Management of Tuna Fisheries for Sustainable Development in the Pacific Islands

One of the most read blog posts I have are two called Governance and Tuna Related Institutions in the Pacific part 1 and 2, that I wrote in September 2015. These posts explain the roles of the WCPFC, PNA and the roles of FFA and SPC, as well the place national fisheries administration have in these “system”. I was asked to update it a few times and also describe the Vessel Day Scheme that is run by PNA.

But such task takes time and care, with is exactly what my ex-boss in FFA Mike Batty and my friend and colleague there Viv Fernades have done. I have tons of respect for both, and Mike batty was one of the fist people that trusted me with important jobs in the region decades ago when he was in charge of the DevFISH1 project. I always been very thankful to him for that.

There is where my future is going

Viv has been with FFA only for a few years, but it has been great to get to know him and work with him, he has very unique background in environmental law and a passion for MCS, hope to keep working with him for along time

In this excellent paper “Management of Tuna Fisheries for Sustainable Development in the Pacific Islands” they explain how the cooperation by Pacific Island countries in the management of tuna fisheries is an important means of achieving sustainable development of these shared resources, in line with Sustainable Development Goal 14 (Life Below Water). The Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) tuna fishery is the largest tuna fishery in the world and two examples of arrangements based on regional cooperation are provided:

• The purse seine Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) is a fisheries management system that is being implemented through the cooperation of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA), which regulates harvesting of tuna in line with SDG 14.4. The scheme also establishes rights in the shared fishery for small island developing states, increasing economic returns in support of SDG 14.7.

• Regional cooperation in fisheries Monitoring Control and Surveillance is a unique collaboration between the members of the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) to address illegal, unreported and unregistered (IUU) fishing in support of SDG 14.4. A range of regionally agreed systems and tools is applied.

I will quote the description of the institutional arrangements (from the intro of the paper as an update of “who does what” in the Pacific) and the discussion and conclusions. But I said every time, nothing beat the original, in particular the excellent description of the two examples with very good evaluation of their successes… this paper a compulsory read if you interested in Pacific tuna fisheries

I know the paper is paywall protected, yet with a bit of initiative and know who to ask or which websites to use you can get them for free (Personally I don’t have the budget to be subscribed to them, so I improvise and normally ask authors for the paper) 

Institutional Arrangements for International Cooperation in the Fishery

Tropical tuna and associated species are highly migratory, and the stocks ex-tend throughout the Pacific Islands’ EEZs and beyond. This shared nature of the fishery, the limited scientific and technical resources of the Pacific Island Countries, and the common issues faced in managing and developing their fisheries, has resulted in the establishment of a number of regional organisations to assist countries to cooperate in the management and development of the resource. The main regional organisations, in order of increasing geo-graphical extent, are the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA), the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), the Pacific Community (SPC), and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). An overview of each, including their roles and objectives, is provided below.

The PNA are the eight countries whose EEZ’s contain the majority of the WCPO purse seine fishing grounds: Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. Established in 1982 as a group that faced common issues in their relations with distant water fishing nations (DWFN), the PNA implement two mutually agreed arrangements. The Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement (FSM Arrangement) is intended to support the development of domestic tuna industries and provides for vessels of a member country that meet certain criteria to have access to the EEZs of all other parties on terms no less advantageous to those provided to vessels of other countries. The Palau Arrangement provides for management of the tropical tuna fishery. In the case of the purse seine fishery, this was originally managed through an agreed limit on the total number of vessels, but has since been replaced by the purse seine VDS, which is discussed below. The New Zealand Territory of Tokelau, although not a member of the PNA, is a party to the Palau Arrangement.

There are also three implementing arrangements (IA) which provide a framework for compliance that are incorporated into national legislation or licence condition. These cover minimum terms and conditions of licencing and include: a requirement to carry observers on board purse seine vessels, requirements for vessels to be on good standing on a shared register of vessels, reporting and inspection requirements (the first IA); mandatory position reporting through a satellite based vessel monitoring system (VMS),  reporting of activities port-to port (i.e. including on the high seas) and a prohibition on transhipment at sea (the second IA); as well as a prohibition on the use of Fish Aggregation Devices (FADs) for part of the year, and a ban on  the discard of tuna. Many of these requirements have also been adopted by the broader FFA membership.

FFA is an international organisation established under the FFA Convention in 1979. Its formation was directed by the leaders of the Pacific Forum, who recognised the need for a specialist agency to advise on the establishment and management of 200 nautical mile EEZs during the later stages of the negotiation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Members include all of the PNA members, as well as Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, New Zealand, Niue, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu; as well as Tokelau (the only member that is not an independent country). For the non-PNA members, their main fishery is the Southern longline fishery which mainly targets albacore. FFA provides a range of advisory services to its Pacific Island member countries on all aspects of tuna fisheries management and development, assists members develop a common position in the WCPFC and also manages the regional fisheries surveillance programme, discussed below.

SPC, formerly the Secretariat of the Pacific Community was established more than 70 years ago by the colonial powers in the region. Its membership includes the independent Pacific Island countries, the territories of France, Great Britain, New Zealand and the United States of America, as well as Australia, France, New Zealand and USA in their own right. SPC provides technical services to members in a range of areas. Its Oceanic Fisheries Programme is particularly relevant to the tuna fishery. This programme has conducted applied research and stock assessments of the regional tuna resources for many years and is the shared repository of all operational fisheries data for its members. SPC works directly with members, as well as with FFA and PNA, to meet members’ needs in the area of tuna fisheries science. It is also the scientific services provider for the WCPFC.

The WCPFC is a tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organisation  (t-RFMO) established in accordance with the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 0  December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (un Fish Stocks Agreement). It is governed under a convention, which was ratified by most members in 2004. In addition to the FFA member countries, which worked as a bloc during the negotiation of the convention and comprise one of the two voting chambers, the WCPFC membership includes Indonesia and Canada, as well as the DWFN active in the Pacific region: China, Chinese Taipei, France, European Union, Japan, Republic of Korea, Philippines and the United States of America, some of whom are also coastal States in the convention area. The extent of the WCPFC convention area mainly corresponds to FAO area 71.11 Boundaries are to the south of New Zealand in the South and enclose the EEZ of French Polynesia in the East, and while not precisely defined to the North and West, are considered to enclose part of the EEZ of Indonesia and extend up to the waters of Japan and Korea.

Thanks for your fish!

Discussion and Conclusions

The implementation of purse seine VDS and cooperative arrangements for MCS in the Pacific have been shown to contribute to efforts to effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (SDG 14.4) and increase the economic benefits to SIDs and Least Developed Countries in the region (14.7). The VDS has effectively capped fishing effort in what is by far the largest tuna fishery in the region, and halted some thirty years’ of growth in catches in PNA waters. None four of the main tuna stocks in the region are overfished or subject to overfishing. Since the scheme was introduced, government revenues from access fees have quadrupled, and the number of domestic fishing vessels and their share of the catch (in a fishery that has always been dominated by foreign fleets) has increased.

These cooperative approaches are tangible examples of how the Pacific Is-land countries are successfully moving towards achievement of these SDGs through progressive improvements in management of the purse seine fishery for tuna in their EEZs, and a growing ability to enforce the management regime through MCS. Regional cooperation between these small and economically vulnerable nations has been essential in achieving these gains.

The VDS has also illustrated that two goals of sustainable management and increased revenues are compatible. Just as SDG 14.6 argues for the elimination of subsidies which allow fishing to continue on depleted stocks, so the ability to charge high access fees (the opposite of a subsidy) is helping to ensure that stocks are maintained at levels which allow a profitable fishery. Indeed, it is likely that the recent decline in fishing effort recorded reflects the economic impact of high access fees. The number of purse seiners operating in PNA waters has fallen from around 275 from 2010–15 to only 259 in 2016 and 2017 as less efficient vessels have withdrawn from the fishery.

This final section aims to draw some general lessons from the experience of the Pacific Island countries with the implementation of the zone based management regime of the VDS and cooperative MCS strategies; consider to what extent it may be possible to replicate their success in other parts of the world; and review some threats and opportunities for the future.

The development of the VDS and regional cooperation in MCS has not been quick or easy. Both the PNA and the FFA have been in existence for nearly four decades, and each agreement to take a major step forward has required consultation to develop consensus, and follow-up at the national level for implementation and capacity building.

The success of the purse seine VDS reflects some unique characteristics of the WCPO fishery. The extent of the PNA EEZs and their importance as fishing grounds for the purse seine fleet gives the member countries considerable leverage and is in contrast to other oceans where much of the tuna fishing takes place on the high seas. The diversity of interests in the fishery allows for competition for the limited opportunities for access, while its economic profit-ability has allowed a large increase in fees.

In contrast, efforts by PNA members to develop a tropical longline VDS – for a fishery that is less profitable and is practiced mainly on the high seas –  have been less successful to date. Opposition by some of the major distant water fleets has seen many vessels restrict their operations to the high seas.  FFA members whose waters provide most of the catches of albacore have committed to the Tokelau arrangement, which aims to introduce zone based management to this important, albeit smaller, fishery. However, reaching agreement on a catch management scheme has proved challenging; while proposals by FFA members to introduce a target reference point in WCPFC that would lead to reduced catches and improve the profitability of the fishery have also not been accepted. Longline fisheries remain an area for further work.

The principle of zone-based rights established by the purse seine VDS – that allocation of fishing opportunities in a shared fishery should reflect the interests of the coastal States in whose waters fishing takes place – is an important one. It has found support from coastal States in the Indian Ocean, and has even been proposed as a basis for a new allocation of fishing quotas to Great Britain after Brexit. As shared tuna fisheries face growing pressure, and the need to limit catches or effort, one can expect the development of a strong view that the allocation process should not exclusively favour the distant water flag States. These fleets have already benefited from many years of access to the resource, and been responsible for the depletion of stocks to date.

Looking to the future, there would seem to be opportunities to further increase returns from the VDS. There are inefficiencies in the transferability of days between zones; and current practices of negotiating access arrangements for an entire national fleet mean that fees may be set at the level that is affordable by less efficient components of the fleet. There is also a risk that the least profitable vessels will continue to withdraw from the fishery, resulting in reduced competition for fishing opportunities. Ideally, days would be sold to individual vessels through a system such as a Dutch auction, which could match fee levels with ability to pay and ensure all days are sold efficiently.

The VDS has contributed to the growth in Pacific Island national fleets, which are taking a growing share of the purse seine catch. While the development of domestic fisheries, as opposed to  simply licensing foreign vessels, is a long-held ambition of many Pacific SIDS, there are also both threats and opportunities in these arrangements. In the best circumstances, these provide employment, economic opportunities for a range of supporting industries, and supply tuna to onshore processing plants which create jobs and exports. At worst, they may amount to little more than re-flagging to secure lower access fees, and actually reduce the contribution of the sector to gross national income. The capacity to analyse the economic benefits of such arrangements is not always present in Pacific Island administrations, where the governance arrangements around concessions for domestic vessels can also be weak.

Higher access fees, and restricted fishing opportunities in EEZs, also create incentives to avoid payment, either through fishing on the high seas or by fishing illegally. Since the introduction of the VDS, three fishing nations have negotiated increased opportunities to fish on the high seas through the WCPFC. Together with the high seas effort of Pacific Island flag vessels, there has been a steady growth in purse seine catches outside PNA waters since 2011.

While there is so far little evidence of increased illegal fishing, the validation of non fishing days is a potential area of abuse; and can be expected to result in increased pressure on fisheries observers. There is currently interest in detecting purse seine fishing activity from the VMS record, as well as the possibility of supplementing human observers with electronic monitoring through on-board video recording.

While it is believed that no other regions share the level of international cooperation on MCS seen in the Pacific, the transnational nature of much IUU fishing is driving a more coordinated international response to the problem in other parts of the world. 

There are now arrangements to share information and coordinate efforts between coastal states in West Africa and the Indian Ocean; and market based measures such as the EU IUU regulation and the EU Seafood Import Monitoring Programme may also assist in combating the problem.

While FFA members can have confidence in regional MCS systems for the tuna fishery, it is clear that the region is still a long way from the SDG goal of eliminating IUU fishing. Quantification of the relative importance of unreported catches necessitates more attention to this area, with opportunities for greatly increased use of electronic reporting and monitoring in the fishery. At the same time, the relatively low level of unlicensed fishing cannot be taken for granted, and systems to identify ‘dark targets’ using increased aerial surveillance and satellite imagery, remain a priority for FFGA.

In conclusion, while much remains to be done, the achievements of Pacific SIDS through cooperation in the management and sustainable development of their shared tuna resources gives grounds for optimism, and can perhaps provide some useful ideas for other regions.

How commercial fishing effort is managed

Always when I meet people outside my fishy circles (or sometimes in them) the question arises around what you I do for a living. Then is slow process of explanations that I work around fisheries management issues and in particular combating IUU fishing in function of the management strategies being used. 

 Besides the “ohh wow how interesting” the next issue is… “what you mean with fisheries management?” And is true… most people have no concept on how that works or thinks that is just a set of rules and people policing them. 

For those situations, I should keep a copy of this paper named as in the title of this blog entry. Written by cast o thousand, all of them from the School of Aquatic and Fishery  Sciences, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, including my friend and FAO colleague Jessica Sanders, that is also doing her PhD there.

Table 1: Summary of behavioural changes observed under each approach to effort management, with associated economic, ecological and community outcomes. Background shading indicates generally negative (red), mixed (yellow) or positive (green) outcomes; gradients reflect outcomes depend on other features of management

The key thing I like of this paper is that reinforces at really high level that one “size does not fit all’, “that are many way of pealing an orange” and my favourite “every has advantages and disadvantages”… even at that really highest level of fisheries decision making as is management.

One of the last paragraphs in the discussion synthesise it perfectly: “Even among biologically effective approaches, methods differ in how they trade off harvesting at low cost and paying many fishermen, and how they distribute the benefits of fishing among industry and community stakeholders. How best to strike these balances in any fishery is ultimately not a question of science, but rather one of the politics: scientists’ role is to advise the decision- makers recognized by civil society on the most likely outcomes of alternative approaches.”

This really interesting paper provide a synthetic overview of three approaches that managers use to sustain stocks: 

1. regulating catch and fishing mortality, 

2. regulating effort and 

3. regulating spatial access. 

Within each of these approaches, they describe common restrictions, how they alter incentives to change fishing behaviour, and the resultant ecological, economic and community-level outcomes.

For each approach, we present prominent case- studies that illustrate behaviour and the corresponding performance. These case- studies show that sustaining target stocks requires a hard limit on fishing mortality under most conditions, but that additional measures are required to generate economic benefits. 

Different systems for allocation allow stakeholder communities to strike a locally acceptable balance between profitability and employment.

As usual I’ll just quote here the discussion where I love the options matrix with a colour scheme (a tool I been using a lot lately), but of course nothing beats reading the original.

Historical attitudes towards fishing were that resources were avail-able for access and that over- exploitation was impossible. While this may have been true with the technology and market conditions that prevailed for much of history, advances in harvesting technology such as mechanization and refrigeration have led to widespread over- exploitation in the absence of limitations on catch. There is building evidence that science- based management methods are reducing the incidence of biological overfishing (Worm et al., 2009), and in many cases, stocks are recovering (e.g., Murphy et al., 2015). This is largely the result of moving from management systems which less effectively restrict catch, towards the centre of Figure 1 to systems that enact biologically informed regulatory practices. But even in fisheries with good biological management, harvesters often still struggle to make money and support their communities (World Bank 2017).

Table 1 facilitates direct comparisons of the observed triple bot-tom line outcomes across management approaches. The left column relates the economic outcome to the behavioural change induced by the management approach. The behavioural changes observed in the fisheries reviewed above underscore that economic success requires more than selecting a target biomass which maximizes profit often called BMEY in the bioeconomic model given a fixed industry- wide cost and market structure. Rather, effort management induces behavioural responses to the need to compete for fish, which change the economic and social structure of the industry in predictable ways, at any target biomass. With open access or harvest guidelines, summarized in the top two rows, there is no restriction on entry, and additional harvesters enter whenever there is profit to be made. As with the post- WWII New England groundfish fishery, entry drives the fishery towards bioeconomic equilibrium, unsustainable levels of effort, and low or no profits. Simply presenting scientific estimates of harvest guidelines, without regulations or enforcement to limit mortality, does not change these incentives, as efforts to manage Atlantic sailfish demonstrate. In these cases, declining stocks are un-able to support those who entered when fish were more abundant, leading to community disruption. With a well- designed spatial component (bottom row of Table 1), stock collapse can be averted, but Galapagos Marine Reserve demonstrates that the economic tragedy of the commons remains.

Limited access (third row of Table 1) and input regulations (rows four and five) attempt to control the effect of increases in effort through new entry, but fail: as in the Bristol Bay salmon fishery, limiting entry still induces incumbents to try to increase their share of the competitive harvest by capital stuffing. However, these competition- driven investments in vessels increase costs, and any biological benefit arises because the point where additional investment is no longer profitable is reached at higher biomass. Eigaard et al.’s (2014) survey concludes that the biological success of effort- based management controls is highly dependent on the ability to anticipate input substitution and changes in catchability attributable to technological change. New England groundfish’s efforts with limited access and days- at- sea demonstrate that sufficiently comprehensive controls are elusive, especially as transferability reallocated effort to those who could capital stuff more effectively, so that social and economic outcomes mirror those in unregulated fisheries.

When a hard total allowable catch is implemented (sixth row of Table 1), additional effort, through new entry or capital stuffing, does not result in additional mortality. As in British Columbia halibut, an appropriately set and enforced TAC ensures biological sustainability, even in the face of increasing capital. With a spatial component, when the scale matches the range of the target species’ life history, stock health can be improved, as in Japanese snow crab. However, harvesters must race to fish to effectively compete for a share of the catch, so they invest in more capital, engage in risky fishing practices and erode value through poor handling and flooding markets; those who refrain from the derby will lose market share to those who participate. Harvesters invest until the additional profits from more investment are less than its cost: a bioeconomic equilibrium at the TAC, with a combination of higher costs, lower revenue, increased employment volatility and reduced safety.

The competition for fish that drives overcapitalization and value- dissipating behaviour can be eliminated by determining the allocation of TAC among fishermen through IFQs or ITQs (rows eight and nine of Table 1), or through a catch share programme (row seven). Unable to increase their catch through additional effort, harvesters instead focus on maximizing profit from their fixed allocation by reducing costs and maximizing value. This shift from choosing effort to capture more, or a greater share, of the fish means the bioeconomic model, and the prediction of bioeconomic equilibrium, no longer applies. Correctly set and enforced TACs ensure biological sustainability, and the focus on maximizing profits makes the fishery economically successful. This is exemplified by the British Columbia halibut harvesters’ development of a fresh market that more than doubled the value of the product and dramatically increased profit-ability. Less intensive harvesting can affect the structure of the crew labour market, often reducing the number of short- season jobs in favour of fewer longer term, higher paying and safer jobs.

