A man made tragedy, good UN support against Fisheries Subsidies

I know... like there are not enough topics to write about. But as you all know, I'm really against fisheries subsidies. I am aware that their disappearance will not be the magic panacea that will fix all fisheries issues... but at least will even the economic playfield, and that would be of massive help.

I'm so pleased that this message is been taken by the top UN bodies, and I know (from working for them) that they will not produce immediate results, yet they are like a glacier... they move very slowly but very powerfully. 

The message from Mukhisa Kitugi - UNCTAD boss,  may not be the most dynamic one but carries a lot of weight. Good on him for lending his support to the cause.

The EU delivers another bad tuna compliance report to Thailand

Thailand has been going trough a rough patch with the EU for a while now, from the still outstanding issues from DG MARE’s “yellow card” in terms of IUU, now DG SANTE (Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety) recently published the results of an inspection that was carried out last year… and the results are bad in terms of catch traceability, eligibility and basic food safety.

Recently  I wrote that in my experience if compliance in the seafood safety area is dodgy, chances are that it would be the same on the fisheries compliance arena and vice-versa. Reading the Thailand report just confirms to me, all the suspicions many of us in the tuna world have are all well founded. 

This audit the first in a series of audits by the EU dedicated to getting a clearer picture of the tuna industry as a whole and determine if the tuna they import meets the applicable requirements concerning public health (in particular limits for biogenic amines and heavy metals) also in the context of fish policy requirements (including the presence and accuracy of catch certificates) and customs rules.
If you want to have an overview of the EU requirements for all these certificates, I shamelessly recommend this publication

The scope of their "Tuna project" extends to geographically identified hubs, where tunas and tuna-like species are caught and processed (all forms) for export to the European Union. Thailand was initially selected following a DG Health and Food Safety study of tuna imports in which it was identified as a major tuna importer/exporter operating in two of the geographically important “tuna hubs” (Indian Ocean and Western and Central Pacific Ocean). (They also were in Ecuador recently that is the other hub, the results are not publicly available yet, and while serious problems were identified, they are as not systemic as in Thailand)

The primary objective of the Thai audit was to evaluate whether the official controls put in place by the competent authority can guarantee that the conditions of production of fishery products derived from tuna species destined for export to the European Union are in line with the requirements laid down in European Union legislation, and in particular with the health attestations contained in the EU Health export certificate.

The audit team noted weaknesses that can be considered systemic in the control of the transport of fishery products of tuna species from carriers to the first land-based establishment, the control of cold stores and the European Union eligibility of the imported raw materials.

 These weaknesses (quote) do not allow the competent authority to fully provide the guarantees required by the EU export certificate

During the period (2012-16), establishments found with  traceability inconsistencies imported approximately 1,075,000 tonnes of tuna species as raw materials potentially used for the manufacture of fishery products for EU export. Those raw materials (frozen only) were sourced from establishments and fishing vessels (including freezing vessels) located in seven EU member states and forty-five non-EU countries.

From the data provided by the competent authority one can see that the majority of tuna is caught in the major FAO fishing areas 57, 71 According to the competent authority Thailand has twenty-seven fishing ports where landing of fishery products (tuna species) can take place. Of those, fifteen are dedicated to the landing of imported tuna and the remaining twelve to tuna captured in waters of Thailand and neighbouring countries (FAO areas 57 and 71) and 77 (Indian and Pacific Ocean). Some tuna was also caught in the major FAO fishing areas 34, 41 and 47 (Atlantic Ocean), 51 (Indian Ocean), 61 and 81 (Pacific Ocean).

In principle, the official control system covering landing sites provides adequate guarantees with regard to the public health attestations of the EU export certificate. However, the deficient control by the competent authority of the transport conditions and the practices observed during the audit do not allow one to conclude that the competent authority can provide the same assurances with regard to the transport of fishery products.

The competent authority cannot ensure that cold stores participating in the production chain of fishery products to the EU comply with requirements at least equivalent to the EU rules, in particular, the relevant requirements of Regulation (EC) No 853/2004, (the requirement related to HACCP)

The competent authority cannot ensure that products kept at the cold stores are EU eligible due to the fact that cold stores cannot demonstrate unequivocally the origin of those products. (quote)

The ability of the competent authority to guarantee that all establishments included in the EU list comply with requirements at least equivalent to the EU rules is weakened due to the shortcomings observed during the audit.

The competent authority cannot ensure that all imported raw materials used in the manufacture of products to be exported to the EU comply and were obtained in compliance with the EU rules and as such is not in a position to certify the public health attestations of the EU export certificate for those products. (quote)

The audit team noted in the files assessed and the data provided by the competent authority that products had been imported to Thailand by reefer vessel (whole fish frozen in brine) or in containers (frozen tuna loins) from facilities located in seven EU member states and forty-five non-EU countries.

From the data provided the audit team noted that 92% of the imported raw material originated from 14 countries (one EU member state and the remainder non-EU countries). Of those biggest suppliers of raw material, three countries were not included in Annex II to Decision 2006/766/EC, hence not authorised to supply fish to the EU. The audit team noted that, in total, Thailand received raw materials potentially used in the manufacture of products for EU export from nine countries currently not included in Annex II to Decision 2006/766/EC, representing roughly 16% of those imported raw materials.

In the import certificates reviewed the audit team found in several of the files the following shortcomings (related to the products prior to their arrival in Thailand)

• Major inconsistencies on transhipment dates.
• Unknown location of the products during periods of time ranging from eighteen days to four months:
• Freezer vessel unloading in a certain port different from the one where the container was loaded into the carrier vessel (470 km distance and eighteen days difference) and no health attestation produced.
• Freezer vessel unloading to a port area and container dispatch from the same port area months later.
• Freezer vessel unloading in a port of a non-EU country not included in Annex II to Decision 2006/766/EC, dispatch of the container at uncertain date (no shipping date available) and arrival into Thailand four months after the fishing trip finished. 

All the above puts into question the reliability of the guarantees provided by the competent authority with regard to the public health attestations of the EU export certificate. Furthermore; 

• The audit team noted in one case out of the five cans placed on the EU market that the fishing area declared was different from the one set out in the supporting documentation.
• The audit team also noted another case where the fishing area was not precisely indicated (two FAO areas cited without the indication of which one was relevant).

