider only the biological and management aspects and do not consider social or economic impacts of the fishery management system.

Economic and social sustainability are often identified in fisheries policies and legislation and targeted in performance measures, such as maximum economic yield (MEY). Much attention has been paid to the economic inefficiency of fishing fleets due to overcapacity and subsidies. In general, the profitability of a fishery will be maximized at lower fishing pressure and higher mean abundance than would produce maximum biological yield. This can produce a situation in which a stock is economically overfished (fishing pressure higher than would produce maximum economic profit), but not biologically overfished. Such a system can certainly be sustained — which is why governments, such as the Australian government, has switched to MEY from MSY as a target reference point — but as yet certification schemes and NGO recommendations have not considered economic management targets or maximizing benefit to the public. As an added benefit, targeting MEY rather than MSY can reduce other environmental impacts such as carbon footprint and water use,

Considering economic return in isolation is not necessarily wise either, however. In many countries there are explicit or implicit social objectives involved in the fisheries management system often centering around maintaining traditional fishing communities and access to fishing as a mechanism for those displaced from agriculture or otherwise unemployed. In contrast, New Zealand has an explicit goal to maximize economic value to the nation without any social objectives. As a result, New Zealand fishery ownership has been centralized, and the social and community consequences have been of serious concern to some. A similar case is the fisheries allocation system for the British Columbia trawl fisheries. From the standpoint of local fishing communities and equitability, these systems might not be considered sustainable.

Forms of unacceptable working conditions and human trafficking have been identified in vessels chartered in New Zealand waters and Thailand. Gender equality is a growing concern for many discussions of sustainability, as are issues of child labor, forced labor, violence, and unsafe working conditions.

Once we move from the restricted consideration of sustainability as a question of marine ecosystems to include the other two pillars of social and economic sustainability, the range of issues that would need to be considered in defining and categorizing sustainable seafood is much wider. Such breadth is undeniably daunting, but again is made more tractable if sustainability is thought of as a process rather than a set of fixed targets.

People have been trying to manage fisheries for more than 4600 years and making jokes about the state of fisheries for at least 1900 years (since Iuvenalis circa 100 AD). The history of fisheries management and analysis of the success of fisheries management have shown that a focus on the state of the resource is insufficient for achieving fisheries that meet environmental objectives, let alone environmental, social, and economic ones. Focusing on environmental status alone can result in a lack of compliance with negative stock outcomes. Externalities, multiple incentives, feedbacks, and behavioral responses can lead to unintended consequences.

Moreover, global change has driven home the pervasive nature of change — ecosystems change, technology and behavior change, societal desires and scientific understanding all change. As a result, any method of management relying on static measures or targets is either eventually irrelevant or at best delayed, both of which ultimately lead to fish stocks in a poor state.

To be successful, the method of management must be dynamic and responsive, a process not an end result. At a minimum this means monitoring changes in the abundance of ecosystem components and adjusting fishing pressure on different elements of the ecosystem as their productivity varies over time.

Sustainability is a process
Many consumers and retailers simply want to know if a specific fishery is sustainable. Using ecological measures of abundance or biomass does not provide the most accurate answer to this question. Even beyond the myriad social and economic considerations listed above, fish stock abundance goes up and down with or without fishing, and paleontological evidence shows many stocks fluctuate greatly and even show widespread local extinction prior to human impacts. A stock may be at high current abundance, but caught in a totally unregulated fishery and fished at rates that are not sustainable.

Thus, the abundance of a fish stock does not necessarily say much about its sustainability, and sustainability definitions that rely on stock abundance as the primary indicator can often be misleading. A question with a more exacting answer is “Is it sustainably managed?” Sustainably managed stocks are far more likely to remain so and dynamically respond to changing circumstances and understanding. Thus, current exploitation rate would generally be a better measure of sustainability than current abundance.

The western theory of sustainable harvesting of fish stocks evolved during the first half of the 20th century and was codified in two major books of the 1950s, but by the 1990s many fisheries in the developed world were considered overexploited. This started to change in the 1990s as more countries implemented fisheries management systems that had (i) specific objectives and targets for fishing pressure and abundance, (ii) monitoring of fishing pressure and abundance, (iii) assessments to determine if targets were being met, (iv) feedback management systems that adjusted regulations in response to the assessments and in particular restricted fishing pressure when it was too high, and (v) enforcement systems to assure compliance with regulations. These are the basic elements of a sustainable management system (for the fish stock at least), and without these elements there can be no assurance that the stock will be sustainably managed. This can be summarized quite simply as “sustainability is a process”.

Certification and sustainability guides
There are now hundreds of seafood guides and several certification programs to provide guidance to consumers and retailers on what is sustainable. In this section we look specifically at two of the most widely recognized to evaluate what elements of sustainability they consider most important in providing consumer advice.

The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) has a transparent scoring process broken into three principles, dealing with (i) stock management, (ii) ecosystem effects of the fishery, and (iii) governance, policy, and the management. Overall, the MSC has eight scoring criteria related to outcomes (state of stocks and ecosystem) and 23 that concern process. Thus, MSC evaluation is heavily weighted towards sustainability as a process rather than as a measure of ecosystem condition. However, the MSC scoring is completely confined to the fish stock and the management system, with no consideration of social or economic impacts nor of environmental impacts beyond the local marine ecosystem.

The Monterey Bay Aquarium’s Seafood Watch program is the best known of over 200 seafood guides and provides consumer advice for particular species, with each species and harvest method graded as “best choice”, “good alternative”, or “avoid”. They have four criteria: (1) impacts on the species under assessment, (2) impacts on other species, (3) management effectiveness, and (4) impacts on the habitat and ecosystem. Within the first two criteria, all scoring is based on the state of the system, with measures of the biological vulnerability, the abundance, and the mortality. Criterion 3 has two process-related scoring factors, while criterion 4 has two state measures and one process measure.

Overall Seafood Watch scoring is dominated by state measures (9), with only three measures of process. As with MSC scoring, no scoring in Seafood Watch deals with social or economic impacts, nor are environmental impacts beyond the local marine ecosystem considered. This is perhaps best illustrated by the relative rankings of yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares) (ratings as of 26 December 2014), which can be a “best choice” if caught by US troll or poll-and-line fishing, “good alternative” if caught by imported troll or poll-and-line or US longline, or “avoid” if caught by purse seine. It is not the status of the stock or its management that distinguishes, but the bycatch of other species that is different among the different methods. Purse seining has significant bycatch of juvenile bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus) and a range of other species. However, pole and line and longline fisheries produce three to five times more carbon footprint per ton of tuna landed than do purse seinersand rely on intense exploitation of “baitfish” from local coastal zones. Therefore, if there were more concerns about carbon footprint (broader environmental impacts) than bycatch impacts, purse seining would be elevated and pole and line fishing demoted in the scoring system.

These guides were predominantly oriented towards the state of the fish stock and assessments of the acceptability of various marine ecosystem impacts. They contain little consideration of the nature of the management system or the social or economic outcomes and essentially no consideration of environmental impacts beyond the marine ecosystem.

Impacts beyond the marine ecosystem and fishing communities
Consumer guides to many forms of consumables, not just food, are growing in number. Since seafood guides came first, fish retailers in the USA, Canada, and Europe can advise you on what seafood is “sustainable”, but no such advice or guidance is available for other forms of food sold in the same stores. Changes have come with labeling as to whether food is organic, eggs are free range, or beef is grass-fed, but there is a deafening silence on sustainability of food stuff as measured by social impact, carbon footprint, water use, eutrophication and acidification, land transformation, and biodiversity. Consequently, consumers may be excused for thinking seafood is not such a good choice even through comparative studies show seafood to be one of the most sustainable, or lowest impact, foods across a range of sustainability measures. As a result, we are now in a position that even though the transformation of marine ecosystems by fishing is in most places far less than the transformation of land by agriculture, and there are direct threats to human health from pesticides, herbicides, and antibiotics used in livestock production, many retail chains have stopped selling certain fish but continue to sell beef, chicken, and pork regardless of production practices.

In the future it may be common for seafood sustainability to be compared with agriculture, aquaculture, and other human activities in its broader impacts. However, as we are not there yet, we should make the most of our experience so far with an evolving understanding of what defines seafood sustainability, lending what we have learned to a wider consideration of which impacts could be used to define sustainability more broadly. For example, Australian fishermen must report any interaction with threatened, endangered, or protected species. In contrast, no Australian motorist has ever been asked to report any bycatch-by-car of It is clear that the transferal of a simple, biological, target-based concept of sustainability to all aspects of humanity is unlikely to be feasible or to deliver the intended biodiversity, broader ecosystem services, or socio-ecological outcomes.

It is clear that the transferal of a simple, biological, target-based concept of sustainability to all aspects of humanity is unlikely to be feasible or to deliver the intended biodiversity, broader ecosystem services, or socio-ecological outcomes.

Conclusions
Once we examine aspects of sustainability beyond food production, we can find little basis for an agreed upon definition of social, economic, or ecological elements of sustainability. The standard in those dimensions depends on what an organization or individual believes is most important. There are some standards in these dimensions that could likely be widely agreed. For instance, bycatch that leads to extinction and use of slave labor, but any attempt to be all-inclusive will subject “sustainable fisheries” to being tweaked and pulled in all directions by different interest groups.

