A new Market Access requirement by the US by Francisco Blaha

Under the Fish and Fish Product Import Provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, exporters of fish and fish products to the United States must now follow the same protective rules for marine mammal bycatch as domestic fishing operations, even if they dont have the same issues.

Marine mammals interacting with a fisherman and his kids :-)

Marine mammals interacting with a fisherman and his kids :-)

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has issued a final rule that, effective 1 January 2017, will revise its regulations to implement the import provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act. NOAA states that under this rule U.S. trading partners will need to show that killing or injuring marine mammals incidental to fishing activities (bycatch) in their export fisheries do not exceed U.S. standards. There will be an initial five-year exemption period to give nations time to assess their marine mammal stocks and estimate and lower their bycatch.

Among other things, this rule establishes procedures and conditions for evaluating a harvesting nation’s regulatory programme addressing marine mammal incidental mortality and serious injury in fisheries that export fish and fish products to the United States to determine if it is comparable in effectiveness to the U.S. regulatory programme (even if it uses different mechanisms).

Harvesting nations will be required to apply for and receive, every four years (after the initial five-year exemption period), a comparability finding for each fishery identified by NOAA in the List of Foreign Fisheries to export fish and fish products to the United States. Notably, imports of fish and fish products from fisheries that do not receive a comparability finding or have had a previous finding terminated will be banned.

Any such import prohibition will become effective 30 days after publication of a notice in the Federal Register announcing the comparability finding and will only apply to fish and fish products caught or harvested in that fishery.

NOAA, in consultation with the U.S. Department of State and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, will consult with harvesting nations that fail to receive a comparability finding for a fishery, provide the reasons for the denial, and encourage the harvesting nation to take corrective action and reapply for a comparability finding. A harvesting nation may, at any time, reapply for or request the reconsideration of a denied comparability finding for a fishery and submit documentary evidence in support of such application or request.

Harvesting nations will have to follow certain procedures and meet certain conditions to receive a comparability finding. For export fisheries operating within a harvesting nation’s exclusive economic zone or the territorial waters of that nation, the conditions include:

  • marine mammal stock assessments that estimate population abundance for marine mammal stocks in waters under its jurisdiction that are incidentally killed or seriously injured in the export fishery;
  • an export fishery register containing a list of all vessels participating in the export fishery under the jurisdiction of the harvesting nation, including the number of vessels participating and information on gear type, target species, fishing season and fishing area;
  • various regulatory requirements (e.g., including copies of relevant laws, decrees and implementing regulations or measures);
  • implementation of monitoring procedures in export fisheries designed to estimate incidental mortality and serious injury of marine mammals in each export fishery under its jurisdiction, as well as estimates of cumulative incidental mortality and serious injury for marine mammal stocks in waters under its jurisdiction that are incidentally killed or seriously injured in the export fishery and other export fisheries with the same marine mammal stock, including an indication of the statistical reliability of those estimates;
  • calculation of bycatch limits for marine mammal stocks in waters under its jurisdiction that are incidentally killed or seriously injured in an export fishery; and
  • comparison of the incidental mortality and serious injury of each marine mammal stock or stocks that interact with the export fishery in relation to the bycatch limit for each stock, as well as comparison of the cumulative incidental mortality and serious injury of each marine mammal stock or stocks that interact with the export fishery and any other export fisheries of the harvesting nation showing that these export fisheries
    • (i) do not exceed the bycatch limit for that stock or stocks, or
    • (ii) exceed the bycatch limit for that stock or stocks but the portion of incidental marine mammal mortality or serious injury for which the exporting fishery is responsible is at a level that, if the other export fisheries interacting with the same marine mammal stock or stocks were at the same level, would not result in cumulative incidental mortality and serious injury in excess of the bycatch limit for that stock or stocks.

For export fisheries operating within the jurisdiction of another state, the conditions include:

  • with respect to any transboundary stock interacting with the export fishery, any measures to reduce the incidental mortality and serious injury of that stock that the United States requires its domestic fisheries to take with respect to that transboundary stock; and
  • with respect to any other marine mammal stocks interacting with the export fishery while operating within the jurisdiction of the state, any measures to reduce incidental mortality and serious injury that the United States requires its domestic fisheries to take with respect to that marine mammal stock.

The rule allows NOAA to consider, during the initial five-year exemption period, an emergency ban on imports of fish and fish products from an export or exempt fishery that are having or are likely to have an immediate and significant adverse impact on a marine mammal stock. In addition, it establishes provisions for intermediary nations to ensure that they do not import and re-export to the United States fish or fish products subject to an import prohibition.

Now, how small development coastal states whose fisheries have very limited interaction with marine mammals would be able to prove all this while doing all the other thinkgs they are expected to do, is the eternal dilemma of fisheries development.  All this comes as another addition to their burden of having to prove themselves innocent of problems that they didn't create.

have no issues with protecting marine mammals, yet I’ll like to see trade measures to countries that support inequality, withholding drugs for communicable diseases based on IP, war (just search Aleppo war and images in Google), and so on. Equally important areas if you wish, were the same high moral ground consumers are bystanders.

Sources: here, here

World Tuna Day announced by UN by Francisco Blaha

The United Nations General Assembly has voted today to make May 2nd World Tuna Day.

is more than just a fish... is life for the pacific islands. (Pic by my brother Hugh Walton)

is more than just a fish... is life for the pacific islands. (Pic by my brother Hugh Walton)

The Parties to the Nauru Agreement have been pushing to establish an internationally recognised event for the past five years.  The United Nations General Assembly voted without objection to ratify a resolution on World Tuna Day that had been endorsed by nearly 100 nations prior to today’s vote at UN headquarters in New York City. Ambassadors from PNA nations attended the vote.

Tuna is a primary source of revenue for Pacific Island governments and is a key part of food security in the region and World Tuna Day helps strengthen the voice of Pacific nations striving to ensure their succeses and challenges are part of the global tuna conversation.

As the resource owners of the regions multi-billion-dollar fishery, it is clearly important that Pacific knowledge, progress and experiences must lead the global tuna conversations. And tuna is keeping the Pacific working, with jobs in the fisheries sector rising from 10,500 in 2010 to an estimated 19,000 in the present.  Added to that, while just under 20% of the tuna catch in the Pacific EEZs is caught by domestic fleets, that is still a rising trend, on top of another area of increase-- the amount of the catch being processed on shore, where the majority of the jobs are filled by women.

A range of factors lead to these upward trends, amongst them an ability to implement at national level the results of regional agreements and actions for fisheries licensing, compliance, and monitoring policies, and management measures 

Our challenge in the region is to continue this growth, including extending it to a broader range of the membership and to all fisheries.  The success of the PNA members in leveraging huge returns from the purse seine fishery is our collective inspiration for also reforming and benefiting more from long lining for example.  

And of course, fisheries are not all rosy.  The Pacific faces numerous and substantial challenges including the overfished status of bigeye tuna, marginal economic status of albacore and concerted attacks on pacific islands sovereign rights from distant water fishing nations.  

A Skipper of Interest (SoI) is better that Vessels of Interest (VoI). by Francisco Blaha

 

Usually when driving a car and you get an infraction, is you the one that get the fine, not the car. The more fines you have the bigger the fines, in fact it will lead to your driver’s license being removed for even longer period of time. So why we focus on the boat in the fisheries equivalent, is the skipper that is responsible for what the boat and crew does.

You are of interest.

You are of interest.

So I’m quite pleased that the pacific nations are initiating a watch list of vessel masters linked to the WCPFC IUU vessel blacklist. The move to strengthen tracking of IUU fishing vessels with another layer of information listing vessel masters, is hoping to gain traction amongst Tuna Commission members. 

 "At the moment we blacklist boats that have been caught illegally fishing, but as we all know, it is the people on board that are actually doing the wrong thing.  The Persons of Interest (POI) watch list will help detect vessel masters slipping through the current IUU vessel blacklist and going on to lead rogue fishing from another vessel", says FFA DG James Movick. 

FFA members first raised the idea of Persons of Interest being added to the Vessels of Interest lists at the WCPFC Technical and Compliance session this year. Their concerns over compliance by vessel crew at the centre of actual IUU activity, rather than the vessel used to carry it out, are behind the new concept.

 “FFA members have been strongly supportive of the WCPFC IUU blacklist, and the ability to identify vessels that have operated illegally and hold them to account, but we recognise a more important body of work is being able to identify the individuals who drive those vessels, and are interested in putting a far greater emphasis the master and owner,” says Movick. 

Members are looking to deal with this in two ways- by increasing the WCPFC measure to include information about the name and nationality of the master on the IUU blacklist; “and to run some internal work amongst ourselves to increase the level of information we have on the FFA Vessel Register, so we have specific details on the master of each vessel.”

Tracking performance of individuals in charge of vessels will not just focus on IUU, but help ensure countries refine the approach for prioritising dealings with compliant vessels, so that both ends of the compliance spectrum are covered, says DG Movick.

 “Obviously, our members want that information to help them make licensing decisions, especially when it comes to licensing one vessel over another,” he says.   The new persons of interest data layer will build on the current FFA database feeding the FFA Regional Surveillance Picture, or RSP. 

 “The regional surveillance picture provides a rich layer of information tracking location, activity and vessels including their license information, compliance rating and previous boardings,” says Movick, “soon, this will be yet another piece of information that FFA members will have at their disposal.” 

FFA members have already advised the WCPFC plenary of work underway on the issue, and welcomed advice from any Commission members doing similar work. 

They’ve asked the Commission Secretariat, where available, to include names of vessel masters on the WCPFC IUU Vessel list

The FFA press release is here: http://www.ffa.int/node/1861 

Fisheries Observer Safety Measure is finally agreed at WCPFC13 by Francisco Blaha

This has been (unfortunately) a long fight, after 5 fisheries observer deaths in the last 6 years, a very disputed CMM (like a law) on the safety of observers while on board was finally accepted today at WCPFC meeting

United they stand...  
 

 
 
 
Normal
0




false
false
false

EN-AU
JA
X-NONE

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 <w:LatentStyles DefLockedState="false" DefUnhideWhenUsed="true"
DefSemiHidden="true" DefQFormat="false" DefPriority=…

United they stand...  ©FFA

Fisheries Observers are the frontline of management and compliance evaluation in the pacific fishery, and their safety is paramount. Read for your self if anything is beyond the minimum anyone at sea will expect

Nevertheless, there was fierce opposition by Japan based on tenuous (allegedly unsubstantiated legal arguments), China (who wanted psychological and medical reports – something they don't ask from their own crew) and similar pathetic arguments by Taiwan and Korea… the usual DWFN suspects .

In an unprecedented move the Pacific nations took a stand for the 'invisible' frontline of human observers watching over fisheries practice in our oceanic fisheries. WCPFC Chair Rhea Moss-Christian confirmed a vote on a proposed Observer Safety CMM tabled by the US, after it stalled in plenary without reaching consensus, due to domestic legislation reasons given by Japan. 

However, Commission Observers WWF and the FFA bloc of all Pacific members at the Commission made it clear the time for waiting was over. "There is not another way forward," said FFA's Wez Norris before the Chair's decision to hold the vote starting 6.10pm Fiji-time. "The discussions have been had, the works been done, the drafting's been drafted." The strong condemnation from all Pacific members and call for a vote has put the Commission in no doubt that when it comes to the safety of nearly 300 Pacific Observers watching over our tuna fishery, human life can't wait.

It would have been the 2nd time the commission would have gone to a vote in their history. But at the end Japan conceded and consensus prevailed.

Bubba takes a stand...&nbsp;&nbsp;©FFA

Bubba takes a stand...  ©FFA

My colleague Bubba Cook from WWF has been a big supporter of the observer’s measure (he already supported the distribution of a safety 2 way communication device for the e-observer app, so we get the reports on real-time, as well as any emergencies on board). "We've heard a lot about 'domestic restraints' this week.” He said… “Prove it, make evidence available. Provide facts, show us the laws. Don't make blind assertions, it wastes the time of everyone here”

"I am sorry for being angry -- but this is about people”, he said... and I agree totally… it is about people.

So may times I said, that I don't work with fish, I work with the people that work with fish. Nothing is going to change if don’t address the people factor first. 

A maori proverb says it clearly:
He aha te mea nui o te ao (What is the most important thing in the world?) 
He tangata, he tangata, he tangata (It is the people, it is the people, it is the people)

Anyone that has spend time in the Pacific knows that.

I wrote about an observer lost at sea here, one of the hardest days in my life.

FFA block cites 'management failure' of WCPFC by Francisco Blaha

Pacific Islands members have pulled no punches on the critical state of Bluefin Tuna stocks in the Northern part of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean fishery, citing lack of progress from the Commissions Northern Committee as  "nothing short of a management failure".  

L1080280.jpg

2016 stock assessments for Pacific Bluefin tuna confirm continued low stock levels, with the spawning stock biomass now at a perilously low level of 2.6% of unfished levels. In response, the Northern Committee at its September meeting in Japan(link is external) had recommended taking up a harvest strategy and catch limits- but not to be negotiated until next year.

There was a resounding rejection from the FFA bloc of the Northern Committee's hopeful projections and 'business as usual' scenario as their agenda item came up at the morning plenary marking the mid-way point of the annual Commission meeting. FFA members say the Northern Committee is not fulfilling its mandate, and raised their voices with enough momentum to force the Committee to reconvene at WCPFC13 and offer a solution to calm frustrations.

"The failure of the Northern Committee to sustainably manage the very stock they were set up to protect is quite frankly, bringing the whole of the WCPFC into disrepute," says FFA Director General James Movick. "FFA member countries have no role in that fishery, and its management has deliberately been kept separate - and we are now facing the consequences of international scorn for failing to manage the Bluefin fishery."

While any Commission decisions on this stock must be based on recommendations from the Northern Committee, some FFA members have gone so far as to imply that they will take the Bluefin decision to the Commission’s first ever vote if they have to. 

He says the strong responses from FFA members in plenary at the deferred approach from the Northern Committee mirrored "strong frustrations from members that this decision making process from Northern Committee to Commission means we have a Convention which gives particular protection to the culture of inaction."

"The Northern Committee has failed to develop meaningful management recommendations and as a Commission, we failed to hold the Northern Committee to the same standards that are adopted for the other stocks we manage, and we have got to do better," FFA members told the Commission plenary. 

Other fisheries stocks around the world have been slapped with commercial fisheries bans to bring them back from similar low levels. While the current management measure for Pacific Bluefin 2015-04 includes a requirement to develop emergency rules in in the event of a recruitment failure, the Northern Committee has failed to do so. 