The Bering Sea crab fishery demonstrates that allowing the transfer of quota facilitates the compensated exit of high- cost operators, further enhancing fleetwide profitability. However, transferability also lets the market determine who benefits from fishing, which often leads to adverse social effects. Smaller, more isolated communities, which are often more dependent on fisheries, may have less well- capitalized harvesters and higher cost processors, leading quota to flow to other communities where operations are more profitable. Although the boat owners who are typically initially allocated quota sell voluntarily, their local crew do not have a choice in the sale decisions that erode an essential employment base within a community of people or of place. Further, the additional profits may accrue to active fishermen, as in Alaska halibut, or initial quota holders can choose to collect lease payments without fishing, as in Bering Sea crab.

Catch share programmes mitigate these adverse community outcomes by allocating quota to groups rather than individuals. Allocations to fishing groups provide incentives to coordinate on harvest effort and joint marketing as in Chignik, and catch timing and by- catch management as in the Rhode Island fluke sector. Such groups can also collaborate to manage “choke” species or by- catch species that limit the harvest of otherwise abundant species, by sharing information and establishing avoidance incentives (e.g., Holland & Jannot, 2012). Catch shares empower the community of incumbent harvesters, rather than markets, to determine allocations. Quota can be additionally allocated to non- harvester community groups, as in the Alaskan CDQ programme, to generate local fishery benefits, giving other stakeholders control over who fishes and receives fishery benefits.

These new tools allow participants to strike a locally accept-able balance between sustaining broad participation that provides high levels of social benefit, and providing high levels of economic benefits to participants. The collective experience in different management methods is that there is a trade- off, whose resolution de-pends both on the priorities of regulators and on the structure of the fisheries: social benefits accrue differently based on whether vessel owners, crew, processing owners and their workers reside in, and spend their income in, the fishing community of concern, and on where benefits are created in the supply chain (Branch et al., 2006).

Approaches that require limiting access, in particular, often engender controversy because designating a group that has the exclusive right to fish implies designating a group that does not. This is often minimized by granting access to all incumbents. However, in some fisheries, there are loosely invested people, or people who leverage access only when other resources (e.g., other fisheries or agriculture) are performing poorly. In areas with diverse employment opportunities, forcing harvesters to specialize within the portfolio of fisheries in which they have participated in the recent past in-creases their exposure to risks of biological and market variations in those fisheries (e.g., Kasperski & Holland, 2013). In poorly integrated economies, fisheries are sometimes viewed as an “employer of last resort” for coastal residents who need subsistence food or income in the event of crop failure or personal financial shocks, and limited access exchanges better outcomes for incumbent fishermen for a social safety net.

Community- based management approaches are not separately included in Figure 1, because community management refers to who has the right to regulate access and harvest, not the approaches to regulating effort analysed here. Regardless of how incentives are established, we expect a community- based management process selecting any of the effort controls discussed to observe the same outcomes. However, involving the regulated community in the management process may still improve outcomes through two mechanisms. First, involving the community in management draws on their expertise about the actual operations in the fishery, and provides managers a sense of what types of measures will meet management goals at least cost. This increases the legitimacy of management and increases compliance and effectiveness (Jentoft, Mccay, & Wilson, 1998; Kuperan & Sutinen, 1998). Second, communities may be able to work together to establish a political consensus around more effective management methods. Both the Chignik co- op and Rhode Island Fluke Sector, which achieved significant triple bottom line successes for their fisheries, were discontinued following disagreements by non-participating harvesters, reflecting the importance of community acceptance of even very effective measures. 

The economic effectiveness of catch share programmes leads to a perverse argument that selling access and harvest rights makes it more difficult for new entrants to participate in the fishery. Fishing quota and permits are valued, like all assets, as the present dis-counted value of the stream of profits to which the permit provides access. Entering open access fisheries is free, but that right also has little value because open access fisheries generate little profit. The value of a limited entry permit in a fishery where limited entry is binding is the present discounted value of the profits from fishing in that fishery. The value of an individual quota share is the present discounted value of the profits from fishing that quota. Therefore, if entry is more expensive in individual quota- based fisheries, it is because they are more profitable, which is likely to be the case given the incentives for maximizing market value and minimizing costs established by individual allocation. In fact, quota which subdivides the fishery rents into more units may make participating in ownership more accessible, as younger fishermen can slowly acquire shares, in-creasing their desirability as crew, without purchasing a critical mass of capital to have a fully independent business. Auctioning these permits or quota allows the government to capture much of the fishery’s rent, rather than harvesters; allocating permits to community leaders, rather than members of the fishing industry, allows local political processes to determine who benefits.

Over the last three decades, fisheries management has demonstrated the ability to attenuate overfishing and sustain stocks and global catches around 90 million tonnes (FAO, 2016). However, not all approaches to management lead to ecological success in all cases. Some are easily circumvented in most applications. Others may be effective for highly fecund species with a weak correlation between spawning stock size and the number of young (e.g., shrimp, forage fish), but not work with more structured stocks. Still others may sustain stocks in geographically isolated fishing communities, but not be robust to the pressures of globalization.

Even among biologically effective approaches, methods differ in how they trade off harvesting at low cost and paying many fishermen, and how they distribute the benefits of fishing among industry and community stakeholders. How best to strike these balances in any fishery is ultimately not a question of science, but rather one of the politics: scientists’ role is to advise the decision- makers recognized by civil society on the most likely outcomes of alternative approaches.

Scientists should help decision makers draw the correct lessons from data, models and past experiences. That different sustainable approaches support different suites of outcomes provide a powerful policy lever that enables policymakers to select the fishery benefits that best suit the needs and values of their stakeholder communities.

A good WCPFC 15

As I mention last week, most of the people I work with where in Honolulu for the 15th WCPFC meeting. And from the feedback I had was good one! Better than in other occasions.

finally, one for them at the WCPFC!

Two of the issues I was quite invested were agreed:

The draft for a Minimum Labour standards resolution. I have to admit that this one surprised me! I was ambivalent, on one side I know that many of the DWFN would not be keen, but on the other side there has been a lot of media on the topic, and honestly what we asked wasn’t much! And it went trough, even if in a diluted way, as a non-binding resolution, and as a an exercise in constructive ambiguity, but is there now! And pressure can be built upon from now on all meetings. Furthermore, this is the first RFMO to take this critical step for addressing labor standards for crew on board fishing vessels. 

Which if you think, is quite incredible… A maori proverb says it clearly:
He aha te mea nui o te ao (What is the most important thing in the world?) 
He tangata, he tangata, he tangata (It is the people, it is the people, it is the people)

The other one I’m personally pleased is the revision of the present (2009) transhipment measure, which is totally inadequate (as I discussed here). This will need a lot of work since my collages in MIMRA volunteer to co chair (with the USA) the inter-sessional working group to review the current transhipment measure. And as my work in RMI has been extended, part of my work will be to deal with it.

Another big ones are:

• The adoption of the South Pacific albacore Interim Target Reference Point, this has been long time coming, and open the doors for other species to come.

• The extension of the provision of the Tropical Tuna Measure arrived at a compromise worked out late on the last day of the meeting.  This includes continuation of provisions for a three-month prohibition on use of fish aggregating devices (FADs) by purse seiners in exclusive economic zones and high seas areas between 20°N and 20°S from July 1-September 30, and an additional two-month prohibition on FAD use on the high seas. By consensus, these FAD closures were extended for an additional two-year period, through the end of 2020. As part of the compromise, PNA members agreed to compromise language regarding the definition of FAD sets in 2019 and agreed to work with others on this broader issue.

• The decision to provide compulsory funds to the Special Requirements Fund, which will help boost participation of Small Island Development State representatives in the decision-making processes of the Commission. 

• The adoption of a measure for the Compliance Monitoring Scheme. This will allow for continued monitoring and assessment of compliance by all Commission Members with the Commission's obligations.

Big part of the “success” relates to the work of the Pacific Island delegates to the meeting and FFA during the year, but also the very able leadership of outgoing Chair my friend a colleague Rhea Moss-Christian after 4 years in that complex role… she has been awesome. 

So everyone goes home and chill till January, when the fisheries routine starts again… Congratulations to all my colleagues that made all this good news possible, and enjoy your time off with family!

CDS for deep-sea fisheries in ABNJ

Those who read this blog would know the I have a lot of respect for my friend and college Gilles Hosch, and our friendship goes back to over 20 years. The fact that we both work on CDS and MCS is based on our common views on the fisheries world we love, while coming from very different backgrounds.

Gilles’ 3rd book dives deep into the CDS hardest fisheries, just like the guys in the picture

What ever he writes, you know is carefully crafted and deeply researched, and therefore compulsory reading. His lates CDS book Catch documentation schemes for deep-sea fisheries in the ABNJ - Their value, and options for implementation tackles the hardest fisheries from a CDS design angle abut also from a fisherman perspective. (as someone that fished Toothfish and Orange Roughy, I can give attest that!).

Back in 2016, he wrote the definitive volume on tuna CDS, and why some in the fisheries world may not agree with the scope and extent of what he proposes, but one must know that any Tuna CDS below the standards he sets in his book will be, literally, a substandard CDS.

In 2017 we co-authored what could have been the 1st CDS book, since from the start it was evident to us that while we all discuss the CDS details, we forget that the success of a CDS is at it roots, on a minimal set of support mechanisms that correlate MCS and traceability at each type of State (flag, coastal, port, processing and end market), along the fish product value chain. 

He now put its name to the 3rd book on the series, Catch documentation schemes for deep-sea fisheries in the ABNJ - Their value, and options for implementation. A book I was honoured to be a reviewer.

This new book discusses the potential value of catch documentation schemes (CDS) in deep-sea fisheries (DSF), and the implementation modalities that have to be envisaged, to ensure the effectiveness of this trade-based tool to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

The paper argues that CDS are indeed capable of directly addressing a number of IUU fishing practices known to occur in DSF, and that their adoption would improve compliance with fisheries management requirements.  

Key infringements that may be directly detected and addressed through a CDS include – but are not limited to – violations of closed areas harbouring protected vulnerable marine ecosystems (VMEs) in the deep ocean, and quota overfishing. 

The paper also establishes the notion that partial coverage of given species through a CDS at the level of individual RFMOs is incongruous from a trade monitoring and control perspective, and that CDS should be considered as either/or propositions with regard to species coverage.

With most DSF species having broad distributions straddling many RFMOs, the implementation modality that avails itself as the most suitable option, enabling the operation of an effective CDS, is that of a centrally operated electronic CDS platform – called a super-CDS – shared by a plurality of institutional and state players.

As before, Gilles Hosch dives deep and does not leave stones unturned. You’ll be ill-advised to work on CDS without reading this book. And while eyebrows may be raised at the concept of a “super CDS”… just think that every time you take money from any ATM in any place in the world, you are using a system and a set of technologies that don’t go too far on its principles from a “worldwide CDS” but for money.

Chapter 1 introduces deep-sea fisheries  and catch documentation schemes . While deep-sea fisheries have been the object of a series of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions, catch documentation schemes find their origin in voluntary instruments such as the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the 2001 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) – and most recently in the Voluntary Guidelines for Catch Documentation Schemes adopted by the FAO Conference in Rome in July 2017. The paper establishes whether a catch documentation scheme (CDS) would be useful when applied to deep-sea fisheries (DSF), and it what form (i.e. under which “implementation modality”) execution should occur.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the 2008 FAO International Guidelines for the Management of Deep-sea Fisheries in the High Seas and their thrust, followed by an overview of deep-sea fish, associated ecosystems, and their fisheries. 

Chapter 3 introduces catch documentation schemes, starting with a summary of what schemes are currently in existence. The recent (2017) FAO Voluntary Guidelines for CDS are introduced, and their purpose and content is discussed in detail. The paper then delves into an assessment of the benefits and limitations of unilateral and multilateral schemes, setting the stage for the discussion of multilateral CDS approaches in DSF, and as applied within the context of DSF management rules. The latter part of the assessment highlights which management measures a CDS is able to implement directly or in combination with other for monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) tools, establishing their value as a tool to combat IUU fishing in DSF. The latter part of chapter 3 introduces harmonised CDS, and presents the rationale for such harmonisation. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is briefly described, presenting its certification scheme, and its use of a single platform and set of rules to cater for the trade certification of thousands of different species of animals and plants – including fish – under a single scheme. The notion of the global “super-CDS” – the logical end-point of harmonisation and acceptance-of-equivalence efforts – arises from this discussion.

Chapter 4 illustrates how DSF management frameworks are sensitive or conducive to CDS implementation, what typical IUU profiles are found in DSF, and what the capacity of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) is in terms of developing and operating stand-alone (or “RFMO-specific”) CDS. The standing and consideration of CDS systems in RFMO performance reviews is assessed, in order to gain an understanding in how far the adoption of such systems by regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) covering DSF has been considered in the past, and what arguments have been advanced in favour of, or against such systems.

Chapter 5 deals with the  trade in DSF, as trade conditions the relevance and the success of a trade-based tool to a very large degree. The paper establishes that the current Harmonized System (HS) classification of goods does not allow to confidently identify consignments of deep-sea species in trade documentation – with the exception of toothfish – and that a deeper analysis of DSF product trade flows in the absence of CDS data and/or enabling HS classification is very difficult. The role of customs and border inspection agencies is introduced, and CDS and their related paperwork – and the potential multiplication of individual schemes that could occur – is assessed in relation to those agencies. It is argued that a potential multiplication of schemes covering only modest amounts of total global fisheries product trade is unsustainable and likely to face implementation challenges at this critical level.

Chapter 6 lists key findings regarding the value and options for CDS implementation. The overall conclusion, arguing that the individual CDS in DSF (based on the classic RFMO-specific implementation modality) is both unsustainable and likely to fail. It highlights the benefits of a multilateral global “super-CDS”, catering for the needs of many species (throughout their global distribution ranges), a plurality of RFMOs and many states – based on a single platform provided by a central service provider. The chapter closes by suggesting a way forward to exploring and bringing about such a modality.

The 15th Regular Session of the WCPFC

While I start another of our great NZ cycling rides with my family as our holidays, many in my “fisheries family” are all in Honolulu where the 15th WCPFC session starts tomorrow. Is the biggest thing ins Pacific fisheries… ridiculous amount of people, money and work gets put into this marathon meeting.

He is never going to be at WCPFC meeting, yet the people there is deciding on his life and future

In a totally unfair table coastal states (mostly developing countries) sit in the table with massively rich and subsidising countries and suppose to find “consensus” on measures that are mostly the interest of the coastal states (is their fish and life) against the wishes and desires of the DWFN. 

I been invited by my host in RMI to be part of their delegation… but I had enough with TCC this year. While the politics, backroom deals and pure hypocrisy of many delegates can be very interesting, it totally frustrates me. Furthermore 5 days in a room does take a toll on me. I know is part of my job and future, but as a consultant I’m out of the picture there. The meeting is for the countries and the regional organisations.  

One thing that has kept me alive in the consulting business is being totally honest about my limitations... and those jobs hits me right in on the two biggest: meetings and writing.

I do well with reading, strategies, training, getting into the guts of boats, finding out the tricks vessels masters do (I used to do them too), sitting with the App programmers and then doing beta testing, and quite a few more things... but I suck at writing big documents and at dealing with people that bulshit in meetings, (i.e. TW, CN saying that their Longline fleets would be economically collapsed if they were agree to ban on at sea transhipments… yea right! I could have jumped on their desks and said “how dare you!!!”)

I see these guys (mostly DWFN long term bureaucrats!) making massive decisions that stop advancements and condemn fishers and coastal countries to be the “working poor” and they never been on fishing boats, they have no idea of what is to work like a mule to earn in year what they spend in hotels coming to this meetings, while they are thinking they know everything about fisheries… really pisses me off! 

I guess my diplomatic skills have a way to go before i feel i can be usefull in these meetings.

Anyway… The agenda shows you the variety of topics to be dealt with: but some of the ones I’m more keen to see passing (yet I know is low chance dire to that hypocrisy I talked before are:

Strengthen management of at-sea transshipment for longline vessels to address non-compliance with existing WCPFC measures. FFA Members' long-term objective regarding transhipment regulation has been to facilitate all transhipments in the Convention Area occurring in port. This is consistent with Article 29{1) of the WCPF Convention which provides that 'the members of the Commission shall encourage their vessels, to the extent practicable, to conduct transhipment in port'. However, the current levels and regulation of high seas transhipment activity are inconsistent both with Article 29(1) and the objective of the WCPF Convention. Furthermore the DWFN transhipping on the high seas have not provided evidence regarding their efforts to encourage their vessels to tranship in port. 

The review of Transhipment measure is long overdue. The measure was negotiated a decade ago and, more importantly, there have been notable deficiencies in its implementation and ability to sufficiently regulate transhipment activity in accordance with the WCPF Convention.

The other one I’m personally interested (since I had a bit to do with this proposal) is the FFA proposal for a Resolution on Labour Standards for Crew on Fishing Vessels. This another one that has been long overdue.

This is the 1st time that a labour proposal is tabled in RFMO (which is incredible). And while I know that this is as my friend Transform said: “an exercise in constructive ambiguity, and the problem with getting a measure like this through is to make it ambiguous so you are seen to be doing something when you are not really doing anything”. I like to think that at least is on the table and obliges people to talk about it and hopefully identify who will be opposed and then let public opinion work on that! I’m encouraged that is on the table (and is more and more on the big decision taking bodies) and then with time it can be adjusted... otherwise is the status quo... which is obviously not working.

 The other areas of key need for the region that need to be dealt for ensure long-term sustainability are:

• Accelerate the development of harvest strategies of all tuna species

• Avoid increasing bigeye and yellowfin fishing mortality

• Strengthen FAD management by adopting mandatory use of non-entangling designs, complete reporting of FAD tracking data, science-based limits on FAD deployments

• Reform the WCPFC compliance assessment process

• Increase longline observer coverage to 20% and ultimately 100% (human/electronic) consistent with the requirements for the purse seine fishery.

I can only wish lots of strength to my friends at WCPFC meeting in Honolulu to keep the good fight, and to suggest the delegates to look into the eyes of the fisherman in the picture and spare a thought for the ones like him, that will never go to any WCPFC meeting (or any fisheries meeting really) yet their life depends more than almost anyone else, on the decisions being taken there.

Problems cannot be solved with the same mindset that created them

Getting to the end of a long year does not always help concerning mood and willingness to travel. Yet going to a place that you love, have friends and have seen grow immensely over the years does always help. So when I was asked by FFA to come to Noro in the Solomons to assess the systems and controls we put in place during 2016-17, I jumped to the opportunity.

the newest ideas may start by next to a open fire kettle

I said many times that Noro is what fisheries should be in the Pacific, locally caught, processed and exported. I have been coming here since 1998 and the only canned tuna I eat comes from there. They have the only MSC certification I wholeheartedly agree with, and they are going towards “Fair Trade” certification as well. In between NFD (the fishing company) and Soltuna they employ over 2500 people of which less than 15 are expats.