Given such intractable, unwieldy complexities, it may be prudent to rein in the definition of sustainable fisheries. The Brundtland definition is already widely accepted, sound, and defensible. Consequently, if a management system can provide food for this generation without reducing the ability of future generations to produce food, let us call that “sustainable seafood”.

Certainly consumer advice can and should incorporate environmental impacts, human rights, and social equity into their advice on what should be eaten, but either we have to abandon the term “sustainable seafood” in those dimensions or find broad agreement on what is acceptable.

Combating Tax Crime and Other Crimes in the Fisheries Sector / October 7, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

Once in a while, I wish I was still working for FAO or some fisheries organization and administration, as to be able to assist to the right seminars, workshops, and meetings. Here is one of them even if I had the money to go to Paris and spend a week of my expenses plus assuming the cost of not earning during that time, it would be difficult to be accepted, just because I represent myself and typically you need to be employed by a government or body. But then I'm supposed to know and be updated on these topics for my work, is a independent consultant's conundrum.

This conference – hosted jointly by the OECD Committee, the OECD Task Force on Tax Crime and Other Crimes, the FAO and the UNODC will take place in Paris (13-14 October 2016)– will provide a platform to policy makers and stakeholders to discuss pressing legal and operational challenges they face in combating fisheries related and associated crimes. It aims to support international cooperation and build mutual assistance to combat serious crimes in the fisheries sectors.

The fisheries sector is vulnerable to criminal activities as many other sectors. Fishing intersects with criminal activities, such as human trafficking, smuggling of migrants, drug trafficking, document fraud, corruption, money laundering, tax fraud and occasionally terrorism financing. Sometimes these crimes are committed by those in the fishing industry, while at other times fishing vessels are used as part of larger criminal operations. All along the value chain, actors turn to criminality to maximise their profits, especially those derived from illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing.

Illegal and unreported fishing is estimated to cost the global economy up to $23 billion annually. This figure does not include the cost of unregulated fishing, the cost of other transnational criminality or the resultant economic losses to countries, and so likely underestimates the full negative impact.

Illegally caught fish are lost to legitimate fishers, and reduce local economic activities related to fisheries. Furthermore, governments lose out on licensing fees and other tax revenues. This undermines governments’ ability to enforce policy, manage the pressure on fish stocks, promote food security, reduce poverty, fund public expenditure and support development activities.

National authorities can work together to combat fisheries crimes. Fisheries authorities, port authorities, customs administrations, coastguards, police and other law enforcement authorities can collaborate to reduce the overall cost of fighting fisheries related crimes by avoiding duplication of effort and enhancing capacities.

The conference will have the following sessions

Understanding Crime in the Fisheries Sector
Bringing together experts in combatting fisheries crimes from international organisations to map the diverse nature of crime in the sector.

Country Experiences
Policy makers and country experts will share best practices and solutions in their fight against fisheries crimes.

Improving Cooperation
Discover technical tools for gathering intelligence and enhancing co-operation among national agencies.

Closing Loopholes
Participants will identify priorities to remove legal and operational barriers for effective international co-operation in combating fisheries crimes.

Workshop - Detect and Investigate Crime
During a half day workshop, participants will receive practical and operational training on the detection and investigation of tax and other crimes in the fisheries sector.

Find more about it here

Busy Friday in Noro / October 3, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

Back in Noro in the Solomon Islands (what fishing should be in the pacific!). I arrived for a 2 week input on my mentoring work, but this time is a bit different as I have my family with me. They will stay for a week only since is a school holiday in NZ and hang out at the leaf house I rented by the water (no electricity, aircon, etc.) and enjoy the ocean and the place while I go jumping on boats and set up forms and processes.

Some of the most driven officers in the Pacific

No doubt transhipments are a complex reality of the fishing industry, and more so the ones in longliners. Many of us have driven hard to have transhipments only in port areas, and since this week we have some for longliners transhipping in Noro Port.

They land some fish and then they tranship other to another vessel (a longliner with no fishing gear) the smaller species and bycatch. Unlike the purseiners, the skippers seen to be quite relaxed about the volumes, in reality all of the cargo goes into one hatch, and then when full a net is used to separate cargoes and next vessels start. But the skippers of none of the vessels seems to be taking notes or numbers…. Surely they will have someone one at the other end doing that.

Counting fish any day any time at transhipment.

But for us is a different story. We need to check what it landed (easier as we have counting station at the loading of containers and each fish is individually weighed at a scale) but also what is transshipped and compare it with what was declared in the e-log or logbook. And as we have not done transshipments yet, we needed to develop a strategy and a form.

Of course everything starts with checking stuff before the vessels even get to port. These are Taiwanese longliners that are licensed to fish in SI EEZ, so we have a good chunk of info ready at the moment they request access to port. Their positions on VMS, ATS, e-log and licensing data is all online under FIMS… so we check the general legality of their operations.

But the key issue this days in not illegal fishing, but underreported hence we need to measure what was landed plus assess what is transhipped. The problem is that there are no scales in board either the fishing boat or the reviving vessel, and the authorities port state (Taiwan) where all going be landed does not communicate the volumes landed.

(I don't even think they have any idea what is landed there nor from where).

So the best thing we can do for this year is to work in pairs with officers on board, one counts the individual fish by species being transshipped and the other estimates the volumes being hoisted down to the freezer hold.

The idea is to then compare their recounts on numbers of individual fish by species and the estimated volumes with the ones in the logsheet. Again all this is based on estimates, which is never the best but is the industry standard. Thankfully all this is changing since from next years onwards these vessels will require to land 100% of the cargo and have cameras on board… both measures will go a long way to assure compliance.

Of course, the heroes of this story are the local fisheries officers, that spend hours counting fish, literally jumping form fishing boat to fishing boat out in the bay 7 days a week and as I have witnessed they were still at sea at 9.30 pm on a Saturday night. (In over 30 years in the fishing, I have never seen that before)

I don't have the numbers to back my claim, but I’m sure that the officers I deal with here in Noro spend more time and effort in relationship to their salary (and their country GDP) controlling Taiwanese Fishing vessels than the Taiwanese Fisheries Officers themselves.

Some people will point always to the problems we still have here in the Solomons, but they should also see the incredible amount of work and advances that we have done in the last few years.

I could not be prouder of these officers here in Noro.

And as you see, my family is enjoying the ride... well... I dont think my wife is sure!!

$35 billion on fisheries subsidies / September 29, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

I know you must be bored with me going on and on about subsidies... but it does really infuriate me. The key redeeming factor of commercial fishing is in the fact that should be "commercial" hence if you don't make money, you should not fish... end of story.

This is a message that is getting some heavyweights behind. Last week, Joakim Reiter, UNCTAD Deputy Secretary-General spoke clearly about this at a meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva.

The trade community has a responsibility to make the trade in fisheries more inclusive and sustainable, including by ending pointless and harmful fishing subsidies.

With exports of fish and seafood products growing tenfold over a decade to reach a record value of $146 billion in 2014, fish has become one of the world's most traded commodities. It is also essential to the development of many coastal developing countries and small island developing states (SIDS).

While some 90 percent of the world's marine fish stocks are now fully exploited, overexploited or depleted, governments still pay out an estimated $35 billion on fisheries subsidies, of which $20 billion contribute directly to overfishing.

These subsidies effectively mean that taxpayers are paying industrial boats to degrade the environment and to destroy the food security and livelihoods of vulnerable coastal communities. By fueling unfair competition between large fleets and individual artisanal fishermen, they are also fostering inequality.

"Subsidies to support the extraction of an already depleted resource make no economic, environmental, or social sense," Joakim said. "We are running a senseless race to the bottom where very soon, we will all be the losers."

"We the trade community have a responsibility to make trade in fisheries more inclusive, more sustainable," he said, outlining three actions to do so - ending fishing subsidies, supporting effective fisheries management, and the minimization of tariff and non-tariff measures.

In July, UNCTAD, FAO and UNEP joined forces to propose a roadmap to ending subsidies, a statement which was supported by more than 90 member States, four international and regional organizations and more than 10 global NGOs.

Reducing harmful fisheries subsidies could result in estimated economic gains of as much as $72 billion per year worldwide. This money should be spent instead on a Blue Development Fund to help SIDS and least developed countries (LDCS) to support bluer economies and more effective fisheries management, Mr. Reiter said.

Research is needed to better understand how some other trade measures can contribute to overfishing, Mr. Reiter said, noting that the nationality of an individual boat, not the origin of the fish, determines the trade policies applied.

"A Liberian fish is miraculously considered, say, European, if fished by a Spanish boat outside the coast of Monrovia," he said. "This situation distorts incentives in an important way."

I wrote about subsidies here, here and here

The Global Fishing Watch Project / September 27, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

The availability of technology makes visualizing problems easier, a "new" player in the "where are the vessels" game, the Global Fishing Watch enables anyone with an Internet connection to see apparent fishing activity anywhere in the ocean in near real-time, for free.