The assessment of those files showed that for imported raw materials used in the manufacture of products for EU export the competent authority cannot provide full guarantees with regard to the EU eligibility of those materials and to the public health attestations of the EU export certificate

The audit team noted weaknesses that can be considered systemic in the control of the transport of fishery products of tuna species from carriers to the first land-based establishment, the control of cold stores and the European Union eligibility of the imported raw materials. (quote)

These weaknesses do not allow the competent authority to fully provide the guarantees required by the EU export certificate when exporting fishery products of tuna species to the EU. (quote)

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The report is quite strongly worded, and Thailand should have spotted their game long ago. If we were to stay on best practices, DG SANTE should ask that establishments that been processing non eligible fish should be delisted. Yet doing that could cause supply problems and Ecuador would take advantage and raise prices, but then they have problems of their own… even if not “systemic”. So in reality is hard to know what they would do.

What I do know is what my friend Gilles Hosch pointed out when he read this report… if the EU would have set a good electronic CDS (Catch Documentation Scheme) instead of continuing with the present paper based system, Thailand would be in less problems since eligibility could be checked electronically and the EU consumers could be more reassured that they have been eating legal and safe fish, since Thailand is the biggest tuna exported to the EU.

Lack of Jurisdiction in Criminal Proceedings Regarding IUU Fishing and Related Crimes

I wrote before in regards the failure of the Spanish courts to criminally charge members of the Vidal family for their involvement as beneficial owners of notorious IUU vessels. My colleagues from Stop Illegal Fishing published an excellent collaborative article (link to the original), I quote below since it analyses the details of the case.

Screenshot from the original post

This article shows to my non-legal understanding, something we all know... the law and justice are different things.

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In March 2016, a joint operation between Spanish police and INTERPOL resulted in the arrest of six people linked to the fishing company Vidal Armadores. The company, along with its affiliates, had long been connected to a string of illegal fishing cases and had more recently been in the spotlight as renewed efforts finally led to high profile captures of the group of six infamous toothfish poaching vessels: the THUNDER, VIKING, KUNLUN, PERLON, SONGHUA and YONG DING.

This case is important to Stop Illegal Fishing as it epitomises the issues faced by many African countries which have rich marine resources but are grappling with the hindrances associated with lack of, or complex and unclear jurisdiction and often weak legal systems. These hindrances, all too often result in countries being unable to bring more than administrative penalties against the beneficiaries of illegal fishing and related activities. Furthermore, several of these vessels were illegally active in African waters, making the outcome of this case important to those States affected.

In December 2016, the Spanish Supreme Court concluded that the courts of Spain did not have jurisdiction in the Vidal Armadores case. The previous ruling by the High Court of imprisonment with bail set at EUR 100 000 for each of the four family members and two workers that were arrested, was therefore overturned and the criminal charges dropped.

Following the conclusion of the case before the High Court, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court because Spanish courts do not have the jurisdiction to make rulings regarding the acts for which Vidal Armadores was being accused.

All the criminal charges faced by the defendants – including money laundering, falsification of documents, environmental crimes and criminal conspiracy – were based on fishing without a license in international waters.  The defence appealed the criminal charges by contesting the jurisdiction of Spain’s courts over the issue of fishing without a licence in international waters. The issue regarding the jurisdiction of Spanish courts to make a ruling in this case is discussed below.

Territorialism

Under the principle of territorialism, the Spanish courts have jurisdiction when an act is committed within its territory, including acts committed on its vessels. The vessels were not flagged to Spain, although the beneficial owners were Spanish, and the acts were committed in international waters, therefore this principle meant the Spanish courts had no jurisdiction unless the barriers imposed by this principle could be broken.

Principles and provisions exist that would justify a break from the principle of territorialism, as outlined below.

Exceptions to Territorialism

PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE

Under the protective principle, for specific acts such as terrorism and the trafficking of illegal drugs, the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (LOPJ) allows Spanish courts to break the restrictions imposed by the principle of territoriality. These specific cases are instances in which the crime has a particularly serious impact on national interests, committed outside of Spain by either foreigners or nationals. The Supreme Court concluded that it could not break the principle of territoriality as crimes against the environment, document fraud and integration into criminal organisations or groups are not classified under the protective principle and neither is fishing without a licence.

PRINCIPLE OF PERSONALITY

The principle of personality gives Spanish courts jurisdiction in cases where nationals (or foreigners who subsequently become nationals) commit a crime, in whole or part, outside Spanish territory if the act is also criminal in the location where it is committed. This can apply either under international law applicable to Spain or under the national law of the territory within which the act was committed.

The acts were committed in international waters and therefore foreign national criminal law was not applicable. Although the acts were committed in the area governed by the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Living Marine Resources (CCALMR), no provisions regarding criminal procedures against such infractions were present in the text of the Convention. This was echoed by European Commission (EC) Regulation no 601/2004, resulting in the conclusion by the Supreme Court that the acts were not criminal in the area committed.

Under Spanish Criminal Code the gear used is not among the list of gears which constitute a crime in Spain (use of poisons, explosives or other gear with similar harmful effects).[1] Furthermore the species targeted is not listed as protected or at risk of extinction and its consumption and harvesting is common practice.[2] Thus there is no double-criminality, meaning that the principle of personality is not applicable.

Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that Spain had no jurisdiction to make a ruling regarding the criminal charges in the current case.

MONEY LAUNDERING

Under Spanish law, the guilty party may be equally punished for money laundering if the crime from which the proceeds came is committed within Spain or outside of Spain. However, there must be a preceding crime from which these proceeds came for there to be money laundering. As shown above, the acts were not criminal where committed (neither were they criminal in Spain) and therefore the Court concluded that there cannot be money laundering in this case.

ISSUES HIGHLIGHTED

Although the Spanish have legislation[3] which covers the issue of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in international waters, the sanctions which are applicable thereunder are not criminal, they are administrative.

Despite the criminal charges against the owners of Vidal Armadores being dropped, the administrative fines and suspensions placed on associated companies and individuals reportedly, remain unaffected.

This case reiterates the need to implement legislation which allows the beneficial owners of vessels carrying out IUU fishing activities in areas beyond national jurisdiction to be prosecuted in criminal proceedings: loopholes in legislation must be closed. The deterrent of purely administrative sanctions has proven to be insufficient, with perpetrators viewing them as operational costs.

[1] Art. 336 del CP.
[2] Los arts. 335 y 336 del CP.
[3]  Ley 33/2014, de 26 de diciembre, por la que se modifica la Ley 3/2001, de 26 de marzo, de Pesca Marítima del Estado.

The importance of qualitative social research for effective fisheries management

A recent paper that includes among their authors two people I know and like (Dr. Kate Barclay and Jeff Kinch), had in the 1st sentence of its abstract, a fundamental “truth” that I absolutely agree with: “Over recent decades it has become widely accepted that managing fisheries resources means managing human behaviour, and so understanding social and economic dynamics is just as important as understanding species biology and ecology”.