"Commission members from all sides, and the Northern Committee in particular, have been warned in no uncertain language, that Pacific nations haven't fished Bluefin because there is no Bluefin to fish. Saying it’s just too hard to address that challenge is simply not an option,” says Movick

Source here

Solid opening from the Solomon Islands at the WCPFC13 by Francisco Blaha

You all know I'm very partial to the Solomon Islands, is like a 2nd home to me, and the Tuna town of Noro exemplify what I believe fisheries should be in the Pacific. So I was very proud to read the transcript of the stern opening address that my colleague Ferral Lasi, Undersecretary (Technical) to the Ministry of Fisheries delivered today at the opening of the WCPFC. I quote it below:

Don't disappoint the fish owners WCPFC13

Don't disappoint the fish owners WCPFC13

Solomon Islands would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the work of the Chair and WCPFC Secretariat who have so ably directed the work of the Commission over the last 12 months. We recognise that this is a very challenging task due to the sheer size of the Commission and the different interest of members.

We also would like to take this opportunity to express our sincere appreciation and thanks to the government of Fiji as host for WCPFC 13 in terms of background preparatory work, organizing, and arranging for the meeting to be held in this magnificent venue. The hospitality that we have received since our arrival here in Fiji has been very warm and friendly.

Madam Chair, we note the long list of agenda items that is before us. Some of the critical issues on the agenda need decisive action to be taken during this Commission meeting.

The Solomon Islands believes that the Commission needs to be take strong action on the following critical issues:

  1. Radical management initiatives are needed to address the severely overfished Northern Bluefin tuna fishery. The current status of this stock is an embarrassment to this Commission and an indictment on the Northern Committee.
  2. A new CMM to give greater protection to the health and safety of our observers is urgently needed. The Solomon Islands is very concerned at the unmanaged risks being faced by observers.
  3. Progress needs to be made on the development of Harvest Strategies for all tuna species. Solomon Islands places a high priority for the development of Harvest Strategies for Skipjack Tuna and Southern Albacore tuna. Agreement on a target reference point for Southern Albacore and risk levels for all tuna species at this years meeting would signal real progress. 
  4. Solomon Island sees the need to progress the reform of the Compliance Management Scheme (CMS) as absolutely critical.  We believe the existing CMS is not as effective or efficient as it could be and most importantly we believe that it is unfair to SIDS.  
  5. An agreement on the process to develop bridging CMMs for both the Tropical Tunas and Southern Albacore will be critical the future success of the Commission. 

Madam Chair the Solomon Islands is committed to constructively working with all members to achieve outcomes on these critical issues and on other agenda items.

Solomon Islands re-affirms its commitment to the Commission to ensuring long term sustainability of highly migratory species through the effective implementation of WCPFC CMMs.

In-line with this commitment and as part of the PNA plus Tokelau initiative we would like to inform the Commission that we are implementing the long-line VDS in our national waters as of 1st Jan 2017. Key components of the long-line VDS are e- reporting and e-monitoring. We are confident that these developments will not only enhance compliance monitoring and data quality for science but also improve long-line fishery management as a whole.

The Solomon Islands looks forward to the day when the Commission implements compatible long-line measures for the High Seas.

Finally Madam Chair I wish you every success as you guide us all through this very challenging Commission meeting.

Thankyou and God bless.

PNA put its cards at the WCPFC 13 table by Francisco Blaha

As part of the FFA members states, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) met also in Nadi to finalize their own strategy for the 13th WCPFC annual meeting that opens Monday 5 December in Denarau, Fiji.

Charlin from the Solomons (part of PNA), does her bit to control the Longliners

Charlin from the Solomons (part of PNA), does her bit to control the Longliners

PNA will reiterate its call on the WCPFC to exercise management on the high seas over both longline and purse seine vessels as part of PNA’s push to see the Commission adopt a “harvest control strategy” for tuna and a bridging measure to extend and improve an existing Tropical Tuna Conservation Management Measure that expires at the end of 2017.

There are numerous areas in which the eight PNA members and Tokelau will be engaging with members of the WCPFC. PNA's strategy at the WCPFC is based on the resource rights owners taking control of their fishery to benefit economically and conserve it by ensuring sustainable practices, and pushing the WCPFC to bring the high seas fishery under similar control and sustainable management, and while fishing in PNA 200-mile exclusive economic zones is now well-regulated and controlled, the same cannot be said of high seas fishing.

“The longline fishery in our region is out of control,” said Mr. Kumoru (PNA's Boss). Catch volumes are under-reported and there is little verification by independent observers, in part because of high seas transshipment of tuna. “All this adds up to a poorly managed fishery that needs to be addressed by the WCPFC,” he said. “PNA has pushed in the past, and will continue to lobby for a ban on high seas transshipment of frozen bigeye and increasing over time fisheries observer coverage on longline vessels to 20 percent.”

PNA officials agree it is obvious from recent fishing trends on the high seas that flag state controls are not working. The WCPFC needs to adopt a “hard limit” on the number of fishing days for purse seiners on the high seas. Meanwhile, PNA has already begun rolling out a vessel day scheme (VDS) for the longline industry that is similar to its successful VDS that governs the purse seine fishery.

Other key points for PNA include:

The ongoing non-compliance of several distant water fishing nations with WCPFC requirements for providing operational catch data. Although all island members of the WCPFC provide catch data as required, several distant water fishing nations continue to violate these Commission requirements. The lack of data is serious management gap and is a critical problem for scientists evaluating the status of tuna stocks in the region.“The aim is to reduce the burden of data provision by small islands, while getting distant water fishing nations to comply with the rules of membership".

PNA will not agree to adding an additional month to the existing three-month fish aggregating device (FAD) moratorium for in-zone fishing because this will cause a disproportionate burden on a number of small islands whose fisheries revenue depends on FAD fishing.

PNA will not accept “capacity limits” on fishing vessels, which PNA views as an attempt by distant water fishing nations to limit island ownership of vessels and greater participation in the fishery.

They play hard, and good on them!

Getting ready for 13th session of the WCPFC by Francisco Blaha

This is a busy time for the Pacific fisheries administrators, as they gear up in meetings going through a long list of proposals at their final round of preparatory sessions in Nadi this week before they meet with the big fishing nations on December 5th for the 13th Session of the WCPFC.

Meetings...&nbsp;

Meetings... 

My friends in FFA work quite hard to try to find common approaches among its members, to put on the table proposals for CMM (Conservation and Management Measures) that should become "law" among their members. So the Officials from the 17 member nations are spending this week working through the detail and discussing strategic engagement on each proposed measure they have tabled.

Accordingly to FFA's inside news, WCPFC 13 will look at a substantive list including those from the Pacific focused around improving ways to roll out a Harvest Strategy Approach aimed at better management measures covering regional tuna stocks - Bigeye, Yellowfin, Albacore and Skipjack. Fisheries Officials from the 17 member nations of the Forum Fisheries Agency are spending this week working through the detail and discussing strategic engagement on each proposed measure they have tabled.

 While FFA members are firmly committed to the Harvest Strategy Approach, they are fully aware that comprehensive harvest strategies for all the key tuna species will take a number of years. So FFA members are turning their minds to putting in place strong interim arrangements for tropical tuna stocks as well as albacore that will stay in place until full harvest strategies are complete. One of their key focuses has been preparing for the development of new Tropical Tuna measure to replace the existing measure that expires at the end of 2017.

Observer safety proposed as a CMM by the US at WCPFC12, has also been highlighted as a key concern for the FFA bloc, who gave the issue of the safety and welfare of Fisheries Observers high priority during their July Ministerial in Vanuatu. All of the observers in the pacific are locals, hence is a simple message "these are our people and they must be afforded safe and harmonious working conditions".  The US drafted a CMM on Observer Safety that is tabled, but Pacific nations have a number of outstanding issues and concerns.  So they will have to work with others to support adoption at the Commission table.”

Proposals from the 17-country FFA bloc to the WCPFC13 cover:

Target Reference Point for South Pacific Albacore- Establishment of a Target Reference Point for the stock to provide an agreed target for the management of the fishery. Citing the SPC science showing that continued current fishing levels will result in further decline of the stock, FFA members say reductions in catch and effort are necessary to ensure a healthy stock and profitable albacore fishery. Another proposal by FFA members seeks to separate South Pacific Albacore from the proposed new Tropical Tuna CMM and create a standalone albacore CMM that limits the total catch of albacore.

Rules for High Seas areas –Backed up by the findings of the Pacific IUU report, FFA members are back with revisions to a proposal tabled at WCPFC12 seeking better fisheries management for the six High Seas areas in the WCPO. Fisheries management on the high seas of the WCPFC is one of the highest responsibilities of the Commission, as per article 8.4 of its founding convention. The proposed High Seas Areas CMM aims to strengthen the management of the Longline fishery and complement the rules for purse seine vessels covering transshipment at sea, and the PNA licensing condition preventing licensed vessels from fishing in the two western high seas pockets.

 Harvest Strategy Levels of risk (interim) FFA members propose this measure to provide a ‘starting point’ for the acceptable levels of risk of breaching limit reference points for yellowfin, skipjack, and south Pacific albacore. It’s a highly technical element of the harvest strategy approach, but is necessary to guide further work on the Harvest Strategy Workplan adopted by the WCPFC last year, and is aimed at helping Commission members decide how it will design harvest control rules and set target reference points.

Enhanced Port-based Monitoring, Control and Surveillance: FFA members are building on their 2015 proposal and flagging a revised version seeking enhanced port based MCS Initiatives to assist with procedures and capacity of Pacific nations to meet their obligations as Port States. The proposal also targets IUU- hoping to nab fish traceability and documentation gaps aboard licensed vessels dodging the rules for reporting.

As my colleague James Movick (FFA's boss) said: “There is little doubt among the Pacific nations that getting any proposal over the line involves focused, strategic engagement with an ability to recognise opportunities and read shifting positions. This is the annual negotiation meeting upon which the future of the pacific Tuna fishery rests, and FFA members remain committed to ensuring meaningful outcomes. Achieving that remains a major challenge.”

I salute all my friends and colleagues at the sessions, I truly support and admire their efforts for the "full on" next couple of weeks they have.

Kia kaha! (Maori for "Be Strong " in the meaning of offering encouragement to succeed when troubled)

 

How to find a Fishing Vessel anywhere in the world (as long as it has its IAS on) by Francisco Blaha

In September I wrote about the public beta version of Global Fishing Watch (GFW) that is available to anyone with an Internet connection and allows users to monitor when and where commercial “apparent fishing activity" is occurring around the world.

They added a feature that may help some people doing intelligence analysis. If you now the name or identity of a specific vessel you would like to find, here’s a step-by-step guide on how to find it.

Is important to understand that AIS is not a specific Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS), that is a general term to describe systems that are used in commercial fishing to allow environmental and fisheries regulatory organizations to track and monitor the activities of fishing vessels.

GFW uses data about a vessel’s identity, type, location, speed, direction and more that is broadcast using the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and collected via satellites and terrestrial receivers. But the AIS unit can be switch off anytime...

AIS was developed for safety/collision-avoidance. It is a maritime navigation safety communications system standardized by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that provides vessel information, including the vessel’s identity, type, position, course, speed, navigational status and other safety-related information automatically to appropriately equipped shore stations, other ships and aircraft; automatically receives such information from similarly fitted ships; monitors and tracks ships; and exchanges data with shore-based facilities.

AIS use for fisheries compliance and MCS is argued quite substantially, it can be useful in my opinion as backup system when VMS fail (until vessels come to port) of when operating in the High Seas. And while AIS is not as fisheries specific as VMS, the fact that one can individualise a vessel anywhere in the world, can only be good!

Furthermore one can "visualize" the "fishing effort", anywhere in the world is truly remarkable, and brings home the incredible amount of Chinese and Taiwanese vessels that they are fishing in the Pacific. 

Stock Assessment and harvest strategies explained in a simple way (2) by Francisco Blaha

I was truly encouraged by the number of visits to the Stock Assessment and Harvest Strategies explained in a simple way (Part 1) blog post of Dr. Ian Knuckey very didactic videos.  So here is the final lot of 6 videos.

The stock assessment and harvest strategy determination is key for sustainability, and is no way that the assumptions are going to be right, without the full collaboration and the insider's knowledge of industry. I wish that this message was understood by many more (particularly the DWFN). But we will get there either by reason... or force

Enjoy.

Catch Per Unit / Effort

Collecting Fisheries Data

The Black Box

Opening the Black Box

Harvest Strategies

Fisheries Economics

Stock Assessment and harvest strategies explained in a simple way (1) by Francisco Blaha

Part of the idea behind this blog was to provide information on different aspects of fisheries since it involves so many areas from social sciences to engineering, via economics and enforcement just to name a few! But one of the more "obscure" areas to make accessible is Fisheries Biology and Stock Assessment... which are key ingredients in the complex recipe of Fisheries Management.

I have never actually met Ian Knuckey, even if we have a lot of acquaintances and colleges in common and have done work for the same organizations, so when I came across his excellent series of 12 videos explaining some aspects of the biology and population dynamics of fish, fisheries data, fisheries stock assessments, harvest strategies and fisheries economics. I contacted him to ask him if I could post about them, to which he kindly agreed.

I liked the videos a lot and watched them with my science-savvy kids (11 and 14) so I relate totally to the introduction the 1st fisherman does. Ian and the production team manages to get rather obscure concepts into plain language, without loosing accuracy, and that is awesome. Furthermore, the fact that he uses real-life examples and local fisherman (from Australia- hence the accents are a bonus!), add to the "right to the point" feeling of the "lessons."

The length of the videos (all below 10') is also about right, to keep your attention focused/

If you ask me, this is the way to fight for sustainability in fisheries, don't come with paternalistic approaches, explain things in a way people can access it. I remember someone saying: "there are no complex subjects, there are complex explanations" so if we get to make explanations simple... we'll get there.

I present the 1st 6 today and the next 6 later on. Enjoy...

Meet the Fisherman

Schools of Fish - What is a stock?

Recruitment

Age and Growth

Mortality

Selectivity

Covenants with broken swords by Francisco Blaha

As said many times, the readership of this blog is always surprising. Hence thanks! Already a few people have sent me interesting stuff to blog about, which is quite cool. I got recently, a collaboration of Aksel Sundström, from the department of Political Sciences of the University of Gothenburg in Sweden that I like to share.

He tackles corruption at enforcement level in fisheries, which is a complex and controversial issue. I grow up in a very corrupt country, and my job takes me top countries that do not rank high in corruptions indexes like Transparency International but then, I have spent the last 21 years of my life in a country is one of the less corrupt ones. So I can see the issue from different angles.