This public beta version of Global Fishing Watch (GFW) is available to anyone with an Internet connection and allows users to monitor when and where commercial “apparent fishing activity" is occurring around the world.

Global Fishing Watch uses data about a vessel’s identity, type, location, speed, direction and more that is broadcast using the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and collected via satellites and terrestrial receivers. AIS was developed for safety/collision-avoidance. It is a maritime navigation safety communications system standardized by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that provides vessel information, including the vessel’s identity, type, position, course, speed, navigational status and other safety-related information automatically to appropriately equipped shore stations, other ships and aircraft; automatically receives such information from similarly fitted ships; monitors and tracks ships; and exchanges data with shore-based facilities.

Is important to understand that AIS is not a specific Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS), that is a general term to describe systems that are used in commercial fishing to allow environmental and fisheries regulatory organizations to track and monitor the activities of fishing vessels. They are a key part of monitoring control and surveillance (MCS) programs at national and international levels. VMS may be used to monitor vessels in the territorial waters of a country or a subdivision of a country, or in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) that extend 200 nautical miles (370.4 km) from the coasts of many countries. VMS systems are used to improve the management and sustainability of the marine environment, through ensuring proper fishing practices and the prevention of illegal fishing, and thus protect and enhance the livelihoods of fishermen.

The exact functionality of a VMS system and the associated equipment varies with the requirements of the nation of the vessel's registry, and the regional or national water in which the vessel is operating. Within regional and national VMS initiatives there are also sub-divisions which apply different functionality to different vessel categories. Categories may be size or type of vessel or activity.

While is VMS data is mostly restricted to RFMO, RFO, Flag states, etc. AIS data is freely available, and GFW collects it from vessels that their research has identified as known or possible commercial fishing vessels, and applies a fishing detection algorithm to determine “apparent fishing activity” based on changes in vessel speed and direction. The algorithm classifies each AIS broadcast data point for these vessels as either apparently fishing or not fishing and shows the former on the Global Fishing Watch fishing activity heat map.

AIS data as broadcast may vary in completeness, accuracy and quality. Also, data collection by satellite or terrestrial receivers may introduce errors through missing or inaccurate data. Global Fishing Watch’s fishing detection algorithm is a best effort mathematically to identify “apparent fishing activity.”

As a result, it is possible that some fishing activity is not identified as such by Global Fishing Watch; conversely, Global Fishing Watch may show apparent fishing activity where fishing is not actually taking place. For these reasons, Global Fishing Watch qualifies designations of vessel fishing activity, including synonyms of the term “fishing activity,” such as “fishing” or “fishing effort,” as “apparent” rather than certain. Any/all Global Fishing Watch information about “apparent fishing activity” should be considered an estimate and must be relied upon solely at your own risk.

Global Fishing Watch is taking steps to make sure fishing activity designations are as accurate as possible. Global Fishing Watch fishing detection algorithms are developed and tested using actual fishing event data collected by observers, combined with expert analysis of vessel movement data resulting in the manual classification of thousands of known fishing events. Global Fishing Watch also collaborates extensively with academic researchers through our research program to share fishing activity classification data and automated classification techniques.

And while its use for fisheries compliance and MCS is argued quite substantially, it can be useful in my opinion as backup system when VMS fail (until vessels come to port) of when operating in the High Seas.

While AIS is not as fisheries specific as VMS, the fact that one can "visualize" the "fishing effort", anywhere in the world is truly remarkable, and brings home the incredible amount of Chinese and Taiwanese vessels that they are fishing in the Pacific!

FAD or not to FAD? / September 22, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

I have tackled the FAD issues before, yet las week, in a very compelling study published recently by the top journal Marine Policy, G.Moreno, M. Herrera and J.Morón of OPAGAC* asks ‘FAD or not to FAD: A Challenge to the MSC and its conformity assessment bodies on the use of units of assessment and units of certification for industrial purse seine fisheries’.

Image from PEW's“Estimating the use of driftings FAD around the globe” paper

The association considers that an industrial tuna purse seine fleet should only be certified as a whole, for its total operations, and not on “artificially construed components of the fishery”, referring to the mixed free-school and FAD fisheries in the WCPO.

Currently, all industrial purse seiners depend on drifting fish aggregating devices (dFADs) for a significant part of their catches, including companies certified by the MSC.

Fish caught in association to dFADs are, however, deemed to not meet the MSC standard and have not been certified.

OPAGAC argues that the certification of FAD-free fish is misleading as the largest proportion of the catch of any vessel comes from fishing operations that are associated to dFADs. Furthermore, the division between dFAD-associated and free school fish is not scientifically robust and can be misconstrued to get certification where it is not warranted.

The main criterion used to separate the two types of school, namely the distance to a floating object, has not been applied consistently by MSC’s Conformity Assessment Bodies, and there are serious doubts that even if it were applied consistently the level of certainty to differentiate FAD-free from FAD-associated schools could not stand up to scientific scrutiny.

The paper also raises questions about the use of species composition, another criterion used to separate the two types of schools, to validate catches. The uncertainty that is inherently present in the current classification raises serious questions about the rigour surrounding MSC-certified FAD-free catches.

“By certifying part of the catch, MSC encourages the misuse of dFADs and does not help to address the issues surrounding their use”,“If MSC wants to improve sustainability of tuna purse seining, all school detections systems (dFADs, anchored FADs, free schools, natural logs and other types of associations) should be included on the certification, Dr Morón concludes.

In response, the MSC issued a statement saying:

The MSC seeks to incentivise the use of responsible fishing techniques – by allowing the separation of tuna caught using drifting FADs, anchored FADs and free school fishing methods, we aim to incentivise a preference towards more sustainable techniques through market preference to MSC certified catch.

In the case of tuna fisheries where only part of the catch is seeking MSC certification, the relevant fisheries and processors must be certified to the MSC Chain of Custody (CoC) Standard requiring that they keep MSC certified catch separate and clearly labelled from non-certified catch.

We are very aware of the risks associated with one vessel catching both certified and non-certified catch and are working with certifiers to ensure that the MSC CoC requirements are effective and adhered to.

Notably:

MSC certified tuna must be kept separate from non-certified catch. This may involve storing and holding it in different containers, or separating it in the hold using nets.
The weight of certified catch is recorded along the supply chain to ensure that no substitution takes place.
MSC certified tuna fisheries may require on board observers to verify that only tuna caught using certified fishing methods can be sold as MSC certified. Observer coverage is often submitted as evidence that adequate systems are in place to assure compliance with our standard, and in some cases observers may be required by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations.

As an example, the MSC certified PNA tuna fishery has developed a sophisticated traceability system to ensure effective segregation and identification of their certified tuna catch from non-certified. It starts at sea with specially-trained observers who confirm that an individual purse seine set captured only free school tuna, and that no aggregating elements (FADs, logs, vessels or whale sharks) contaminated the set.

Free-school catches are then stored in sealed wells, and traceability is required in all stages of the transfer from catch, through transhipment to carrier vessels to landing at tuna canning factories.

Shipments are checked on landing to ensure that segregation and traceability has been maintained, and cross checks are made using data collected at the point of capture by observers and catch composition data sampled on landing. Only shipments that meet PNA’s rigorous testing and checking procedures are confirmed as coming from free school catches and can pass into the supply chain as MSC certified.

No doubt this is a valid and interesting discussion.

Beyond any ulterior motives (there is always that possibility), there is a point (at least for me) in challenging the sustainability brand of a fishery, based on the fact that the same fleet/vessel has a “sustainable” and a “non-sustainable” (or at least not sustainable enough to certify as "sustainable") way to catch the same stock..

If using no FAD, (or one particular type of FAD) makes it “sustainable” and using dFAD makes it "non-sustainable"… So should a vessel using a “non sustainable” practice be certified only for it “sustainable” one while ignoring the other? Isn't that cherry picking?

Should Tuna fisheries be only be certified if they can prove that they have not fished with FADs? Or should be fishing with FADs banned for that matter, if it obviously leads to a lesser degree of sustainability?

Really interesting set of questions, beyond the fact that the MSC certification can prove traceability and chain of custody for each well in a seiner, assuring that only the FAD-free fish get their certification.

I would also ask deeper in terms of the role of “flag state performance” for some of the assessments where vessels from Flags with poor records of compliance are involved. Even if the rules are quite clear and consistent by the regulators, and the specific vessels involved in the fishery are “clean”… but this issue may need a post on itself in the near future.

* OPAGAC is an Spanish association of purse seine fishing companies operating in the three main oceans (Indian, Atlantic and Pacific)

The Impact of Wasted Fish on Subsistence Fishers / September 19, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

Despite fish waste being a global problem, post harvest losses mostly affect the subsistence fishers in developing countries, who depend on fish for food, nutrition and income.

Back in May, I wrote about a contract with APEC with aim of the project is to develop a manual to facilitate the improvement of the catch condition of subsistence fishers (aiming at food security) by reducing economic losses and overfishing by the deterioration of fish products that were not properly handled, achieving that consumers receive high-quality products.