A lot of this uniqueness in compliance and sustainability drive comes to the attitude of the Wickham family that had been a the steering of the company since the beginning and the positive support of Trimarine their capital and distribution partner. The Wickham family has treated my family and me as part of the extended family so coming over feels like visiting family.

And this feeling is enhanced as I was again a guest of my friend and colleague Dr Transform Aqorau… I say again because I stayed at his house in Majuro, while he was the head of PNA. (if you think you know about tuna fisheries and don’t know who Transform is, you don't know tuna fiheries).

After leaving PNA he took on a series of other wide-ranging commitments that are all based on a common goal we share… innovation.

Einstein said, “Problems cannot be solved with the same mindset that created them.” And we have been trying to work out problems in fisheries with the similar mindset that created them. Yes, I agree, the arsenal of tools and technology has expanded… but the core seems to be the same. We need to open the field and thing differently.

And that is the reason I like having long conversations and sparring of ideas with Transform, but even more so when on his ancestral family land in Rakutu. Sitting on the outdoor kitchen, with an open fire and having some kava, we discussed changes and ways to deal with the present set of problems but under a traditional and culturally respectful approach.

Francis Hezel, in his seminal book “Making sense of Micronesia” (2013) said: “Changes may have to be made, as they must in any culture, but we outsiders should at least understand some of the broader contexts of Island culture before we begin leading the charge for change according to our own formulas”

And this for me always has been a hint that we are trying to fix problems with the same mindset that created them. We need to try different approaches… the solutions from aircon meeting rooms haven’t entirely worked… so why not try ideas coined by the open fire next heating water in a black kettle?

I was 12 by the time I first lived in a place with electricity. Living without it and under shared spaces in “not foreign” to me, so while this life may be “new” (by being old) to most of my colleagues from “developed” countries, it totally felt like home to me; hence I’m very thankful to Transform for his hospitality.

The irony of sorts is that while in his open kitchen we discuss a lot a joint project we have that is called eNoro. The objective of this project is to pilot test the digital integration of all port MCS related activities in the port of Noro, Solomon Islands. The data to be integrated will include the requirements of the WCPFC PSM CMM, unloading monitoring, factory “weight in” and processed product volumes exiting Noro. The system is to ‘mass balance” inputs and outputs and be ready for an eCDS. The system would be using tablet-based Apps under the present capabilities of PNA FIMS, SPC and FFA platforms

Hence we are using a high tech yet totally holistic approach while enjoying traditional life… also, we are keen on exploring incentive-based compliance and way to change the present model of selling fishing rights towards owing fish all the way to the product end.

He is (and has been) an innovator, but what I have respected the most is that while being the head of PNA, he decided to spend time on a purse seiner as to understand fishing from its roots, I yet have to know any other manager at his level to have done that.

If it were only for that, he would already have my full respect!

A further trait we share is that you can still appreciate and like someone, even if to disagree profoundly with some of his ideas… and this is also something I’m always keen to stress.

In any case, this was a short but beneficial mission that had a huge human element to it, something a fully appreciates. So thank you Transform, Cynthia and Edmond, Dave and the extended families of each of you for again making me feel at home while trying to do my job the best I can!

Framing social responsibility in fisheries

It has been quite busy lately, full last week of my yearly visits to Majuro and preparing a workplan full of new challenges and gear for our port operations there, followed up by over 22 hrs flight (each way) to Namibia to do a workshop on the minimal MCS elements for even start talking about a CDS and the ways to overcome the shortcomings of the EU Catch Certification Scheme by building up your domestic systems at home.

good luck my friend

Yet I’m slowly diving into my “new” contract for FAO as a Senior Expert in Social Guidance and Fishery Value Chain. Is strange to be invited to work on a topic outside my usual specialities, that is the reason I was so doubtful… I can imagine how shitty must feel to people that has been working on this for a long time, and then some ex fisherman / become consultant that work on IUU on tuna and writes a blog, get to be responsible to make position paper for FAO. 

I guess the reason is because people at FAO know me and trust me, and as far as I know they asked around and most people was happy to see me involved, I can only assume that is based on a realistic and unbiased view of my sector.

I think that when people are in my present position, you have two choices: either I surround yourself with people that are less knowledgeable than me so I look smart, or I look for people that really know their stuff, then you listen, learn and make sure that the doors to the decision makers I have access too (from all these years in fishing) remain open, and perhaps a bit of “these guys are with me” when getting looked down by part of the sector that may resist change. 

The 1st option has been always a no, so the 2nd one was the way to go. Hence I contacted Katrina Nakamura, whom I have known now for a few years and recently published a brilliant paper I blogged here, if she was keen to work with me on this, and I’m really happy she accepted.

Since getting on the job, I been reading a lot and trough Katrina and Jack Kittinger (whom I also recently meet) and I was quite taken by this little one sent to Science “Committing to socially responsible seafood”, was written by by a cast of thousands and I only so far I got to a few of them (besides Katrina and jack) I know Aurora Alifano and Mariah Boyle from fishwise and Jonathan Peacey from NZ that used to be with Conservation International at the time.

 In any case, they developed a comprehensive framework for social responsibility, responding to a need for alignment around a shared, transdisciplinary approach, informed by a strong scientific basis to support policy and practice. 

I quote parts below, yet read the original

 Policy instruments such as the International Labour Organization’s Work in Fishing Convention, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Small-Scale Fisheries, and the UN’s guiding principles on business and human rights are already being used by governments, businesses, and nonprofit organizations as the basis for action on specific issues, such as human rights and labor. Our framework unites a diverse set of social issues that have heretofore been fragmented and is informed by social science research on human rights, natural resource management, and international development.

Our framework is also informed by practical experience from organisations and experts that work in the seafood sector and is supported by a strong legal and policy basis for implementation, as indicated by review of international law, policy, and guidance (table S1).

Over the past several decades, the scientific community has invested sizeable effort in determining key elements for environmental sustainability in fisheries standards. A similar effort is now needed for social responsibility, yet comparatively little research effort has been invested in the social dimensions of seafood sustainability. 

As a result, the seafood sector has largely been in a reactive stance, responding to visible issues associated with slavery and human rights. Although these egregious violations must be eliminated, social responsibility encompasses far more, and a narrow focus overlooks other pervasive issues that have real-world impacts on billions of people.

 The framework comprises three components:

• (i) protecting human rights and dignity and respecting access to resources,

• (ii) ensuring equality and equitable opportunities to benefit, and

• (iii) improving food and livelihood security.

Protecting human rights requires that fundamental human rights are respected, labor rights are protected, and decent working conditions and safety standards are provided, particularly for at-risk groups. Human rights violations range in severity from the most egregious, such as slavery, to less acute but pervasive practices such as abrogation of wages, poor working conditions, and restrictions on freedoms. Violation of these rights in the seafood industry has been observed in both developing and developed economies. 

A largely overlooked, but critical, aspect of human rights is rights to resources, including traditional tenure and access rights. These social, economic, and cultural rights are central to many indigenous management systems and are especially relevant in small- scale and customary fisheries that supply most of the catch for direct human consumption but where regulatory institutions to protect fishers’ interests are generally lacking. 

Ensuring that seafood is equitably produced requires that benefits derived from its production accrue to all participants in the supply chain (e.g., fishers, processors, and distributors), not just those with not just those with financial or political power. 

Ensuring equality requires that workers receive appropriate recognition, voice, and engagement, irrespective of their gender, ethnicity, nationality, culture, or socioeconomic status. Marginalized groups, such as women, are often discounted in terms of their role, knowledge, or influence in fisheries, and the high prevalence of migrant labor in the seafood industry can create conditions ripe for discrimination. Failure to recognise issues of equity and social justice can result in misguided policies, often with consequences for small- scale producers, minorities, or women.

Improving food and livelihood securityrequires that ocean-dependent communities, some of the most vulnerable people in the world, do not suffer from the global seafood trade. In coastal fisheries in Africa, for example, extraction by foreign fleets is reducing the availability of fish, the main source of animal protein, affecting both nutritional and income security. Such practices place vulnerable populations at risk and run counter to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 

Businesses are obligated under international policy to ensure that their practices do not undermine food and livelihood security, including providing fair access to markets and preserving capabilities for workers to generate income in the face of social and environmental change. Businesses can do more than mitigate their impact and should seek to improve livelihood conditions where they operate and ensure food security where seafood is a critical component of diets .

This framework can aid in global alignment among governments, businesses, civil society and nonprofit organizations, driving integration of social responsibility into policy, practice, and ultimately performance in the sector. Here, we identify opportunities for the scientific community to support this transition by providing relevant knowledge to inform actionable approaches toward social outcomes.

First, ocean science must evolve, incorporating a stronger focus on social dimensions and their linkages to environmental issues. Social science is embedded in sustainability science, but key social science concepts such as agency, inequality, and social justice are missing from many sustainability efforts, and social science research capacity in the sector is woefully inadequate. 

Environmental challenges -including habitat destruction, overfishing, and resource collapse- threaten the viability of livelihoods and food security and create conditions for discrimination  and subversion of human rights. Social and environmental issues often overlap in the same geographies, such as Southeast Asia, a hotspot of overfishing and labor issues. In these areas, slavery and forced labor depress the true cost of extraction, which distorts the market and promotes overexploitation. 

The research community can play a timely and important role in assessing the linkages between environmental sustainability and social issues, bringing necessary expertise together to inform responses by businesses, government, nonprofits, and communities. The UN SDGs explicitly recognise the link between ecosystem health and human well- being, but more integrated approaches need to be developed to address these issues in the fisheries and aquaculture sector.

Second, the scientific community has a major role to play in research, monitoring, and analysis of the seafood sector, including developing rigorous, objective approaches to evaluate performance. Evidence-based assessments are needed to understand the scale of social abuses and the efficacy of approaches, particularly as governments begin to translate existing international laws, policies, and guidance (table S1) into domestic laws, regional initiatives, and regulations to improve industry practices. Social science provides a strong foundation for these approaches, and existing performance indicators and tools need to be adapted to meet this challenge. 

The research community can also integrate social responsibility indicators into globally accepted performance standards for sustainable seafood by ratings and certification schemes, reducing the prevalence of social abuses and risks for businesses. Continued development of research approaches, tools, and technologies will be critical, particularly to ensure transparency and accountability, to reduce risk and secure market incentives for businesses, and to produce credible information while considering the sensitivity and risk associated with researching these issues.

Third, the research community must be responsive to real-world needs. The current level of commitment to integrating the priorities of stakeholders and decision-makers into research is inadequate. This requires more than simply training and hiring more social scientists in the sector, it requires a shift in 

• the way social and environmental research is conceptualised and conducted together with stakeholders, 

• the expertise prioritised in the development of research capacity and initiatives, and 

• the level  of resources directed toward these issues. 

This requires prioritising the coproduction of knowledge with the scientific community engaged together with stakeholders in a participatory approach to develop re- search initiatives that have a clear pathway for implementation in practice. The ocean science community can benefit from experience in other production sectors -including agriculture, forestry, energy, and mining- that have addressed similar challenges by investing in shared strategies, a strong multidisciplinary evidence base, and collaborative institutional arrangements and global research networks.

By 2030, the oceans will need to supply 152 to 188 million metric tons of seafood to nourish a growing population. Fulfilling this demand in a socially and environmentally sustainable manner will require increased investment from public and private sources, so that the level of resources and expertise committed is commensurate with the scale of these challenges. Across the sector, organisations that work on environmental sustainability issues will need to work more closely with socially focused organisations, as these issues are intrinsically linked and require joint investments. 

The global conversation about social issues presents an opportunity for the seafood sector to take steps to ensure that a healthy ocean will support human well-being, now and into the future.

Back to Namibia (after two decades)

When I was working in Mozambique with my family in 2002 when I left someone told me “you can leave Africa, but Africa does not leaves you” and while for me that rings a bigger bell with the Pacific (instead of Africa). I have to admit that I was quite happy when I was asked to come to Namibia, even if it was to run a workshop on an area that I become a reluctant specialist… the EU Catch Certification Scheme.

The cold and grey Atlantic… where my fishing life started

It is organised by SADC, WWF and my friends at Stop Illegal Fishing, so is good to work with people one likes.

I have a couple of rules in my job, one is to do at least two jobs outside the pacific every year and the other is to go to new places, and even if I was in Namibia in 97 during a Orange Roughie foray with a NZ fishing company and is a beautiful country. It must look very different after 21 years and I already did work in Asia and the US this year… besides I also miss the cold and grey Atlantic (as you see in the picture) which is my first ocean love. Also one of my favourite songs ever is called Namibia.

Yet Swakopmund where I’ll be working is a rather strange city since has a lot of German colonial architecture. It was founded in 1892 as the main harbour for German South West Africa, and a small part of its population is still German-speaking today, and the local supermarkets are full of germat type food

Interestingly is a capacity development workshop on the EU IUU Regulation in the South West Indian Ocean but done by the Atlantic… there you go with development logics…

Is a 21 hrs flight from Waiheke, but it just feels right to do some work here and meet new people that may get some benefit from my work based on these two documents (MCS for CDS and EU Market Access) I wrote in the last couple of years.

Vessels Agents and Port State Measures

As I commented here, port agents have a busy life in some ports in the Pacific. They are the nexus in between the land and most of the necessities of the fishing vessel and the fish, from engine parts to certificates for the fish, from helicopter fuel to the observer accommodation while waiting for the vessel.

Business is always good for the agent

But critically, they are the ones that let authorities know the vessel is coming to port and often provided all of the information required to the fisheries administration, should any be required at all.

These processes and a lack of real time reporting during the trip provide opportunities for vessels to hide offending. Ideally the vessel should request entry via e-reporting tool. This would give the fisheries administration key advantages as it would oblige the vessels to use e-reporting tools of their choice, provided it was compatible with the administrations system, otherwise they cannot notify their arrival and request entry to port as required by Ports State Measures and subsequently they would not be able to unload.

If vessels were to request port entry via an App, inspectors in port would be able to use this time for advance notification to interrogate the logsheets in advance of arrival. They could analyse volumes, positions, days of unusual fishing and this would allow verification and the development of intelligence through the use of other tools such as VMS, AIS and e-observer (if they have it).

The "advance notice for port entry element in the Apps" has been talked about, but for now, as a whole, most regions in the world depends on the agents, and very little information is captured on these Agents, on the whole, especially for a group that are so influential in the movement and vessels and product.

Despite there being little knowledge held on these agents, there is currently no past or future study in the Pacific that has assessed and considered agents as a unique and vital player in the industry.

Value to PSM

In principle there is no role assigned to agents in law. However in practice they are the nexus in between the arriving vessel and the fisheries administrations and therefore vital for PSM and CDS. Yet a more fundamental issue is whether some of the services provided by agents are in fact needed for PSM?  The role of agents has become so valuable partly because of the deficiencies of national fishing authorities port management structures. 

Should the national authorities be able to organise and communicate with vessel themselves? Why is it that agents are used to transmit and sometimes collect data from fishing vessels? 

If the argument for the use of agents is based on the view that working with opaque and bureaucratic governments is too complicated and time-consuming for the industry, the answer lies in improving government services, not in establishing a lucrative business sector for well-connected, but ultimately unaccountable intermediaries.

Ideal Structures to Close the Gaps Around Vessel Agents

Operationally, this gives us two options: either their formalisation or the removal of the use of vessel agents for as a reporting intermediary.

Formalisation

There should also be a public registry of agents, a minimum amount of information to be provided and responsibilities to be assumed under an established way to communicate with the fisheries administrations. Port entry should be requested via the Web Portal/IMS of the port state, with the same data fields than the App plus all the compliance elements (i.e. licenses, volumes on board, etc) but the vessels agent would impute the data and upload the required information

No involvement

For this concept to work on a e-based system, it should be a port entry function (yet to be built) on the ER Apps for licenced vessels (foreign and domestic) to request port entry to the central fisheries authority of the port state and from then to the identified port of entry. 

As vessels using the App are licensed, hence port access (as requested by WCPFC CMM PSM) is granted, by the simple fact that they are using the tool and reporting catch.

Under the present ER App all important details from PSM are covered (i.e. VMS, local and regional licence, volumes on board, port of last call, etc.), so the vessel request is sent to the intended port of call for the vessel screening and authorization (or denial) of port use, including the need of full or targeted arrival inspections. This information could also be shared with the port authority, other line agencies and notify coastal and flag States as appropriate.

In the case of vessels not using ER (such as some longliners) and carriers, port entry should be requested via the Web Portal/IMS of the port state, with the same data fields as the previously discussed application plus all the required compliance elements (i.e. licenses, volumes on board, etc). In these cases the vessels agent would be required to input the data and upload the required information on behalf of the vessel. If the vessel is on an IUU list port entry will be denied and enforcement and other State agencies advised.

For vessels that have been approved entry, the screening of the vessels would take place incorporating all available data streams and a decision is made on the requirement for more detailed vessel inspection, or not, prior authorising port use. 

For the region

As noted earlier, very little information is captured on Vessel Agents, on the whole, across the Pacific and especially for a group that are so influential in the movement and vessels and product. In some situations, MCS staff from fisheries administrations are dependent on vessel agents for facilitating access (both literally in terms of getting to the vessel and operationally in terms of timings) to vessels for inspection, thereby removing the independence and autonomy of the administration and their regulation of the industry.

Agents across the region vary in their backgrounds and associations with the vessels, some are independent, others relate to the traders, some to vessel operators or business conglomerates on shore. Most agents are foreign nationals and not Pacific Islanders, but this is not the rule.

In some cases, agents are actually quite close and familiar to the fisheries administrators, since they interact with them on a constant basis. Yet they can be quite opaque in their accessibility, even if they have fundamental information that can be of benefit for the authorities and fisheries economists.

Currently in the Pacific these vessel agents fill a need, but it is a self-perpetuating need and more work needs to be done to formalise the role through licensing, or remove these agents from the vessel reporting requirements that are so pivotal to CDS and PSM. 

And as I said many times, this is an area I love to investigate… so feel free to contact me if it is something you keen to research and have funds available.

Disclaimer: This text is a small part of a bigger job I did with my colleague Damian Johnson

Why do we have so many transhipments in Majuro?

I have been working on transhipments controls and Port State Measures for a while, I think this year in between all my jobs I’ll be doing over 100 boardings in total. Most of them, of course, took place here in Majuro.

There are no coincidences here, this is the place

Last week we had at some stage 14 carriers and 28 Purse Seiners, and in general we hit over 420 transhipments controlled a year quite consistently. But what makes Majuro such a desirable transhipment port, over other regional alternatives, such as Tarawa, Funafuti or Pohnpei?

I have been making my self this question for a while and besides trying to answer it as a fisherman, I been talking to observers, captains and company reps… and, as in anything else in fisheries, there is not a straightforward answer, but rather a series of natural and operational advantages that combine nicely.