I like the fact that he is tackling the issue from a political sciences background and his research was done in South Africa, a country at cultural crossroads.

An important issue I always bring up when the issue of corruption is discussed, it is like tango, it takes two for corruption. The one accepting it and the one offering it… and it is in my opinion, a mix of cultural issues as well as power imbalances and risk management.  

What I mean with risk? If the enforcer earns 100 and the issue at hand has a value of 1000, someone offers him 100 to look aside and if he gets caught no much happens… the incentive is clear. Now if the enforcer earns 1000 and if he gets caught he looses his job and gets publicly exposed… he is not going to accept 100 to risk 1000

If you expand this principle to other areas, is the same… I know people that are responsible for administering 5 million USD worth of catch access but earn lest that 40000 in a year… in no other area of management, you’ll see people earning less than 1% of the value of assets they manage… that is just not right and too much of a bait.

In any case here are some of the passages that I find more interesting of this article, and as my usual advice, read the original here.

Abstract
Insights into how corruption hampers law enforcement in the governance of common-pool resources are currently limited. This article develops our understanding of this process through confidential interviews with enforcement officials in South African fisheries. First, it outlines how inspectors become ‘‘blind and corrupt’’: They receive bribes from fishermen in the form of finance, food, or friendship, which they pay back through inadequate enforcement, information sharing, or involvement. Second, it shows that widespread bribery increases the costs of remaining honest: Inspectors face corruption in the judiciary, which makes the writing of fines useless because these disappear from bribery among clerks and judges in the enforcement chain. Moreover, they face corruption in their organization, where substation managers and actors in top management are engaged in bribery, sending signals that corruption has small consequences. The article concludes by discussing how corruption distorts regulations and the implications for governing the commons.

How to achieve cooperation that entails welfare for the collective, yet requires restrictions on the behavior of individuals, is a puzzle that continues to engage political theorists. Hobbes posited that covenants – promises to follow agreements of engaging in certain behavior – require an external agent to enforce such pledges with the threat of force ([1651]). Yet, research on governance of the commons has found numerous examples of when individuals manage to limit their use of resources without relying on enforcement by an outside agent (e.g. Ostrom, 1990). An illustration of self-organized institutions enforcing rules on common-pool resources (CPRs) – resources that are under rivalry and where exclusion is difficult, such as irrigation schemes or fisheries – are for instance herders on pasture lands who monitor each other’s behavior and successfully impose sanctions on those who break their pledges. The literature has therefore described the two situations of externally governed or self-governed enforcement of commitments as ‘‘covenants with or without swords’’.

When corruption is present in CPR regimes with government-imposed regulations, bribery may distort management. However, current literature lacks knowledge on how the presence of corruption affects public officials’ choice to enforce or not enforce regulations. The aim here is to contribute theoretically and empirically by exploring the mechanisms in which this process takes place.

In order to do so, the article poses two questions for research: First, in what way does corruption corrode enforcement of state-imposed CPR regulations? Second, in what way does corruption pose a further enforcement dilemma for inspectors in government authorities responsible for imposing CPR regulations?

Guided by these questions this study reports a qualitative exploration of these enforcement agents’ perceptions. The focus is on the enforcement of CPR regulations in a corrupt context, the fisheries law enforcement in South Africa. Confidential interviews where performed with public inspectors at the Compliance Directorate, of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). Also former inspectors – no longer facing risks for speaking openly – are interviewed, as well as former senior managers of this directorate and key stakeholders. The study offers a contrasting perspective to the literature on corruption and environmental outcomes where most studies use countries as the unit of study. Such a focus risks simplifying this relationship since single indicators hardly capture variation in levels of corruption and environmental health within countries and across sectors. This study follows the research vein of existing but scarce interest on the role of bribery in the governance of natural resources on the local level.

Discussion
This investigation provides theoretical nuances related to the first research question—in what way does corruption corrode enforcement. As fleshed out in these accounts, there are analytical categories that can improve our understanding of this process. Bribery involving resource users in this context seems to come in three distinct forms: finance, food, or friendship.

While these forms of bribes differ between each other – the first being monetary, the second being nonmonetary, and the third being an even more vaguely defined transaction – the three categories share that they all target inspectors to be blind to violations. These different forms of bribes illustrate that ‘‘corrupt behavior’’ – and more precisely, small-scale collusive corruption – may take varying shapes, ranging from material aspects to social practices. Moreover, the accounts suggest that the mechanisms in this process can be further nuanced analytically.

Enforcement agents seem to become blind in three different ways: Inspectors may engage in inadequate enforcement, practices that could include no monitoring at all, the intended misreporting of landings, or the systematic writing of faulty fines. They may also start to engage in information sharing, revealing details of secret operations. Finally, blindness to violations among such agents may take the shape of involvement, where enforcement officials take part in illegal actions through transporting goods, stealing catches, lending freezers for storage, or even poaching themselves.

Having found these mechanisms in the empirical accounts, it is also interesting to explore how they can be used to improve our theoretical understanding of this process. First, it can be noted that blindness could be understood through the work of Kahn et al. (2001). They make the conceptual distinction between temptations affecting a public official into two categories: shirking (the avoidance of duties) and corruption (the extraction of a bribe from an evader). The process of becoming blind and corrupt can therefore be seen as the process linking these phenomena. When an enforcement officer has received a bribe, this agent will shirk selectively to benefit certain resource users. Second, this more nuanced understanding of blindness to violations is important as it points to the fact that ‘‘not enforce’’ – one of the two choices of the state actor used in the game-like situations outlined by Gibson (1999) and Sjostedt (2014) – is a simplified understanding of defection in such interactions. It seems that blindness, rather than only a choice of not enforcing, consists of different strategies. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.

Here, I depict the three distinctive strategies that counter the choice to enforce regulations. Moreover, they differ from each other in their impact on other inspectors’ decisions, as there is possibly a rank order in how these different options affect management. Inadequate enforcement is the moderate obstacle for enforcement, affecting mostly the individual relationship between the inspector and a resource user. Information sharing on the other hand is understood as a larger impediment, potentially ruining other inspectors’ possibilities of enforcing regulations. Finally, the involvement of inspectors in poaching is perhaps the worst type of hurdle as it fundamentally turns the inspector into a complicit agent in the activities they should prevent. Moreover, the interviews inform us theoretically about the second question—how corruption becomes an obstacle in the inspectors’ enforcement work. First, inspectors face a context dilemma, making the writing of fines useless as these disappear from bribery among clerks and judges in the enforcement chain. Second, they face an organizational dilemma where substation managers and actors in top management of their own organization are known to be involved in corrupt behavior, thus further demotivating the inspectors. Signals from above indicate that it is accepted to enrich yourself and that there are few consequences if you get caught. This indicates that there are linkages from large-scale corruption that are important in order to understand the presence of small-scale practices of bribery.

Moreover, corruption in higher ranks of this organization renders whistle-blowing inefficient as inspectors risk telling someone involved in corruption. Also, becoming blind and corrupt gives advantages to individual inspectors as they become known among colleagues as people who can be included in shady transactions, sanctioned by substation managers. In tandem, the two dilemmas create disincentives to individual inspectors for honest behavior. Put differently, the choice of remaining honest and enforcing laws becomes much more costly for individuals when the presence of bribery has spread in the enforcement chain and in their own organization. In such settings it is more likely that enforcing agents will choose one of the defecting strategies discussed above. In relation to the findings of Akpalu et al. (2009) and de la Torre- Castro (2006) – showing that inspectors face social costs when enforcing regulations in a local community – this investigation helps us better understand bribery’s role in this relationship.

Much of the behavior that is analyzed in this article is taking place in a context with locally specific features. Yet, the key insights from this investigation are not necessarily limited to resources with the particular characteristics of the South African marine fisheries. The different forms of bribes discussed in this case – monetary as well as nonmonetary – may also be obstacles for enforcement in other settings where corruption is widespread. Moreover, the improved analytical depiction of the relationship between government inspectors and resource users may be used to better understand state-governed resource regimes with other characteristics, such as tropical forest reserves, where corruption may be a problem for management.

The insight that officers that enforce natural resource regulations are affected by corruption in the judiciary system as well as corruption within their own organization is also general enough to inform policy in a range of contexts and across various types of resource regimes. So what are the implications of these findings for our understanding of the governance of commons? On a more general level, the argument in this article was presented at the backdrop of the debate where scholars have depicted the choice of enforcement in CPR governance as one between covenants ‘‘with or without swords.’’ As a contrasting view this article has proposed that when bribery is prevalent in the agency imposing regulations on a CPR, this can be depicted as covenants ‘‘with broken swords.’’

As Table 1 illustrates, the situation of widespread corruption in law enforcement can be contrasted to the situation with a government enforcer with no corruption present. Importantly, the process outlined in this article clearly shows that in situations with corruption, the likelihood of achieving sustainable outcomes for management of CPRs is severely decreased. When regulations – the policy tools that are meant to steer behavior of resource appropriators – are not enforced due to widespread bribery, this will increase the probability of a ‘‘tragedy’’ where resources are overharvested.

Then how can the path in such situations be reversed? The results from the empirical investigation speaks to a general understanding among studies on corruption where government agents find it difficult to act honestly when bribery is endemic within and outside of the organization. The literature suggests that bureaucrats’ incentives for corrupt behavior is affected by perceptions of other bureaucrats’ behavior in the organization. This echoes previous findings where individual refusals to engage in bribery in a highly corrupt context are perceived as futile It is also compatible with an understanding that corruption can be described as a social dilemma, where it is rational for actors to partake in corrupt behavior if ‘‘everybody else’’ is perceived as doing it.

This is most likely an important point as it is imperative to keep such considerations in mind when discussing ways to reform corrupt authorities. For instance, as accounts indicated, corruption at the top of this department may influence the behavior of street-level employees. Reform programs targeting bribery among local enforcement officers on the ground may need to consider strategies where corruption in top management is also dealt with.

Conclusions
This article focuses on a problem that has been somewhat overlooked when political theorists and empirically oriented scholars have analyzed the challenge of monitoring in the governance of CPRs. While research holds that corruption produces suboptimal law enforcement, studies seldom investigate the way this takes place, and the government agents enforcing regulations are rarely at the center of analysis. It is here argued that corruption in enforcing authorities risks leading to a situation of covenants with broken swords. In such a condition, bribery corrodes the effectiveness of sanctions for noncompliance.

Using original data this article outlines some of the mechanisms of this process and develops our understanding of how widespread bribery becomes an enforcement obstacle. It also points to improvements in the analytical depiction of the relationship between government inspectors and resource users under widespread bribery. Illustrating the destructive effects from corruption on governance of the commons, these findings resonate a big challenge for scholars and policy-makers. How to tackle the fact that CPRs around the world – for instance, the tropical forest reserves that are key in global efforts to store carbon and protect biodiversity – are monitored by institutions that are infested with corruption?

Future research therefore has several tasks on its agenda.

First, to get a better diagnosis of this problem, it would be worthwhile to analyze if this case is comparable to other contexts. The research on corruption in local governance of CPRs still relies on a scarce number of in-depth studies and may benefit from a comparative approach across CPR regimes with external enforcing authorities. A pertinent issue for comparative research would be to disentangle the institutional circumstances under which we may find a situation of covenants with broken swords.

Second, to get an improved understanding of cures for such situations, it is essential to explore if there are institutional remedies that are successful in reducing corruption. There is also a need to study existing or future alternatives for monitoring when corruption in enforcement authorities is widespread. It has been said that ‘‘when state agencies are involved in corruption and rent-seeking, bottom-up initiatives may improve monitoring’’.

A future discussion on governance of CPRs would profit from investigating alternatives or complements to strategies of state-run enforcement of the commons.

Marine pollution originating from purse seine and longline fishing vessels by Francisco Blaha

Once in while we get in the news that some companies are fined for illegal waste dumping. In the pacific to my recollection is always in Pango Pango (American Samoa) last week an American based company was fined 1.6 millon USD, a few years ago NZ based Sanford endured the same issue in the same place.

Marine Pollution issues are “governed” by MARPOL 73/78 is the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978. ("MARPOL" is short for marine pollution and 73/78 short for the years 1973 and 1978.)

It was developed by the International Maritime Organization in an effort to minimize pollution of the oceans and seas, including dumping, oil and air pollution. The objective of this convention is to preserve the marine environment in an attempt to completely eliminate pollution by oil and other harmful substances and to minimize accidental spillage of such substances.

From my time in the fishing boats and from the workbooks I see from SPC/FFA fisheries observers that include a Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6 (See at the end of the post for an example). I assumed the issue must be substantial, even if nothing gets done with the findings (a bit like compliance issues). And unfortunately… I wasn’t wrong.

At last years WCPFC TCC (Technical and Compliance Committee) and group of SPREP lead by Kelsey Richardson presented a report on the issue. I quote it in the post… the original is here.

The report examines more than ten years of collected data on more than 10,000 pollution incidents by purse seine vessels and more than 200 pollution incidents by longline vessels within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of 25 Pacific countries and territories, and in international waters. The report finds that 71% of the reported purse seine pollution incidents related to Waste Dumped Overboard; 16% to Oil Spillages and Leakages; and 13% to Abandoned, Lost, or Dumped Fishing Gear.

When the category “Waste Dumped” was examined further; Plastics were found to make up the largest portion of total purse seine pollution incidents (37%). Only 4% of the incidents occurred in International Waters, while the rest occurred in the EEZs of Papua New Guinea (44%), Kiribati (13%), the Federated States of Micronesia (12%), Solomon Islands (7%), Marshall Islands (6%), Nauru (6%), and 19 other countries and territories in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.

While based on limited data, the report finds evidence that pollution from fishing vessels, particularly purse seine vessels, in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean is a serious problem and highlights the need for three initiatives:

  1. Increased monitoring, reporting, and enforcement of pollution violations by all types of fishing vessels, especially longliners, which currently have a very low (5%) mandatoryobserver coverage;

  2. A regional outreach and compliance assistance programme on marine pollution prevention for fishing vessel crews, business operators and managers; and

  3. Improvements in Pacific port waste reception facilities to enable them to receive fishing vessel wastes on shore.

This report provides the first consistent and substantive documented evidence about the nature and extent of ocean-based marine pollution in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. These incidents were all reported by regional fisheries observers through use of the Secretariat of the Pacific Commission/Pacific Islands Foreign Fisheries Agency (SPC/FFA) Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6.