I'm off to present the resulting manual at the APEC Ocean and Fisheries Working Group meeting in the north of Peru.

The topic is much complex that I anticipated, fish post harvest losses are the measurable reduction in the quality or quantity of the fish produced in a value chain. Losses and waste can occur at varying intensities in different stages of the value chain, which themselves vary across countries, production systems and fisheries.

There are four types of fish losses and waste:

Physical: when fish are completely lost from the value chain
Quality: when the quality of a fish is harmed (usually expressed in a reduction in monetary value) and is the most common type.
Market: when market forces create high marketing and production costs or gluts cause prices to drop
Nutritional: linked to biochemical changes within the fish flesh as a result of spoilage, processing or meal preparation.

My friends in FAO estimated that for small-scale fisheries in lower-income countries, quality losses account for more than 70 % of total losses, compared with only 5 % physical losses . These losses because of the processing, transport and marketing techniques used, make the fish vulnerable to external forces.

When fish is wasted, less fish is supplied, meaning less fish is available for consumers. This increases the price, which most affects poor consumers, and limits their access to fish, an important source of protein and micronutrients.

For those working in the value chain, as the value of fish degrades because of poor handling, the reduced market price means their income is decreased. When the quality of fish deteriorates, it is not wasted but sold at cheaper prices to consumers, often the poor. This may create negative health impacts as they are consuming fish with a lower nutritional value or that is unsafe to eat.

Fish loss has gender impacts too. In developing countries, men, women, the young and the old all have different roles in fish value chains. But women are most affected as they do up to 90% of post harvest activities (FAO data), where the majority of losses occur.

Lower-quality fish sell for less, making it a cheap protein source for low-income consumers, who cannot afford the higher prices of better quality products and whose diets often lack the micronutrients present in fish.

The manual I wrote is (in a modest way) trying to help APEC Economies to tackle this problem. The manual is intended for use as a training aid to help introduce and explain post-harvest fishing topics to subsistence fishermen and others actors in the coastal fisheries value chain.

To support this aim, the manual presents as much information as possible in a visual form, for the benefit of fisherfolk whose literacy may be limited. For the same reason, the text has been kept as simple and non-technical as possible.

In compiling this manual, I have split the many interwoven aspects of post-harvest and fishing into a series of individual topics. Each covered in “chapters” intended to convey the information and practices relevant to that particular subject. I have tried to be comprehensive in the coverage of each topic.

The manual has a structure of separate but consecutive chapters, as to allow for training delivery in an integral programme or by chapters. Each chapter has guiding text to be used as “aide memoir” by trainers and illustrations for each concept, as to convey the message without relying only on written words.

Chapter 1 deals with the basics of good fish handling and is general to all other chapters
Chapter 2 deals with good fish handling at the time of capture and harvesting.
Chapter 3 deals with good fish handling at the landing.
Chapter 4 deals with good fish handling during transport.
Chapter 5 deals with good fish handling at point of sale and the prior importance of these practices
Chapter 6 deals with very basics of traceability at all stages
Chapter 7 deals with the very basics of the importance of the ecosystems approach to fishing.

The pages of each chapter present the contents in a “graphic narrative” with the key concepts of the chapter supported by minimal text and examples of common good and bad practices.

The illustrations are based on a fisherfolk family along with different “characters’ representing fish, bacteria and enzymes. The fisher guides the explanations to his family and colleagues along the manual.

The illustrations are in black and white to facilitate printing, but also to be used as “colouring book” and encourage the children in the fishing families to keep the manual in their households. (I really like this idea)

Predictably, it has proven impossible to avoid overlap altogether. However, I hope that the cross-references in the text will enable trainers and trainees to follow a given theme through the manual, independently of the mode and time of training delivery.

All the illustrations were done by my friend David from Emphasise and Kim Thomson helped me with the research and language

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Summary of WCPFC’s Twelfth Scientific Committee Meeting / September 17, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

The Scientific Committee Meetings of the WCPFC are where the status of the tuna stocks are discussed for the members to make the management decisions, and while some advances are made, normally the member that loses the most is the tuna.

Catch in mt of the 4 main species in the WCP

This year the meeting took place from the 3-11 August 2016 in Bali, Indonesia and was attended by around 150 participants. The text below is quoted from FFA's Trade News, a very good bimonthly summary produced by my colleague Len Rodwell.

An overview of the WCPO tuna fisheries was provided using the latest scientific data available. In 2015, the total provisional tuna catch in the WCPF-Convention Area (WCPF-CA) was estimated at 2,687,840 mt, the third highest on record, accounting for 80% of total Pacific Ocean catch (3,379,789 mt) and 56% of global tuna catch (4,799,697 mt).

In terms of gear type, the purse seine fishery accounted for 68% of the total WCPO catch (1,766,070 mt), which was the fifth highest catch on record, but more than 280,000 mt less than 2014, largely due to reduced fishing effort. The longline catch declined below both the 2014 level and the last five-years’ average to 243,547mt, and represented 9% of the total tuna catch. Pole and line catch for 2015 (228,129 mt) remained amongst the lowest annual catches for the fishery since its peak in the late 1960s.

In terms of species, skipjack accounted for 68% of the total WCPO catch, yellowfin 22.5%, bigeye 5% and albacore 4.5%.

The WCPO tuna catch for 2015 was valued at US $4.77 billion, which was a decline from $5.78 billion in 2014 (and the previous two years), due to a reduction in catches and fish prices for all four tuna species. Capacity in the purse seine fishery continues to expand since pre-2007 levels when the vessel day scheme was introduced - 279 purse seine vessels actively fished in 2015 vs. 228 in 2007; total gross registered tonnage was 440,000 mt in 2015 vs. 300,000 in 2007; total well capacity was 380,000 m3 in 2015 vs. 250,000 m3 in 2007. While total purse seine effort in 2015 was 15% lower than recent years, the fishing effort and catch on unassociated (free-school) sets relative to drifting FAD sets increased by 72% and 59% respectively.

Catch per unit effort (CPUE) for purse seine-caught skipjack continues to increase, averaging around 35 mt/day for all fleets, but reaching as high as 50 mt/day for the Korean fleet vs. around 28-30mt/day for the US, Japanese and Taiwanese fleets. Strong

El Niño conditions were sustained in 2015 which resulted in the majority of catch occurring east of 160°E and partially explaining the lowest bigeye catch by purse seiners since 2007 (48,772 mt).

A new stock assessment was released for skipjack which yielded results broadly similar to the 2014 assessment. The WCPO skipjack stock remains healthy, but fishing mortality is approaching maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Scientists recommend that management action is taken to avoid further increases in fishing mortality to maintain stocks around the target reference point (50% of unfished spawning biomass).

Japan raised concerns that the latest assessment does not adequately take into account range contraction of the skipjack stock which it believes is negatively impacting skipjack catches in Japan’s coastal waters. Studies to date do not support this theory.

Bigeye, yellowfin and albacore stocks were not formally assessed in 2016, with stock status’ and management advice reported in line with the last assessments. Bigeye remains overfished with overfishing occurring, with a 36% reduction in fishing morality from 2008-2011 average levels recommended to return catch levels to MSY and allow the stock to rebuild above the limit reference point (20% unfished spawning biomass).

Yellowfin stocks remain healthy, with a recommendation that catches not be increased above the 2012 level and measures implemented to maintain current spawning biomass levels until a target reference point is agreed. Given high fishing mortality of yellowfin in several tropical regions, scientists recommend that spatial management approaches also be considered.

South Pacific albacore also remains healthy, but it is recommended that longline catches be reduced to avoid further declines of the stock and ensure economically viable catch rates can be maintained. Both silky shark and oceanic white tip shark stocks remain in an overfished state, with overfishing occurring.

Improvements in data provision were noted, with the majority of Commission Members and Cooperating Non-Members (CCMs) providing annual catch estimates for 2015 by the deadline. Japan provided operational data for the first time for 2015 and Korea and China for the second year running. Several CCMs are still yet to provide aggregated and/or operational level catch and effort data for key tuna species and sharks.

Under management issues, SC12 noted that WCPFC13 is scheduled to record management objectives for each fishery/stock as part of the development of a harvest strategy framework. To help progress this task, the WCPFC Chair has circulated draft management objectives (biological, social, economic and ecosystem-based) for consideration by CCMs, based on ‘strawman’ discussions held during the second Management Options Workshop in 2013. WCPFC13 is also scheduled to agree on a target reference point for South Pacific albacore (FFA members propose 45% of unfished spawning biomass).

Analysis was presented at SC12 of three management alternatives to achieve a 45% TRP by 2033, with an early effort reduction (immediate 53% cut from 2013 level) identified as the most economically viable option vs. break-even scenarios of a delayed reduction until 2024 (49% effort cut on 2013 level in 2024) and a spread reduction (3% annual reduction from 2013-2033).

The Scientific Committee was also tasked to determine a “biologically reasonable timeframe” for bigeye stock recovery. An analysis of five rebuilding scenarios over 30 years indicated only a full fishing closure would enable the stock to rebuild within the average generation time (2-4 years), while the status quo scenario (current management arrangements) could take 8-30 years depending on the acceptable level of risk adopted.