Obviously, this is my take on this, and I will be stunned if I did not forget to consider other factors… as Oscar Wilde said “I’m not young enough to know everything.”

My long thin home 100 days a year

Good anchorage: As you can see in the map above, the Majuro lagoon is very protected but what you don't see is that it has very good anchorage grounds: good deep sand. Most operators I talked never had issues with anchor dragging on high winds (a big problem in Tarawa) and that corner of the lagoon is remarkably stable to groundswell, only wind chop sometimes. This may not come up in any economic type analysis… but is incredibly important. Honestly, you don't want to have someone continually triangulating position to see if you anchor is dragging. And this is particularly important for carriers that often have two Purse Seiners transhipping (one on port and one on starboard) and all depending on the carriers anchor.

Easy port access: to come to Majuro there is a deep well-marked channel without shifting sandbanks or exposed coral heads

Town Access: the lagoon has access to downtown via the Uliga wharf, you can be in any vessel in the lagoon in 10 -15 minutes from there. The crew can go down, and stuff can come up. Supermarkets, entertainment, phone cards, pharmacy, etc. all nearby. On top of that an easily accessible airport with flights to the US, Australia and Fiji via Nauru and soon PNG, which is good for Observers… and all with connections to Asia which is good for companies and crew.

there is two of us now.

Services access: Purse Seiners and carriers are floating little cities… imagine everything you need on your daily life, well is the same there. Vessels need shit loads of stuff. And there is an incredible amount of machinery that needs parts and maintenance: from propulsion, to electricity generators, to hydraulics, to refrigerate 900 tons of fish, to maintain the electronics, to cook, etc., etc., etc. Most things can be repaired here or can be sent to repair in Hawaii 5 hrs away.

Big wharf access for net repairs: There are two big wharves to load or unload heavy gear, and one of them has a net repair shed with a Net Master based there… A Purse Seiner net is a marvel of craft and design that weight tons…

The dimensions of these nets can reach a length of 2,000 m and 300 m in depth. The measures vary depending on the characteristics and the power of the boat yet each part of the net (aft and fore strut; aft cutter; central body, vertical panels; horizontal panels; bag mouth and bag) have their own intricacies and twines. Then you have to include the floatline, floats, leadline, bridle line, sein rings, purse line, and so on… it never stops… a net master has to have all this in his head and also understand the characteristics of the vessel and gear as to make changes and adapt each or some of the parts. The Panamanian net master here is indeed a master.

Helicopters: While the role of helicopters on board is coming to an interesting situation, as they compete now with drones and by the fact that most fish are caught on FADs with sonar buoys… they still an important element of the industry.

The tuna helicopter world is a subculture inside a subculture… the helicopter doesn't belong to the boat, but are subcontracted by the boat owners from specialised companies, that provide the helicopter, the mechanic (mostly Philippinos) and the pilots… once the niche of NZ and Australians, now is they have been replaced by much cheaper out of work former military Nicaraguan, Salvadorian, Guatemalan, Panamanian, Venezuelan and Colombian pilots. Helicopters need lot of maintenance, their own fuel, and their own “set up”usually not going beyond 40 nm from the vessel they are used to spot fish schools…

Majuro has an airport that is 5 minutes flight from any PS and a local base for Hansen one of the key helicopter service providers worldwide. Meaning that if a helicopter is broken beyond onboard repair, just come to the wharf (see above) crane down the helicopter and there is another one in the airport ready to fly to your boat, and you can go no fishing.

Tatiana check the plot against her notes from analysing the vessel trip so far

Ubication and distance from where to the fish is: When in “normal” conditions (what ever-shifting meaning this has these days) the fish tends to be on the western side of the Pacific, so vessels have the options in PNG of Rabaul or Vidar (near Madang) but this is mostly for Philippine vessels or associated with PNG based companies (and in the case of Vidar it belongs to RD). Or the other option is Honiara (very exposed harbour when the fish is south or Pohnpei in FSM, which is a good harbour, but the access to the vessels is more complicated (bigger distances) and the available wharf is closely related to a fishing company. But the reality is that the fish is moving to the central Pacific particularly in Nauru, Kiribati, eastern PNG, and the high seas in between Kiribati’s EEZs, then the options are Funafuti (almost no services), Tarawa (quite exposed anchorage and minimal services) or Majuro with all the advantages. Also if you plot it, is quite an easy navigation to Bangkok. Now on la Niña years… then stuff changes and Kiritimati becomes the hub… even is the anchorage is not protected… but thankfully does not happen a lot.

Agents: Agent plays a key role in the pacific tuna world, and is a role I love to study in depth as I mention here (any of my powerful NGO readers: here is a hot topic no one is touching, so an opportunity to contribute and I’m available). In any case there six Agents (3 Taiwanese, 1 Chinese, 1 local and 1 Korean) that kind of got it all sorted and can arrange for most things while providing translation since the bulk of the fleet speaks some form of Chinese. They lease in between vessels owners, captains, traders ( FCF, Trimarine, Itochu), carriers, and the line agencies (see below)

Regulatory requirements and costs: While I would love more integration and efficiency among all the line agencies (Customs, Quarantine, Immigration, Environmental Protection Authority, Port authority, Maritime Police, and of course Fisheries) everyone is there to do their job and is a quite straight affair with the boarding parties, and other than request for fish (something I oppose and thankfully fisheries boarding officers don't do) I have not seen backhanders.

A big part of my job has been to align our MIMRA processes with PSM best practices and be more investigative and streamlined on the operations and controls we do, but as well provide incentives to industry to comply. Furthermore, the PSM controls we do as to approve transhipments we are on the process to share them with Thailand’s Dept of Fisheries under a MoU… but that is a topic for another blog.

Riin (Fisheries Observer from Kiribati) chats to Melvin (RMI Boarding Officer) in the trip she just did

Vision and leadership: last but not least, MIMRA’s management has been stable and clear on their vision of becoming a transhipment and (hopefully, shortly a landing, sorting and containerisation) hub and they have a rare virtue in the fishing administration world: foresight. Needless to say, this is partly why I like working here and I been very fortunate to have their trust and support to do my job.

The point is, there is no one reason why vessels come here in such numbers but a combination of reasons as well as a vision. I profoundly believe that even if other port was to invest massively in some aspects of the “transhipment hub equation” there are aspects that can’t be changed. And in this combination, part by nature and part by practice, Majuro is and will continue to be the main transhipment port in the Pacific.

What does the consumer really "want" when choosing eco-labelled products?

A big part of the selling point of the ecolabels brands is that the consumer rewards the investment the companies make in paying for the certification with a price plus in their product and that their logo and story is better than the other ecolabels that compete for the same business.

What to do my fellow friends?… to Ecolabels or not to Ecolabel, that is the question…

In my experience the price plus hardy eventuates, but is more about positioning in a rich country market where “sustainability” is something seems keen to afford.

Here in Majuro I board everyday tuna vessels that catch the same tuna, under the same management system, in the same part of the world with the same method (and with both FAD associated and free school* sets (see below for additional comment), yet part of the cargo of one vessel has a sustainability logo because they pay for the certification, while the other vessel (doing mostly the same) don’t have it because they didn’t pay for the certification? Seems more than business than a higher motivation for the common good to me… in any case my opinions about Ecolabels are public.

In any case i was interested to read this psychology paper (A Social Norms Intervention Going Wrong: Boomerang Effects from Descriptive Norms Information) that deals with the perceptions by the consumer and how he really react to the logo of an ecolabel and the messages on it.

I paste below the discussion, but as usual read the original!

The results of this research suggest that popular social norms advertisement, like, “More than 75% of the seafood customers in this store bought MSC-labelled seafood”, might not influence supermarket shoppers’ purchasing patterns in the intended way. In fact, rather than promoting a more sustainable diet, they might do the opposite while at the same time leading to increased consumption of seafood (in this case) in general. Messages, including the social norms ones promoting seafood from sustainable origin, seems to be processed in a very shallow way in the busy and message-over-crowded supermarket setting. Shoppers primarily seem to comprehend the overall theme seafood—a product category which then indeed gets primed, increasing the likelihood that they will indeed buy some. At least in the present studies, texts and labels promoting sustainability were apparently not processed sufficiently to produce the intended effect, and instead, consumers relied on their usual choice heuristics for this product group [55].

However, substantial differences were identified between the Norwegian and the German supermarkets. In the former, but not in the latter, an information prompt about the sustainability label alone led to a significant increase in the sustainability labelled share of seafood sales. This may be due to a mixture of factors. First, this is the experimental condition where least text was added, and the text was even simpler and shorter in the Norwegian case, where there was only one label on the sign, while there were two in the German case. The text being simpler may have made it easier to grasp its meaning (i.e., “less is more”). Second, there were on average twice as many sustainability-labelled seafood products in the Norwegian than in the German supermarkets, making sustainability labels more salient in the shopping context in Norway than in Germany. This may have meant that the Norwegian shoppers may have been relatively more exposed to and therefore more familiar with the sustainability label than the German shoppers. Third, the share of sustainability-labelled seafood products sold was also twice as high at baseline in the Norwegian than in the German supermarkets, which may mean that the Norwegian shoppers had more experience with sustainability-labelled seafood and therefore could also process this information on the sign with less effort.

In the Norwegian case, adding social norms information to the sign neutralized the positive effect of labelling information on sales, leading to a significant drop in sales compared with labelling only. In the German case, adding social norms information also led to a significant drop in sales, both compared with the prompt-only condition and compared with baseline. The negative effect in Norway could be due to the increased amount of information confusing shoppers and dragging attention away from the labelling information. However, this cannot explain the findings in the German case. The significant drop in the sustainability share compared with baseline in the German supermarkets suggests that the social norms messages were demotivating shoppers and perceived as something negative about buying sustainability-labelled products. A possible reason is that German shoppers found the social norm messages pressing or manipulating, which led to psychological reactance.

These findings are in line with previous research revealing trait reactance and the importance of autonomous buying behaviour as significant predictors of situational reactance on a sample of German consumers [72]. Psychological reactance is also a possible explanation for the drop in the share of sustainability-labelled seafood when adding social norm messages to the prompt only in Norway.

Hence, it can be concluded that the main effect of messages in the supermarket context aiming to make individuals consume products with specific (sustainability) characteristics within a product category is to promote the consumption of this product category in general, without increasing the share of sustainable produce. This is similar to the finding that telling people not to eat a particular product can have the opposite of the intended effect, due to the message priming the product, as it was found in Study 2.

An important implication for the promotion of sustainable consumption options is to focus on simple messages, avoiding long, fuzzy, and complex messages [73]. For example, instead of promoting “eating less meat”, promoting “plant-based alternatives” would be more effective. Indeed, campaigns promoting the consumption of more fruit and vegetables [35,74] are probably the main reason why meat consumption has decreased in Europe in the most recent decades. However, it also shows that promoting sustainably produced products within categories that are unsustainable can be complicated. The use of labels and symbols to identify sustainable products has shown good results in the past [1]. However, the design and placement of labels and symbols need to be based on a thorough understanding of how consumers make choices in the product category [26,75]. Also, such a label or symbol needs to be promoted in a way that makes the actual logo and its core meaning easily accessible in the consumers’ minds in the moment of decision, preferably more accessible than other product characteristics. Potentially, a general “green” logo on all products following sustainable certification guidelines would be an option. If one logo standing for sustainability could be applied to all product groups, the meaning of this logo will be easy to process and its priming is likely to be effective. In this way, consumers following sustainability goals would more easily identify their preferred products with a symbol standing for sustainability being salient in their minds.

The results of these two studies suggest that the display of pictures or icons is more efficient than the display of text, especially in real-life purchase situations where written information is hardly read or processed carefully. More research is needed on how to make the sustainable logo and its core meaning more salient in consumers’ minds at the moment of decision.

From this research, it is concluded that just adding text with label information and social norms messages is not the way to go to increase the share of sustainable product alternatives. Additional text will often not be processed in the purchase decision situation or the message will be forgotten as soon as other product characteristics come into play. This also illustrates that to reach the desired effects and minimize the risk of side effects, careful evaluation is necessary before communication strategies are implemented.

——

Is really interesting to be doing vessels inspection inspections during the WCPFC FAD closure (July to September)… even if the concept of closures is not completely black and white. Since the closure applies to all vessels but there are complicated to understand exemptions if you are flagged in Kiribati (even if they are Korean) when fishing in the high seas adjacent to the Kiribati exclusive economic zone and Philippines’ vessels operating in HSP1, and a few more.

In any case, most of the vessels I boarded until during that time had huge trips, long time at sea and very little catch… and by the mood and comments of the masters, they are not doing any money, yet somehow they don't want to tied up the vessels and send everyone home as they do in at IATTC with the fishery closures where there is no fishing during 3 months at all. As a Croatian skipper (I loved working with croats! they run crazy, funny, clean, funny boats with good food) told me yesterday in full fisherman wisdom … “a closure is a closure, or is not closure” don’t f*ck around man!

Yet knowing that in couple of years compartmentalisation will finish and only totally FAD free trips will qualify for MSC certification, I can not stop wondering if the companies will still paying for the certification if they are not making enough money trying to catch without FADs.

So either MSC pull down its pants and extend the transition process under some excuse (surely something associated to the impact of the process on small scale fisheries) or the companies go… nah… you want us more that we need you now, so the power is on our side, drop the standards or we walk away and your earning will suffer…

So yes… interesting times ahead.

More on Social Issues in Fisheries

Only a fisher (doesn’t matter where is he from) knows this feeling

While I have not signed yet, over the next year, on top of all other present obligations, FAO has contacted me to support their efforts to develop a guidance on social sustainability in cooperation with relevant stakeholders, including industry and fish worker associations. The final outcome of the guidance development process will be presented to COFI-FT in 2019 and COFI in 2020.

Important to understand right from the beginning, is that as usual (as with many other aspect of fisheries) the social component in not just a matter of new legal instruments, but a better implementation of the present ones.

My colleague (and very clever man) Tim Adams from FFA reminded me that  the latest UN General Assembly Resolution on Fisheries - to be agreed in December 2017 in paragraph 172 says: …”(the UN General Assembly) Calls upon flag States to effectively implement their duty under the Convention with respect to labour conditions, taking into account applicable international instruments and national laws, and in this regard encourages States that have not yet done so to consider becoming parties to the Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and the Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 (No. 188), and to implement the Guidelines for port State control officers carrying out inspections under the Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 (No. 188) and the Guidelines on flag State inspection of working and living conditions on board fishing vessels”… This paragraph is actually copied from last year's UNGA fisheries resolution paragraph 169 – i.e. this is the existing view of the UN General Assembly. (See my last post for the details on these instruments)

So how come these issues are still a problem?

Well in that aspect, it seems to be not really different to the problems in fisheries (call them IUU, management, international collaboration, etc). Where international commitments are made, but do not eventuate into reality. For a myriad of factors, ranging from geopolitics to pure greed via transparency and subsidies, just to name a couple of them…

But on the labour side there is also a bit of further complexity from the human perspective… we fishers are a unique bunch of people and only a limited body of research has been done in order to understand our “anthropology” and decision making process…

And while I never would even dream to generalise on “one size fits all” casting of the “model” fisher, I remember nodding my head positively many times while reading many years ago  Social Issues in Fisheries - FAO FTP 375 from 1998 and while things have changed a lot since them (hence the book is ready for refresh!) some parts always stayed close to me, like the ones below:

10.3 Attitudes towards institutions and authorities
Peoples attitudes to authority will also play a major role in shaping their responses to efforts to manage their fishing activity. Fishers the world over are renowned for being independent and suspicious of authority. This is as true in modern, industrialised fisheries as in artisanal fisheries in less developed countries.

In order to gauge what responses to different types of fisheries intervention might be, managers need to look at the history of management and assess how stakeholder communities have reacted to these interventions and also assess current opinions and attitudes towards authorities concerned with fisheries.

These attitudes towards the institutions responsible for fisheries can have a major influence on the extent to which future fisheries interventions will be observed. If a particular institution is commonly perceived by fishers as being either untrustworthy or dominated by particular sets of interests which are not necessarily sympathetic to the needs of fishers, co-operation is likely to be reduced. On occasions, the same set of fisheries interventions might succeed or fail simply depending on who it is that is seen to be enforcing them.

10.4 Levels of education
The long-term ability of fishers to adapt to changes in the fishery as a result of development or management will also depend on the skills and education which they command. In many parts of the developing world, fishing communities are consistently among the people with the lowest levels of education. What is more, their skills are extremely specific to the fishing profession. This can make movement out of fishing very difficult.

From assessment of educational levels and skills within stakeholder communities affected by changes in fisheries, managers and decision-makers can determine what forms of education or training might be required as part of development packages.

I heard once that “organising fisher is like herding cats” yet on the other side when is see the countries that have ratified ILO Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 (No. 188) my believe is that the common factor for some of them is a strong labour union and syndicates.

From my personal experience in Argentina (which was the 1st country to sign it in 2011!) we always had the Sindicato de Obreros Marítimos Unidos (SOMU) and Sindicato Marítimo de Pescadores (SiMaPe), both work close to each other and have a tradition of being very hard core and combative while quite dodgy on their directive ranks (corruption, embezzlement, etc.) Yet reality is that I would have not being able to start and to finish my university studies without the concessions they had for students (even if most them where for high school)e and the established contracts they had (while keeping a % of my income).

I did not expected to have anything like that while fishing in the Pacific Islands, but it did totally surprised me when I came to NZ. I just started working… no standard contract, no membership, etc. There would be 3 or 4 of us in vessel that in Argentina would have at least a crew of 6 or 7, of course the 4 of us made more money that if we were 7, yet something important was lost in my opinion. I could not have done my 2nd MSc at Auckland Uni, if I had to survive by fishing only for example

In fact even if at the time I was working a lot land bases for NZ biggest fishing company, they didn't accepted my proposal to work part time so I could do my thesis on a topic of their interest, that was part of the reason I took on consulting. Anyway point is that once you loose (or your never had) some rights and good contract conditions (even if at the cost of financial gains or “efficiency”) there are gone for good.

Yet this “union” protection model work when the flag, port and coastal state are the same and the nationality of the crew relates to them.

Reality today in many fisheries is totally different; for example half the US Purse seine fleet is Taiwanese owned and there is only a token American captain on board… that is it. Everyone else is from either the beneficial ownership country (TW) of one of the crewing countries (Indonesia, Myanmar, Vietnam, etc.)

Yet at least there is a link to America via the captain, but while the vessel is an extension of the US floating in the pacific, their labour rules don’t apply, no one on board will have a US working permit, if you try to enter US territory without a visa you get deported, yet on a FV rules don't apply.  

Of course it gets worst, most Vanuatu flag fishing vessel have absolutely no linkage to Vanuatu or they labour or migration system, and so on… I just have chose those two yet it could be dozens more countries.