The pollution reports are overwhelmingly biased to the purse seine fishery, due to high levels of observer coverage in the fishery, which is mandated by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). Prior to 2009, observer coverage for the purse seine fishery was around 5-8%, increased to 20% in 2009, and to 100% required coverage from 2010 to the present (P. Williams, personal communication, March 18, 2015, WCPFC, 2009). By contrast, observer coverage of the approximately 3,000 longline vessels operating in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean is only 5% for the entire fishery as of 2012 (WCPFC, 2014).

There is also likely to be some bias in observer reporting particularly through some observers not reporting MARPOL issues, although the extent of this bias is not yet known.

 The report is structured in seven sections.

  • Section I Introduction

  • Section II provides a background on ocean-based marine pollution.

  • Section III describes the history and structure of the SPC/FFA Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6.

  • Section IV describes and analyzes the pollution report data, including types, quantities and locations of pollution events.

  • Section V importantly highlights that pollution incidents by fishing vessels are not isolated to the purse seine fishery, but there is limited information and data for pollution activities by other fisheries, particularly the longline fishery, due to extremely low to no observer coverage in other fisheries. Thus, the pollution data analyzed in this report likely represents only a portion or snapshot of total pollution incidents by fishing vessels throughout the region.

  • Section VI addresses the need for revisions and updates to the current version of the SPC/FFA Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6, particularly the need for updates that more clearly communicate revisions to MARPOL Annex V which entered into force in 2013.

  • Section VII concludes the report and provides recommendations designed for a variety of stakeholders and policymakers to reduce incidents of marine pollution by fishing vessels in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. The report ends with suggestions for further data analysis and research.

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) is the strongest and most important international regulation to prevent sea-based sources of pollution, including pollution of oil (Annex I) and garbage (Annex V), arising from operational or accidental causes. Despite these regulations, there is limited actual monitoring of MARPOL, and, consequently, little information exists about illegal pollution activities by vessels at sea.

One study in Australia did find that in 1992 and 1993, at least one-third of fishing vessels with onboard observers did not comply with MARPOL regulations prohibiting the dumping of plastics overboard. Of the 14 Pacific island countries who are SPREP members, 11 are Contracting Parties to MARPOL Annexes I/II and V, and therefore have specific responsibilities to implement this important treaty to prevent pollution from ships, particularly in the forms of oil and garbage.

At the fourth SPC/FFA Tuna Fisheries Data Collection Committee in December 2000, SPREP submitted a request for fisheries observers to collect information on marine pollution. This resulted in the creation of the SPC/FFA Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6. Form GEN-6 was designed by SPREP in partnership with SPC and FFA as a tool to monitor fishing vessel violations to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).

Pollution categories were created based on MARPOL’s Annexes I and V which provide regulations for the prevention of pollution by oil and garbage by ships, respectively. SPC is responsible for maintaining and managing all observer data including the Form GEN-6 data which it started collecting in 2004. In March, 2015 SPREP requested access to the GEN-6 data from SPC and were provided with more than 10 years of data from 2003 through 2015.

Form GEN-6 documents marine pollution incidents by fishing vessels in three categories: Waste Dumped Overboard, Oil Spillages and Leakages, and Abandoned or Lost Fishing Gear. Each category has its respective subcategories, and revisions have occurred to improve reporting over the years, such as the addition of the category Abandoned or Lost Fishing Gear in 2009. Subcategories reported here are from the most current form, revised in March, 2014. Subcategories under Waste Dumped Overboard include: Plastics, Metals, Waste Oil, Chemicals, and General Garbage. Subcategories under Oil Spillages and Leakages include: Vessel Aground/Collision, Vessel at Anchor/Berth, Vessel Underway, Land-based Source and Other. Subcategories under Abandoned or Lost Fishing Gear include Lost during fishing, Abandoned, or Dumped.

The form provides an area to report whether there was information posted on and around the vessel about compliance with the latest revisions to MARPOL, as an indicator of vessel and crew awareness of MARPOL regulations. It also includes a section for ‘Other comments’ where observers can add more details about the pollution event. The reverse side of the form provides notes which clarify definitions and reporting areas. At the bottom of the form it is clearly stated for the observer that under MARPOL regulations “It is illegal for any vessel to discard any form of plastics into the sea at anytime; It is illegal for any vessel to discard any form of oil into the sea at anytime and It is illegal for any vessel to dump any form of rubbish into the sea within 12 nautical miles of the seashore.”

Since recent revisions to MARPOL Annex V entered into force in 2013, dumping of almost all garbage types which were previously allowed beyond the 12 nautical mile zone referenced by this note are now prohibited.

In addition to comments, observers are provided an area on the Form GEN-6 to describe the different types of pollution per category and material (subcategory), as well as to describe quantities. There are no standard categorical options for observers to report quantities of pollution and quantities are reported as written comments by observers, which complicates data analysis.

Table 1. Summary of Written Pollution Descriptions and Quantities as Reported by Observers

Table 1. Summary of Written Pollution Descriptions and Quantities as Reported by Observers

Figure 1 shows the pollution incidents mapped by the latitude and longitude positions given by observers at the time of reporting. The incidents are overlaid on a colorized map that shows purse seine activity from April, 2013 through March, 2014, using FFA fishing vessel databases and Automatic Identification System (AIS) vessel tracks. The high numbers of incidents in these countries’ EEZs, especially in Papua New Guinea, is consistent with the fact that these EEZ waters are also highly active purse seine fishing grounds.

Figure 1. Purse Seine Pollution Incidents Mapped by Latitude and Longitude

Figure 1. Purse Seine Pollution Incidents Mapped by Latitude and Longitude

Seventy-one percent of the purse seine pollution incidents were documented in the form of Waste Dumped Overboard, 16% as Oil Spillages and Leakages and 13% as Abandoned, Lost or Dumped Fishing Gear. When the subcategories under “Waste Dumped” were analyzed further and compared to total pollution incidents, Plastics were found to make up the largest portion of total pollution incidents at 37% followed by Metals (15%), Waste Oil (9%), General Garbage (8%), and Chemicals (2%).

See Figure 2 for a summary of the composition of purse seine pollution incidents by pollution types.

Figure 2. Percent of Purse Seine Pollution Incidents by Pollution Types, 2003-2015

Figure 2. Percent of Purse Seine Pollution Incidents by Pollution Types, 2003-2015

When total pollution incidents from 2002-2015 were compared against total observer trips during this time period (with and without reported pollution incidents), there was an average of 1.2 pollution incidents for every trip undertaken by an observer aboard a purse seine vessel during these years.

When the total number of pollution incidents was compared more selectively against only observer trips with reported pollution incidents, there was an average of 3.2 pollution incidents for every observer trip with a reported pollution incident during this time period also.

Purse Seine Pollution Incidents by Flag States

Seventy percent of the total pollution incidents from 2003-2015 were reported by purse seine fisheries observers aboard vessels from Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs). Papua New Guinean flagged vessels comprised the greatest percentage of pollution incidents at 18%. It is interesting to note that more than 85% of the pollution incidents by Papua New Guinean flagged vessels occurred within the Papua New Guinea EEZ. By contrast, the next highest number of pollution incidents occurred by vessels flagged to Taiwan (16%), USA (15%), Korea (12%), Philippines (10%), Japan (10%), and China (8%).

Figure 4. Percent Purse Seine Pollution Incidents by Flag States, 2003-2015

Figure 4. Percent Purse Seine Pollution Incidents by Flag States, 2003-2015

Recommendations

1. Increase observer coverage and more data
Increased observer coverage aboard other fishing vessels such as longline vessels would provide more information about the amount and types of pollution by other fisheries, which fish more heavily in other areas of the Pacific not covered by the purse seine fishery. The current SPC/FFA Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6 is designed for reporting of pollution incidents aboard any type of fishing vessel. After necessary revisions and updates, covered in section VI, this would continue to be an appropriate form for use by an expanded observer program. The primary challenges anticipated for expansion of fisheries observers programs are financial, technical, and human resource capacity constraints, especially for some observer programs that are already struggling to meet full coverage requirements each year. Future efforts to decrease marine pollution from fishing vessels should include all fisheries and vessel types within the Western and Central Pacific region.

2. Reporting
SPREP should report the Form GEN-6 pollution incidents to member countries where the pollution incidents occurred and to the flag States whose vessels are responsible for the pollution violations. This will allow port States and flag States to follow up with appropriate enforcement mechanisms such as fines and penalties. SPREP should also report incidents to the Noumea Convention to be shared at the biennial Conference of Parties (COP), and to the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). Data and incidents will need to be further organized, quality controlled, and standardized to the IMO’s Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) reporting format.

3. Enforcement
Opportunities may exist for more effective enforcement of MARPOL and other anti-pollution regulations. If provided with documentation of marine pollution incidents and violations, member countries and port States, particularly those with high numbers of violations in their EEZ waters, could penalize violators through fines and restrictions. Countries could also prohibit operational dumping of wastes as a condition of their fishing licenses, with associated penalties and restrictions if pollution incidents do occur. This is another method to prevent pollution incidents from vessels by holding vessels accountable to their license requirements. Effective enforcement programmes send a message to fishing vessels that marine pollution is not acceptable.

Some fishing vessels, operators and crew may engage in especially severe pollution activities with full knowledge that such activities are illegal and harmful to the marine environment. In the case of particularly egregious or criminal polluters, a list of vessels and operators could be kept for records to ensure against repeat offenders. If certain vessels and operators prove to be repeatedly engaging in pollution events, steeper fines or criminal proceedings could be levied. Vessels could also be added to a marine pollution ‘blacklist,’ similar to the WCPFC’s blacklist for vessels who have engaged in Illegal, Unregulated or Unreported (IUU) fishing activities (WCPFC, 2010). Such a blacklist system could both serve to stigmatize vessels and owners, in addition to providing opportunities for more stringent and focused monitoring and regulation to ensure that such vessels do not continue to engage in illegal activities. A marine pollution blacklist could then be compared to the WCPFC’s IUU blacklist, to determine range and regularity of illegal activities by particularly problematic vessels.

4. Outreach and Compliance Assistance Programme
An Outreach and Compliance Assistance Programme should be developed within the Western and Central Pacific region through coordination and collaboration between regional organizations including SPREP, the Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), fishing and maritime industry representatives and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in consultation with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the IMO. The Outreach and Compliance Assistance Programme should inform ship masters, mariners, and ports about the proper manner for disposal of all garbage, wastes and pollution types generated onboard fishing vessels in the Western and Central Pacific region and the adjacent high seas areas.

5. Invest in expanded capacity of port waste reception facilities
Most Pacific island countries and territories have few if any waste reception facilities for ships at their ports, and many of those which are in place are inadequate to meet the needs of ships using those ports. Adequate reception facilities are defined by the IMO as those which “mariners use; fully meet the needs of the ships regularly using them; do not provide mariners with a disincentive to use them; and contribute to the improvement of the marine environment”. The facilities must also “allow for the ultimate disposal of ships’ wastes to take place in an environmentally appropriate way”. This lack of port waste reception facilities could provide further incentives for ships to dump waste at sea rather than store their wastes without anywhere to later responsibly dispose of them.

Given these challenges, the locations and availability of existing port waste reception facilities should be clearly communicated to all fishing vessels, with input from the IMO. SPREP has taken important first steps in this area through its Regional Reception Facilities Plan, which recognizes five Pacific shipping hubs (Apia, Suva, Port Moresby, Noumea, and Papeete) as regional centers for safe offloading of wastes from ships.

Areas for Further Data Analysis and Research

1. Specific pollution categories
Further data analysis should be undertaken of the specific pollution categories Waste Dumped Overboard; Oil Spillages and Leakages; and Abandoned, Lost or Dumped Fishing Gear. For example, an investigation into Oil Spillages and Leakages would likely offer a better understanding of how to improve data reporting fields and specific drop down menus to standardize observer descriptions and quantities of discharge during pollution incidents, in addition to a better understanding of conditions associated with spillages and leakages, and the number of oil spills which occur in fishing grounds. An investigation into the data collected on Abandoned, Lost, or Dumped Fishing Gear could include amounts of each subcategory which are lost, abandoned, or dumped, and types of gear per category, such as remnants of fishing gear discarded after repairs, and Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs).

2. Examination of the Abandoned, Lost or Dumped Fishing Gear incidents involving FADs
Within the comments and pollution description sections of the Abandoned, Lost or Dumped Fishing Gear category, numerous reports included the deliberate dumping of FADs either whole, discarding of damaged FAD nets, or retrieval of the GPS buoys before dumping of the old FAD. Lost or discarded FADs in the marine environment can be harmful to marine life through ghost fishing, entanglement and acting as habitat for the spread of invasive species, and have the potential to eventually wash ashore to coastlines and reefs as marine debris. An area for further data analysis is an examination of the Abandoned, Lost or Dumped Fishing Gear incidents that involve FADs.

3. Survey fishermen, crews, vessel operators, port authorities and observers about causes behind and drivers for pollution incidents
Surveys could be conducted of fishermen, crew, vessel operators, port authorities and observers to better understand the drivers of pollution incidents from fishing vessels, and identify solutions that address underlying causes. For example, interviews with and surveys of crews and vessel operators could explore motivations for dumping of wastes at sea, such as issues around convenience, time, and costs associated with disposal on shore. Interviews with and surveys of port authorities could investigate adequacy of port facilities to receive wastes from vessels, human resource capacity constraints, and time pressures to process vessels quickly through ports.

4. Identify appropriate laws, regulations and procedures by which countries and territories can monitor and enforce penalties against pollution incidents by fishing vessels
Enforcement of pollution incidents will largely depend upon existing national laws and regulations within port States where the incidents occur. Procedures for differing levels of enforcement will need to be identified within national contexts, which may be more complicated than prosecution based upon an observer’s report alone. Barriers to enforcement specific to different States can additionally be identified, as well as challenges experienced by vessels which may act as barriers to compliance. For example, vessels may only carry gear they are licensed for, and might be hesitant to retrieve abandoned fishing gear if it doesn’t meet their licensing requirements.

5. Overlay of purse seine marine pollution incidents with marine ecosystem information
Latitude and longitude data from the pollution incidents could be overlaid with regional and country specific marine ecosystem information such as ecologically and biologically important or unique areas, and migration routes for highly migratory, threatened, or endangered species. These overlays, such as between abandoned nets which can result in ghost-fishing and wildlife entanglement and highly migratory species like whales and turtles, could be used to show possible repercussions of the pollution incidents upon surrounding ecosystems and wildlife.