Many time in conversations (and some job interviews) I said that as a consultant, researcher and manager, I don't work with fish anymore… I work with the people that work with fish. So, I was quite happy to read their publication.

spending the day at sea with artisanal fisherman in Guatemala, my best way to get info

Abstract
They start by recognising that until recently, fisheries managers and researchers have struggled to develop effective methods and data for social and economic analysis that can integrate with the predominantly biological approaches to fisheries management. The field is now growing fast, however, and globally, researchers are developing and testing new methods.

This paper uses three divergent case studies to demonstrate the value of using qualitative social science approaches to complement more conventional quantitative methods to improve the knowledge base for fisheries management. In all three cases, qualitative interview and document review methods enabled broad surveying to explore the research questions in particular contexts and identified where quantitative tools could be most usefully applied.

In the first case (the contribution of commercial fisheries to coastal communities in eastern Australia), a wellbeing analysis identified the social benefits from particular fisheries, which can be used to identify the social impacts of different fisheries management policies.

In the second case (a gender analysis of fisheries of small islands in the Pacific), analysis outlined opportunities and constraints along fisheries supply chains, illuminated factors inhibiting community development and identified ecological factors that are typically overlooked in conventional fisheries management.

In the third case (sea cucumber fisheries in Papua New Guinea), an interactive governance analysis assessed how well fisheries management tools fit the ecological, social and economic reality of the fishery and the trade in its products, including market influences and stakeholder values.

The qualitative approach adopted in these three case studies adds a new dimension to understanding fisheries that is not possible with a focus solely on quantitative data.

With the development of new policies on release programs (stock enhancement, restocking) and artificial reefs, and the momentum to use these interventions from recreational fishing groups, the qualitative approach will provide an important contribution to understanding their wider costs and benefits.

Conclusions
The case studies discussed in this paper show different ways qualitative social science can be used to help tie together the complexity of fisheries as social systems for improved governance. They cover some of the myriad ways in which social relations affect fisheries management − the interdependence of resource user groups (NSW), specific sets of social relations, such as gender, affecting natural resource use and post-harvest activities (Solomon Islands), and the interplay of factors along a whole market chain affecting fisheries governance (PNG).

Social research on fisheries may be thoroughly applied and practical in nature. Each of these case studies was commissioned by a stakeholder organisation, for purposes specifically related to fisheries management.

• In NSW the project was requested by industry to assist in negotiations with the government and used a well-being approach.
• In Solomon Islands it was a donor body wanting to tailor its engagement in coastal fisheries institutional strengthening incorporating a gender approach.
• For PNG, a conservation organisation wanted to know how to best target its work in supporting a new fisheries management plan and adopted a “fish chain” approach to fisheries governance.

The wellbeing approach may be used to assess social impacts in a fishing community, and the ways in which fishing contributes to the wellbeing of the wider community. It addresses shortcomings in measuring only material standards of living, in covering also social relationships and subjective aspects of wellbeing.

Gender analysis, as used in the Solomon Islands case study, should be part of any social evaluation of fisheries, since gender norms and gender relations fundamentally shape the ways fisheries and post-harvest activities operate, the ways natural resources are used, and the community development outcomes of projects.

The interactive governance approach applied to BDM in PNG was developed as a way to tackle the complex interrelations fishing activities have with the natural world and non-fishing social and economic world. The potentially broad coverage and exploration possible with qualitative approaches enables researchers to uncover aspects of their topics they would not otherwise be able to see, providing depth and contextual understanding for quantitative findings.

These three case studies highlight the value of qualitative approaches to complement other approaches used more consistently in fisheries and would add a significant dimension to understanding the broader implications of release programs. Interviews are a key element of qualitative research fisheries scientists may incorporate to improve understanding of why fisheries operate as they do, and what the effects of policy changes are likely to be.

This means going beyond the fishers and managers themselves, to interview people with a wide range of perspectives on the fishery.

Gaining useful and reliable information from interviews is a complex research skill, it takes training and years of experience to experience to do well. Fisheries scientists may invest in developing that skill themselves, or collaborate with qualitative social researchers.

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I also, totally agree with the last sentence of their conclusions, from my experience, for example I have gained much wider perspectives on artisanal fisherman by going fishing with them (exchanging skills is always a bonus!) or getting a small boat similar to theirs and heading out at sea to conduct interviews, rather than doing it at the shore.

But then that is just me :-)
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My favourite Māori proverb or Whakataukī says:
He aha te mea nui o te ao (What is the most important thing in the world?) 
He tangata, he tangata, he tangata (It is the people, it is the people, it is the people)

A global footprint on Transhipments

Back in November 2014 and then later September 2016, I wrote about the Global Fishing Watch initiative as a compelling web based tool that while limited regarding MSC (Monitoring, Control and Surveillance), it had a unique value as to show the positions and share amount of fishing and carrier vessels involved in “apparent fishing activity" occurring around the world.

From the Oceana report

This week, they hope to make another splash by not just mapping global fishing activity, but by providing an unprecedented view of very specific activity by a very specific class of vessels around the world: Fish carriers/reefers 

Today, at the Economist World Ocean Summit in Indonesia, Brian Sullivan, Google’s lead for Global Fishing Watch, presented the results of our their analysis that produced the first-ever global footprint of transhipment. They released the data and analysis of these transshipments in a free report titled The Global View of Transshipment: Preliminary Findings.

At the same time, Oceana is publishing a complementary report exposing the global scale of transhipment and its potential for facilitating suspicious behaviours like illegal fishing and human rights abuses. 

In the commercial fishing industry, large refrigerated cargo ships collect catch from multiple fishing boats and carry it back to port. This practice of transhipment enables fishing vessels to continue fishing, which reduces fuel costs for fishing vessels and gets the catch to port more quickly. 

That’s why it is illegal in many cases, and it is why the ability to monitor refrigerated cargo vessels and identify when and where transhipment happens can play a significant role in reducing illegal activity at sea.

Their analysis of 21 billion AIS messages from ships on the ocean between 2012 and 2016 identified 90% of the world’s reefer vessels (794 reefers compared to the 882 identified in 2010 according to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook.) 

When they applied a new algorithm we developed to finding telltale transhipment behaviour, such as drifting long enough to receive a transfer of catch, the results revealed 86,490 instances of “potential transshipments.” Drilling down through these 86,490 occurrences, they identified 5,065 confirmed rendezvouses between a reefer and a fishing vessel. They have labelled these “likely transshipments.”