The crew recruitment process typically occurs through recruitment agencies or brokers that may range from legally-regulated job placement agencies to very informal arrangements (sometimes associated with people- smuggling and trafficking). Sometimes brokers charge a fee to be paid against future earnings, which could become a basis for debt bondage.

Crew may also be transferred from one broker to another, or sometimes brokers source fishers for recruitment agencies or fishing vessels directly. Many fishers may come from non-fishing countries (Nepal, Laos) and not aware that they will be working on fishing vessels and what are the conditions until they find themselves in the harbour.

The process can start with:
1- the fishers signing the agreement with home state agents  
2- then then proceed across a border to other agents- who take the fishers to a vessel in country X
4- which is owned in country Y - while being flagged in country Z

So which rules apply? In principle Flag state… but if they don't play game…. How do you push the agenda? 

Of course from the port state (as in fisheries) can have a role… but why should RMI for example  a developing country who has one good port, take on controlling Taiwanese, Chinese, Korean and other much richer countries vessels… furthermore even if they where to do that, nothing stops those vessels top go to another port or a different 300 mile south, where no one ask questions? Is big ask to for small countries without even their won labour systems to take on that role.

But also there is also scope for nations to act on their own as coastal States, New Zealand, for example, applies its social and labour laws to all fishers operating within its Exclusive Economic Zone. (We had Korean flagged vessels fishing under joint ventures in NZ waters, their ill treatment and forced labour conditions of their Indonesian crews made the media, yet was little that could legally be done at the time. This brought into law the Fisheries (Foreign Charter Vessels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill, requiring labour conditions similar to those expected for NZ nationals were imposed. As a result, many vessels didn't come back)

So as you see is VERY complex and there are no easy answers.

Furthermore, and from own experience when you have nothing... anything is a lot, you’ll eat shit if you have to. I had only 70 USD to start a new live when I came to NZ in 1994, I would have accepted anything that gave some hope… and is only by good luck that I got an opportunity given by quite decent people.

And here is perhaps a key element to big part of this, poverty and desperation… Adam Smith in 1776 nothed in “An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations”  that  “...(fishers) are all very poor people who follow as a trade what other people pursue as a pastime.” 

Of course today is not the same when we talk about commercial fisheries (while to a point not much has changed for subsistence and small scale ones), but looks like the system is always rigged to predate on the desperate.

The complexities around decent work conditions and safety at sea on fishing boats

the undervalued key people of our industry

Further from my last post where I talked about my own experience working at sea, partly motivated by the fact that I may be involved in the Vigo Dialogue process and a personal interest (sparked by some outrageous events like this one) as to gain a more profound understanding of the labour and safety realities in fisheries.

Coming from pure commercial fisheries and then compliance background this a broadening step in my career even if it overlaps (to a point) issues of IUU fishing. This “extra step” wasn't one I was sure to take, yet, as usual, a conversation with my kids has been illuminating… “Papa, you always say that you don't work with fish, your work with the people that work with fish… so this is it”… and they are right, I always say that and I need to live up to my word.

So, I’m here just telling my take on VERY complex issue, so if you spot a conceptual mistake, please let me know! As Oscar Wilde said: “I’m not young enough to know everything”

An important element to understand is that there are various legal frameworks on crewing that are mixed on board, partly because they are hard to separate, but yet they are very different. One is around forced labour, slavery, abuses, non-payments, etc. and the other is the safety component. Because as I said many times, fishing is the most dangerous job in the world, by far.

Despite more awareness and improved safety practices, more people are fishing now than ever before, and this worldwide increase (in many cases involving people not from fishing nations – i.e. many Nepalese work in fishing vessels) has contributed to a rise in the number of fishers' deaths. Exact figures are hard to come by since reporting is not always consistent.

Preliminary, conservative estimates of fatalities in fishing are now over 32 000 people annually.  The number of fishers injured or suffering from work-related illnesses is much higher. The fatalities and accidents have major impacts on fishers' families, fishing crews and fishing communities.

Yet how does being safe from accidents, links to getting paid on time or not being in forced labour? Well… there is not an easy answer unfortunately.

As in fisheries, there are plenty of international agreements and voluntary standards that vary in their scope and adoption). Let's start with the ones at the global level: 

The ILO International Labour Organization and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) have established a number of binding legal instruments to improve fishers’ safety and working conditions; the IMO’s Torremolinos Protocol and the IMO’s Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel (STCW-F) which entered into force in March 2013, as well as non-binding recommendations and codes, some of which were developed jointly between the ILO, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the IMO.

The ILO has started this process through the adoption of the Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 (No. 188). This seeks to ensure decent standards for all fishers regarding conditions of service, accommodation and food, occupational safety and health protection, as well as medical care and social security. The Convention came into force in November las year when the 10th country ratified it. The Convention is supplemented by the accompanying Work in Fishing Recommendation (No. 199)  as well as two sets of Guidelines for flag States and port States carrying out inspections under the Convention.

Yet the slow pace of ratification of conventions inhibits effective control of safety and labour standards in the fisheries sector, and undermines important opportunities to prevent and detect instances of abuse on board.

 And then there is the 2012 Cape Town Agreement (CTA),adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), outlines fishing vessel standards and includes other regulations designed to protect the safety of crews and observers and provide a level playing field for industry. 

The CTA updates, amends, and replaces the Torremolinos Protocol of 1993, relating to the Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, 1977. Neither the Torremolinos convention nor the protocol will enter into force themselves, but the CTA reflects provisions contains on those.

Once in force, the CTA will set minimum requirements on the design, construction, equipment, and inspection of fishing vessels 24 meters or longer that operate on the high seas. Its entry into force would empower port States to carry out safety inspections that could be aligned with fisheries and labor agencies, to ensure transparency of fishing and crew activities. The treaty consists of minimum safety measures for fishing vessels that mirror the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)—an internationally binding treaty on safety for merchant vessels that entered into force in 1980. It also calls for the harmonised fisheries, labor, and safety inspections.

The CTA will enter into force 12 months after at least 22 states with an aggregate 3,600 (China alone gets to this number!!) fishing vessels of at least 24 meters in length operating on the high seas have expressed their consent to be bound by it. To date, 10 countries have ratified the agreement, so we still have a way to go.

Until the CTA enters into force, there are no mandatory global safety regulations for fishing vessels.

My friends at PEW published recently an excellent explanation on the CTA and its linkages to the IUU side (which is another different topic!). A lot of emphases is being given into linking this safety at sea instruments with the FAO Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA), which is an area I work a lot, since vessels at some stage need to come to port, and there they can be inspected. 

Still, you can be in a very safe boat and being in forced labour while fishing illegally, or fishing illegally, while being paid well, in a safe or unsafe boat… or all the combinations you want around this.

Yet in general, terms, when you are dodgy… you pretty much dodgy all across the board.

International investigations have shown that some migrant workers seeking employment overseas have been tricked with false promises of jobs on land, but end up toiling in quite terrible working conditions on board unsafe fishing vessels and most probably involved in IUU activities in the high seas

And while not a rule, we all increasingly recognise that in most IUU listed fishing vessels bad working conditions, forced labour, poor safety standards are pretty much the standard. 

Operators who under-report catch or fish illegally are less likely to provide their crews with adequate labour conditions, training, or safety equipment, and more likely to fish in hazardous weather. To minimise upfront costs, their vessels might have  inadequate equipment or inappropriate modifications and might operate for extended periods without undergoing inspections or safety certifications. 

So the ILO, the IMO and FAO promote the synchronised implementation of these three instruments The PSMA’s aim is to ensure that catch to unload is legal, the C188’s to make sure that the working conditions for crews are good, and they can leave if unhappy and the CTA to make sure the vessel is safe to working out there. 

The safety side of a vessel may not be seen as an issue related to working conditions, but believe me is a key issue… you need to be alive to be paid.

To ensure that vessels are safe, their design, construction, and equipment must be inspected and surveyed. This may be carried out by a flag State agency, or by a delegated authority such as a surveyor or classification society. The CTA states that a vessel’s lifesaving appliances, radio installations, structure, machinery, and equipment must be inspected before it is put into service and at intervals not exceeding five years. Details of the surveys will be made available in an International Fishing Vessel Safety Certificate. If a vessel has been exempted, its operator must complete an exemption certificate and make it available on board for examination at all times. 

The Agreement has a “no more favourable treatment” clause (Article 4[7]). This means that all vessels entering a port of a State that is a party to the Agreement would be subject to the same inspection standards—even if their flag State hasn’t ratified or acceded to it. This allows States to control all vessels entering their ports, raising global safety standards. 

But this latest is obviously part of the problem, you as a country need to got it sorted before you start looking into others, and not many have, or more importantly… not many want to. 

Yet at the end of the day, it comes ideally to flag state living up to the expected standards, after all, under international law a vessel is a territorial extension of the state that flagged it and all rules should apply on board, from safety or the vessels to labour conditions (and fishing legally). And that does not happen… so we need to find alternatives

Either from the port state (as in fisheries), but also there is also scope for nations to act on their own as coastal States, New Zealand, for example, applies its social and labour laws to all fishers operating within its Exclusive Economic Zone. (We had Korean flagged vessels fishing under joint ventures in NZ waters, their ill treatment and forced labour conditions of their Indonesian crews made the media, yet was little that could legally be done at the time. This brought into law the Fisheries (Foreign Charter Vessels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill, requiring labour conditions similar to those expected for NZ nationals were imposed. As a result, many vessels didn't come back)

My approach to this would be to thinking that work it from two parallel angles: a) On one side regulatory frameworks, international agreements under flag, coastal, and port state jurisdiction, and b) on the other private sector/ due diligence, since at the end of the day Consumers in key rich market states are would not be keen to buy if there are doubts on the human cost of their fish. So the importers have the chance to influence the international supply chains on raising vessel safety standards and labour conditions (and hopefully support that with price difference) 

Yet as I said before, and I say it again my guiding principle is that "we need to shift the basis of the discourse and screening from attempting to prove or to disprove forced labour conditions in supply chains toward establishing system fundamentals for human rights due diligence"

Labour conditions in fishing vessels

The issues of fishers welfare, decent work conditions and forced labour have been at the forefront of the news these days, and for various good reasons. So much so, that FAO is getting involved through the Vigo dialogue (a process I may be involved with), and surely RFMOs will start extending their view over it. As in other complex areas in fisheries, there are already legal frameworks that cover the issues at hand, yet they are incomplete, or just not adhered to.

Ocean Breeze, Purse Seiner, South Pacific, 2001. I’m with a Peruvian, Madeira and Philippinos on board

Over the next few posts, I’m going to dive into the labour conditions issue, as well as the present agreements. As I may get involved more in-depth into the topic, I thought I write about my personal take on this based on my experience. This way I may look back on this post in the future and see if my views changed through the experience of working on this complex yet necessary area.

In my experience, where you stand and what you are used to, makes a big difference in this area. So where is the line that separates what is acceptable from what is not? I cringe a bit at the “developed country saviour” stereotype that I perceive in some initiatives in this area.

Here is an example: Recently I listen to an expose on conditions on board a Taiwanese vessel and people were working 18 hrs (I get back to this later), but also how there where cockroaches in the galley, in principle that should not happen, yet it does constantly… I remember spending time Bulgarian and Russian trawlers during the 80’s (South Atlantic), using mosquito nets in the bunk as to avoid them crawling on your body, and squashing them when you sleep (not a nice feeling when you wake up believe me), and finding them in your clothes, books and cooked in your food and bread made on board. Yes, surely wasn’t nice, but you get used to it, and I still here.

Yet, as the other side of the coin and in a huge contrast, they were the only vessels I been in my life, where 2 or 3 times a week, after dinner a string sextet (a cello, 2 violas and 3 violins) made of crew members (guys from the deck and engineers) will play traditional folk songs and light classics directed by the 2nd mate, with some excellent operatic singing… other nights we played chess or read classics from the captains’ library, he had little cards and would recommend books based on your past choices. The disparity in between the filth we lived in (I never been in any Asian boat as bad in terms of filth at those ones) and what I always perceived as a high civilised culture, was unique… I never forgot that paradox.

Yes, there are conditions, (particular regarding space and general hygiene) that I find difficult to deal with Asian vessels, but I find this also in Asian cities. But then, I’m a 196cm (6’5’) ex-rower and swimmer, that grow up in places with a lot of space… I would not try to impose my view of what is “right”, even if it feels “wrong” to me

Anyway, is also really important to understand that fishing is not like any other job in any other area I’m aware of (yet my experience is only in fisheries, farming, academia and UN bodies) for various reasons (I explain some below), therefore there is no way that "one size fits all" will ever work.

Furthermore, there are massive differences between countries and sometimes between fisheries in the same country.

The first element of everyday reality that you notice disappears when you work on fishing boats (unless you are an officer doing logsheets) is dates and times. They don't really make a lot of sense anymore after a week at sea... if it Tuesday 6.15 am or Sunday 3 pm doesn't really make a difference, so your really forget about that... In Argentina (by some reason) is a tradition to eat pizza on Saturdays... so we will know that a week has gone because there was pizza for dinner.

There are many fisheries where your income is based on a fix "fee" and catch shares that vary by your position. In many boats actually, the captain and chief engineer earn only based on catch shares and not salaries.

Critically, ‘when the fish is there, the fish is there" and that is the only time to catch it. For example: I'm able to think of many occasions where if the captain would have tried to apply ILO’s C188: Work in Fishing Convention; “10 hours of rest per day may be reduced to no less than six consecutive hours during active fish catching and fish processing" I would have been pissed off because that meant less money in my pocket at the end of the trip...

"however the fisher shall receive compensatory periods of rest as soon as practicable." Well, that kind of happens anyway... you spend time looking for fish, and in that time crew work on vessel and gear maintenance, but is not "fishing" also you have shift work on deck, bridge or engine room so the 10 or 6 hr may not be consecutive.

You'll know if someone has been a fisherman by his/her ability to fell asleep at any time or any position under any weather even if it is only for 15' minutes. When I get on a flight in the Pacific with fishing crew... we are the only ones sleeping in 5 minutes of sitting in the plane. Sleeping short but repetitively is just part of what you do.

Fleet wise, that variability of practices is massive, and I merely talk about my experience:

Purse Seiners would set pre-sunrise for FAD sets, but then any time of day for free school sets. Hence the nights usually are resting time (unless you had a big problem on the net, and then is all hands on deck overnight for repairs)

Trawlers will depend on what are they targeting and if they are using bottom or midwater gear... at which latitude you are, etc. I have done 18 hrs days during the summer in the southern seas, and that was given. If you are in a factory vessel, then your work in 6x6hr shifts or 8x6hr... but you get less than 6 hrs sleep literally, because you will like to have some food and a shower, so that will already be out

Longliners tend to set pre-sunrise and sunset, but then sometimes during the day... and depending the number of sets the boat has out you will be hauling the times you are not setting... pretty much 24 hrs... so the ILO rule will not really work... but then you have plenty of time to sleep when you are getting to or off the fishing grounds.

Also as a skipper, at the end of the day not your interest to have an exhausted crew, when people are there is when they make mistakes and get hurt, an injured guy on board is a real problem you need to get back to port, and if crew is with low moral, efficiency goes down, and accidents tends to happen. And even if you were to be the worst possible human being, tired people break stuff as well as getting hurt, broken gear means less fishing, and no one wants that on board.

In principle, a key aspect of the master’s responsibility (that was drill into me both at navy and fishing school) is to look after the safety and welfare of crew and make money for everyone involved. If the crew is exhausted, shit happens, and no one wins, if I see someone on deck not being really into it, I sent him to the bunk... not only because he will get hurt, but mostly because the other crew will get hurt too, and as I said, stuff will break.

How can you control this issues on board?
Well... you could have logs (like truck drivers) and add that to the already huge paper-work already on board. The logical way would be via EM (cameras on board) and have then a labour inspector sitting with the observer scanning the footage (but then that will imply quite a lot of labour inspectors being trained in fishing, and that ain’t gonna happen, labour departments struggle to get enough people as ist is already).

But my biggest issue is that, while I’m all for crew rights due to the well-known cases of slavery and abuses, trying to be too authoritative on hours and days worked, and the having labour inspectors checking is the wrong approach since you are barking at the wrong tree.

Most of the slavery and crew rights abuses seem to take place in vessel flagged in countries that don’t really give a shit about any rules, much less those that will apply to the 10 countries that have signed the ILO convention... and even if they were to sign it, what credibility will they have in controlling it?. I don't think anyone in Taiwan, Vanuatu or China has any idea of where all their vessels are and who is on board... much less how the crew get treated.

So we have to be aware that the weight-of compliance, (as usual) will fall on the countries that are already pretty responsible operators... and that are barely competing with the other countries that don't give a shit.

And while potentially the consumer could reward the responsible states with their choice (the ecolabels semi myth), reality is that the people who care, are the well-intended and conscious middle-class buyers of developed countries… which are not the primary market of most fishery products

Fishing is about flexibility... and if you have to stop fishing because the crew would only be able to sleep 5 hr instead of 6, because otherwise, you'll have to spend time explaining why you took that decision to some bureaucrat that does not know the difference in between stern and bow even less the works of a Purse Seiner, then you're pushing them to hide things... and no one really wins when that happens.

The people that the rules are trying to protect are still being abused and the responsible operators’ countries are getting constrained by rules that do not reflect reality sometimes.

There is limited evidence of abuses in well-regulated fisheries, and the reasons are because there is a system to control them... in the WCPFC area the biggest issue is unreported (specifically underreporting), illegal fishing or unregulated are non-issues.

From my present experience, my feeling is that in the WCPFC PS tuna fishery the key issues would be about fair payment, but not slavery and being kept on board against their will.

For the LongLiners the process gets a bit murkier because we have a lot of vessels that fish in the High seas and do not come to port or have coastal state licenses... so you must trust the flag-state conditions. But then while China and Korea are ILO members, they are not 188 signatories - and mostly employ other countries crew (Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Philippines, etc). Taiwan is not even member of ILO, nor is Vanuatu that has hundreds of Chinese and Taiwanese owned vessels under its legislation!

Japan tho, is interesting since because of its labour unions, does employ a lot of Japanese crew, at Japanese salaries, and still (allegedly) makes money.

What I would do?
As in any other fisheries compliance are, explore incentives for people to do the right thing, instead of only having a system to punish them when found doing the wrong thing. But that will take time (but i’m working on it)

In the meantime, as an ex-fisher I can think about 4 initial ideas:

1. Actually trust fisherman to know what is better for them and create the avenues for them to be able to log complains if they feel they have been abused, not paid, or made work in conditions beyond reasonable.

2. Provide independent avenues for crew to have the opportunity to complain and take action via arrangement with flag, coastal or port states... one idea... have 3 randomly selected crew members to come with their passports to the ILO rep office/labour dept/fishers union or similar at the key ports in the Pacific (60% of the skipjack in the world comes from there)

3. Pull the pressure on the crewing agencies and crewing related legislation in the countries of origins of the crew - not just flag states.