6. Fish sampling for plastic ingestion
Fish species consumed by Pacific islanders or sold commercially could be sampled for plastic ingestion to link plastic pollution with potential socioeconomic impacts, as much of the Pacific region is dependent upon healthy fish stocks for livelihoods and food security. This could identify an area of potential linkage between plastic waste dumped at sea and within fishing grounds by fishing vessels and ingestion by marine wildlife and fish later sold in commercial markets.

This is what a Gen 6 looks like

The tuna transhipment hub of Majuro by Francisco Blaha

Very little is known about the Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI), even if they are at the crossroads of many of the developed world consequences... 4 colonial masters in less than 100 years (Spanish, Germans, Japanese and the US), then 2nd WW hotspot, followed by American imperialism, then nuclear tests and fallout, set up as tax heavens, FoCs (flag of convenience organizations), sea level rising and climate change, airlines duopoly squeezing fortunes of them, just to name a few...

the beautiful front line

the beautiful front line

However, its location and magnificent protected lagoon make it a fantastic transshipment hub for the Pacific tuna trade.

Last year they had 704 transshipments involving nearly 450,000 tonnes of tuna, which at the Tuna prices on the Bangkok market (that have started to weaken) to$1400/mt are worth 630 million USD, which is ridiculous when you consider that RMI annual budget is 90millon (U.S. aid and reparations accounted for 60% of it).

repeat this image 10 times a day

repeat this image 10 times a day

So every day millions of dollars worth of tuna are transhipped in the Majuro lagoon, while most Majuro's inhabitants live in tough conditions and the remoteness of the outer atolls makes mostly accessible only by boat, even if at any time they would be several helicopters on top of the purse seiners transhipping.

From the fisheries compliance perspective, their role is fundamental and is entrusted to the Oceanic Division of the Marshall Islands Marine Resources Authority (MIMRA). I have been their guest for this week.

my hosts

my hosts

The key issue is that for biggest part of the purseine tuna, this is the last stop before they leave the region forever, and by the nature of fishing, the verified weights (hence how much fish was actually caught) is only known at the dockside on the processing states, where the fish is weight in for payments and prior to processing. The rest is all estimates.

And as the processing nations for most of the WC Pacific Tuna (Thailand, Philippines and increasingly Ecuador) don't communicate back the weights per vessels, the transshipment weight estimations are our best opportunity to know how much was caught.

Furthermore, fish does not become illegal at the factories, is caught and unloaded illegally. And as all these movements occur here, RMI needs to be a responsible port state. Let me use my standard explanation: “A” steals a stereo from “B”, and then it goes to “C” house and sells it… “A” is a criminal and “C” is an accomplice, and “B” is the accuser. Pass this to the IUU fish world, “A” is responsibility from the Flag State, “B” is the Coastal State where the IUU fishing occurs and “C” is the Port State.

Beau doing the checks

Beau doing the checks

And while there is solid argument on question why a country with such a limited resources as RMI, is to take responsibility of controlling the operations of vessels from DWFN that ridiculously subsidize their industry and have abyssal level of compliance (Taiwan – 400millon US/year, China around 2 billons, including 1 million fuel subsidies per Purse Seiner).Taiwan – 400millon US/year, China around 2 billons, including 1 million fuel subsidies per Purse Seiner).

Well… that is a big topic… one that deserves its own discussion (not today). The reality is that many of the PICs do take the responsibility as fish is one of the few sources of revenue they have, and then the pressure from civil society and the EU that will point fingers and shame them with labels of non cooperating countries, or pirate ports or whatever.

Coming from the paper work

Coming from the paper work

And, since all vessels come and go from here, is a hub for the Fisheries Observers (in no many places in the world you will see guys with fisheries observer t-shirts in shops, walking the streets and so on). Hence the place is at the forefront of what we try to do regarding tuna fisheries in the Pacific. Not in vain, the PNA Office is based there.

Needleless to say MIMRA has only limited resources available, but very good people! Therefore in many ways RMI is a great place to test run the Unloading Authorization Code model, integrated into FIMS (wrote about this in the past), so I came here to scope the system design… and it has been great.

Catch monitors, mostly former or off duty observers... unsung heroes in fisheries

Catch monitors, mostly former or off duty observers... unsung heroes in fisheries

I’m exploring the opportunities of integrating various sources of data we already have: VMS, licensing, e-logbook and FFA compliance Index. The idea is that because vessels need to provide 72 hrs notice prior port arrival, we can use these data streams to remotely pre-assess the legality of the catch prior vessel arrival and then focus the limited resources in targeting those vessels with lower compliance indexes and add the observers notes on compliance, interactions with species of special interest and marine pollution that we receive on a daily basis via the e-Obs app. The aim is to focus arrival inspections on those that deserve it more, then we come on board with tablet App that is preloaded with the data of interest, so the inspection is not about finding problems and questions… but finding answers to the problems we already know, while keeping eyes open for the ones we may see.

And while the FAO Port State Measures Agreement in not compulsory, nothing stop countries from using some of the elements it has. In this case, pre-screening and denial of permission to transship or unload if IUU fishing has been detected. The biggest penalty you can put on a rogue vessel is not a fine… is not letting them unload.

This is the key issue

This is the key issue

But then, a fully hard-core attitude towards compliance, if not regionally adopted… will imply that the fleets will simply move to other regional hubs with a lesser incline or capacity to be a responsible port state. Transshipments generate good revenues ashore as well. Mike McCoy estimates in his 2012 transshipment study figures in between 9 to 14000 USD per vessel (not including fuel). So unless the system is implemented and maintained regionally, the fleet will move somewhere else that, while less convenient geographically, may let them get away with less scrutiny.

In any case, while a lot of these days here involve sitting and thinking, writing (hate it!), exploring data capabilities, designing App and screen interfaces, I also get to go on board and accompany the MIMRA crew and embed myself into their day to day activities… which is something I love!

And here is were my days on vessels pay back… you look at numbers and operations, and you know if bullshit is nearby… i.e. is no way that those drums with oil have been there since you left port a month ago… no fish slime, scales or rust on rims… no saltishness on the backside? Or you him to sign a paper that says that vessel xxx did a 300ton set in a day (and was able to freeze it!)… and then was able to transship 800 tons in less than 48 hrs… really!!

man on a mission (observers are the corner stone of fisheries management in the pacific)

man on a mission (observers are the corner stone of fisheries management in the pacific)

So yeah… jobs like this one make my days happier… I’m trying to design something new and useful, using new technologies, to help improve traceability and levels of compliance. And I get to go up and down from boats, and I like that :-)

But the best of it, is that I get to hang out with cool people, like the young local fisheries deputy director Sam (check his other side as a local street artist that makes awesome t-shirts), Beau a young enforcement officer and ocean man (surfer, fisher, freediver, boatman, etc, etc) and lots of other people that are working hard to control this transhipment hub and let their people have a fairer slice of what is, after all, their fish.

You, ladies and gentleman, have my full respect.

Projected change in global fisheries revenues under climate change by Francisco Blaha

Here is another of those (too many) studies I find interesting that has U. Rashid Sumaila as an author. This one takes an interesting angle since it goes to the business of fishing. As usually I recommend everyone to refer to the original.

Impacts of climate change on MCP and MRP by the 2050 s (average between 2041–2060) relative to the 2000 s (average between 1991–2010)

Impacts of climate change on MCP and MRP by the 2050 s (average between 2041–2060) relative to the 2000 s (average between 1991–2010)

Global marine fisheries landings are estimated officially at between 80 and 85 million t a year since 1990, with corresponding mean annual gross revenues fluctuating around USD 100 billion annually. Accounting for unreported catches, a recent study estimated the likely “true” annual global catch to be about 130 million t.

The global fisheries sector supports the livelihoods of between 660 to 820 million people, directly or indirectly, which is about 10–12% of the world’s population, if the dependents of fishers are taken into account. Globally, fish also provides more than 2.9 billion people with 20 % of their animal protein needs and is a crucial source of micronutrients. However, along with other non-climatic drivers such as changes in markets, demographics and overexploitation, climate change is considered to be a major challenge that will significantly shape the future of global fisheries.

Several studies suggest that these non-climatic stresses and changes in management regimes may have a greater impact on fisheries than climate change in the short term, while increasing uncertainty in climate poses a major threat to world fisheries in the long run.

Changes in ocean conditions, including temperature, sea ice extent, salinity, pH, oxygen levels and circulation, lead to shifts in the distribution range of marine species, changes in primary and secondary productivity, and shifts in timing of biological events. Warmer temperatures may also lead to decreases in maximum body sizes of marine fishes. The combined effects of the predicted distributional shift and changes in ocean productivity under climate change are expected to lead to changes in species composition and hence global redistribution of maximum catch potential (MCP), with projected increases in MCP in high latitudinal regions and decreases in the tropics. These changes have large implications for people who depend on fish for food and income, and thus the contribution of fisheries to the global economy.

The changes described above under climate change are bound to affect the economics of fishing through changes in revenues (price x landings), costs (fixed + variable costs) and fisheries subsidies.

In this study, they tackle, as a first step in understanding the potential economic impact of climate change, focus on modeling the effects of climate change on revenues through changes in the amount and composition of catches. Price dynamics are affected by the interplay between the supply and demand of seafood products. The preference of consumers and the development of other food supply sectors such as aquaculture may also affect the future price of seafood and therefore have the potential to alter the economic impact under climate change. Here, price dynamics are incorporated as exogenous factors and the effects on revenues are explored by conducting different scenario analysis on prices. These scenarios describe how future development of other production sectors in the economy would likely affect seafood prices.

Specifically, changes in total potential catches may not directly equate to changes in revenues from fisheries. Firstly, climate change may affect catches of species that command different prices in the market. Secondly, even though potential catches are expected to increase in some countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs), the fishing sector of these countries may still suffer if they include a substantial Distant Water Fishing fleet (DWF) that operates in foreign waters that are impacted by climate change.

Conclusion

Their study highlights the impacts of climate change on society through its impact on revenues from fishing as a result of the interplay between ecology and fishing patterns. Our results suggest that the negative impact on MRP under the “faster aquaculture expansion” scenario is higher than the change under the “constant price” scenario. This suggests that we have to carefully consider development of aquaculture as a way to adapt to climate change impacts on marine capture fisheries.

The results also indicate that the countries that are most highly exposed to fisheries revenue impacts due to climate change have lower adaptive capacity to absorb these changes. We find that the projected impacts on revenues are relatively robust to climate and structural uncertainty, but not to the range of discount rates and prices explored in this contribution. Future work is needed to assess the full economic effects of mitigating or not mitigating GHG emissions.

Rough times for American Samoa by Francisco Blaha

There have been hard time for the American canning industry as whole, but for a small "Pacific Country" like American Samoa (they have US passports, but not the same entitlements than the rest of their citizens) the recent announcement by Tri Marine that it would be closing the Samoa Tuna Processors factory, resulting in 800 layoffs, is particularly tough. There are not a lot of other jobs there.

those were the day of a busy port

those were the day of a busy port

The closure seems to be the result of numerous factors combining, the fleet was prevented from entering much of its prime fishing grounds for a several-month period earlier this year as the South Pacific Tuna Treaty expired and negotiations to revive it proceeded slowly. Even after the treaty was renewed, fishing was tough with the fish moving east, resulting in raw materials shortages at its factory.

And late last year, Tri Marine missed out on a federal tax break known as the American Samoan tax credit, which saved companies that had previously established production facilities in the territory millions of dollars, but didn’t apply to companies that had been built after 2006.

In January 2015, Tri Marine, opened a new USD 70 million tuna canning factory in the village of Atu’u. The Samoa Tuna Processors factory was equipped with state-of-the-art technology producing shelf-stable and frozen products that were marketed and sold to the U.S. through The Tuna Store, Tri Marine’s downstream distribution arm. Their outlook was on a business model of vertical integration between its U.S. flagged vessels, its processing facilities and its distribution channels, allowing it to market and sell “Product of the USA”-labeled tuna to its private-label customers.

The “Product of the USA” is a noble initiative, but the realities of tuna as a commodity food and the supply issues seems to been too much. As a major seller to private label food retailers, Tri Marine also had to convince its large corporate buyers that its tuna was worth a premium.

I know personally some of the top management in Tri Marine, and they are good solid people, committed to the Pacific... I'm sure it must have been a tough decision for them to make, not only at a commercial level, but at a personal level too. I really feel for them.

younger days when we will go to unload in Pago Pago

younger days when we will go to unload in Pago Pago

I have not been in Pago for many years now, but is hard to believe that the bustling place I knew is nonexistent now... our problem was how long it took to unload because the huge amount of boats waiting... now if that there are no boats coming with fish. 

Interestingly, there are at least the 14 US flag tuna vessels (owned by Ocean Global Fisheries, Sea Global Fisheries and Pacific Global, collectively known as the Global Fleets) but these "American vessels" vessels do not operate at all in relationship to American Samoa, but align themselves with Taiwanese capital and trading operations so basically they catch for Thailand and not for the "home" country.

As usual, tuna fisheries are full of twists and complexities.

Trade Measures to Combat IUU Fishing by Francisco Blaha

A few days ago I reported on a publication by my friend Gilles, as it goes, another of his works, (also with difficult birth) was published on the same day. This one deals goes on a Comparative Analysis of Unilateral and Multilateral Approaches to combat IUU fishing.

Gilles been bussy

Gilles been bussy

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a persistent and global problem that undermines the achievement of sustainable fisheries, being fish one of the most valuable renewable resource commodities exploited today, and a significant proportion of global fish production enters international trade (particularly from developing countries to developed ones), makes sense that trade policy should have a role in addressing the problem.

His paper describes and compares the apparent impact of multilateral and unilateral trade-related measures taken to address IUU fishing, including trade and catch documentation schemes and trade-restrictive measures that identify and sanction countries for perceived weaknesses in addressing IUU fishing.

I obviously recommend you read the original, in the meantime, I go over the Executive Summary to pick up, some key issues.

Key trade-related measures to combat IUU fishing fall into two distinct categories; trade restrictive measures (TREMs), sometimes referred to as “trade sanctions“ enacted by one or more market-states, and catch certification schemes, of which two specific variants (trade documentation schemes (TDS) and catch documentation schemes (CDS)) have been developed and implemented to date. This paper assesses the merits and limits of unilateral and multilateral approaches with regard to both types of instruments.

TDS have been used by a number of tuna regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) since the early 1990s. A key attribute of TDS is their capacity to detect flag of convenience (FOC) vessel operations. Trade measures taken on the basis of TDS appear to have led to trade in specific species from FOC states such as Bolivia or Honduras subsiding completely. The economic impact of these measures on FOC states has been limited since tuna trade bypassed these states both physically and financially.