In the new report, they outline our methodology for developing the algorithm and identifying important patterns in the data such as clustering of transshipment activity along the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ’s) of certain countries, and a lower prevalence of transshipment around countries with comparatively good management, such as in North America and Europe, when compared to regions with higher suspected levels of IUU fishing.

The data also show that transhipment is clearly a pan-national problem that involves ships registered to a diverse array of countries operating on the high seas and offshore waters around the world and far from their home ports.

Their preliminary report represents our first steps toward increasing transparency of the previously hidden practice of transhipment at sea. There is more work ahead for them as they continue to mine data for still more data to mine, and more. It is no doubt an interesting field that while of limited enforcement impact, it bring public attention and scrutiny to activities that until now were largely away from anyone's attention, and that is GOOD news

Download the free report and the supporting data here!

Learn about a companion report released by Oceana.

Read about how our  SkyTruth captured satellite images of a Thai reefer in a likely transhipment in a remote part of the Indian Ocean.

Source: Global Fishing Watch Blog

EU Commission lifts it 'yellow card' for the Solomon Islands

For more than two years, I have been working a lot on the Solomon Islands to help their efforts to get off the "yellow card" that was handed to them in December 2014. I wrote many times about my work there and how much I love the fishing town of Noro "what fishing in the Pacific should be". So when today, the announcement came, it was good news.

One of the many training sessions we did over the last two years

Not going argue on the merits of the yellow card (there is no point on it at this stage) but rather honour the fact that a lot of people in the country, its industry, government and organisations like FFA and NZ AID, put a lot of effort for this to happen.

Everyone involved deserves a: "Good Job brothers and sisters". Yet, the hardest bit is just now ahead... maintain the effort now that the pressure is not on.

The press release of the EU said:
Speaking on the margins of the Economist's World Ocean Summit in Bali, EU Commissioner for Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Karmenu Vella, said: “This is a good day for Curaçao and Solomon Islands, and good news for sustainable fisheries around the globe. Countries worldwide have a shared duty to fight illegal fishing, protect law-abiding fishermen, and keep our oceans healthy. 

Under the IUU Regulation, the European Commission warned Curaçao in November 2013 and Solomon Islands in December 2014 that they were not doing enough against IUU fishing. Since then, both countries have embarked on a series of reforms to bring their fisheries legal and administrative frameworks in line with international law, and are now equipped to tackle illegal fishing effectively. Working closely with the European Commission, they have strengthened their sanctioning system, and have improved monitoring and control of their fleets.

Interestingly, my friend Gilles reaction to this news was spot on:

what i find striking in news items relating to EU yellow, red and green cards – such as this one above – is the complete lack of journalistic curiosity and scrutiny regarding the seemingly random selection by the EU of so-called “third” countries, threatening them with trade sanctions for their perceived lack of commitment to combat IUU fishing. does it ever occur to anybody that 38% of all south-west pacific island nations have been yellow-carded under the EU IUU regulation – when only 24% of countries in asia, and 0% in south america, the near east and in europe have been objects of such cards? yes, of course it is nice for the solomons to have that threat lifted – as it would be for any ACP country totally dependent on the EU seafood market for the continued survival of its export sector – but would it not be equally important to question how it is possible that small countryies like the solomons are serially pre-identified by the EU commission, and threatened with the extinction of their seafood trade sectors, while other major fishing nations – in their role as recognised state-soponsors of international IUU fishing ventures – are never even making it onto the EU radar!? i am missing the elements of critical and vital news reporting here.

A study on Seafood Fraud in the USA

While I work a lot with the operational side of IUU fisheries, there is an equally important type of crime at the other end of the value chain, species substitution and fraud. How prevalent is it? You'll be surprised!

From Oceana's report.

Oceana (a Ocean protection NGO) conducted one of the largest seafood fraud investigations in the world to date, collecting more than 1,200 seafood samples from 674 retail outlets in 21 states of the US to determine if they were honestly labeled.

DNA testing found that one-third (33%) of the 1,215 samples analyzed nationwide were mislabeled, according to U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidelines.

Some of facts  found are:

• Mislabeling was found in 27 of the 46 fish types tested (59%).
• Salmon,snapper,cod,tuna,sole, halibut and grouper were the top collected fish types.
• Snapper (87%) and tuna (59%) were the most commonly mislabeled fish types.
• Only 7 of the 120 red snapper samples were honestly labeled.
• 44% of all the grocery stores, restaurants and sushi venues visited sold mislabeled seafood.
• Sushi restaurants were far more likely to mislabel their fish than grocery stores or other restaurants.
• In Chicago, Austin, New York, and Washington DC, every single sushi restaurant sampled sold mislabeled tuna.
• 84% of fish samples labeled "white tuna" were actually escolar, a by-catch of the tuna and swordfish longline fishery.

If you've ever wondered why the "tuna" and "snapper" sushi in the display case is so affordable, well... ain't what it says it is, and that always has been the basis of any fraud.

Today, more than 90% of the seafood consumed in the U.S. is imported, and less than 1%t is inspected by the government specifically for fraud. With more than 1,700 different species of seafood from all over the world available for sale in the U.S., it is unrealistic to expect the American consumer to be able to independently and accurately determine what they are actually eating. 

A forthcoming FAO book that we wrote with my friend Gilles Hosch covering all the value chain from harvest to market, analysing the roles of flag, coastal, port, processing and market state does suggest some control tools (at end market state) for this malpractice. Looking forwards to present it at some stage when officially released.

Disclaimer: I take this results at "face value" I have not reviewed their methodology or conclusions, yet it would not surprise me if the results are accurate .

The Sunken Billions of present global fisheries practices

Back in 2009, when I was based in FAO in Rome, the World Bank and FAO published a seminal work that blew my small mind. It was called The Sunken Billions: The Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform, by explicitly quantifying the potential economic benefit forgone in global marine fisheries, The Sunken Billions underscored the urgency of improving marine fisheries governance and generated additional momentum toward restoring overexploited fish stocks. Yet not much has changed :-(

A new report, The Sunken Billions Revisited: Progress and Challenges in Global Marine Fisheries, reviews on the old one, using a bio-economic model developed by Professor Ragnar Arnason of the University of Iceland. And the message still urgent.

The report confirms what many intuitively know: overexploitation is not a good strategy to manage a renewable natural resource like fish stocks, for steady profits, reliable jobs and long-term growth. For global fisheries as a whole, about $83 billion were foregone in 2012, compared to a more optimal scenario, largely because of overfishing.