4. Since a lot of the reported abuses seems to happen in the HS Long Line fishery, we need to increase the pressure to stop at sea transhipments (as we did with PS), hence they have the chance to disembark if needed.

I’m sure many will disagree with my take or find my take a bit strange, but then, that is what happens when you talk about your views… and I (even as a consultant) never take any paternalistic (listen to me, I know better!) attitude towards anything in regards fisheries.0, this is just what I know, think and see.

Any solutions in the labour arena will have to come from a consensus view of all the elements that pay into the topic, and not only from a well-intended side of it. I'm just getting into this topic, and I'm entirely open to change my views be understanding more and be proven in a different light.

So far the best take in this topic I have seen comes from this paper I blogged about recently:

We need to shift the basis of screening from attempting to prove or to disprove forced labour conditions in supply chains toward establishing system fundamentals for human rights due diligence.

Images from past days, and yes it was a different time, unions existed, and I was able to use my earnings to study, and not just to survive or maintain a family.

On being at WCPFC TCC and the decision making process at RFMOs

The WCPFC Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC) is over, a massive "shout out" of nothing more than pure respect to EVERYONE in MIMRA that worked non-stop to make TCC be the success it was.

Sometimes a sensory depravation chamber, sometimes the front line of geopolitics.

I have to admit that being part of it was a confronting experience sometimes, yet somehow illuminating… I never been to one before, but I totally understand how people get hooked on them and become RFMO “junkies”. Yet I don't think that there is something I could do.

I’m a total believer of being totally aware of your limitations and know where your strengths are, and meeting rooms is definitively an area where I don't really contribute, particularly when it comes to language discussion and endless correction to a text. Yet I totally understand why it has to be done, as words becomes the “lawyers” job in the delegations fighting ground, when shit hits the fan.

The level of geopolitics, influencing, positioning, country egoisms, plain misplaced righteousness, coalitions, back room deals and in many cases full hypocrisy (as in the case of CN,TW, KR and TW in regards transhipments at sea) could be a sociologist/international relationships specialist wet dream.

The dynamics of decision making among countries as despair as China and Tokelau are unique to RFOMS and the presence of member institutions such as FFA, SPC and PNA are unique to the WCPFC in particular, so during my time there I wonder how the situation would be in other RFMOs in regards decision making and if what I see there is the best we can do? 

But no more, academia came to the rescue and a recent paper by Antonia Leroy and Michel Morin “Innovation in the decision-making process of the RFMOs”.

Is an interesting read, and I recommend you go to the original. In the meantime, I quote the abstract and some parts that I stuck to my little brain. 

Abstract
Throughout the last several decades, the Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) have become essential bodies for the management of the fisheries resources. However, the state of fish stocks that are fished in the high seas seem even more critical for some species. That situation put into question the functioning of the RFMOs where decisions adopted have not been stringent enough to tackle the overexploitation of many fish stocks.

When states are establishing RFMOs’ conventions they have to fulfil their duty to co-operate while applying the principle of consent, a basic principle in international law. This has led states to setting up various decision-making processes within RFMOs. The paper shows that a better tailored decision-making process for RFMOs is needed so as to bring changes in them to comply with the objectives set out in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, i.e. maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield. 

With that aim, the analysis defines three principles to evaluate the effectiveness of the decision-making procedure in RFMOs; 1) blocking or opting-out behaviours constrained, 2) transparency in the objection procedure, 3) conservation and management measures, including the related dispute resolution process, adopted in a timely manner. In line with these three principles, after considering the example of 12 main RFMOs, the study concludes that among them, the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) has developed the most advanced and innovative decision-making mechanism.

Conclusion
Despite the duty for states to cooperate in the management of fisheries resources, they remain cautious about the establishment of transparent and timely efficient decision-making mechanisms, certainly as a fear of renouncing some of their prerogatives. RFMOs decision-making procedures have evolved. In the last few decades, several RFMOs have evaluated and modified their Convention provisions such as the NAFO, the NEAFC, the IATTC and the GFCM.

However, there is a lack of a true evolution on the objection and dispute settlement procedures. Recent adopted or amended conventions remain far below the recognised best practice (see Fig. 1 below for a summary of RFMOs’ performance in terms of decision-making process). For instance, with one of the last organizations created, the SIOFA, while the convention text is rather innovative in including the precautionary approach and the ecosystem approach to fisheries, the lack of which is seen as a weakness in performance assessments of other RFMOs, the decision-making procedure does not correspond to best practice; in this case, each decision must be made by consensus without the possibility to object to a CMM. 

The ICCAT convention has been under revision since 2013 and a new one should be adopted soon; debates on the objection procedure and its follow-up are one of the issues that remain to be solved. Up to now, only the NAFO and the SPRFMO conventions have set out provisions which oblige the members of the RFMO concerned to take into account the positions of the others when one of them decides to present an objection and might be considered as implementing best practice. 

These two examples show that it is possible to bring progress in core provisions of these conventions without ignoring the principle of consent. But these are the only two examples, that is not enough. States, which are members of the other RFMOs, should really push for the adoption of conventions giving a better framework for the adoption of strong CMMs in order to tackle the issue of the poor state of many fish stocks.

The international community is far from having defined the appropriate procedural rules in order to adopt the necessary measures for the optimal management of fishery resources. The possibility of not accepting a measure or of objecting to it is still too frequent. 

For this reason, the procedure developed by the SPRFMO is promising in that it obliges the parties to resolve the dispute quickly and within the organization itself. This way of resolving the conflict is certainly preferable to treating it outside of the organization as shown by the CCSBT case in 1999–2000. This is so far one of the newest and the most innovative decision-making mechanisms.

Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the WCPO, including Economic Conditions, for 2017

What do 2,539,959 Tons of tuna look like?

One thing that never ceases to amaze me from working in the WCPF tuna fisheries, is the vastness and sometimes “incommensurability” of the numbers we work with. Just forgets for the moment we have 17 PS and 9 Carriers in the lagoon… that is a lot in Pacific terms, but not much for other fisheries. But the volumes of fish we (via SPC) estimate is being caught is just mind-blowing.

Definitivelly not the guys gettingUS$3.40 billion

Among the many papers we have in TCC, I just quote below the abstract of a paper by my friend and colleague Peter Williams from SPC (one of the people I respect the most in the tuna world) and Chris Reid from FFA. “Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,including Economic Conditions 2017”, as usual: read the original.

This paper provides a broad description of the major fisheries in the WCPFC Statistical Area (WCP-CA) highlighting activities during the most recent calendar year (2017) and covering the most recent summary of catch estimates by gear and species. 

The provisional total WCP–CA tuna catch for 2017 was estimated at 2,539,950 mt, the lowest catch for six years, and around 340,000 mt below the record catch in 2014 (2,883,204 mt). The WCP–CA tuna catch (2,539,950 mt) for 2017 represented 78% of the total Pacific Ocean catch of 3,239,704 mt, and 54% of the global tuna catch (the provisional estimate for 2017 is 4,715,836 mt, at this stage, the fourth highest on record). 

The 2017 WCP–CA catch of skipjack (1,624,162 mt – 64% of the total catch) was the lowest since 2011, at nearly 375,000 mt less than the record in 2014 (2,000,608 mt). 

The WCP–CA yellowfin catch for 2017 (670,890 mt – 26%) was the highest recorded (more than 35,000 mt higher than the previous record catch of 2016), mainly due to increased catches in the purse seine fishery. 

The WCP–CA bigeye catch for 2017 (126,929 mt – 5%) was the lowest since 2016 and mainly due to continued low longline catches. 

The 2017 WCP–CA albacore catch (117,969 mt – 5%) was slightly lower than the average over the past decade and around 50,000 mt lower than the record catch in 2002 at 147,793 mt. 

The south Pacific albacore catch in 2017 (92,291 mt) was a record catch, primarily due to a record in the longline fishery (89,388 mt.); the 2017 catch was around 4,000-5,000 mt. more than the previous record catch in 2010 of 88,147 mt. 

The provisional 2017 purse-seine catch of 1,812,474 mt was slightly less than the most recent five-year average, and nearly 250,000 less than the record in 2014 (2,059,008 mt). While the total purse seine catch in 2017 was similar to the 2016 catch level, the species composition was clearly different.

The 2017 purse-seine skipjack catch (1,280,311 mt; 71% of total catch) was the lowest since 2011 and nearly 350,000 mt lower than the record in 2014.

In contrast, the 2017 purse-seine catch estimate for yellowfin tuna (472,279 mt; 26%) was the highest on record at nearly 50,000 mt higher than the previous record (423,788 mt in 2008); this record was mainly due to good catches of large yellowfin from unassociated-school set types in the west and central tropical WCP-CA areas (see Figure 3.4.8–right).

The provisional catch estimate for bigeye tuna for 2017 (56,194 mt) was a decrease on the catch in 2016 and lower than the most recent five-year average. 

The provisional 2017 pole-and-line catch (151,232 mt) was the lowest annual catch since the mid-1960s, with reduced catches in both the Japanese and the Indonesian fisheries. 

The provisional WCP–CA longline catch (240,387 mt) for 2017 was lower than the average for the past five years. The WCP–CA albacore longline catch (96,280 mt – 40%) for 2017 was higher than the average catch over the past decade, and only 5,000 mt lower than the record of 101,816 mt attained in 2010.

The provisional bigeye catch (58,164 mt – 25%) for 2017 was the lowest since 1996, presumably mainly due to continued reduction in effort in the main bigeye tuna fishery.

The yellowfin catch for 2017 (83,399 mt – 35%) was lower than the average for the past decade and more than 20,000 mt less that the record for this fishery. 

The 2017 South Pacific troll albacore catch (2,508 mt) was similar to catch levels experienced over the past four years. The New Zealand troll fleet (111 vessels catching 1,952 mt in 2017) and the United States troll fleet (13 vessels catching 556 mt in 2017) accounted for all of the 2017 albacore troll catch. 

Market prices in 2017 generally improved with significant increases in prices for purse seine caught skipjack and yellowfin, pole and line caught skipjack and longline caught yellowfin, swordfish and striped marlin while longline caught albacore prices remained steady and longline caught bigeye prices were either steady or declined.

The total estimated delivered value of catch in the WCP-CA increased by 12% to US$5.84 billion during 2017. 

The value of the purse seine catch (US$3.40 billion) accounted for 58% of the value of the catch, the fishery’s 2nd highest contribution to total catch value. 

The value of the longline fisheryin 2017 (US$1.46 billion) was the lowest since 2007 and accounted for 25% of the value of the catch, its 2nd lowest contribution to total catch value. 

The 2017 values of the pole and line, and other catch were US$348 and US$631 million respectively. 

The value of the 2017 WCP–CA skipjack catch(US$2.98 billion) was the equal to the third highest recorded and 13% higher than 2016. 

The 2017 value of the WCP–CA yellowfin catch(US$1.9 billion) was the second highest recorded and 17% higher than 2016. 

The value of the WCP–CA bigeye catch in 2017 (US$0.65 billion) was at its lowest level since 2005. 

The 2017 value of the WCP–CA albacore catch (US$0.34 billion) was around that averaged over the past 10 years. 

Economic conditions in the purse seine, tropical longline and southern longline fisheries of the WCP-CA showed mixed results. The southern longline fishery saw a further improvement in catch rates which drove the FFA economic conditions index to its highest level since 2009. 

Conversely, the tropical longline fishery index, which moved above its long term average in 2016 for the first time since 2010, fell back to below the long term average. 

In the purse seine fishery, despite significant falls in purse seine catch rates, higher prices resulted in the continuation of the good economic conditions in 2017, with the FFA purse seine fishery economic conditions index increasing marginally from 2016 to be at its third highest level since 1999.

A Review of High Seas Transshipment occurring within the WCPFC

I has been a busy few days at this TCC, I’m doing my day job and working on PSM with the barding officers, and then when finished coming over the TCC meeting. Is a very interesting dynamics going on there, none than I’m either used too or really like.

Wealth transfer

The bit shocked me the most is that all the observers (NGOs and even FAO) get kicked out of the plenary before the reports of not compliance  gets discussed, as if it was to be said there is not known. Most of the non-compliance relate to the DWFN and the ones of the PIC flag state are overwhelmingly focuses on those vessels have beneficiary ownership on those DWFN. I don't really get it, but then is not my job to get it. Yet for me, transparency is transparency… end of story.

Anyway, the process itself is a bit frustrating for me, people seems to argue more about words than outcomes (I always struggle with that, and I think is biassed against those that not have English as a first language). In any case I’m learning a lot while in the room. Decisions being made here, are the ones that then front line compliance people and those advisers like me, have to put in place.

By doing boardings in the mornings and assisting to the discussion on the afternoons, the contrast could not be starker.

In any case, there is a lot to read… and among the plethora of interesting things to read, there are a few that caught my attention, but among them this one is quite illuminating: A Review of Management and Reporting Trends Related to Transhipment Occurring within the WCPFC Submitted by Pew Charitable Trusts WCPFC-TCC14-2018-OP03. 

I quote here some of the most interesting aspects (at least for me) of the paper, the link above if for the intranet, but I been assured by Pew Staff that is open and available. 

As indicated through the WCPFC Secretariat Annual Report on Transshipping, the number of reported high seas transshipment events has increased by 97 percent between 2014 (552 events) and 2017 (1,089 events). The number of transshipping vessels has also increased; in 2018, 55 percent of fishing vessels on the WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels (RFV) were authorized to transship on the high seas, a significant increase from the 40.5 percent seen just three years ago in 2015. A robust analysis of transshipment data, however, is difficult because information regarding transshipment is diffuse, spread out between multiple reports, and tends to be inconsistent between reporting sources.

 The data and trends clearly illustrate the need for additional management rules on transshipment in the WCPFC Convention Area to ensure full and effective control and monitoring of these activities and to reduce the opportunities for illegal fishing and the introduction of illegal caught fish into the seafood supply chain. Several specific recommendations are included at the end of the paper.

Key Issues

1. The Size of Carrier Fleets and Number of High Seas Transshipment Events is Increasing

By August 2018, Panama’s active authorized carrier vessel fleet on the RFV grew to 114 vessels, followed by Korea (33 vessels), Liberia (25 vessels) and Chinese Taipei (20 vessels). Between 2014 and 2017 the number of Panamanian flagged carriers reported to have “Fished” in the Convention Area increased by 56% (55 vessels to 86 vessels). Between 2016 and 2017, Chinese Taipei flagged vessels increased the number of their reported high seas transshipment events by 82 percent for offloading vessels (290 to 529 events) and by 80 percent for receiving vessels (113 to 204 events). During that same period, Korean flagged carriers also increased receiving vessel reporting of transshipments by 112 percent (94 to 200 events).

Table 1 below summarizes the number of carrier vessels reported by each CCM to have “Fished” in the Convention Area in 2017 and the number of carriers that reported high seas transshipping events as per the 2018 WCPFC TCC Annual Report on Transshipment (RP03). The difference between the number of carriers that operated in the Convention Area in 2017 (139 carriers) as opposed to the number of carriers that reported high seas transshipping events (27) should be noted. There is very little transparency or reporting on the regional level of the operation of the remaining 112 carriers, which represent over 80 percent of the entire carrier fleet, that were reported to have “Fished” in the Convention Area in 2017 by their flag State CCM but did not report high seas transshipment events. In order to provide a full accounting of all the activities of carriers that operate in the Convention Area, carrier vessels should be required to provide all transshipment reports and declarations to the Secretariat regardless of where the transshipping event occurs (high seas, EEZ, or in port).

2. There is Insufficient Sharing of Data Regarding WCPFC, IATTC, and NPFC Transshipment Operations 

Due to the lack of an agreement between the WCPFC and the IATTC carrier observer service provider on transshipment observation, nearly 11% of transshipments that were reported to have occurred in the WCPFC Convention Area on carriers carrying an IATTC observer were not observed in 2017, despite the presence of an IATTC observer. The sole reason for this appears to be because a vessel captain is allowed to have the discretion whether an event is observed or not. These unobserved events, totaling 50 separate events with an average weight of transshipment of 56.03 metric tons, potentially represents over 2,800 metric tons of WCPFC product that went unreported by weight and species in 2017 3. To ensure that all transshipping events occurring in the WCPFC Convention Area be observed, documented, and reported directly to the WCPFC Secretariat, and to prevent the delegation of decision-making on transshipment monitoring to vessel masters in the future, the current data-sharing agreement between WCPFC and IATTC should be extended to cover MRAG Americas, the IATTC carrier observer service provider.

Additionally, it appears there is no specific mention of the 413 events WCPFC transshipment events that were observed by IATTC observers in 2017 included within the 2018 WCPFC TCC Annual Report on Transshipment (RP03). As such, it is unknown if the WCPFC Secretariat has received information from IATTC on these events and whether this information was included in the Annual Report. If these transshipments have not been included, the Secretariat should be tasked with updating RP03 to include this information, including a clear delineation of the additional number and flag of offloading and receiving vessels involved in transshipping in the WCPFC Convention Area and the amount of product transshipped.

3. Carrier Observer Reports Are Not Being Submitted to the Secretariat 

The 2018 WCPFC TCC Annual Report on Transshipment (RP03)1 does not include any information about reports received by the Secretariat from observers, despite the fact that CMMs have indicated full observer coverage of all 1,089 reported transshipment events*. In 2017, the Secretariat reported at TCC13 (paragraph 203 of the TCC14 Meeting Summary Report)4that they had received only one observer report for the 956 high seas transshipping events that were reported to have occurred in the Convention Area in 2016. To allow for independent verification of transshipment related data received from carrier vessel transshipment declarations, TCC14 should recommend that the Commission revise the WCPFC Regional  Observer Programme (ROP) Standards and Guidelines document to mandate that observers document all transshipment events occurring on the high seas in the WCPFC Convention Area and submit these observer reports directly to the Secretariat. 

4. Discrepancies Existing in the Number of Transfers Reported by Offloading and Receiving Vessels 

The 2018 WCPFC TCC Annual Report on Transshipment (RP03)1 reveals discrepancies in notifications and declarations received from offloading and receiving vessels. For instance, the report indicates that Panamanian carriers were involved in 280 high seas transshipment events in 2017, yet only 210 notifications and 202 declarations were received from the carriers1. Small inconsistences occur with three other flag States. These inconsistencies are also found in the information provided by CCMs on transshipment within their Annual Report Part I submissions5. For example, Panama’s 2018 Annual Report Part I indicated only 15 high seas transshipment events occurred in 2017 (as compared to the 280 high seas events reported in RP03). Liberia reported 243 events in their Annual Report Part I (without a breakdown of where the events occurred – high seas, EEZ, or outside the Convention Area - although they reported the events occurred in all these locations). Korea reported 168 high seas events (as opposed to 200 high seas events in RP03). Vanuatu reported 270 high-seas transshipping events without a breakdown of how many involved offloading or receiving vessels. China reported one carrier to have conducted high seas transshipment (as opposed to two carrier vessels in RP03). Chinese Taipei provided no information in their Annual Report Part I regarding transshipping events involving their carrier vessels.