The outcome has, however, profoundly influenced the IUU profile of global tuna fisheries; today, over 95 percent of IUU fishing operations in the most important tuna fisheries are perpetrated by legally registered and licensed fishing vessels, undertaking illegal activities such as misreporting or under-reporting of catches that can be eliminated effectively by well-designed CDS.

Multilateral CDS are operated by three RFMOs. These schemes provide a mechanism for certification (by the flag state) of the legality of the harvest of the species covered and are relatively simple to police and to enforce. These schemes—when well designed and implemented by relevant state actors along the supply chain—can be effective in eliminating under-reporting by otherwise compliant, registered, and licensed fleets.

Under-reporting of Atlantic bluefin tuna is believed to have fallen from double the total allowable catch (TAC) to close to nil when important market states—including Japan—started to enforce the relevant CDS. Imports of Atlantic bluefin tuna into Japan fell by 90 percent following implementation of the scheme. Importantly, there is a strong correlation between the introduction of the CDS systems and the beginning of recovery of affected tuna stocks.

In value terms, the price of illegal product under a CDS is diminished because it cannot be legally brought to market, severely reducing the financial incentives to engage in IUU fishing. Legally certified Patagonian toothfish has been shown to trade at prices 20–30 percent higher than non-certified product, and non-certified Atlantic bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean has been reported to lose 85 percent of its legal international market value.

While enforcement of a CDS is likely to cause short-term economic and social costs, the long-term economic and social impact of stocks recovering as a result are positive from both developed and developing country perspectives. Current impacts of multilateral systems are mostly limited to industrial fisheries and developed countries.

Only the EU currently operates a unilateral CDS, although a unilateral US system is poised to come online in late 2016. The EU system is paper based and does not operate a central data registry, impairing traceability and hence the exclusion of illegally harvested products from certified supply streams. No evidence of impact on trade has been detected since the system came into force. The US system is likely to differ from the EU system, notably by targeting at-risk species, and because of how data will be collected, submitted, and validated.

Unilateral CDS are inherently difficult to enforce since fisheries products may circulate through most of the supply chain without being covered by certificates. Most importantly, multilateral systems cover and protect entire fish stocks, while unilateral systems only partially cover many stocks. The potential for direct positive impact of multilateral systems on the sustainable management of individual stocks is therefore greater.

The EU also uses TREMs in the form of yellow cards (identification of non-cooperating countries) and red cards (ban on imports). Four countries have been red-carded since 2014. States can only become the object of EU trade measures in their capacity as flag states; port or market states that actively participate in the laundering of IUU products cannot be targeted.

These trade restrictions are applied broadly to all fish and all fleets of a particular country regardless of the IUU fishing that triggered the identification, which means they are more likely to have disproportionate impacts on small-scale fisheries. Small-scale fisheries are inherently unable to escape embargoes on their flag state, while industrial operators generally have the option of reflagging their vessels to avoid flag state-related restrictions.

The US has identified third countries involved in IUU fishing since 2009 in biennial reports submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Commerce. To date, none of these identifications has led to a “negative certification”—the equivalent of an EU red card. US TREMs can, however, be designed to target only fleets, species, and product types directly tied to the IUU fishing that has given rise to the identification.

This paper argues that the EU system of identifying countries is opaque and that the standards on which decisions to identify (or not to identify) specific countries are based are unclear. In the US, on the other hand, biennial reports to Congress provide detailed information on cited infractions, the reasons behind a country’s identification, and the reasons for an identified country’s positive certification.

The countries identified by the US and the EU are fundamentally different. Only three countries out of 51 identified appear on both lists. EU identifications are currently confined to Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and the South West Pacific; 48 percent are small island developing states (SIDS). US identifications are more evenly distributed between world regions and target more developed fishing nations. The largest number of identifications is of South American countries, closely followed by EU member states, which represent 25 percent of all US identifications.

EU identifications appear to have pushed some identified countries to improve frameworks for fisheries governance, but there is no clear evidence as yet that this has translated into actual reductions in IUU fishing. It is also not clear what tangible effect the US system has had on IUU fishing because no sanctions have been implemented to date. More broadly, however, the impact of unilateral TREMs on IUU fishing, and hence on fish stocks, may in fact be greater than that of unilateral CDS.

A unilateral identification and sanctioning process is likely to be more effective in changing the behaviour of countries if they export significant amounts of seafood to the market imposing the sanctions. If soft flag, port, and processing states can be pushed, through the application of transparent and fair trade-restrictive measures, into becoming more responsible, the impact of unilateral TREMs could be substantial.

In finishing, the paper provides the following conclusions and recommendations.

RFMOs should be supported and strengthened so that they can continue to deliver and expand multilateral solutions to the problem of IUU fishing in shared fisheries. Unilateral end-market CDS may protect markets from sourcing a wide range of illegally harvested products, but because they close off only one market to IUU products, they may have limited overall impact on IUU fishing and the sustainable management of individual fish stocks.

Policymakers looking to improve the effectiveness of multilateral and unilateral CDS could consider focusing on the following:

1. Systems should be based on a technically sound design which achieves verifiable traceability and encompasses supply chain operators at flag, port, processing, and market state levels in an even-handed manner;
2. Systems should be designed around a central certificate (or data) registry spanning the full supply chain to achieve verifiable traceability;
3. Verifiable traceability requires online electronic submission and validation of data within a centralised repository at every step along the supply chain;
4. CDS ought to be risk based and apply only to fisheries suffering from established and serious IUU fishing issues.

Policymakers looking to improve the effectiveness of multilateral and unilateral TREMs could consider focusing on the following:

5. Ensuring that TREMs are as species- and product-specific as possible, in order to address IUU problems with precision and minimise undue economic and social impacts;
6. Ensuring there are clear standards regarding what constitutes IUU fishing, clear rules and procedures for the identification of countries, and transparent public records on dialogues with potential targets of TREMs;
7. Designing TREM provisions in a way that allows countries to be identified in their capacity as flag, coastal, port, or market states, and to be sanctioned in t hose same capacities;
8. Using regional trade agreements (RTAs) as an avenue for enhancing the regulatory coherence in the design and application of unilateral trade instruments. Eventually, governments could consider adopting a multilateral approach to TREMs, for example in the World Trade Organization (WTO).
A further focus for work could be how to improve the coherence, and eventual multilateralisation, of various CDS initiatives. In this regard, policymakers could consider the following:
9. New and existing unilateral schemes ought to devise means for mutual recognition and equivalence of their certificates. Systems could then be aligned. The merging of unilateral CDS would eventually produce de facto multilateral systems, which could then be opened up for expanded end-market state membership;
10. The international community could assess the feasibility of the development and operation of global multilateral CDS systems, designed to apply to specific species of fish in need of protection from IUU fishing throughout their global geographic range.

Design options for the development of tuna catch documentation schemes. by Francisco Blaha

Back in April, I wrote about an article that my friend Gilles Hosch wrote for Globefish. I also mentioned there that he was finalising a big study for the GEF - ABNJ - FAO initiative, and that I will post about it when published… well after a complex birth process here it is (click to download)

Gilles' most difficult baby

Gilles' most difficult baby

CDS have been a topic of debate for more than 16 years and continue to mean different things to different people. His book clarifies the nature of CDS and what they can achieve and identifies the factors to be considered in the design of such schemes as a management and monitoring, control and surveillance tool in tuna fisheries.

 While we work in the same field, I have no issue to admit that he is "the" analytical expert on the CDS topic, and this book proves it. He gets to the bone of things and writes about it brilliantly. No one else I know (and it is my job to know) has spent more time and effort thinking and researching this topic out than he has.

I see my work to be on the implementation side of CDS in specific fisheries, the set up of the data streams needed to make it work and the capacity building to make them happen. As is bluntly obvious, I’m not a good writer… (I fact I hate it), but as in other aspects of my life, I force myself to do it, just because I’m bad at it.

Gilles can be a polarizing figure, and people in the fishing community may not agree with the scope and extent of what he proposes, but one must know that any CDS below the standards he sets in his book will be, literally, a substandard CDS.

Any e-CDS initiative based on whatever digital structure I have discussed in the past (here, here, link), would not do itself a service, if it didn't read this book from cover to cover first.

I have read his book at various stages of its development; and to me, it has become a compulsory reference at this stage…

At 131 pages, the book is not a light read, unless you are truly interested in the topic. However he set it up in a very accessible way, including the introduction, the book is structured into thirteen chapters.

Chapter 1 provides the introduction, establishing that the paper aims to provide technical guidance for tuna RFMO’s that may decide to develop CDS for commercial tuna fisheries in the future.

Chapter 2 defines the objective of a CDS as combatting IUU fishing, by creating markets restricted to the circulation of legally-certified tuna products. The potential for secondary CDS objectives is analysed, noting that the complex tasks of a CDS make it a tool unfit to pursue other objectives, without incurring the risk of overburdening and weakening it.

Chapter 3 establishes the concept of supply chain mapping, as a fundamental first step in designing a CDS. The supply chain and its complexities regarding product flows must be mapped out and understood, before the system can be designed. The chapter delves into the supply chain segments covering harvesting, unloading, distribution, processing and trade.

Chapter 4 is a key part of the paper regarding system design, as it presents the basic conceptual CDS framework on which all current unilateral and multilateral CDS are based. The concept presents a supply chain regimented into national and international supply chain segments, of which the former is managed through national rules and regulation, and the latter is directly subjected to the rules of the CDS.

Chapter 5 addresses the issue of estimated and verified weights, which is of particular importance to tuna fisheries. Current CDS do not provide adequate mechanisms to allow for the adjustment of estimated weights established at sea, and before unloading, into verified weights following landing and grading in a factory.

Chapter 6 is another key part of the paper regarding system design, describing the document system on which the CDS hinges. In electronic systems, documents are data assemblages – but in designing the system, it is easier to refer to “documents” to designate groups of data that have to be recorded and validated at given points along the supply chain.

Chapter 7 provides details regarding information to be recorded in certificates, for the full and the simplified catch certificates, and the trade certificate. It discusses the importance of the layout of certificates, even for electronic systems, so that printed copies can be easily read and understood.

Chapter 7 provides details regarding information to be recorded in certificates, for the full and the simplified catch certificates, and the trade certificate. It discusses the importance of the layout of certificates, even for electronic systems, so that printed copies can be easily read and understood.

Chapter 8 discusses a swathe of points related to the development of an electronic CDS (e-CDS), and the function of a central database – conceived of as a central online certificate registry. The location, architecture and parameters of the system are discussed, arguing that a single centralized electronic platform providing for global remote user access is the most solid option

Chapter 9 presents a number of key factors that must be taken into account when designing a CDS. These include the relevance of risk analysis, the coverage of species, products and types of fishing operations, document security, and the place of logbooks, VMS and observers in CDS.

Chapter 10 discusses oversight and enforcement in the CDS, and details how the principle of subsidiarity assigns enforcement mandates between centralised and least centralized authorities.

Chapter 11 looks at CDS development from a project perspective, detailing which elements should be taken into consideration when it is decided to develop a CDS, and how the project – overall – could be segmented and managed.

Chapter 12 takes a step back, and assesses what the consequences of individual RFMO CDS, covering but a fraction of any particular global tuna species would be. All current RFMO-based CDS cover an entire species throughout its global range, while all future RFMO-based tuna CDS would not.

Chapter 13 provides a model conservation and management measure for a harmonized tuna CDS established on the principles and options outlined in this paper; the model CMM can be used as a draft foundation text to establish a global tuna CDS harmonized between tuna RFMOs – or to develop a tuna CDS for a single tuna RFMO.

What impact this book will have on the development of future tuna CDS systems – including those efforts currently underway at the WCPFC –  or the review and fine-tuning of systems already in place, I don't know… but I like to think I can recognize effort when I see it… and Gilles went to the bottom of a topic that is dear to both of us… and it is my hope that those tuna RFMOs engaged in the process of developing CDS will give this book well deserved attention.

 

What We Talk About When We Talk About Sustainable Fisheries? by Francisco Blaha

I'm paraphrasing in the title, the name of a short stories book by one of my favorites authors (Raymond Carver), but I was really asking “When is a fishery sustainable?”. This is a great question recently analyzed by a group of heavyweight fisheries researchers. These days we either seem to read about “Sustainable” Fishing or IUU Fishing… and the IUU ones are much better explained.

Remind me when is a fishery sustainable?

Remind me when is a fishery sustainable?

What I found most interesting about this paper, is that in the attempt to answer that question, they review various elements of fishing management theory. I have seldom seen it explained in a comparative way. So as usual, hoping not to run into copyright problems, I quote here some of my favorite parts of the paper. But recommend that you go to the original!

Abstract
Despite the many scientific and public discussions on the sustainability of fisheries, there are still great differences in both perception and definition of the concept. Most authors now suggest that sustainability is best defined as the ability to sustain goods and services to human society, with social and economic factors to be considered along with environmental impacts. The result has been that each group (scientists, economists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), etc.) defines “sustainable seafood” using whatever criteria it considers most important, and the same fish product may be deemed sustainable by one group and totally unsustainable by another one. (i.e. Hoki in NZ)

We contend, however, that there is now extensive evidence that an ecological focus alone does not guarantee long-term sustainability of any form and that seafood sustainability must consistently take on a socio-ecological perspective if it is to be effective across cultures and in the future. The sustainability of seafood production depends not on the abundance of a fish stock, but on the ability of the fishery management system to adjust fishing pressure to appropriate levels. While there are scientific standards to judge the sustainability of food production, once we examine ecological, social, and economic aspects of sustainability, there is no unique scientific standard.

Everyone talks about sustainability—but how do we define it?
Various layers of government have legislated mandates; international policy-makers and environmental non-governmental organizations (eNGO) have made statements, and consumers have formed opinions. Do they all talk about the same thing?

Perhaps the most widely used definition comes from the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), commonly known as the Brundtland Commission: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”

The creation of ecosystem-based fisheries management (FAO 2003) was an attempt to define best practices that blended the concerns of the conservation community and fisheries managements agencies. At approximately the same time, eNGO-issued consumer seafood guides proliferated, offering a simple appraisal of whether or not the fish you had planned for dinner was sustainable. NGO guides have become an important force in retailers’ choice of what they will sell and subsequently a powerful tool for marketing particular seafood.

Many perspectives on sustainability extend beyond biological resources to social and economic sustainability of dependent human communities.