Is a big docuement, that everyone with interest in fisheries should at least have areference and hopefully read. It higlights some good examples, a few of them in place I work a lot such as Peru and the Pacific.

But for me, the key message is very straight: 

Restoring fisheries would yield substantial returns
Severely overexploited fish stocks have to be rebuilt over time if the optimal equilibrium is to be reached and the sunken billions recovered. To allow biological processes to reverse the decline in fish stocks, fishing mortality needs to be reduced, which can only happen through an absolute reduction in the global fishing effort (as captured by the size and efficiency of the global fleet, usually measured in terms of the number of vessels, vessel tonnage, engine power, vessel length, gear, fishing methods, and technical efficiency).

To reach the sustainable optimal state, global fleet overcapacity would have to be reduced by 44% from the level inferred for 2012. Doing so would likely lead to the following economic benefits:

• The biomass of fish in the ocean would increase by a factor of 2.7.
• Annual harvests would increase by 13%.
• Unit fish prices would rise by up to 24 %, thanks to the recovery of higher-value species, the depletion of which is particularly severe.
• The annual net benefits accruing to the fisheries sector would increase by a factor of almost 30, from $3 billion to $86 billion.

Bold measures are required to achieve this 44% reduction in the global fishing effort and to allow overexploited fish stocks to recover. At one hypothetical extreme, if the fishing effort were reduced to zero for the first several years and then held at an optimal level, global stocks could quickly recover to over 600 million tons in 5 years and then taper off toward an ideal level.

Yet reducing the global fishing effort by 5% a year for 10 years would allow global stocks to reach this ideal level in about 30 years. And this doable!  

Of course, reform will require financial and technical assistance at many levels, but the report makes a very clear case for the need for reform. It does not analyze policies, financing, or the socioeconomic impacts of embarking on such reform. Many case studies have shown that different strategies are called for in different circumstances and places. Whichever strategies are chosen, fishing capacity will have to be reduced, jeopardizing the livelihoods of millions of fishers. Financing will be needed to fund the development of alternatives for them, to provide technical assistance at all levels, and to conduct additional research on ecosystem changes and related ecological processes.

This report poses important questions. If the sunken billions wasted annually at sea are to be recovered, and fisheries put on a sustainable pathway, policy makers will need to answer these questions, and soon. 

As I see it, you don't have to be a visionary genius to understand that if there is less fish, we cannot have more vessels and more subsidies as a strategy... the opposite should be the goal.

What is Fisheries Crime?

Fisheries crime is an ill-defined legal concept referring to a range of illegal activities in the fisheries sector. These activities - frequently transnational and organized in nature - include illegal fishing, document fraud, drug trafficking, and money laundering.

the initiative's logo

So it is quite interesting that Uniten Nations Office on Drugs and Crime decided to weight in. While I mostly disgree with their aproach to drugs, I find it reasuring the fisheries crime gets their atention.

Criminal activities in the fisheries sector are often regarded as synonymous with illegal fishing, which many States do not view or prosecute as criminal offences, but rather as a fisheries management concern, attracting low and usually administrative penalties. Organized criminal organizations thus engage in fisheries crime with relative impunity due both to low risk and high profits and uncoordinated, ineffective domestic and cross-border law enforcement efforts.

Fisheries crime is a multifaceted phenomenon which comprises various crimes, including economic crimes, that are committed at any point along the whole value chain; from the marine habitat through to the final consumer product. The transnational element of fisheries crime is important from a jurisdictional perspective when it comes to law enforcement efforts.

One facet of fisheries crime at a transnational organized level is large-scale, illegal fishing which threatens the stability of coastal communities – economically, socially and politically – particularly in developing regions.  In areas such as West Africa and South East Asia small-scale or artisanal shers depend on sustained stocks of near-shore fish for their livelihood and as a subsistence food source.

Considering the already-strained fish stocks in these regions, these groups are increasingly vulnerable.  As fish is a key source of animal protein in many coastal countries, diminishing fish stocks puts an increased strain on local and national food security which in turn can make Governments more unstable. 

The fact sheet they have published is worth reading. 

Summary of 2017 Biennial Report to Congress

Every two years NOAA Fisheries presents its report to US Congress as a mandated requirement of the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act, as amended by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act.

The report highlights U.S. findings and analyses of foreign IUU fishing activities and of bycatch of protected species and shark catch on the high seas. And while a unilateral assessment (as the EU yellow cards), I find this document quite useful since it is well researched.

The US identifies countries whose fishing vessels were reported to be engaged in these activities, and consults with those countries to improve their fisheries management and enforcement practices. Nations identified for having vessels engaged in IUU fishing are required to take appropriate corrective action to address the activities described in the biennial report.

Based on information provided by nations during the consultations, the US issues a certification decision which is published in the next Report to Congress. A positive certification is issued if the nation has provided evidence of actions that address the activities for which it was identified.

If the nation cannot demonstrate sufficient action has been taken, a negative certification may be issued and the nation, which means it has not taken sufficient action to address the IUU fishing activities that formed the basis for its original identification, that nation is subject to prohibitions on fisheries product imports into the United States and denial of port privileges for its fishing vessels.

Ecuador, Mexico, and the Russian Federation were identified as having vessels reported to be engaged in IUU activity during 2014-2016. On behalf of the US, NOAA Fisheries will consult with each nation to encourage action to address these activities and improve fisheries management and enforcement practices.

The 2017 report also notes that five of six nations identified for illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the 2015 report—Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Nigeria, and Portugal—took action to address the identified issues and now have a positive certification. Mexico, while it continues to make meaningful progress, including increasing surveillance patrols, curtailing engine subsidies, and initiating enforcement cases against those individuals involved in the IUU fishing operations, has not yet fully resolved the enforcement cases, and has therefore been issued a negative certification.  NOAA Fisheries will continue to consult with Mexico toward achieving positive certification.

No nations were identified for bycatch of protected living marine resources or for shark catch on the high seas... which is always hard to prove. I guess they could get deeper in that having the power they have.

WTO members review proposals for addressing fisheries subsidies

I know that I'm quite insistent on subsidies, but as I said many times before, if we manage to eliminate them, I believe we will have a fairer chance at having sustainability in fisheries. 

While we can strengthen institutions,  train inspectors, create e-CDS systems, develop better fisheries management tools and the rest, these are just palliative care strategies.  In my opinion, some of the root causes of IUU and overfishing are on the subsidies policies.