Table 3 summarizes data outlined within CCMs Annual Report Part I, the number of carrier vessels that conducted transshipments in 2017 as well as the location where these transshipment events took place (high seas, EEZ, in port). Four out of these six flag States did not provide the number of carrier vessels that conducted transshipment in 2017. In addition, four of the six did not specify the location of their transshipment events. One did not provide any information at all about carrier vessels and only reported on “offloading” vessels.

Without infringing upon the national laws of any coastal State, the Commission should mandate consistent transshipment reporting requirements for all transshipping events within the Convention Area, regardless of where the event occurs, including those that take place in port and within EEZs. This would allow the Secretariat to have a clear overall picture of all transshipping events occurring within WCPFC waters during a specific calendar year. 

5. Additional Sources of Information Are Needed to Effectively Verify Reported Transshipment Operations 

According to the 2018 WCPFC TCC Annual Report on Transshipment (RP03)1, the Secretariat undertook an analysis of VMS data to attempt to detect potential transshipment events, specifying that an incident would be counted as an event when “…the reported WCPFC VMS positions related to two fishing vessels, are estimated to be within a distance of 250 meters, over a time period of at least 4 hours…”. Despite only 23% of the over 1600 transshipment events that were reported to the Secretariat during that period being detected, the Secretariat should be applauded for this initiative. In order to improve the accuracy of the tool, the Secretariat should consider data from the ICCAT and IOTC carrier observer programmes, which indicate that the vast majority of transshipment events at sea in those regions are completed in less than three hours. Observer report analysis and stakeholder input are key resources the Secretariat can utilize to improve the effectiveness of the WCPFC Transshipment Analysis Tool and increase the overall detection rate. Another valuable tool is the use and analysis of Automated Identification System (AIS) data. Given that the VMS polling rate for longliners is once every four hours, AIS could be used to gain a better understanding of the length of time a transshipment at sea takes place within the WCPFC Convention Area that VMS cannot do due to the length of time between polling. TCC14 should recommend that the Secretariat consider modifying its detection criteria and be allowed to conduct a demonstration on the usefulness of AIS as a supplement to VMS and other reporting data over the next year, especially as it relates to transshipment reporting. 

In order to standardize the data submitted by CCMs on transshipment operations, the Secretariat has created the template in Annex 3 of RP031 for use by all applicable CCMs when submitting their Annual Report Part I. TCC14 should approve this template with the addition of data fields that clearly outline the number of offloading and receiving vessels involved in transshipping in the Convention Area as well as the number of events for each by location (high seas, EEZ, in port).

Considerations: 

This analysis clearly demonstrates the need for management reform of transshipment in the WCPFC Convention Area. The Pew Charitable Trusts has developed best practices related to transshipment management aimed towards maximizing transparency and minimizing the potential for IUU fish to be laundered into the market. Oversight of transshipment can be improved in WCPFC by implementing these best practices in three main areas: 

• Reporting - The current WCPFC transshipment measure (CMM 2009-06) should be strengthened to include consistent transshipment reporting requirements to all areas within the Convention Area, including all transshipments that occur in port and within EEZs. This will allow the Secretariat to receive a complete picture of transshipment activity that occurs within the WCPFC Convention area. 

• Monitoring –The template provided by the Secretariat in Annex 3 of RP03 should be expanded to include additional data fields on number of offloading and receiving vessels involved in transshipping and locations of where transshipping events occurred (high seas, EEZs, in port). This will allow cross-verification of vessel transshipment reporting. In addition, the ROP Standards and Guidelines document should be revised to mandate the submission of observer reports to the Secretariat for all high seas transshipments occurring within the WCPFC Convention Area to facilitate the ability for the Secretariat to review, cross-verify and validate transshipment information. 

• Data sharing – The Commission should establish formal transshipping data-sharing procedures with the North Pacific Fisheries Commission and expand the current data-sharing agreement with IATTC to include the ability for the IATTC carrier observer service provider (MRAG Americas) to share information directly with WCPFC for any transshipment taking place on the high seas in the WCPFC Convention Area involving a carrier vessel with an embarked IATTC observer. 

References:

1. Annual Report on WCPFC Transshipment Reporting with an Emphasis on High Seas Activities (WCPFC-TCC14-2018-RP03) https://www.wcpfc.int/node/31649

2. WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels History as of 24 August 2018 https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/historical-record-fishing-vessels-rfv-data

Corporate Dynamics in the Shelf-stable Tuna Industry

If you want to understand the tuna industry, don’t look at the harvesting side only, since it will give you only a small view of a much bigger picture. The tuna industry is very particular, since does not only has the usual “States” (flag, coastal, port, market), the “new” one (processing state), but then two unique “supra states”: the traders (FCF, Trimarine and Itochu) and the main Brands, and their influence goes down the value chain “big time”.

this crew in the solomons, is actually the only one I know that best benefit from their product

This latest FFA report by my colleagues Elizabeth Havice and Liam Campling, gives us a very detailed view on the main brads, that “far end” aspect of the tuna world, to people like me at the 1st steps in the value chain. 

As all of their work I’ve read, this one is good stuff. I quote here the executive summary. but as usual read the original!

This report provides FFA members with industry and market intelligence on the current status of the shelf-stable (e.g. canned) tuna processing industry. It offers a global overview of processing capacity (providing data on volume and value of activities), new developments and key issues shaping the sector. It then conducts a focussed analysis of five case-study firms (three ‘major’ and two ‘minor’) to demonstrate the range of industry dynamics currently in play in the sector and to draw out implications for Pacific Island countries.

The case study firms are: Thai Union, Dongwon Industries and Dongwon F&B, Bolton Foods, Princes, and Bumble Bee. Primarily through desk-based research, the analysis details operations, ownership and management structures, vertical integration such as brand ownership, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), major markets, financial performance, sustainability and labour initiatives, recent changes and future developments, WCPO business interests and links with Pacific Island countries. 

Global Overview and Key Developments 

Between 2008 and 2017, global tuna processing capacity (whole round and cooked loins) increased 12-13%. Over the same period, the total number of processing plants increased from 144 to at least 215. Whole round fish represents around 85% of raw material throughput and frozen cooked loins account for around 15%. Loins are mostly used by processors in the US mainland, Spain and Italy. Estimated global canned tuna processing capacity is around 13,700mt/day, requiring around 3 million mt of whole round fish (skipjack, yellowfin and albacore). In 2017, the top five canned tuna processing countries by volume were: 1) Thailand (3,490 mt/day); 2) Ecuador (1,635mt/day); 3) Spain (1,275 mt/ day); 4) Mexico (725 mt/day); and, 5) Philippines (510 mt/day). 

Thailand remains the world’s largest canned tuna processor, accounting for around 15% of production. Thailand does not have a significant tuna fishing fleet and so relies heavily on raw material imports, mainly from the WCPO, which exposes Thailand-based processors to risk during periods of high tuna prices. 

The European Union is the world’s largest market for canned tuna. The market is supplied by producers inside the EU, mainly Spain (67%) and Italy (21%), and by imports, especially from countries with duty free access. The top three foreign suppliers are Ecuador, Seychelles and Mauritius. Import volumes from the Philippines and from Papua New Guinea have increase by 48% between 2013-2017. PNG and Solomon Islands loin imports accounted for, respectively, 9% (12,093mt) and 5% (6,477mt) of the EU’s total loin imports; volumes sourced from Solomon Islands, largely for Italy, grew 64% between 2013- 2017. Given that the UK is Europe’s largest imported canned tuna market, there is concern that Brexit might have a negative impact for exporters accessing that market. 

The United States remains the second largest shelf-stable tuna market. The market is supplied by two canning-only plants (i.e. that import frozen loins) in the mainland and from the US territory American Samoa, where whole round is also processed, and by finished goods imports from around 35 countries. The top three foreign suppliers are Thailand, Ecuador and Vietnam. Frozen cooked loin import volumes have declined since 2013, with Fiji as a significant supplier of albacore loins in the range of 11,000-12,000mt/year. 

Canned tuna processors continue to intersect with several long-standing concerns. The industry continues to struggle with overcapacity, with a majority of plants continuing to operate below full capacity, while new plant investments and expansions continue. Cyclical, short-term raw material price volatility continues to place pressure on processors in periods of higher prices, especially those that are not backward integrated into trading or fishing. Efforts to strengthen tuna fisheries management across all four ocean basins have not yet yielded long-term tightening of raw material supplies and associated long-term fish price increases. Canned tuna processors continue to face increased costs of key production inputs such as cans and ingredients such as olive oil; such costs are largely absorbed by processors because of the difficulty of passing cost increases on to consumers. The global canned tuna industry has continued to consolidate through mergers and acquisitions (M&A), which have taken place within the tuna and other seafood sectors and for both shelf-stable and frozen products. The rate of M&As is expected to slow as the most attractive deals have been completed or blocked by anti-trust regulation. Supermarkets continue to dominate retailed canned tuna sales globally, with private label brands providing strong price competition to national brands. 

A number of countries with significant canned tuna and frozen cooked loin processing capacity that compete with Pacific Island processors in the EU market have concluded or are in negotiations for preferential trade agreements with the EU. The Philippines and Ecuador have gained duty free access to the EU and Vietnam has secured a quota for canned tuna and gradual liberalization of loins. Negotiations between the EU and Thailand, ASEAN countries and Indonesia are in various stages. The EU continues to issue IUU yellow cards as warnings that lack of compliance with the terms of the IUU regulation could lead to suspended market access. In the Pacific, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, PNG and Tuvalu have been issued yellow cards and subsequently had them lifted when compliance was demonstrated. 

Several developments have emerged in recent years. Initiatives related to sustainable fisheries, supply chain transparency, and ethical labour are now permanent fixtures in the industry, though each initiative varies in scope and aims. Processors and brand owners are developing innovative and value-added product lines that use less tuna raw material to combat high raw material prices and meet changing consumer preferences. Some processors are diversifying into high-quality pet food production to expand into new market segments and improve profitability. Firms are diversifying packaging materials and marketing channels (e.g. online platforms) to improve returns and reach new markets. 

Case Study Firms 

Thai Union is the largest tuna company in the world. Its business is focussed on three seafood divisions: shelf-stable seafood; frozen and chilled seafood and related products; and, pet care and other ‘value added’ products. Thai Union’s business model is highly dependent on tuna and ensuring stability of tuna supply is critical for the firm. It is not backward integrated into fishing, so to stabilize supply it maintains a large raw material inventory in cold storage and has recently developed a Global Procurement Team to centralize its purchasing power. 

Thai Union’s core business is the manufacture of seafood for its own brands and as a private label processor for clients. It owns extensive processing operations in Thailand that contribute to a total of 17 production facilities in North America, Europe, Africa and Asia. Over the last 20 years, one of Thai Union’s key corporate strategies has been to forward integrate into brand ownership, notably with the purchase of Chicken of the Sea (1997) and MW Brands (2010). Forward integration has enabled Thai Union to capture a greater proportion of value through brand rents. Thai Union’s major markets are the US, Europe, Thailand and Japan, with 15% of total sales made in emerging markets. Thai Union is expected to look to organic growth, selective M&As, and product diversification to boost sales and growth. Thai Union is emerging as a leader in environmental and social responsibility, internalizing environmental and labour commitments and procedures and investing significant financial and human resources into monitoring and compliance. 

Thai Union’s principal relationship to the WCPO is in its ongoing dependence on the region for tuna raw material supply, which is facilitated through Thai Union’s long-term relationship with the FCF trading company. Thai Union has increased its processing of co-branded Pacifical canned tuna for Northern European markets and the US market and is well positioned to supply growing demand for ‘sustainable’ canned tuna. Thai Union is a partner in Majestic Seafood Corporation in Lae, PNG, an investment that provides raw material supply to Thai Union, but that has not operated at full capacity. 

The Dongwon Group is a sprawling South Korean industrial conglomerate. Through the inter-connected set of companies that make up Dongwon, the firm has comprehensive backward and forward linkages in the processing value chain and has the capacity to raise money to purchase supporting companies. Two of its subsidiaries are central players in the tuna processing industry. 

Dongwon Industries Co., Ltd. is Korea’s largest deep-sea fishery company, owning 19 purse seine vessels. The firm has focussed on expanding vessel capacity and profitability, building seven new purse seine vessels since 2006, with two additional large vessels scheduled to join the fleet in 2018. These new vessels enhance annual per-vessel catch and are equipped with rapid cooling technologies and facilities to manage sashimi-grade handing and freezing. The vessels supply plants in Bangkok and sister company, Dongwon F&B’s processing plants. Dongwon Industries’ ULT longline fleet primarily supplies Japan for sashimi grade product. Dongwon Industries vertically integrated into brand ownership by purchasing Starkist (2008), the market leader in the in the US, and also owns processing facilities in American Samoa, Senegal and Ecuador. Starkist is also the leader in the higher profit pouch segment of the US market and is expanding into niche marketing and value-added products. Dongwon F&B Co. Ltd is a branded manufacturer that controls 75-80% of the Korean canned tuna market through ownership of over 16 brands and three processing plants. Dongwon F&B has high exposure to raw material price increases; the firm is presently working to expand further into the domestic market and broaden its reach to international markets and develop value-added products, emphasizing the health and convenience of its products. 

The broader Dongwon conglomerate exhibits a high degree of vertical integration, accomplished in part through M&As, where Dongwon’s affiliates integrate with each other and create opportunities for the Group as a whole to expand market and product reach. Strategic M&As that support the Group’s tuna processing business include mergers with or acquisitions of firms that specialize in tin can production for shelf-stable products, logistics, online retailing of ready-made meals, tuna processing and diversified seafood products. Reversing a long resistance to eco-certifications, Dongwon Industries has made several moves into the MSC certification market. Starkist has initiated the MSC process for US flagged longline vessels out of American Samoa, and Dongwon Industries has initiated MSC assessments for its purse seiners in the WCPO (which make a high proportion of sets on free schools) and longline operations in the WCPO and Eastern Pacific Ocean (EPO). 

Dongwon has several important connections to the WCPO. Both Dongwon Industries and F&B are heavily dependent on the WCPO, particularly waters of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA), for raw material supply, and Starkist has a large processing plant in Pago Pago, American Samoa. Dongwon Industries has announced a collaboration to build a small tuna processing plant in Kiribati in an aim to secure access for highly competitive fishing days and market access to the EU (if rules of origin are met). It has also engaged in ongoing negotiations to build processing plants in exchange for access in PNG and Solomon Islands, though there has been no recent progress on these proposals.

Bolton Foods is part of Bolton Group – a large privately-owned company offering a wide range of consumer goods under five business units. Bolton Foods focuses on premium branded shelf-stable tuna products and has developed high quality product specifications. It wholly owns three canned tuna brands, holds shares in several other important brands and distributes tuna product to over 60 countries. 

Since 1999, it has made several acquisitions to become more vertically integrated; diversified its portfolio of brands and processing operations geographically from Italy into other markets within and outside of Europe; and further secured access to raw material. Bolton’s purchase of the Saupiquet brand (1999) cemented its standing as the EU canned tuna market leader and integrated the firm into fishing with four large tuna purse seiners operating in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Supply from those vessels feeds non-branded processing plants in West Africa, Spain and Latin America that handle loins and finished goods production for Bolton. More recently, it purchased Calvo, acquiring Spain’s leading canned tuna brand and processing plants in Spain, El Salvador and Brazil, and a fleet of seven purse seine vessels. In 2013, it acquired a share in US global tuna trading company, Tri Marine, which strengthened its links to the WCPO and gave it access to supply, processing capacity, a niche brand in the US market and fishing vessels. Its 2015 it acquired Conservas Garavilla and its two brands, with presence in Spain, across the Americas and in North Africa, as well as processing plants in Spain, Ecuador and Morocco and four purse seine vessels. 

Bolton also has processing capacity in Italy which relies on imported frozen loins. To retain competitiveness for processing facilities in Europe, Bolton pioneered the import of pre-cooked loins, and has continued to innovate mechanized canning facilities that require minimal labour. Bolton also sources some branded finished goods from processors in Spain, Thailand, Ecuador, Ivory Coast and Mauritius. It is presently focussed on growing its presence in international markets, expanding into online and convenience sales platforms. It continues to differentiate its products through premium quality and ingredients as well by developing value-added products. It has launched its ‘Responsible Quality’ programme, through which it undertakes a range of corporate social responsibility initiatives related to environment, health and labour. Partnerships with advocacy organization World Wildlife Fund (WWF) focus on sustainability and traceability. 

Like other firms, Bolton is linked to the WCPO through its use of raw material from the region. It has direct links through its shareholding in Tri Marine, which owns a Solomon Islands’ flagged fleet of seven purse seiners and four pole and line vessels. Tri Marine is the majority shareholder of the Soltuna processing plant in the Solomon Islands, whose primary business is to process loins for Bolton. Tri Marine also owns six US-flagged purse seine vessels operating in the WCPO and Samoa Tuna Processors in American Samoa, which is presently not operating but leasing cold storage to Starkist. 

Princes Group focuses on the import, manufacture and distribution of food and drink products to the grocery trade. It is a private company headquartered in the UK and owned by Mitsubishi Corporation; being a part of one of the world’s largest trading companies means that Princes has access to financial resources that enable it to act on M&A opportunities. It holds a wide portfolio of over 350 Princes’ own brand products, including Princes canned tuna, and also provides private label canned tuna for EU supermarkets. Over 70% of all sales take place in the UK, where Princes holds around 25% share of the canned tuna market, chasing Thai Union’s 35% market share with its John West brand. To improve profitability, Princes has reduced can size, and developed value-added products. Princes has high exposure to a concentrated number of buyers and is actively seeking new markets.

Princes is vertically integrated from canned tuna brand ownership into processing, with a major factory complex in Mauritius, making it a competitor to Pacific Island processors because of its duty-free access to the EU market. It complements supply with contract processing arrangements with firms in Ecuador, Thailand and the Philippines. 

Princes is not planning any major changes and is remaining focussed on its existing core businesses. It is developing sales of value-added tuna products but remains constrained by price and promotional offers in the UK market in particular. Following poor performance on Greenpeace rankings, Princes committed to sourcing 100% of its supply from either pole and line fishing or purse seine fishing on free schools. Princes now sources MSC ‘wherever possible’ and is procuring fish from several MSC fisheries and several fisheries under Fishery Improvement Projects (FIP). Princes does not own boats, which makes it sensitive to raw material price fluctuations. It has no direct investments in the WCPO, but it is a leading partner with Pacifical and was the first UK brand to sell tuna from the MSC certified PNA fishery. 