While the acceptable level of risk adopted by other tRFMO’s ranges from 5-20%, WCPFC requires the risk to be “very low” (i.e. 5-10%). FFA members will present a proposal to WCPFC13 in line with the 5% interim risk level for skipjack and albacore and 10% for yellowfin and bigeye currently considered. Scientific analysis presented at SC12 will also assist the Commission in developing harvest control rules and monitoring strategy evaluations for albacore and skipjack in 2016-2018, as per the 2016 Harvest Strategy Workplan, as well as performance indicators to evaluate harvest control rules and a monitoring strategy to assess performance against reference points.

The tropical tunas measure (CMM 2015-01) requires the Commission to formulate and adopt purse seine and longline yellowfin catch limits for CCMs at WCPFC13, in line with advice by SC12. Yellowfin tuna stocks status is relatively insensitive to purse seine set type (unassociated vs. FAD) and 2015 catches for both the purse seine and longline sectors are fairly stable.

Hence, FFA members indicated that yellowfin catch limits are not immediately necessary, but expressed concern about the increase in yellowfin catch by the Indonesian and Philippines’ handline fisheries. SC12 will recommend that WCPFC13 considers the need for continued improvement in data collection in these fisheries.

CMM 2015-01 includes a provision that CCMs who have achieved a verifiable reduction in bigeye catches by their purse seine fleet to 55% of 2010-2012 levels are able to claim an exemption from the 2017 high seas FAD closure. SPC data analysis indicates that several fleets, including the EU have achieved catch reductions in 2015 greater than the required 55% reduction.

However, some CCMs expressed concern that CMM 2015-01 does not stipulate the period of time over which the reduction has to have been achieved, nor how long it needs to be sustained for. PNA members indicated that they are considering alternative FAD management measures (i.e. FAD charging, FAD tracking) to reduce bigeye catches in their waters.

On ecosystem and by-catch mitigation issues, SC12 noted the limitations in evaluating compliance and the effectiveness of CMM 2010-07 for sharks, given difficulties evaluating the 5% fin to carcass ratio requirement. It also considered applying a definition of longline fisheries “targeting” sharks as problematic, given fisheries need not be targeting sharks to have a significant impact on vulnerable shark stocks. SC12 will recommend that WCPFC13 considers adopting guidelines for the safe release of Manta and Mobula rays caught incidentally in WCPFC fisheries.

if this isn't enough, download the Summary Report of the meeting.

The Traceability Interoperability Initiative / September 15, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

The Use of Regulatory Data to Improve Supply-chain Traceability and Combat IUU Fishing

In the over 30 years I been in commercial fishing, research and management, there have been a lot of changes, but generally, a very stable type of people has been the norm, so I'm excited and intrigued when I see new "people" coming in.

A while ago Jeff Douglas, an interesting entrepreneur from the IT industry, that has worked on various fisheries and marine projects contacted me (along other people) with his 'plan". He was getting into traceability with the focus on the mechanics of implementing and integrating IT systems to enable the secure capture, exchange, and processing of digital seafood traceability data. He produced an interesting and lucid proposal I’m quoting below:

His objective is to provide a “digital passport”—ideally, with a cryptographically provable chain-of-custody—that follows seafood as it moves through the supply chain: from harvest, through processing, export, import, and wholesale, to retail sale.

This supply-chain is a complex one, mixing both public and private sector organizations, at all stages of harvest and handling:

What Data Exists?

Traceability can mean many things to different audiences. For our purposes they define it in terms of Key Data Elements (KDEs), and the organizations that collect these. Existing public and private sector databases often record:

It is fair to say that much of the relevant data is already captured in electronic systems (databases)—either by regulators or by private sector organizations. However most exchanges of this data occur in paper form: through printing, scanning, and faxing or emailing of documents. This is inefficient, and creates an elevated risk of documentation fraud or mislabeling.

For both commercial and political reasons, it seems unlikely that a single “grand database” of global seafood traceability data could be assembled. Of necessity, the government (regulatory) and private (commercial and NGO) sector organizations will continue to maintain independent databases. Additionally, there are unique challenges involved in designing interoperable IT solutions: particularly, given the multi-jurisdictional nature of the seafood supply-chain, and the number of participants; i.e. multiple regulators, customs agencies, food safety agencies, the seafood industry, and independent certification providers.

The data is difficult to harmonize. For valid scientific, commercial and political reasons regulators require different KDEs. Introduction of a “global” catch report is, therefore, problematic. However, a standardized extract of catch details—from existing databases—is feasible.

Enabling this process is their objective.

Why do we Need Standards?

The structure of the seafood supply-chain implies the need to develop standards—and agree these jointly between regulators and industry. This becomes essential when electronic traceability scales to, eventually, include all harvest.

They can find technical standards in-use within the cold-chain segment—for packaged goods—but these are largely unknown to fisheries regulators, and have a high degree of complexity to implement. Conversely, many aspects of importance to fisheries regulators do not have accepted mappings—and certainly there are no global standards—when one seeks to integrate this data within supply-chain systems.

For example, there are no globally interchangeable electronic records covering: registration of vessels; recording of crew details/transfers; issuance of licenses, permits and quota; or, recording and reporting of catch/harvest location. Additionally, there are significant differences in how fisheries are managed (the mix of capacity, input and output controls).

This reflects in the differing Key Data Elements (KDEs) required by each fisheries regulator.

A Standards Body Will Fix This?

Yes, and no.

There are standards bodies who can address the technical elements within one domain, but none that act across the entire group of broader stakeholders. For example, national fisheries regulators often set their own technical/data standards (and in some cases, RFMOs or transnational bodies, such as the EU, do likewise). Within the supply-chain, the GS1 organization is influential, but does not provide implementations of their standards in a form easily taken up by fisheries regulators.

Additionally, there is valuable work occurring at many levels on traceability and interoperability, including:

Initiatives by the United Nations Food & Agriculture Organization; whereby RFMOs and National Fisheries Regulators exchange vessel particulars on a voluntary basis, to assist in building a history of fishing vessels identifiers.
The Global Food Traceability Center (GFTC) and GS1.org are working to define Key Data Elements (KDEs) from the perspective of mainstream cold-chain IT systems, in a manner that facilitates integration and interoperability.
Private sector traceability providers have demonstrated the ability to collect data, and to provide it to regulators, wholesalers and retailers—including limited interoperability between competing IT vendors.
A number of regulators, most notably within the United States and European Union, have published data standards for electronic catch reporting. However, some standards do not address aquaculture/processors and/or are restricted to exchanges via trusted government data networks only—hence, they are not directly suitable for supply-chain use.

All these initiatives are encouraging, but what appears to be lacking is an initiative focusing exclusively on the most pressing gap in interoperability. This occurs at the intersection of the regulatory sphere—fisheries, food safety and customs regulators—when their IT systems must interface with the systems operated by harvesters, processors and the cold-chain.

Defining Success

Our Key Performance Indicator (KPI) can be stated as follows: “What percentage of the global seafood harvest is reported via a regulator participating in the Traceability Interoperability Initiative?”

They have a particular focus on the Top 20 national regulators and Top 10 RFMOs.

Put simply, seafood regulators should be able to implement—at reasonable cost—software modules within their existing IT systems to provide the seafood industry with electronic equivalents for paper documents of record (i.e. fishing permits, receipts for catch matched against quota). Such electronic representations must be digitally signed, tamper-proof, and verifiable. It is of equal importance that these documents are standardized in presentation (i.e. XML schemas): so that industry, certification bodies, traceability providers, NGOs and other private sector organizations may integrate this data efficiently.

Only once this occurs, do they have a feasible path towards true electronic seafood traceability (Additionally, in approaching this discussion, they must be mindful that, despite the end objective being a fully electronic system, there is a requirement for the foreseeable future to support hybrid paper-based, and partially-electronic options also)

Traceability must begin with the regulators: Certain functions (e.g. authorizing vessels to fish, issuing quota, and approving exports) are inherently governmental functions. As such, these functions cannot be “outsourced” to the private sector: yet, this data is critical for the chain-of-custody and must also flow to private sector participants; i.e. harvesters, processors, and customs agents.

By analogy, this role is similar to that of a Land Registry (recording deeds), a Department of Motor Vehicles (issuing drivers licenses), or a Passport Office (issuing passports). In each case private sector organizations and foreign governments rely on the data—and there are well-defined methods to obtain this information electronically (i.e. an insurance company querying a driving record; biometrics embedded on an RFID chip within a passport). The challenge within seafood traceability is to find a similar path towards public-private sector data interoperability.

Of course, our KPI is easy to state, but rather more difficult to implement in practice. They turn to this next.

How do we get there?