WTO members gave their initial review on 24 January to a new paper from the Group of Least Developed Countries (LDC Group) regarding principles and elements for new multilateral disciplines on fisheries subsidies and further reviewed another three proposals from the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group, the European Union, and six Latin American countries. All four initiatives seek to achieve the 2020 targets set out in the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SGD Goal 14.6 calls for prohibiting certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminating subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and refraining from introducing new such subsidies, by 2020. Goal 14.6 also recognizes that appropriate and effective special and differential (S&D) treatment for developing and least developed countries should be an integral part of the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations.

Introducing the LDC Group proposal at a 24 January meeting of the Negotiating Group on Rules (NGR), Benin and Senegal said addressing fisheries subsidies was a priority for LDCs, who were not the cause of overfishing but were the first to be affected by it. The paper sets out disciplines to achieve the SDG goals in the future but emphasises the importance of S&D treatment. In this regard, Benin and Senegal noted that disciplines should be calibrated to target large-scale industrial fishing operating outside a subsidizing member's national exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and not to prevent artisanal and small-scale fishing in territorial waters. The fisheries sector is important to the livelihood and well-being of LDC members, and not all subsidies cause overfishing, they argued.

The proposal would specifically seek to prohibit subsidies to fishing vessels or fishing activity that negatively impact overfished stocks, subsidies provided to vessels or operators engaged in IUU fishing and subsidies to capital and operating costs which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing.  The first two prohibitions should apply to all WTO members without exception; however, technical assistance and transition periods should be provided to address LDCs' institutional and financial constraints in implementing the disciplines.

Further discussions also took place on the proposals put forward at previous NGR meetings by the ACP Group, the EU, and six Latin American countries - Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. Details on those proposals are available here.

Summing up the full day of discussions, the chair, Ambassador Wayne McCook, said progress was steadily building and that the next phase of the negotiations would be crucial. He said he would hold consultations with interested members starting the week of 30 January and in early February, with the idea of reconvening the NGR later in February to review the progress made.

Canada told members that the first meeting of participants in a plurilateral initiative on fisheries subsidies would take place later in the week and that any delegation interested in attending should let Canada, the group coordinator, know of its interest.

Photo Manual for Fisheries Enforcement, what a great tool!

As many of you must be aware, I like photography, I think is a great way to communicate,  it "freezes" a piece of reality. And while normally one emphasises the aesthetic or sentimental values of a picture, we forget that "freezing reality" for posterity has an amazing value as "evidence", and knowing how to take good pictures that contain the key elements necessary in fisheries enforcement has become fundamental knowledge for MCS practicioners. 

So I was really pleased to see this Photo Manual for Fisheries Enforcement that has been produced my colleague Per Erik Bergh leading the Stop Illegal Fishing team and Trigg Mat Tracking as part of their support to the FISH-i Africa and West Africa Task Forces, as it covers all the elements.

This manual provides very good information that is fit for purpose, I'll definitely pass this manual to all the inspectors I know in the Pacific.

Photographs play a vital role in identifying vessels that are involved in illegal fishing and fisheries crime. By gathering information about the appearance, identity and operations of fishing vessels we are collecting evidence that may prove crucial for investigations – for example, documenting transhipment, recording which vessels operate together and establishing vessel identity fraud.

The ability to take and analyse photographs are important skills and cameras are an essential tool for anyone involved in fisheries monitoring and enforcement including fisheries inspectors, observers, MCS staff, field staff, the Coastguard and community groups. 

I took this picture from a suspected illegal transhipment from over 800 m away with my phone camera, I "connected" the lens to a good binocular I had on board. Sometimes, If you don't have the right equipment, you to use your imagination!

I absolutely agree with them; it is only through the eradication of illegal fishing that developing nations and their people will enjoy the full benefits of stable and increased revenues from their fishery resources.

I wish NFDS (the consulting team behind all this good work), had a more sustained presence in the Pacific as I love to collaborate more with them.

Seafood prices reveal impacts of a major ecological disturbance

While the bulk of my interest is in Oceanic fisheries, I’m always happy to learn novel approaches to the general fisheries conondrum. Obviously the traditional approaches have a mixed record at best, since we keep having some of the same problems for years, yet to be fair, that has to do more with our behaviour than to the methods we use to prove that we keep doing the wrong thing.

A recent paper I read, researched causal inference for coupled human-natural systems. Although establishing causality with observational data is always challenging, feedbacks across the human and natural systems amplify these challenges and explain why linking hypoxia to fishery losses has been elusive. They offer an alternative approach using a market counterfactual that is immune to contamination from feedbacks in the coupled system. Natural resource prices can thus be a means to assess the significance of an ecological disturbance.

If I had a few clones of my self and lot of money available, among the many thousands of other things I’ll love to do, one of them would be see if this approach (not with hypoxia obviouslly, but with another indicator) could be used in oceanic areas.

Below is the abstract of the paper:

Coastal hypoxia (dissolved oxygen ≤ 2 mg/L) is a growing problem worldwide that threatens marine ecosystem services, but little is known about economic effects on fisheries. Here, we provide evidence that hypoxia causes economic impacts on a major fishery. Ecological studies of hypoxia and marine fauna suggest multiple mechanisms through which hypoxia can skew a population’s size distribution toward smaller individuals.

These mechanisms produce sharp predictions about changes in seafood markets.

Hypoxia is hypothesized to decrease the quantity of large shrimp relative to small shrimp and increase the price of large shrimp relative to small shrimp. We test these hypotheses using time series of size-based prices. Naive quantity-based models using treatment/control comparisons in hypoxic and nonhypoxic areas produce null results, but we find strong evidence of the hypothesized effects in the relative prices: Hypoxia increases the relative price of large shrimp compared with small shrimp.

The effects of fuel prices provide supporting evidence. Empirical models of fishing effort and bioeconomic simulations explain why quantifying effects of hypoxia on fisheries using quantity data has been inconclusive. Specifically, spatial-dynamic feedbacks across the natural system (the fish stock) and human system (the mobile fishing fleet) confound “treated” and “control” areas.

Consequently, analyses of price data, which rely on a market counterfactual, are able to reveal effects of the ecological disturbance that are obscured in quantity data. 

Increasing value of fisheries access fosters potential for corruption

The latest version of the FFA Trade and Industry News written by Havice, McCoy, and Campling brings (as usual) very interesting articles. In this post I’ll quote one that caught my eye. My first fishing master told me many big truths that I always remember, one of them was: “fish is money, and money is politics… have you ever met an honest politician?”

The recent Cook Islands Court of Appeal decision rejecting an appeal against the conviction of a former Minister of Marine Resources and Opposition Leader on corruption charges linked to fisheries has brought the subject of corruption in fisheries to the fore. 