There clearly is a divide between those who define sustainability in strictly ecological terms and those who focus on people. As we will see later, almost all definitions used in the context of seafood sustainability have dealt only with environmental protection. We argue against a purely ecological focus to sustainability and that seafood sustainability (and sustainability more broadly) must take on a socioecological perspective if it is to cope with global change and be effective across cultures, social drivers, and with the increasing number of uses of the ocean.

Defining sustainability
There is now a multitude of meanings of sustainability and how to define “sustainable” seafood. A common theme to all discussions on sustainability is living within limits and the capacity of natural ecosystems to indefinitely produce the goods and services we want. For example, Murawski (2000) discusses how ecosystem-level sustainability implies “systems are managed for the highest net benefits to society consistent with other biological objectives.” Any population, or system, that is harvested to maintain forever maximum sustainable yield or near it would meet many definitions of sustainability. If future generations wanted to return such a population to an unfished state, they would have the option of ceasing all harvest, and in theory, the population would return to its preharvest condition. Now consider a fishery where the annual exploitation rate is higher than would produce long-term maximum yield so that the population fluctuates at a lower level than would produce maximum yield. If such a fishery can be sustained indefinitely, then it too would seem to meet the Brundtland definition; future generations could choose to harvest at a lower rate and the population would increase. This could be called “sustainable overexploitation”.

Major differences in perspectives on sustainability revolve around the extent to which the use of a resource modifies other components of the ecosystem. In a fishery that is harvested to produce long-term maximum sustainable yield, fish abundance will be lower than it would be if not harvested at all. However, add to this scenario the unintentional catch of another species, commonly called bycatch. If the level of unintentional catch is low enough, the impact of this fishery on the bycatch species may simply be to reduce the mean abundance of the nontarget species, but if the unintentional catch is too high and the bycatch species has a low reproductive rate, that species may go locally or even globally extinct. In this case the targeted fish species is sustainable, but we will have eliminated options to take benefits from the bycatch species for future generations.

Much of the controversy over sustainability appears not to be centered on the potential for long-term yield of the resources but on how much alteration to the ecosystem we are willing to accept. Fishing undoubtedly changes the trophic structure of an ecosystem, and fishing one species may make other species more or less abundant even if not threatening local or global extinction.

Groups concerned with the status of seabirds, for instance, may consider fisheries that reduce bird food availability beyond some point to be. In view of this, how do we measure the environmental sustainability of marine ecosystems?

Single-species population dynamic
The theory of exploited populations suggests that the mean abundance of the population will decline as the exploitation rate increases and that the long-term mean yield will be maximized at an intermediate exploitation rate. Managers seeking to maintain long-term MSY search for the exploitation rate with the highest long-term harvest, but in theory almost any exploitation rate that does not lead to extinction of the population or cause a flip to an alternative enduring state is sustainable (in the sense that they can be maintained indefinitely). Flipping into a permanent alternative state would deprive future generations of the potential benefits from the species. In many places, exploitation rates above the level that would produce MSY are called “overfishing”.

As fishing mortality is increased, sustainable yield initially increases, then beyond some point it declines. This simple relationship is derived for a logistic growth model, but can be shown to result from a wide range of life histories and population dynamics. For instance, age-structured or size structured models provide a similar relationship, the abundance declines with exploitation rate, and yield is maximized at an intermediate value. It is an exceedingly reassuring view of how populations behave, because the exploitation rate can be reduced at any time and the population will rebuild to its higher levels and can, in theory, rebuild to its unexploited state if harvesting is stopped.

However, there are many ecological relationships that can provide different perspectives. The ones of most concern are thresholds or tipping points (Kelly et al. 2015) in either population size or exploitation rate that lead to irreversible changes. Perhaps of the greatest concern are mechanisms known as depensation that can lead to a threshold population size below which the population might never recover. Concern about possible low abundance thresholds and the long recovery times to rebuild stocks from low abundance has caused management agencies to attempt to avoid low levels of abundance. Large-scale meta-analysis suggest that there is little evidence for depensation, although it certainly cannot be ruled out in individual cases. Thus, while the weight of the evidence is that stocks depleted to low abundance will generally recover if fishing pressure can be sufficiently reduced, provided the environment has not changed, almost all past considerations of fisheries sustainability have suggested that there are lower limits on abundance below which stocks are not considered sustainable.

Fishing exerts selective pressures on stocks, and one of the most ubiquitous and striking examples of life history responses to fishing is the lowering of the age and size at maturity of heavily exploited stocks. Fishing increases the total mortality rate, individuals are less likely to live to older ages, and individuals who delay reproduction until older ages are unlikely to survive to reproduce. This is almost certainly an evolutionary response to fishing pressure. The impact of such changes is twofold: the long-term yield available at any exploitation rate will be lower than the simple logistic theory, and the higher exploitation rates otherwise considered sustainable could lead to extinction of the population.

There is a considerable literature documenting major changes in fish stock abundance unrelated to fishing, and recent meta-analysis suggests that irregular and often abrupt changes frequently occur in the key parameters (recruitment, somatic growth, and natural mortality) either from natural or anthropogenic causes. These abrupt changes are often called regime shifts, and such shifts can alter aspects of ecosystem dynamics and the sustainability of exploitation. For instance, if a stock shifts into a less productive regime because of changing ocean temperatures or a decreased food supply owing to fishing, the sustainable yield and exploitation rate that would maximize longterm yield may both decline. While this does not mean the stock is no longer “sustainable”, it does mean that sustainable management in an unproductive regime will need to be different than management in a productive regime. If a population shifts into a more productive regime, previously unsustainable exploitation rates may become sustainable.

In summary, all the single-species evidence available suggests that species can be sustained across a range of fishing pressure and that stocks will rebuild when fishing pressure is reduced, unless there have been externally induced changes in the environment or a tipping point has been crossed. Stocks may be sustainably overfished in that they can sustain exploitation rates in excess of those that would produce MSY and recover to MSY levels (and beyond) if fishing pressure is reduced, but whether such overexploitation is desirable is a societal matter.

However, few fisheries catch a single target species; many fisheries capture a broad mix of species.

Multiple species caught in the same fishing gear
The theory of mixed stock fishing can be divided into two parts: the technical interaction due to the fact that multiple species are caught with the same fishing effort and trophic interaction that considers the predator–prey and competitive dynamics of ecosystems.

The theory of management and maximization of sustainable yield from mixed-stock fisheries has received ongoing consideration. The problem occurs when two (or more) stocks being jointly harvested have different optimum exploitation rates. To illustrate with a simplified example, we assume we have a productive stock where MSY would be achieved at a harvest rate of 30% per year and an unproductive stock where MSY would be achieved at 10% per year. If both stocks have the same potential yield, then long-term MSY is achieved by applying a harvest rate slightly higher than would maximize the unproductive stock so it would be slightly overexploited. However, if the potential yield of the unproductive stock is small in comparison with the productive stock, then long-term yield will be maximized by overfishing the unproductive stock, and, depending on the relative optimum exploitation rates and abundance, the long-term yield may be maximized by fishing so hard that the unproductive stock goes to local extinction.

This is a problem for nearly all mixed-stock fisheries, since there are almost always some unproductive and productive stocks in the mix of what is caught. Trying to capture the potential of the productive stock while protecting the unproductive stock has been an ongoing management concern in a wide range of fisheries, both within and between species.

The response of some fisheries managers has been that all stocks that are assessed must be fished at rates less than that which would produce maximum sustainable yield (FMSY) resulting in substantial lost yield overall. While some would hold such lost food production acceptable, those concerned with food security may not find it so. Consequently, a number of solutions that try to meet both expectations by reducing exploitation rates on unproductive stocks while allowing harvest of productive stocks have been proposed and implemented. Core habitat for the least productive stocks can be closed to provide a refuge. Gear modifications can be found that reduce the relative effectiveness of gear on the least productive stocks. Finally, individual incentives have been provided to fishermen to find time, places, and fishing methods that minimize catch of unproductive stocks, such as individual vessel quotas on both unproductive and productive stocks. Using the concepts from single-species management discussed earlier, any fishing policy that may overfish unproductive stocks but allows them to recover in the future would meet the Brundtland definition of sustainability.

None of this, however, takes into account resilience to external perturbations such as climate change, and there is growing evidence that the long-term productivity of a mix of stocks depends on maintaining the portfolio of stocks over time, so that while short-term yield may be maximized by severely depleting unproductive stocks, stocks that are unproductive during one regime may be the productive stocks of the next environmental regime.

Ecosystem dynamics
Model results Fish stocks do not exist in isolation, affected only by removals from fishing; species in a marine ecosystem interact through predation and competition. Thus, if we fish a single species, the abundance of prey of that species would be expected to increase, whereas the predators of the target species might decline because their food supply is reduced. These interactions are assessed in the ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) or ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM).

A range of ecosystem models that consider these trophic relationships have been used to evaluate ecosystem-wide impacts of fishing. While the implementation of these ecosystem models differs in many ways, a common result is that the ecosystem-wide yield behaves much like a single-species model. As exploitation rate increases from zero to higher levels, long-term ecosystem yield increases, eventually reaching a maximum, and then as exploitation rates increase further, the total yield declines.

A modeling study by Garcia et al. (2012) found that when fishing broadly across an ecosystem (exploiting all non-microfauna, including jellyfish, macroalgae, small-bodied pelagics such as krill, finfish, and even high-trophic-level species like marine mammals), not only was the sustainable catch of this entire assemblage of species much higher (1.5–2 times greater than for selective fisheries typical of North American, Australian, and western European nations), but there was little if any decline in that yield until the exploitation rate was very high. The entire shape of the curve was (typically) more skewed to the right than seen when focusing on traditionally targeted finfish; this did mean, however, that when exploitation rates rose very high, the declines in catch were precipitous. There was always a biodiversity cost of high exploitation rates, with some of the traditionally preferred species disappearing and being replaced by other species that can sustain very high exploitation rates. However, the rate of loss and replacement was not so rapid when fishing broadly across the ecosystem than when selectively targeting traditional finfish. This is because the application of pressure across much of the system was not as destructive for system structure and connectivity as the selective removal of specific nodes.

Trophic models show the same basic trade-off that is found in mixed, single-species models; if you want to maximize the yield from a mix of stocks, the less productive stocks will be overexploited. Moreover the tension between objectives for different components of the ecosystem will remain (e.g., between targeting small pelagic fish and allowing for consumption by species of conservation concern).

Consideration of alternative harvesting regimes (e.g., balanced harvesting) is a growing area of research because there is a need for open discussion of what different patterns of fishing mean across objectives — e.g., intentionally shifting to targeting smallerbodied and more productive forage fish— and whether that is considered desirable by society. Even if concepts like balanced harvesting are found to be sound and desirable in theory, the practicalities involved are quite challenging, not the least of which is re-educating the palate (and markets) of more selective cultures and addressing the economic considerations of fishing fleets. Not all harvested biomass is equally sustaining (or attractive) to all people, further highlighting the social and economic aspects of sustainability.

Empirical results
It has been well documented that ecosystems subjected to intense fishing pressure show strong declines in abundance of the target species (Thorson et al. 2012). Ecosystems subjected to strong fishing pressure also show declines in mean size of targeted species, diversity of species, and a shift towards more productive species. But, interestingly, there is growing evidence that ecosystems do not show declines in sustainable yield when yield is made of up a range of taxa and trophic levels. Ultimately, it should be possible to completely deplete all species in an ecosystem, but within the range of fishing pressures seen in studies it has not happened.

There has not been a meta-analysis of the relationship between fishing pressure and ecosystem-wide yield, but there is certainly evidence that yield (as measured in kilograms) can be sustained and potentially even maximized at very high fishing pressures.

The structure of ecosystems under extreme fishing pressure will be highly modified (e.g., much reduced biodiversity), and the landed catch in such situations may not be desired in all cultures. The market for these fish may be limited and of less economic value than the yield that would be realized if fishing pressure were reduced and the ecosystem shifted back to species with higher market values. The history of such intensively modified marine systems is quite short in comparison with our experience and acceptance of highly modified terrestrial systems, and we know little about the long-term dynamics of such highly perturbed (and simplified) systems.

However, evidence from nearshore marine ecosystems (e.g., coral reefs, kelp forests, seagrass meadows, and other coastal seas) suggests that system simplification due to overfishing can modify their structure substantially (e.g., causing shifts from kelp forests to barrens or reefs to algal-dominated states), which increases the vulnerability of such systems to the impacts of other human activities such as eutrophication due to excessive catchment run-off, invasive species introductions, and climate change.

Forage fish impacts
Another ecosystem impact of fishing is the potential reduction in marine predator abundance (fish as well as birds and mammals) when low-trophic-level fish, often called forage fish, are exploited. As they are fished more intensely, there may be less food available for high trophic levels and the abundance of the predators may decline. This is a rather straightforward impact of ecosystem interactions — reduce the abundance of the food and the species that eat that food will be less abundant. These models suggest that fishing forage fish is certainly sustainable by the Brundtland definition, but it does have impacts on other species that may be highly valued or in some cases may be legally protected. The situation is further complicated by indirect ecosystem effects. For example, modeling work done by Smith et al. (2011) found that predators of competitors of targeted small pelagics could benefit from fishing small pelagics.

Bycatch and ecosystem impacts of fishing gear
Two further impacts of fishing on ecosystems are bycatch of nontarget species and impacts of fishing gear on benthic habitats. Bycatch, particularly of birds, mammals, turtles, and sharks, has become a major concern of most fisheries management agencies and brings an immediate warning “not to eat” in consumer guides. The international ban on high-seas drift-netting, declared in the early 1990s, was one of the highest profile management actions to ensue. The bycatch of dolphins in the eastern Pacific purse seine fishery for tuna caused major declines in several populations, and strong pressure, including the introduction of the “dolphin safe” label, was put on the fishing fleet to reduce bycatch. It was strikingly successful. The kill of dolphins declined from 133 000 in 1986 to 2600 in 1996 through a number of changes in fishing practices. By the 1990s the mortality rate of dolphins by purse seining was comparatively negligible (well under 1% per year), and populations began to increase. However, one way the dolphin catch was avoided was by moving to fishing floating objects called FADs, which has resulted in considerable bycatch of other species. (And is a practice not considered sustainable under MSC)

Two other well-studied examples of bycatch affecting threatened, endangered, or protected species are turtles caught in a variety of fishing gears (and seabirds caught by longlines. In both cases the bycatch caused major reductions in population abundance, potentially leading to extinction, and in both cases technical measures were taken to dramatically reduce bycatch mortality. These positive changes in fishing practice have generally taken place in developed countries with legal frameworks that protect the nontarget species and central governments with sufficient funding to monitor and enforce changes. In many other fisheries in the world, bycatch of these same or related species continues with likely negative impacts on the species.