They propose to establish:

An open, non-profit, technical organization with membership extended to seafood regulators, the seafood industry, and all technology suppliers having an interest in seafood traceability.
To hire a core set of technical experts who will become the preeminent source of deep knowledge on the relevant supply-chain data standards and relevant fisheries data standards. They do not envisage this to be a static process, but one that evolves over time as new standards are developed and implemented by our members.
To maintain a publically accessible GITHUB repository, which codifies this knowledge through a series of open source reference implementations—widely adopted by fisheries regulators in conjunction with their existing IT providers. (To include security roles, and scaffolding to enable regulators to efficiently wire implementations to existing databases.)
To maintain a website of participating fisheries authorities: including public keys to facilitate verification of digitally signed traceability documents. (This website will contain only public keys, and redirect links to the relevant implementation by each fisheries regulator. No traceability data is received or stored.)

Perhaps, more importantly, what they are not:

They are not a primary standards organization. They seek to implement existing standards, and to identify real-world issues as they arise (i.e. different methods of coding fish species), and provide the appropriate data mapping tools.
They are not a portal or repository of traceability data. They provide only code (software). Regulators handle all digitally signed documents directly. For example; basic vessel details (Good Standing Lists) might be public (where they are now), commercially sensitive data—such as receipts for catch records—are provided by the fisheries regulator direct to the harvester (via web or email)— mirroring existing paper-based workflows. They are not involved in these processes.
They do not seek to become an IT supplier to fisheries authorities. Instead, they propose that existing IT professionals (whether in-house or contractors) become members, and then perform the integration work directly with their clients.
They are not an electronic logbook supplier; catch reporting vendor; or traceability provider. However, organizations of this nature are welcome as members (and they anticipate many will wish to join).

Current Status:

They are seeking funding! Once they have this, they will start work immediately—in collaboration with a core set of “early-adapting” fisheries regulators and private sector traceability suppliers (who have agreed to contribute to the development, and assist in beta testing, of the data exchange APIs). Our intention, over time, is to move to a self-funded model: perhaps, based on the volume of seafood processed by each regulator. However, to “bootstrap” this initiative, and prove it’s worth to regulators, they anticipate the majority of early funding will need to come from private sector and philanthropic sources.

Structure & Governance

They propose that all participants in the seafood supply-chain have a seat at the table. Only in this manner can they accommodate the unique considerations of each stakeholder: data sovereignty, in the case of regulators; commercial sensitivities and privacy, in the case of industry; technology choices, in the case of IT professionals.

Different countries (and even individual fisheries) have differing views on acceptable fishing practices. To properly support all participants, it is essential that they not be viewed as a lobbying organization. They can take no position on specific fisheries policies; catch methods; or any other aspect of fisheries management.

Their role is narrow: To facilitate efficiency and transparency within the supply chain. Primarily, through offering electronic/automated means to exchange data that is handled manually, in paper form, at the present time.

Noting the nature of the work, they believe the board should consist primarily of technical/subject-matter experts. They are seeking a balance between regulators (preferably, through their IT suppliers—either in-house or contractors), the fishing industry (to ensure they properly address concerns regarding data confidentiality and commercial sensitivity of information), and the technology industry (to ensure they adopt best practices for all engineering work). Individuals interested in serving in some capacity on the board, or otherwise being involved with this initiative, are invited to provide an indication at this time.

This is a small, tightly focused initiative. To avoid the outlays of a standalone governance structure, they are in discussions with a non-profit incubator. (And will update, pending approval.) The option of joining an existing organization was also considered. However, due to the requirement for strict neutrality on fisheries management practices, and furthermore, a desire to avoid any perception of favoring one participant over another (i.e. regulators or industry), it was felt that a standalone initiative was more appropriate. This said, over time, they might revise this view if another home becomes suitable.

On location, they propose Massachusetts, USA—based on the nexus of technology and seafood expertise. They have received a few comments suggesting alternate locations (all of which, themselves, would give rise to similar questions!) Although they have to pick one location initially, they are open to collaborations with other academic and non-profit institutions, particularly those willing to house developers, interns or researchers performing complementary work under this initiative (our intention in designating this an open-source project is to encourage a broad range of contributors, beyond the core team).

Benefits

The benefits to regulators and the seafood industry are substantial:

For regulators: Our approach can reduce or eliminate the cost of negotiating proprietary data-exchange solutions for each traceability provider, or alternatively, the difficulty in developing and supporting a country (or fishery) specific API. At point of import, interoperability allows the digital chain-of-custody to extend back to the original national regulator (or RFMO).

For industry: Interoperability avoids the cost of integrating and testing with each regulator—using disparate technical standards—and promotes traceability across multi-jurisdictional supply-chains. In particular, lacking interoperability, it becomes difficult to maintain a strong-chain-of-custody, as data conversions are not permitted on digitally signed data.

For IT Professionals: Access to a well-tested, professionally developed and documented code base is always attractive when developing solutions—whether this is used to integrate with an existing Fisheries Information System, Vessel Monitoring System or Catch Reporting System, or to automate exchanges with such systems on behalf of commercial clients within the seafood industry. The need for interoperability is obvious: With at least 40 significant fisheries regulators, and likely a similar quantum of traceability providers, if one approaches this on a point-to-point integration basis, the number of system combinations to be integrated and tested would be staggering (and simply not feasible); i.e. 40 x 40 = 1,600.

Seafood traceability is only as strong as its weakest link: The ability to electronically obtain vessel particulars, fishing licenses/permits/quota, and vessel location/track data (where applicable) becomes key to the entire chain-of-custody. Such data sources are essential to developing an evidentiary-grade seafood traceability solution.

Of specific interest are the Key Data Elements (KDEs) which establish: vessel/facility particulars (“who”); the entitlement to harvest (“what”); and the location of harvest (“where”/“when”).

They are mindful that simplicity is key: Technical solutions that minimize the change needed to systems in-use by fisheries regulators and industry are far more likely to be widely adopted, making interoperable seafood traceability a reality.

Managing the security surrounding this data, so that different participants can receive different levels of access, is one of the key discussions that this initiative is well placed to undertake, with all stakeholders represented.

You wanna know more and/or be part of this, Please Contact:

Jeff Douglas - Jeff(at)douglasitech.com - +1 (617) 320 1326

From Bitcoin to Catch Documentation Schemes? / September 10, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

I know that technology isn’t going to solve all the issues around IUU fishing and slave labour, the same way it hasn't solved money laundering… but if it helps and is solid, I take it!

I do believe that a way ahead is around something that I have named “private transparency” (the benefits of English not being my 1st language) that works in principle as a decentralised network where everyone along a data chain knows “a bit of information” as part of a data field that makes sense, as long as everyone in the chain maintains their “bit”.

You don't know what everyone else has, you know yours and the ones that want to share it with you. Now if you want to change your data bit, you’ll need to convince everyone else in that chain about that… and unless you have a truly justifiable reason, this would be really complex. So data integrity is maintained along the chain… which exactly what we need in a eCDS (electronic Catch Documentation System) to fight IUU fishing

In principle that is what the “blockchain” principle behind “bitcoin” does: is an information system that is shared between many computers and in which new information cannot be removed or changed after it has been written. In real life, it allows any set of parties to agree on some information and be certain that it will still be in the system in the future. They don't need to trust one another, nor do they need to trust a third party. Blockchains do not belong to anyone, however they can be trusted. This little video explains it neatly

The clever people from Provenance (they call themselves a “framework for knowledge”) have run a 6 month trial that was aimed more towards social claims, but does fit nicely into IUU. Their goal was to aid robust proof of compliance to standards at origin and along the chain, prevent the “double-spend” of certificates and explore how these new technologies could form the basis for an open system for traceability powering consumer-facing transparency for food and other physical goods. The pilot was successful in tracking fish and key social claims down the chain to export

The used blockchain technology, along with mobile and smart tags, to track physical products and verified attributes from origin to point of sale (POS). The first system to use blockchain was a peer-to-peer (p2p) payment system that became (in)famous under the name of Bitcoin, Provenance used the same p2p technology to track a tuna fish caught in Maluku, Indonesia from landing to factory and beyond - demonstrating how blockchain technology can enable supply chain transparency and traceability.

Their trial was in Indonesia is the largest tuna-producing country, ideal for assessing opportunities to drastically increase transparency in fish and seafood supply chains. Conducting research and deploying our prototype in the region allowed us to understand the problems, assess technology opportunities and iterate both the design and implementation of our application for building an important part of an impactful and sustainable software system for end-to-end (e2e) traceability.

There is a rallying call from customers, governments, NGOs and businesses towards the end of the supply chain for information about the origin and social standards of fish and seafood products - to prove their compliance to regulation (e.g. no slavery) and voluntary social and environmental standards to warrant premiums or preferential access. To do so, it is also essential to know each link in lengthy supply chains – the chain of custody of a product from capture to customer, which is what we refer to as traceability. With current systems however, effective interoperability of data along the supply chain poses a large technical challenge.

A centralized system, with a governing third party was, until recently, the only conceivable way to achieve data and transaction transparency. The truth is that no single organization can be responsible for making data throughout a whole supply chain transparent. Third parties like NGOs or industry associations, rarely manage even one of these two aspects of transparency, and even if they could, they would become a single point of weakness. This would make them and their operations a vulnerable target for bribery, social engineering, or targeted hacking. Adoption of such a transaction platform among various third parties would add further difficulties, as the shared costs for set-up and operation would be difficult to apportion and agree on, and benefits to each party are not usually made transparent.