Increased pressure on fish stocks in the WCPO and the resultant limitations on catch and effort at national, sub-regional and regional levels have greatly increased the value of fisheries access, as demonstrated by significant gains in revenue by Pacific Island countries in recent years. In Cook Islands for example, an initial 1981 agreement with the Taiwan tuna longline association resulted in a lump sum payment of US $90,000 for access by up to 90 longliners. By 2007 foreign access revenue from all sources had reached just US $300,000, according to the Ministry of Marine Resources, but by 2016 the Ministry reported US $8.4 million in fisheries access revenue.* 

In the high stakes and competitive environment of WCPO tuna fisheries that have developed in recent years, the potential financial gains from acts of corruption (one definition of which is “the misuse of entrusted power for private gain”)** raises important public policy considerations to ensure that fishing access rights are objectively and transparently allocated in accordance with clear policy objectives and priorities. 

Corruption in fisheries in the Pacific Islands has been heralded by various commentators and critics from time to time but generally without clear proof or basis. With regard to corruption in fisheries, as for corruption generally, access to information for and in specific Pacific Island countries is not always available. Publication of global rankings by several international organizations helps to shed light on the relative severity of the problem, but does not always include the smaller Pacific Island countries.

Transparency International for example publishes a “Corruption Perceptions Index” listing 167 countries, but only Papua New Guinea (137th) is listed. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators include “control of corruption” as one of six governance indicators and ranks each of 14 Pacific Island countries against over 200 countries and territories. For 2015, those ranking in the highest percentiles of countries in the world controlling corruption were Federated States of Micronesia (76) and Samoa (66), while those in the lowest percentiles were PNG (14) and Tonga (40).*** 

It has been eight years since a published report by authors at the University of Wollongong highlighted the fact that in some Pacific Island countries the legislative and/or administrative framework for licensing is described as a “one man” system”****  

In these systems, the licensing processes lack adequate opportunities for review and are particularly vulnerable to corruption. With moves in some PICs to require fishery access license holders to participate in shore-based activities or government-sponsored opaque “joint venture” vessels, there may be a need to re-evaluate and expand the scope of anti-corruption activities and measures. 

Firm action by Pacific Island governments to establish effective public policy objectives, transparent processes and uniform practices for fishing access and investment decisions will not only guard against possible corruption but also better ensure more efficient and effective use of fishing access revenues and investment returns for the broad public benefit of those Pacific Island communities. Preventive action now will serve to curtail opportunities for corruption and abuse of funds and privilege that may otherwise arise.

* ‘Boost for fishing revenue’, Cook Islands News, October 16, 2016. Available at: http:// http://www.cookislandsnews.com
**AusAID, Tackling corruption for growth and development: a policy for Australian development assistance on anti-corruption, Australian Agency for International Development 2007
***Corruption Perceptions Index 2015 – Table of Results, Transparency International. Available at: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015?gclid=CLvFl6aFj9ECFUVlfgod1YAJ3w#results-table
****Martin Tsamenyi and Quentin Hanich. ‘Managing fisheries and corruption in the Pacific Islands region’,
Marine Policy, 33(2): 386-392. March 2009.

Compliance for "Fish as Safe Food" not just legally caught

While a lot of what I post here relates to “fish as fish”, we tend to forget that after fish is on deck, is not just fish anymore; is food.

Typical image in the Pacific, an EU approved  Panamanian Carrier (where no one speaks Spanish) nor been inspected in years, receiving fish from an another EU approved vessel that also should not be approved from the hygiene perspective. 

Until the fish is caught, we work with IUU, CDS, sustainability, management, science, harvesting technology, and so many other aspects of fish as a sustainable and legally caught resource. But once it is caught, then it becomes “food”, and a completely different world of regulatory frameworks gets added to it.

“Fish as Fish” is typically in the realms of the fisheries authorities, but “fish as food” is in the hands of health and/or food safety authorities, that normally know very little about fisheries in general terms, and almost nothing about fishing boats in particular. Hence a substantial part of my work includes helping the “food authorities” to understand and apply the rules to fishing vessels, carriers and port/landing sites, especially the EU ones as they are a market access condition.

To explain the EU market access conditions system does take a while, (if interested, download a manual I wrote years ago and keep updating every 2 years).  For now, let's say that EU imposes conditions in regards the infrastructure ( the type of materials, outcomes, etc.) operations (hygiene, training, controls systems, etc.) and controls (including traceability) required for every operator from the harvesting vessels all the way to distribution to consumers). And the Competent Authorities (CAs) responsible for the vessels (flag state) or processing (processing state) need to be able to prove that the operator complied with all the requirements.

Health authorities never actually went to vessels and wharfs, in the same way, that fisheries officials never went to processing plants. But all this is changing; fisheries inspectors need to get involved in processing as to control “fish laundering” (think money laundering but with fish), while health authorities need to start getting their scope of work to include vessels and landing sites as to assure compliance and traceability.

Under the EU system, freezer vessels (where fish is just frozen) and factory vessels (where fish is processed - and then frozen) need to be flagged in an EU authorised (equivalent in terms of sanitary controls) country (around 100 worldwide), and then individually approved and listed, as to confirm the eligibility of their captures to the EU market. The EU sends their inspection team (that used to be called the FVO-Food and Veterinary Office and now Directorate F of DG SANTE) to do in country inspection and verify how the responsible CA inspects their own establishments.

In principle, all freezer vessels need to be under control and listed by the CA of the flag state, but with most DWFN, operating thousand of miles away and not coming to home port in years, you wonder how they do those inspections. From my experience, they don't. I have been on board vessels Taiwanese, Chinese and Philippine vessels that should never have been on the list and where there is no evidence of any inspections in at least 5 years, yet they still authorised. And then you have vessels that are in much better condition but are flagged in a small non-authorised country, so by de facto that fish is not eligible for the EU even if the Taiwanese are fishing in this smaller countries’ waters.

The "dry locker" of a DWFN EU authorised Purse Seiner, after a MSC unload....

Two authorised countries can have a MoU and inspect each other's vessels on behalf of their respective CA, but there is only one of these MoUs in existence, one I drafted and got approved in between PNG and Philippines. Otherwise not possible.

To complicate things more, the requirements for freezer vessels (contact me of you want them) extend to carriers/reefers that work as floating cool stores that take the fish from ports near the fishing grounds to the processing countries.

Carriers tend to be flagged in countries with very low registration and control cost (read: flags of convenience), and one of the few that has the EU authorised status is Panama.