Much of the annual global catch of marine fish is caught by gear that is dragged along the bottom of the ocean, particularly bottom trawls, dredges, and Danish seines. These gear types are well documented to modify benthic flora and fauna. The negative effects to the benthic ecosystems are considerable on hard sea floor that is rarely subject to natural disturbance. However, there is considerable evidence that on soft sea floor that is subject to natural disturbance, there are few if any long-term negative effects of alteration by fishing gears, and in some cases fisheries productivity may be increased. While trawling changes marine benthic communities, that in itself does not mean that these fisheries are unsustainable.

The system must be considered as a whole. For instance, if there are area closures to protect key, vulnerable, or representative species, the system as a whole can remain sustainable in structure and function even if individual locations are impacted by fishing gear. The dynamic nature of ecosystems, both in time and space, is in part why sustainability must be thought of as a process not a simple stock target — it is far more like juggling than throwing darts at a bull’s-eye.

There is mounting evidence (largely modeling, but with a growing database of empirical observations) that both seafood production and broader marine ecosystem form and function can be sustained at a wide variety of fishing pressures, including some very high levels of fishing. Although the highest exploitation rates likely come at the cost of a dramatically transformed and potentially less resilient ecosystem, this would make these systems less sustainable by many definitions of sustainability, but, as stated above, it is not yet clear where one would draw the line between a sustainably and an unsustainably exploited marine ecosystem. It is also unclear what level of ecosystem transformation could be considered sustainable.

We live at a time when there is still room for such debate for marine ecosystems, in contrast with terrestrial systems where near complete ecosystem transformations and ecosystem simplification with highly productive exotic species are the norm in agriculture and are broadly accepted. While food security means that we are unlikely to dramatically change our agricultural system, we can still learn from the history of agriculture and what shaped it. First and foremost among those lessons is that to ignore social and economic pressures is to put considerations of environmental sustainability at risk.

Social and economic sustainability
The three pillars of sustainability include economic growth, environmental protection, and social development. Almost all seafood guides and certification schemes consider only the biological and management aspects and do not consider social or economic impacts of the fishery management system.

Economic and social sustainability are often identified in fisheries policies and legislation and targeted in performance measures, such as maximum economic yield (MEY). Much attention has been paid to the economic inefficiency of fishing fleets due to overcapacity and subsidies. In general, the profitability of a fishery will be maximized at lower fishing pressure and higher mean abundance than would produce maximum biological yield. This can produce a situation in which a stock is economically overfished (fishing pressure higher than would produce maximum economic profit), but not biologically overfished. Such a system can certainly be sustained — which is why governments, such as the Australian government, has switched to MEY from MSY as a target reference point — but as yet certification schemes and NGO recommendations have not considered economic management targets or maximizing benefit to the public. As an added benefit, targeting MEY rather than MSY can reduce other environmental impacts such as carbon footprint and water use,

Considering economic return in isolation is not necessarily wise either, however. In many countries there are explicit or implicit social objectives involved in the fisheries management system often centering around maintaining traditional fishing communities and access to fishing as a mechanism for those displaced from agriculture or otherwise unemployed. In contrast, New Zealand has an explicit goal to maximize economic value to the nation without any social objectives. As a result, New Zealand fishery ownership has been centralized, and the social and community consequences have been of serious concern to some. A similar case is the fisheries allocation system for the British Columbia trawl fisheries. From the standpoint of local fishing communities and equitability, these systems might not be considered sustainable.

Forms of unacceptable working conditions and human trafficking have been identified in vessels chartered in New Zealand waters and Thailand.  Gender equality is a growing concern for many discussions of sustainability, as are issues of child labor, forced labor, violence, and unsafe working conditions.

Once we move from the restricted consideration of sustainability as a question of marine ecosystems to include the other two pillars of social and economic sustainability, the range of issues that would need to be considered in defining and categorizing sustainable seafood is much wider. Such breadth is undeniably daunting, but again is made more tractable if sustainability is thought of as a process rather than a set of fixed targets.

People have been trying to manage fisheries for more than 4600 years and making jokes about the state of fisheries for at least 1900 years (since Iuvenalis circa 100 AD). The history of fisheries management and analysis of the success of fisheries management have shown that a focus on the state of the resource is insufficient for achieving fisheries that meet environmental objectives, let alone environmental, social, and economic ones. Focusing on environmental status alone can result in a lack of compliance with negative stock outcomes. Externalities, multiple incentives, feedbacks, and behavioral responses can lead to unintended consequences.

Moreover, global change has driven home the pervasive nature of change — ecosystems change, technology and behavior change, societal desires and scientific understanding all change. As a result, any method of management relying on static measures or targets is either eventually irrelevant or at best delayed, both of which ultimately lead to fish stocks in a poor state.

To be successful, the method of management must be dynamic and responsive, a process not an end result. At a minimum this means monitoring changes in the abundance of ecosystem components and adjusting fishing pressure on different elements of the ecosystem as their productivity varies over time.

DSC_0051 - Version 2.jpg

Sustainability is a process
Many consumers and retailers simply want to know if a specific fishery is sustainable. Using ecological measures of abundance or biomass does not provide the most accurate answer to this question. Even beyond the myriad social and economic considerations listed above, fish stock abundance goes up and down with or without fishing, and paleontological evidence shows many stocks fluctuate greatly and even show widespread local extinction prior to human impacts. A stock may be at high current abundance, but caught in a totally unregulated fishery and fished at rates that are not sustainable.

Thus, the abundance of a fish stock does not necessarily say much about its sustainability, and sustainability definitions that rely on stock abundance as the primary indicator can often be misleading. A question with a more exacting answer is “Is it sustainably managed?” Sustainably managed stocks are far more likely to remain so and dynamically respond to changing circumstances and understanding. Thus, current exploitation rate would generally be a better measure of sustainability than current abundance.

The western theory of sustainable harvesting of fish stocks evolved during the first half of the 20th century and was codified in two major books of the 1950s, but by the 1990s many fisheries in the developed world were considered overexploited. This started to change in the 1990s as more countries implemented fisheries management systems that had (i) specific objectives and targets for fishing pressure and abundance, (ii) monitoring of fishing pressure and abundance, (iii) assessments to determine if targets were being met, (iv) feedback management systems that adjusted regulations in response to the assessments and in particular restricted fishing pressure when it was too high, and (v) enforcement systems to assure compliance with regulations. These are the basic elements of a sustainable management system (for the fish stock at least), and without these elements there can be no assurance that the stock will be sustainably managed. This can be summarized quite simply as “sustainability is a process”.

Certification and sustainability guides
There are now hundreds of seafood guides and several certification programs to provide guidance to consumers and retailers on what is sustainable. In this section we look specifically at two of the most widely recognized to evaluate what elements of sustainability they consider most important in providing consumer advice.

The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) has a transparent scoring process broken into three principles, dealing with (i) stock management, (ii) ecosystem effects of the fishery, and (iii) governance, policy, and the management. Overall, the MSC has eight scoring criteria related to outcomes (state of stocks and ecosystem) and 23 that concern process. Thus, MSC evaluation is heavily weighted towards sustainability as a process rather than as a measure of ecosystem condition. However, the MSC scoring is completely confined to the fish stock and the management system, with no consideration of social or economic impacts nor of environmental impacts beyond the local marine ecosystem.

The Monterey Bay Aquarium’s Seafood Watch program is the best known of over 200 seafood guides and provides consumer advice for particular species, with each species and harvest method graded as “best choice”, “good alternative”, or “avoid”. They have four criteria: (1) impacts on the species under assessment, (2) impacts on other species, (3) management effectiveness, and (4) impacts on the habitat and ecosystem. Within the first two criteria, all scoring is based on the state of the system, with measures of the biological vulnerability, the abundance, and the mortality. Criterion 3 has two process-related scoring factors, while criterion 4 has two state measures and one process measure.

Overall Seafood Watch scoring is dominated by state measures (9), with only three measures of process. As with MSC scoring, no scoring in Seafood Watch deals with social or economic impacts, nor are environmental impacts beyond the local marine ecosystem considered. This is perhaps best illustrated by the relative rankings of yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares) (ratings as of 26 December 2014), which can be a “best choice” if caught by US troll or poll-and-line fishing, “good alternative” if caught by imported troll or poll-and-line or US longline, or “avoid” if caught by purse seine. It is not the status of the stock or its management that distinguishes, but the bycatch of other species that is different among the different methods. Purse seining has significant bycatch of juvenile bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus) and a range of other species. However, pole and line and longline fisheries produce three to five times more carbon footprint per ton of tuna landed than do purse seinersand rely on intense exploitation of “baitfish” from local coastal zones. Therefore, if there were more concerns about carbon footprint (broader environmental impacts) than bycatch impacts, purse seining would be elevated and pole and line fishing demoted in the scoring system.

These guides were predominantly oriented towards the state of the fish stock and assessments of the acceptability of various marine ecosystem impacts. They contain little consideration of the nature of the management system or the social or economic outcomes and essentially no consideration of environmental impacts beyond the marine ecosystem.

Impacts beyond the marine ecosystem and fishing communities
Consumer guides to many forms of consumables, not just food, are growing in number. Since seafood guides came first, fish retailers in the USA, Canada, and Europe can advise you on what seafood is “sustainable”, but no such advice or guidance is available for other forms of food sold in the same stores. Changes have come with labeling as to whether food is organic, eggs are free range, or beef is grass-fed, but there is a deafening silence on sustainability of food stuff as measured by social impact, carbon footprint, water use, eutrophication and acidification, land transformation, and biodiversity. Consequently, consumers may be excused for thinking seafood is not such a good choice even through comparative studies show seafood to be one of the most sustainable, or lowest impact, foods across a range of sustainability measures. As a result, we are now in a position that even though the transformation of marine ecosystems by fishing is in most places far less than the transformation of land by agriculture, and there are direct threats to human health from pesticides, herbicides, and antibiotics used in livestock production, many retail chains have stopped selling certain fish but continue to sell beef, chicken, and pork regardless of production practices.

In the future it may be common for seafood sustainability to be compared with agriculture, aquaculture, and other human activities in its broader impacts. However, as we are not there yet, we should make the most of our experience so far with an evolving understanding of what defines seafood sustainability, lending what we have learned to a wider consideration of which impacts could be used to define sustainability more broadly. For example, Australian fishermen must report any interaction with threatened, endangered, or protected species. In contrast, no Australian motorist has ever been asked to report any bycatch-by-car of It is clear that the transferal of a simple, biological, target-based concept of sustainability to all aspects of humanity is unlikely to be feasible or to deliver the intended biodiversity, broader ecosystem services, or socio-ecological outcomes.

It is clear that the transferal of a simple, biological, target-based concept of sustainability to all aspects of humanity is unlikely to be feasible or to deliver the intended biodiversity, broader ecosystem services, or socio-ecological outcomes.

Conclusions
Once we examine aspects of sustainability beyond food production, we can find little basis for an agreed upon definition of social, economic, or ecological elements of sustainability. The standard in those dimensions depends on what an organization or individual believes is most important. There are some standards in these dimensions that could likely be widely agreed. For instance, bycatch that leads to extinction and use of slave labor, but any attempt to be all-inclusive will subject “sustainable fisheries” to being tweaked and pulled in all directions by different interest groups.

Given such intractable, unwieldy complexities, it may be prudent to rein in the definition of sustainable fisheries. The Brundtland definition is already widely accepted, sound, and defensible. Consequently, if a management system can provide food for this generation without reducing the ability of future generations to produce food, let us call that “sustainable seafood”.

Certainly consumer advice can and should incorporate environmental impacts, human rights, and social equity into their advice on what should be eaten, but either we have to abandon the term “sustainable seafood” in those dimensions or find broad agreement on what is acceptable.

Combating Tax Crime and Other Crimes in the Fisheries Sector by Francisco Blaha

Once in a while, I wish I was still working for FAO or some fisheries organization and administration, as to be able to assist to the right seminars, workshops, and meetings. Here is one of them even if I had the money to go to Paris and spend a week of my expenses plus assuming the cost of not earning during that time, it would be difficult to be accepted, just because I represent myself and typically you need to be employed by a government or body. But then I'm supposed to know and be updated on these topics for my work, is a independent consultant's conundrum.

This conference – hosted jointly by the OECD Committee, the OECD Task Force on Tax Crime and Other Crimes, the FAO and the UNODC will take place in Paris (13-14 October 2016)– will provide a platform to policy makers and stakeholders to discuss pressing legal and operational challenges they face in combating fisheries related and associated crimes. It aims to support international cooperation and build mutual assistance to combat serious crimes in the fisheries sectors.

The fisheries sector is vulnerable to criminal activities as many other sectors. Fishing intersects with criminal activities, such as human trafficking, smuggling of migrants, drug trafficking, document fraud, corruption, money laundering, tax fraud and occasionally terrorism financing. Sometimes these crimes are committed by those in the fishing industry, while at other times fishing vessels are used as part of larger criminal operations. All along the value chain, actors turn to criminality to maximise their profits, especially those derived from illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing.

Illegal and unreported fishing is estimated to cost the global economy up to $23 billion annually. This figure does not include the cost of unregulated fishing, the cost of other transnational criminality or the resultant economic losses to countries, and so likely underestimates the full negative impact.

Illegally caught fish are lost to legitimate fishers, and reduce local economic activities related to fisheries. Furthermore, governments lose out on licensing fees and other tax revenues. This undermines governments’ ability to enforce policy, manage the pressure on fish stocks, promote food security, reduce poverty, fund public expenditure and support development activities.

National authorities can work together to combat fisheries crimes. Fisheries authorities, port authorities, customs administrations, coastguards, police and other law enforcement authorities can collaborate to reduce the overall cost of fighting fisheries related crimes by avoiding duplication of effort and enhancing capacities.

The conference will have the following sessions

Understanding Crime in the Fisheries Sector
Bringing together experts in combatting fisheries crimes from international organisations to map the diverse nature of crime in the sector.

Country Experiences
Policy makers and country experts will share best practices and solutions in their fight against fisheries crimes.

Improving Cooperation
Discover technical tools for gathering intelligence and enhancing co-operation among national agencies.

Closing Loopholes
Participants will identify priorities to remove legal and operational barriers for effective international co-operation in combating fisheries crimes.

Workshop - Detect and Investigate Crime
During a half day workshop, participants will receive practical and operational training on the detection and investigation of tax and other crimes in the fisheries sector.

Find more about it here