What if we could share the same truth between all stakeholders - fishermen, factories, certifiers and consumers, without giving any of them a backdoor to the system?

Blockchains offer precisely this opportunity. This project explored new methods for enabling traceability - a secure flow of information enabling the full chain of custody to be accessed, including key social attributes such as fishing method, vessel type and compliance data.

Building on the blockchain enables a global p2p network to form: an open platform that can deliver neutrality, reliability and security, particularly in grassroots trade.

It makes it possible to avoid double-spending of certificates and claims, which is otherwise impossible without a trusted third party
It acts as the base layer of truth that everyone throughout the chain can refer to in a trusted way
It allows the definition of unbreakable rules called smart contracts that will be enforced by the protocol itself

This project tested their beta chain-of-custody application to estimate and optimize its impact for slavery-free, sustainable practices in the fishing industry. Read more about the technology and its background in their whitepaper.

There are many initiatives big and small (e.g. mFish, Trace Register, ThisFish and many more) looking to digitise data capture along the supply chain but few have presented a convincing approach for making that data truly interoperable without monopoly. Every fisherman, supplier and factory worker we met had a mobile phone. 3G and wifi was patchy but accessible from most of the towns and villages we visited.

As an alternative to current methods, the Provenance application is designed to work through a simple smartphone interface - either through the Provenance application itself or by linking Provenance with existing interfaces and systems for data capture along the supply chain. The application links identity, location, material attributes, certifications and audit information with a specific item or batch ID. The data is stored in an immutable, decentralized, globally-auditable format which protects identities by default, allowing for secure data verification.

Pilot phase 1: Registration and data collection from the "first mile"

Provenance worked with local fishermen from two different supply chains to help them collect catch data and track it through to suppliers. The respective fishermen sent simple SMS messages to register their catch, thus issuing a new asset on the blockchain with each SMS. Accompanied by permanent, unique IDs, the assets were then transferred from fisherman to supplier along with the catch, in both physical transactions and in the digital register on the blockchain. At this point, the items originally owned by the fishermen become linked to the suppliers. The identities of the fishermen are saved forever in the list of previous owners held on the blockchain.

The social and environmental conditions for the fishermen at the point of capture are verified through trusted local NGOs, whose audit systems validate their compliance to an external standard, resulting in their eligibility to participate in the Provenance-validated chain of custody.

Using a blockchain explorer like morden.ether.camp allow them to check the raw content of the digital asset that represents the item on the blockchain. It ensures the history and any details about the item have been recorded on the blockchain. The system they built is thus completely standalone and, more than building it on top of the Provenance platform, they rather peg a stakeholder object to a Provenance user in order to take advantage of both.

The 1st mile work like this:

1. Registration of fisherman > 2. Item attribute confirmation > 3. Fisherman issues item (catch) > 4. Fisherman transfers the item to supplier. > 5. Supplier receives the item > 6. Checking item on blockchain explorer.

Pilot phase 2: Linking the blockchain with existing systems

Many supply chain management systems already exist, although most are expensive, large-scale enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems that run on internal hardware or in private cloud environments. These data silos discourage interoperability and open standards, rarely cover a product's full supply chain, and are often unable to capture the first mile from the original source.

Interoperability

Standards allow unconnected systems to communicate using the same language, structures and identifiers. GS1, for example, manages a closed set of global standards for most supply chain concepts such as barcodes and shipping container codes. There are, however, very few standards for identifying individual instances of products or their history. They are working to develop this as a community-owned, open standard.

A unique ID in their system takes the form of an address on the blockchain (this is where I see my concept of Unloading Authorisation Code fitting in). More than a simple identifier, fetching the data stored at that address on the blockchain allows any entity to access details about that particular item. It is thus interoperable by default – as long as each entity along the chain commits its transaction to the blockchain in some fashion, the platform or system they use to access the blockchain is irrelevant.

Single Source of Truth

To ensure trust in a system, there should be a single source of truth (SSOT) for each piece of information. They propose that in this system, the blockchain should be the SSOT for verifying an actor’s identity, as well as the validity of any certification or attribute they claim to have. It should also be the SSOT for the full ownership history of each item from first mile to end consumer (i.e. its chain of custody) as well as the validity of any certification or attribute associated with it.

Integration details

1. Accepting items / ingredients / materials

Today, only paper records and tags accompany the sale and purchase of items such as skipjack tuna. By digitising the supply chain at the first mile, these items will be sold along with a digital record. The record will be held on the blockchain, accessible to anyone with the unique identifier attached to the item as a QR Code, RFID tag or using any other hardware technology.

2. Registering new or transformed items

When raw materials are processed and turned into new products, the corresponding assets on the blockchain need to be updated or transformed accordingly. For example, a whole fish whose catch was registered to the blockchain initially will leave the factory in multiple cans, which will each need their subsequent sale tracked separately. They will implement the concept of process as a contract on the blockchain to handle this. To counteract malicious processing, open-source conditions will be defined, publicly enforced by the contract.

Tally-O uses mass balancing to account for the amounts of ingredients used in the transformation. For example, the calculation for a can of Fairtrade skipjack tuna might be 200g of certified skipjack tuna and 10ml of olive oil. The details of this calculation will be sent to the process contract once the transformation has taken place, and the identifier then encoded in a label that will be passed with the transformed product down the chain.

3. Accepting transformed items

Just as inputs were transferred on the blockchain when physically arriving at the factory, outputs are transferred to the next actor in the chain when leaving the facility. Tally-O is connected to scanners that enable shipping management. Scanning labels containing a reference to the digital asset issued at the transformation step triggers the transfer of that asset to the next actor in the chain.

In short, the blockchain provides an audit layer sitting on top of an existing ERP or other data management system - like Tally-O. This allows data to be shared and mass balancing of certified product to be conducted between two separate factories. Even more, it allows that data to be joined with data collected from the first mile in a trustworthy way - providing a true end-to-end record without the need to change existing interfaces to data capture.

Pilot phase 3: The consumer experience and building an interface for trust

The final part of this pilot explored how the information from origin and the supply chain can be reached and trusted by shoppers towards the end of the chain.

To effectively integrate Provenance into physical retail environments, they conducted a workshop and in-store prototyping session with local Brighton supermarket Hisbe Food CIC. The workshop provided significant insights on consumer behavior, influencing ideas for how Provenance technology could best manifest in a supermarket scenario. The resulting strategy: to replace the clutter of traditional printed communication with Provenance online stories and journeys, accessible via in-store tablets and NFC-enabled smart stickers. On the tablets, shoppers can view stories for each product range, seeing the producers and suppliers involved in farming or processing. Through smart stickers and packaging, shoppers can hover their smartphones over a product to track its provenance right on their screens. This system empowers a new era of more conscientious, trusting consumers willing to pay more for products with proven origins.

Key choices and challenges for Provenance: Towards an open registry for material products, their attributes and ownership

Provenance aims to define open traceability standards for the material world. They do not seek to be yet another solution added to the list of data silos. Instead, they strive to build a system from the grassroots that can use existing interfaces and apps wherever possible - simply providing the first layer of shared truth for the material world.

Public vs. private blockchains

Most well-known blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum are public. This means that anyone can join the network without any restriction to read, write or take part in the consensus. Consortium blockchains then emerged to take advantage of the distributed consensus when it comes to maintaining a shared, consistent source of truth within a business process, company or industry at low maintenance cost. They give a controlled number of validators the responsibility to reach a consensus.

We know that building on a consortium blockchain would be an easier path: they are currently more scalable, cheaper to operate and provide better privacy options. But we believe that the incremental complexity of using public chains is worth the effort:

Equality: Since anyone can take part, this makes sure we can take consumer input and onboard new stakeholders without changing consensus mechanisms.
Consensus: Trust in consortium chains rest on an assumption that the small number of validators involved can not collude. They could still however decide to censor certain information if they share some common interest in doing so. Public chains make that impossible, and so censorship can only happen outside of the chain, leaving the core data untouched.
Network effect: We see blockchain as an empowering technology and want to use it in an open way, taking advantage of other projects such as identity frameworks. Learnings from the early days of the internet also weigh in favor of the public approach.
Commons: Our goal is to define standards for supply chain data without linking to a proprietary system. We are building a public utility to keep track of our material world.

This task is obviously bigger than them, and one that will have the most impact if it is developed as an open source project. They will welcome industry experts to take part in building the standard and extend our current protocol.

Connecting digital and physical

For this pilot, they linked products to digital assets using QR codes and NFC stickers. 2D barcodes can store the address of a digital asset on the blockchain and can be generated in batches. However, it is easy to copy these tags at any stage of the supply chain, which would undermine the validity of the physical product associated to the blockchain, without indicating it in the digital register. NFC tags can be programmed to store cryptographically secure data - but they aren’t currently practical for use upstream in the supply chain.