Bumble Bee is a manufacturer and brander of seafood products with a focus on tuna, ready to eat meals and a range of other shelf-stable and frozen seafood and protein products in the US and Canada. It is owned by Lion Capital, a private equity firm focussed on the fast-moving consumer goods sector. In the US, the firm markets products under the Bumble Bee and Wild Selections brands and is the US leader in canned albacore, which has higher value than light meat product. It sells canned tuna, as well as a wide range of shelf-stable seafood and chicken products. In overall tuna product offerings, Bumble Bee is number two in the US market, accounting for 25% of the category in value sales. Connor Bros. is the Canadian marketing arm of Bumble Bee. It owns the Clover Leaf brand, Canada’s market leader in canned tuna, as well as Brunswick, Sweet Sue, and several other brands that sell tuna, other shelf-stable seafood and protein products. 

Bumble Bee is not backward integrated into vessel ownership. Rather, to secure supply it has developed a global sourcing and production strategy that focuses on white meat product. Bumble Bee sources white meat loins from Fiji (PAFCO – Bumble Bee managed plant) and Mauritius and light meat loins from Thailand and Ecuador (and very small amounts from SSTC in Papua New Guinea), for its Santa Fe Springs plant on the west coast of the US. In addition to processing for its own brand, the Santa Fe Springs plant co-packs for Chicken of the Sea; while Chicken of the Sea’s plant located on the east coast of the US co-packs for Bumble Bee. Bumble Bee also has a strong historical relationship with trading company FCF. Bumble Bee has pursued and been the object of several M&As in recent years. It has been pursued by private equity funds seeking to increase the value of the brand before selling it for a profit. Thai Union attempted to acquire Bumble Bee, an effort that terminated in 2015 as antitrust clearance procedures stalled and opened the door to unfolding price fixing revelationsamong the US ‘big three’ canned tuna brands. In the wake of the US price fixing scandal, Lion Capital is unlikely to sell Bumble Bee in the near term. 

Future developments focus on sustainability, traceability and product diversification, and on jump-starting the North American market after a prolonged decline. It has recently launched a catch-to-can, consumer-friendly tracking programme. In its effort to boost the stagnating US market, Bumble Bee has emphasised the health and quality attributes of its products, differentiated its products from lower quality competitors, and developed value-added product lines, including a move into the freezer aisle facilitated by its purchase of Anova Foods. 

Bumble Bee has several direct links to the WCPO. It manages the majority government-owned PAFCO plant in Levuka, Fiji, which supplies its mainland US plant with albacore loins. In recent years, it has offered PAFCO loans for cold storage and infrastructure upgrades, though high operating costs and supply concerns are ongoing. It has also purchased small volumes of loins from SSTC in PNG. Its 2013 purchase of Anova Foods deepened links to the Pacific as the firm sources from the Cook Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia, in addition to Indonesia. Anova has initiated sustainability initiatives in those locations. Bumble Bee has also announced a deal to bring Pacifical products to the US. Several exploratory initiatives, including for a loining plant in Samoa and for processing in Vanuatu, are yet to come to fruition. 

Implications for Pacific Island Countries 

Collectively, the five case study firms reveal a diversified set of strategies in the shelf-stable tuna sector. While all of the firms use M&As to expand the scope of their business portfolio, they do so in different ways and for different reasons. In some cases, this has deepened horizontal integration, expanding a firms’ traditional strength by, for example, purchasing processing plants in strategic locations, or acquiring brands that offer access to new markets. In others, they have enabled vertical integration outward from the processing node of the canned tuna value chain into direct marketing, branding, trading and/or fishing. Each firm has employed these strategies in distinct ways and to various extents. 

The cases studies offer evidence of growing consolidation among leading firms with core competencies in processing and branding, though the pace of consolidation is likely to slow with many large mergers now complete or blocked by anti-trust regulation. There is a high degree of vertical integration between processing and branding, with some, but not all firms, also backward integrating into trading and/ or vessel ownership to secure supply. The large investments that several firms are making into brands offers evidence of brand rent in shelf-stable markets. This has relevance for efforts from Pacific Island countries, like Pacifical, to develop links into branding to improve returns in the region. 

These features also relate to the degree in which each firm has exposure to raw material price, that is, the extent to which a firm’s profitability is influenced by fluctuations in canning-grade tuna price movements. Firms that are vertically integrated into fishing have lower exposure and may in fact benefit from raw material price increases. Processing-focussed firms with high exposure to raw material prices have adopted strategies such as investing in cold storage to hedge against such risks. 

Several of the firms reviewed are financialized – that is, intertwined with transactions in which profit making and risk hedging occurs through financial channels, rather than only through trade and commodity production. Access to financial capital enables these firms to make strategic investments, counter hostile take-overs, and weather unexpected costs that might hit competitors with access to fewer resources. 

In addition to these firm-specific dynamics, the analysis reveals several broader dynamics that are impactful industry-wide and have specific implications for Pacific Island countries. 

As a group, branded-processors are able to weather fluctuations in raw material price, with variation among them. This might be explained by a combination of factors including (a) cross-subsidisation (e.g. boat ownership and/ or other business segments); (b) greater focus on cost control and/ or synergies from M&As; and (c) investment in new process technologies and value-added product innovation. There has been relative stability in aggregate branded-processor profit. This may relate to these firms’ market power and related ability to squeeze non-branded suppliers (of which there are many, in sharp competition among one another), capture brand rents, and ad hoc strategies such as the recent US price fixing scandal and the prior role of the Pacific Operating Committee in stabilizing canning-grade albacore price. The firms appear to have factored in, and adapted to, the PNA Vessel Day Scheme, and related WCPO initiatives such as high seas closures and limitations on and charges for FAD fishing. 

Processing firms, as they form various degrees of forward and/or backward integration, continue to develop and rely on and create global procurement and production strategies to secure both raw material supply and market access. These strategies continue to be formulated around trade policy, labour productivity, and resource access. 

Product diversification and development of value-added products is finally becoming more established in many of the major and emerging markets. If value-added products take fuller hold and spur market growth and improvements in profitability, all of those involved in the global value chain – including Pacific Island country resource owners and processing firms – will compete to capture the value added. There is an opportunity to increase yellowfin volumes caught from the WCPO – and/or to direct existing yellowfin that presently gets mixed into ‘light meat’ products – to substitute volumes supplied from the Indian Ocean to high value EU market segments, given the IOTC yellowfin stock is overfished and subject to overfishing, while WCPO stocks remain healthy. 

One of the most significant recent developments in the canned tuna sector is the increasing focus on sustainability, eliminating IUU fish in supply chains, traceability and ethical labour practices. Many such efforts began as a result of external pressure from advocacy organisations and resulting demand from buyers. They have now been internalised within many firms, and/or are being developed through collaborations between firms and advocacy groups. Generally, these movements will present both costs (auditing, management and production changes) and opportunities (reputational gains, market access, potential price premiums) to fishing fleets, processors and branding and retail. It is not yet clear how these will shape raw material prices and related access fees. 

Pacifical stands to be an important supplier of certified product but will also face increasing competition from other MSC certified fisheries as major fishing and trading companies (Tri Marine, FCF, Dongwon) obtain their own certifications for purse seine fishing operations in the WCPO. These competing certifications will likely have a different pricing structure which is more palatable to brand owners (i.e. MSC premiums payable on the cost of raw material (i.e. $/tonne) rather than the Pacifical model where a premium is charged on finished goods (i.e. % of gross sales value)). Competing certifications will not have compulsory labelling requirements, which is a key feature of the Pacifical model. 

PICs needs to continue to conduct careful analysis of proposals from foreign companies expressing interest in investing in onshore processing developments. Companies considering making an onshore processing investment are usually doing so as a means to obtain beneficial access to fishing through guaranteed and/or discounted fishing licences. There are multiple cases of companies expressing interest in processing facilities in various Pacific Island countries which have not yet or are unlikely to come to fruition.

The Impracticability Exemption For Transhipment on the High Seas

Not long I wrote about a paper quantifying transhipment at sea, and some the failures around their management, since while they regulated (and in cases prohibited) by RFMOs, the decision making (and reporting) stays with the flag state. In the WCPFC the key word is the “Impracticability” as an Exemption to the WCPFC’s Prohibition on Transhipment on the High Seas. And to dig deeper on this issue a paper was tabled by the RMI delegation to the present TCC here in Majuro.

yet it mostly only two

I don't personally know the author Chris Wold from Lewis & Clark Law School, but I know well and respect a lot two colleagues that contributes to the study: Vivian Fernandes and Wez Norris, as well as Bubba Cook from WWF that commission it, and the product is excellent. I only have some small “operational side” criticism to it, which I comment at the end of the blog.

In any case, paper is luminating and put very good facts on issues we kind of know but can be accounted know. Basically the paper show that most of the issues we have are with a handful of Distant Water Fishing Nations, and show that the usual reason to justify the “Impracticability” of not transhipping at sea don't really hold any ground.

I totally recommend you download the paper as it is public and read it. I just will quote some of the key aspects in personal opinion.

The WCPF Convention and the WCPFC have also sought to limit transhipment at sea, but they have established different transhipment rules for purse seine vessels and other fishing vessels. The WCPF Convention expressly prohibits transhipment at sea (on the high seas and in a WCPFC Member’s territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by purse seine vessels operating within the WCPFC Convention Area.16 For longliners and other vessels, however, the WCPF Convention only requires WCPFC members and cooperating non-parties (collectively known as CCMs) to “encourage their vessels, to the extent practicable, to conduct transshipment in port. ”Through a binding conservation and management measure (CMM)—CMM 2009–06—the WCPFC prohibits longliners and other vessels from transhipping on the high seas except where CCM has determined that “it is impracticable for certain vessels . . . to operate without being able to tranship on the high seas.” 

CMM 2009–06 requires WCPFC Members to make vessel-specific determinations as to impracticability and submit a plan detailing the steps being taken to encourage transhipment in port. However, certain CCMs are not implementing either of these duties and transhipment on the high seas has become the norm rather than the exception.More than 50% of longline and other non-purse vessels are registered to tranship on the high seas and significant amounts of valuable tuna, including 36.9% of bigeye tuna, are transhipped on the highs seas. Clearly, CMM 2009–06 is not effectively reducing transhipment on the high seas.

Moreover, the evidence indicates that transhipment in port is not impracticable. Port infrastructure throughout the region is sufficient to support and supply fishing vessels.The purse seine fleet, which catches a significant amount of fish on the high seas,still manages to transship in port. At least three longline fleets—those of the EU, Japan, and the United States—fish on the high seas hundreds of nautical miles from port yet tranship all (EU and U.S.) or most (Japan) of their high seas catch in port.

A large number of high seas transhipments occur just outside the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of CCMs, suggesting that these vessels are able to travel a much shorter distance than the EU, U.S. and Japanese longliners do to transship in port and that they are moving from waters under national jurisdiction to the high seas in order to avoid monitoring by coastal State CCMs.

In fact, over the last two years, just three CCMs—China, Chinese Taipei, and Vanuatu—accounted for 84% and 89% of those transhipments in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Moreover, costs associated with transhipment in port are insignificant in relation to the costs of operating a tuna vessel. Fuel and labor costs do not fully explain an impracticability of transhipping in port as overcapacity may play a more significant role as evidenced by the profitability of the Japanese fleet.

Given the variables affecting profitability— operational costs, subsidies, over-capitalization—assessing whether transhipment in port causes “significant economic hardship” on a vessel-by-vessel basis is challenging. Even two factors that have been proposed recently for exemptions from a high seas transhipment ban—the lack of ultralow temperature (ULT) freezer capacity at some ports and the need to get fresh fish to market— are questionable.

Thus, this paper proposes replacement of the “impracticability” test with bright line rules. It begins with a presumption against transhipment on the high seas but allows, at least in the short term, exemptions to tranship ULT frozen fish from a fishing vessel to a carrier vessel with ULT freezer capacity and for fresh fish. However, it directs the WCPFC Secretariat to study whether ports have a shortage of ULT freezer capacity and whether carrier vessels can be placed in various ports to accept ULT frozen fish just as they would on the high seas. It also directs the Secretariat to identify the circumstances under which fresh fish needs to be transhipped in order to maintain a high-quality fish product.

In addition, and in sharp contrast to the current regime, the exemptions must be approved by the WCPFC; they cannot be unilaterally established. The abject failure of CCMs to comply with the WCPFC’s information requirements, including the submission of a plan to encourage transhipment in port, indicates that unilateral decision-making should be abandoned.

Moreover, to promote the implementation of a plan to encourage transhipment in port, exemptions may not be granted for more than three years. While a CCM may apply for a new exemption for a vessel at the end of the three years, presumably the WCPFC will want evidence that the CCM is implementing its plan before granting the exemption. 

Transhipment in Practice

Transhipment practice within the WCPFC varies by region and by CCM. Some CCMs, for example, prohibit transhipment at sea by all vessels in all circumstances, including the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA).

Other CCMs, however, are availing themselves of the exemption for transhipping at sea at a rate that indicates they are not making vessel-specific impracticability determinations. In 2016, for example, CCMs authorized 2,223 of 4,468 (49.75%) WCPFC-registered vessels to tranship on the high seas, including 58.2% of all longline vessels, 88.2% of all pole-and-line vessels, and 42.8% of carrier and bunker vessels. The percentage of vessels authorized to tranship on the high seas rose to 52% (2,431 out of 4,658 vessels) in 2017, with the majority of these vessels being longline vessels (1,831 vessels).

The number of reported high seas transhipment events has fluctuated from year to year between 2011 to 2016, with a high of 948 in 2016 and a low of 525 in 2012.The number of high seas transhipments, however, appears to be trending upwards. See Table 1 above. One possible reason is the move of some fleets from fishing in EEZs to the high seas due to increasing costs of fishing in the EEZs of some Pacific Island States.

All reported high seas transhipments in 2015 and 2016 were conducted by fishing vessels registered to just 5 CCMs—China, Korea, Chinese Taipei, Vanuatu, and Japan—but the vessels of China, Chinese Taipei, and Vanuatu accounted for 84% and 89% of those transhipments in 2015 and 2016, respectively. See Table 2 above. As 22 of the 24 registered longline vessels flagged by Vanuatu are owned by individuals or companies in China and Chinese Taipei,it may be possible to attribute an even greater portion of high seas transhipments to those two CCMs.

High seas transhipments in 2016 accounted for a large percentage of the catches for certain species, including 25.3% of albacore, 36.9% of bigeye tuna, and 10% of yellowfin tuna. The proportion of high seas catch relative to catch limits appears to be even greater when the small number of vessels transhipping on the high seas is considered: just 352 fishing vessels of the more than 3,100 non-purse seine fishing vessels registered to fish in the WCPFC Convention Area accounted for the catch transhipped on the high seas in 2016.

Yet, according to the annual reports of CCMs, some longline fleets rarely, if ever, transship on the high seas. For example, 23 CCMs reported that vessels they flag fish on the high seas, but just 7 of these CCMs (including carrier vessels from Liberia and Panama) reported that vessels they flag tranship on the high seas. The 157 U.S. and 446 Japanese longline vessels rarely tranship on the high seas. In fact, no U.S. vessels transhipped on the high seas in 2014, 2015, and 2016; Japanese vessels reported just 31, 29, and 28 high seas transhipments in those years.

Significantly, these vessels typically fish far from the ports in which they land their fish. U.S. tuna longline vessels fish up to 1,000 nautical miles from Honolulu, although most trips are within 500 nautical miles, yet land their catch in Honolulu.Japanese longline vessels focus their fishing in tropical waters easily more than 1,000 nautical miles from Japan,yet land their catch back in Japan.

Conclusion

This paper proposes replacement of the “impracticability” test with a presumption against transhipment on the high seas. It allows, however, time-limited exemptions to ensure transhipment of ULT frozen fish from a fishing vessel to a carrier vessel and for fresh fish.

However, it directs the Secretariat to study the circumstances under which these exemptions are needed; the exemptions expire unless these studies conclude that the exemptions are necessary. In addition, and in sharp contrast to the current regime, the exemptions must be approved by the WCPFC; they cannot be unilaterally established.

The process that applies to exemptions for purse seine vessels would be applied to all other vessels. Moreover, to allow the WCPFC to review implementation of such plans to encourage transhipment in port, exemptions may not be granted for more than three years, although CCMs may apply for a new exemption at the end of the three years. Only through such a process can the WCPFC help minimize IUU fishing, prevent human rights abuses, and reduce opportunities for human trafficking and smuggling of guns, drugs, and wildlife. At the same time, it will help Pacific Island States develop their ports and economies.

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If I was to criticize something is only from the operational side. I don't think enough differentiations and alignment was made in between transshipping defined as “vessel to vessel” and “landing and containerization”, this latest practice while sometimes referred as transshipment, but is not. Furthermore, as soon as the fish leaves the boat and is landed (even if in a custom bonded wharf) all sorts of market access and trade implications arise.

Furthermore the excuse that ports don't have ULT (Ultra Low Temp -50C for sashimi) capacity should affect transshipment, since if the fish is being “transhipped”, then by definition is not being landed, so what does the port as to do with it… if anything (from my experience) if you want to transship ULT fish in between vessels, is much easier (and more importantly safer) to do it in the protected water of a port, rather in the high seas where you are way more exposed to weather events and rain (at -50C fresh water drops causes marks on the fish skin affecting value). 

The WCPFC Technical and Compliance Committee here in Majuro

I’m back in Majuro under my work as aOffshore Fisheries Advisor with MIMRA. Normally it is busy time but is just only us…. Yet this time is really busy! Besides having 12 Purse Seiners in the Lagoon (+ 3 arriving over the next few days), and 7 carriers; RMI is hosting the Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC) of the WCPFC… and everyone and his dog is here. Majuro is booked out!

The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) supports three subsidiary bodies; the Scientific Committee, Technical and Compliance Committee, and the Northern Committee, that each meet once during each year. The meetings of the subsidiary bodies are followed by a full session of the Commission that is in December (this year in Honolulu)

I’ve never been in a commission meeting, since it is normally only for either staff from the members countries, people form the commission, regional organizations and approved observers (mostly NGOs) and while I have worked for pretty much everyone one of those, as an independent consultant (and mostly operationally) I don’t fit in the picture, yet I know a lot of people that are the picture!

Thankfully MIMRA’s boss Mr Glen Joseph  has been a total champion with me, he really support my ideas and ways> I’m totally honoured that he invited me to be part of the RMI delegation, so I will join them for some areas of interest (FADs, PSM and compliance scheme), while we keep working with all the rest of the normal jobs that need to happen for us! Yet for TCC I’m more than happy to helping with: fixing the boarding boat, reading with some policy briefs and picking up people for the airport!

Hence yes, I’m quite exited, even if I was told by everyone that I will find it really slow and frustrating, but that is part of the deal, and something I need to learn about.

Many people says that RFMO are too confidential… yet all the documentation for TCC is available on line, as well as for the 3rd meeting of the WCPFC FAD Management Options IWG, that is the other meeting I will be involved.

So yes, this are my next couple of weeks! If you are one of those that read this and we never meet before come and say hello! I know my way around the place and have the right places and times for a surf, a swim, a yoga session, some healthy food, good sashimi, and even some pizzas with my host family!