They are exploring ways to avoid duplication and identified two main approaches:

High tech: advances in NFC technology now enable tags to hold a secret securely. This makes copying advanced NFC tags increasingly difficult and double spending for the item more expensive. Prooftag uses bubbles to generate unique tags that can’t be copied. Other technologies are emerging: for example, « nano spirals » are being engineered using electron-beam lithography and are even harder to clone. These approaches are suited for expensive goods for which authenticity is a critical issue.
Low tech: for some low-value products, secure tagging technology might not be necessary. Particularly when the financial incentive to substitute goods is low or the system makes it difficult. If goods are digitally transferred and confirmed as received using a public blockchain it would be impossible to sell the asset twice for a premium for a certain claim. However, this would mean systems would need to be linked to ERP systems and POS systems and customers would need easy methods to also confirm the purchase.

Conclusions and next steps

Provenance envisions a future where any material, ingredient or product can have an identity, life, and history on the internet in a shared, interoperable format.

This project highlighted the grave need for a common backend to support the growth of a new digital ecosystem for traceability - uniting the myriad of initiatives with a shared language and public infrastructure.

More than an interface

They came across several great projects in the data-collection space including vessel tracking, vessel registration, self-reporting of catch and effort, independent port sampling programs, Fairtrade data capture, fish tagging, internal traceability systems and apps for fishermen and suppliers all happening in the areas we researched in Indonesia. Needless to say data capture was rife both by software and hardware.

Sharing data securely between different parties is a clear barrier for achieving the level of trusted traceability needed to prove slavery-free fish. Currently, the main solution being posed is for one of the traceability providers to gain huge monopoly - this is neither secure, just or sustainable. The atrocities in the fishing supply chain mainly occur at catch, before the final destination of the fish is known. This means an incentive structure and data system would have to be shared by a number of companies to cover the data capture needed - but this must be a system that supports each fisherman as much as it helps the brands that add their names to the packaging.

A system for the lone fisherman and the gigantic retailer to come together

The blockchain won’t solve traceability alone and indeed much of our pilot was spent looking at how information could even be digitised, let alone shared or secured. However, it does provide an ideal base layer upon which architectures for robust traceability systems can be built and participated in without ownership by the biggest or richest actor. It could also open up a powerful driver within this system - access to a premium payment for a fish that is of known origin and proven to be compliant with standards.

That premium may manifest itself through Market Access, however the sooner we demand and require proven compliance of standards and traceability back to the source for the food we eat, the sooner we can fuel an engine for change.

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I’m really interested in this and I’m definitively diving deeper. From my work, I’m interested in the legality and integrity of the value chain in from Harvest to Market. Consumers make their own choicesbased on price, brands and ethics… I just want to make sure that what was caught was legal, and that no IUU fish was laundered along the way.

IUCN Motion 53 calling for 30% of EEZ to become MPAs / September 2, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

The Union of Conservation of Nature (IUCN) congress is meeting in Honolulu, Hawaii from the 1st to the 10th September and will conduct a vote on a number of resolutions which it wishes to present to the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) at the time of the review of the Aichi Targets.

These targets are part of the CBD’s biodiversity strategic plan for the 2011-2020 period targeted towards the conservation of biodiversity. Among the many resolutions that will be put to the vote and one which is concerning to Pacific Island Countries is motion 53 which calls for implementation of 30% of members’ national waters as marine protected areas (MPAs).

If this is passed it will require all coastal states to close 30% of their EEZs to all fishing in the next 24 years. Pacific Islands countries already have robust management controls of their commercial fisheries, such as the capping of the number of fishing licenses.

Solomon Islands, for example, will be implementing long liner vessel day scheme (VDS) as early as 2017. In addition, Vessel operators in the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) areas are also faced tough fisheries management measures like the VDS, Fish Aggregating Device (FAD) ban periods and the ban on high seas pocket 1 and 2 in the central and western Pacific Ocean which already covers area of around 1.2 million square kilometers of “no take” closed areas.

Therefore, to find themselves "forced" to a further 30% of “no take” MPA is a unfair to the struggling Island economies where the Fishing Industry is one of the few viable income options.

Further to that, tuna is a highly migratory pelagic fish species and has no residential home in an MPA, therefore the use of large MPAs as a management tool for sustainable fisheries in the pelagic fisheries is arguable from the science and common sense perspectives.

The pelagic fish species shift from a protected area to areas where there is less control like the high seas. This could lead to overfishing in the uncontrolled areas. The other area of concern is that responsible agencies for this agreements are not fisheries agencies but environmental agencies which do not deal with fisheries management or understand the science of it.

These types of conundrums are unfortunately not new. Legitimate conservation agendas are driven by developed economies, that have had bad demersal fisheries policies over years (and where MPAs make more sense). Push a blanket agenda (to calm their own fishing constituency?) over countries that have different fisheries model and set of needs. These issues go beyond conservation and fisheries.

Lets watch the space, as the Pacific Islands Tuna Industry Association (PITIA) is advocating

Review of the use of Manual Reporting when VMS "Malfunction" / August 25, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

I'm always enticed by jobs that take you into "uncharted" waters. Here is one by my colleagues at FFA. They are calling for tender from consultants to review the use (or abuse) of manual reports of the vessels positions of in the case of VMS "malfunctions".

giving less options could be a good start

The aim of the contract is to conduct an independent analysis and assessment in two areas:

providing an outline of the limitations of VMS manual reporting in order to facilitate improvements and developments to this process, both nationally and regionally amongst FFA Members; and
proposing recommendations to address the limitations of VMS manual reporting, looking at potential technical, operational, and regulatory improvements or developments.

The issue is worrying one, the most recent version (2014) of the FFA Harmonised Minimum Terms and Conditions (HMTCs), which describes the rights and obligations of all vessels licensed to fish in the FFA region as a matter of “good standing” and includes requirements to carry VMS.

The HMTCs allow for a vessel to manually report its position at intervals of 4 hours or such shorter period as specified by the delegated authority. Additionally, under the criteria for withdrawal or suspension of a good standing designation, the HMTCs address the failure to provide manual reports when so directed by the delegated FFA member authority in the event of an ALC/MTU breakdown.

The use of VMS has proven a critical tool in not only detecting and deterring IUU fishing, but also for securing fundamental fisheries management information. However, MCS practitioners have noted that manual reporting represents a significant loophole in MCS efforts because, in its current form, it effectively allows for vessels to stay out at sea, unmonitored, for up to 45 days.

Pew Environment Group recently highlighted that 100 fishing and carrier vessels provided a total of 2,044 manual reports in just the first eight months of 2014 on the basis that their VMS unit malfunctioned or failed. Those manual reports, assuming a reporting rate of every 6 hours, amount to roughly 511 days where those vessels were effectively invisible. With fisheries observer coverage at less than 5 % of fishing effort for a number of fleets, that vessel time is almost completely unverifiable.

Furthermore, VMS equipment and service providers note that these failure rates are much higher than would be expected under normal operation, suggesting that operators are selectively turning off their units to evade detection.

In addition, regional and national capacity to utilize manual reports (data collection and entering) is also insufficient, further weakening vessel location verification and national and regional MCS capabilities.

Thus, given the potential abuse and under utilization of manual reporting and the importance of VMS to both fisheries management and MCS applications, in addition to a pending review of the requirements for manual reporting by the WCPFC in 2017, an analysis of the use of manual reports is both relevant and timely. FFA has partnered with WWF – New Zealand to provide resources for this consulting role.

So If anyone out there, is a VMS technical guru and wants to partner with someone with local knowledge and access to information for this really interesting job... just let me know :-)

EU removes tariffs on regionally caught tuna processed in Ecuador / August 24, 2016 by Francisco Blaha

The European Union (EU) lifted temporally restrictions on Ecuador’s tuna industrya and will now allow them to use products from countries that also have agreements with the EU. Hence raw tuna from El Salvador, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru, which is processed and exported to the EU by Ecuadorian companies, will be exempted from a 24 % tariff.

In April 2016 Ecuador applied to the EU for a "derogation from the rules on preferential origin", so that its processing industry could consider raw materials originating in Colombia, Peru, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama to be materials originating in Ecuador, "by virtue of regional cumulation"

Without the accumulation of raw materials from these other nations Ecuadorian exports of preserved or prepared tuna headed for the EU would be reduced by 30 percent.

The announcement was made August 17 after the Official Journal of the EU issued the Implementing Regulation 2016/1380 concerning the rules of origin applicable to regional cumulation for tuna from Ecuador.

Until December 31, 2016 this regulation lifts the restrictions preventing Ecuadorian tuna exporters from using raw materials from those countries, which already have trade agreements with the EU.

"Considering the circumstances, the reasons provided in Ecuador's request and the further adverse impact of the earthquake on its fish processing industry, Ecuador should benefit from a temporary derogation from the requirement (...).

Consequently, the materials originating in Colombia, Peru, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama used for the manufacture of prepared and preserved tuna and skipjack classified in HS subheading 1604 14 and in prepared or preserved tuna skipjack or other fish of the genus Euthynnus of CN subheading 1604 20 70 should be considered to be originating in Ecuador, provided that certain conditions are fulfilled," states the numeral 8 of the EU Regulation.

Some of the basics on the EU rules on origin, tariffs and cumulation can be found in this publication

Francisco Blaha

Independent Fisheries Adviser