In principle the Panamanian CA should be inspecting these vessels as part of their routines, but reality is that these vessels are never in Panama (and sometimes they have never been there), no one on board is Panamanian, nor they speak Spanish… yet they are expected to comply with Panamanian food law and being able to interact with the Panamanian Inspector. Obviously, this does not happen.

The EU is getting way more aware of these issues (since 2008 I have been conducting training for them with CAs and Industry in their specific requirements for vessels and landing sites) but is difficult for them to witness inspections that do not happen.

But they starting to gain control… the FVO just published a report of a Panamanian reefer vessel inspection that took place in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Spain, as an addendum to their audit report of Panama in 2014, during which there were no EU listed freezer or factory vessels were available for on-the-spot visits.

The FVO observed and audited an inspection of Chinese-owned Panamanian-flagged vessel performed by an official inspector from Panama in Las Palmas. HACCP plans and Standard hygiene procedures were found to be very unspecific in nature, and this was an issue, which had not been identified by the Panamanian inspector.

The vessel inspection was performed by an official inspector from Panama. According to this inspector, the competent authority has more than 26 inspectors employed at present, and all of them may be appointed to travel to foreign ports for vessel inspections. Most of the inspectors are based in the regional offices and routinely carry out official controls of farms and food and feed production establishments. The Panamanian inspector who carried out the Las Palmas inspection had four years' experience of official control tasks and had initially received one week's on-the-job training at central level. Also, instructions and information had been given to staff from central level. This inspection was the inspector's 10th vessel inspection.

The inspector from Panama used a comprehensive official checklist that covers applicable requirements for different types of vessels. In this case, it was a reefer vessel transporting packed, frozen fishery products transferred at sea from freezer vessels. There were four holds on the vessel being inspected which had a total capacity of 4,262 tonnes.

The vessel being inspected is owned by a Chinese company that also has a fleet of fishing vessels. The audit team was informed by the company's representative that it owns between 40 and 50 freezer vessels fishing in the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of West Africa, all flying the flag of China. The consignment unloaded during the inspection contained fishery products deriving from 23 of those freezer vessels. All freezer vessels involved were found on the EU list of approved Chinese establishments. (It would be VERY interesting to see how China inspects these vessels in East Africa!)

The competent authority stated during the audit in 2014 that vessel owners have to provide interpreters if necessary, as many of the vessels flying the flag of Panama have crews that do not speak Spanish. A company employee, from the company's office in Las Palmas, was present to help with interpretation from Chinese to Spanish as the Chinese crew spoke Chinese/English and the Panamanian inspector Spanish.

All cartons unloaded were labelled with information on type of product (frozen fishery products from central-east Atlantic Ocean), vessel names and approval numbers, origin (China), fishing area (FAO No.34), common names of species, sizes, catching/freezing date and best-before date. Scientific names of species were given in the captain's declarations for each freezer vessel.

Manual records of temperatures in the holds were shown to the team. Staff read the panels in the machine control room and note them in a logbook every two hours. The temperatures noted were well below -18ºC (between -22.7º and -32.5ºC) which is the maximum required storage temperature of frozen fishery products. The day after the inspection, the Panamanian inspector revisited the vessels and was shown the recording devices in the machine room.The records were photographed and the pictures were forwarded to the audit team.

An analysis of potential hazards based on HACCP principles for the handling of fishery products on board this vessel had not been done. A copy of the previous year's vessel inspection report (checklist filled out with comments) was available. The inspector had at that time not noted the lack of procedures based on HACCP principles. The vessel was equipped with a good manufacturing practice manual and sanitation standard operating procedures, written in English which was made available to the audit team. These documents were referred to as an "HACCP plan".

Both documents were generic in nature, provided by thecompany's office and contain information that was not applicable to the simple processes (cold storage of packaged fishery products) executed on board this vessel, e.g. sanitation standard operating procedures including detailed instructions on type of disinfection substances and their respective dilution percentage for substances not relevant to be used in this vessel's operations.

The Panamanian inspector was unaware of the generic nature of both documents until it was pointed out by the audit team. The inspector then noted "not compliant" in the checklist concerning HACCP-based procedures. Besides, the inspector also asked for translation into Spanish of documents that contained quality parameters checked at reception of cartons from the supplying freezer vessels.

Transhipping 

During the inspection, copies of the captains' declarations from the freezer vessels supplying the packed, frozen fishery products in the cargo of this reefer vessel were not available to the audit team as all such documentation had been forwarded to the border inspection post in Las Palmas and no copies were kept on board. The inspector from Panama sought additional information on the supplying freezer vessels which was received the following day and forwarded to the audit team.

Each freezer vessel, all of which are registered in China and listed for EU export, provided a list of its cargo detailing the type of fishery product, name, size, weight and number of cartons.

The scenario described above is not news for us here in the Pacific, so we are pleased that the EU starting addressing (albeit partially) the hygiene/food safety requirements for vessels from DWFN and flags of convenience. Hopefully, they start doing this in the Pacific soon, since we struggle to get countries authorised (only 3 –PNG, Fiji, Solomons -of the 15 members of the Pacific Islands Fisheries Forum Agency can access the EU market). Nevertheless, my brotherand friend Jope Tamani is guiding many of my PICs friends and colleagues in the Islands are doing and incredible work to increase this number.

Running a CA sucks a lot of resources for small PICs since the EU does not only imposes what is to be done but also (more importantly) how is to be done, and requires to have vessels to a high level of hygiene and food safety management… Taiwanese, Chinese, Philippines and Korean vessels that would not pass any inspection as per the local standards catch fish in the Pacific and can access the EU market. Surely my colleagues in PNG, Fiji and Solomon’s would love to help visiting inspectors from those flag states and or the EU to inspect their vessels and see how they are given the pass. Thai would give us the feel of a more fair playing field.

Finally, the common factors in between fisheries rules and food safety ones are traceability and a culture of compliance, from my 30 years working in both areas… when you don't see conformity in one of them, chances are the other one is not followed either. And this needs to change if we want to maintain an industry for the future.

The subsidies of others

The EU is a big subsidiser of it primary production, and fisheries take a solid chunk of it. But they are not alone in that practice, even if they get the brunt of the criticism for it. And as in many areas in fisheries, while they do stuff one can find challenging, they are quite transparent about it, and if you know where to look, you can find information. The other big players are less so open, hence finding info about subsidies is complex. I assume then, this was rational behind when the EU commissioned a recently released report on subsidies by major fishing nations beyond the EU.

Total subsidy values by country (EUR million) sourced from the above linked report

Is a big document that can only be of interest to people (like me) that think that the elimination of subsidies is one of the key tools that can bring fisheries to a more stable and rational operational level. Since (for me at least) the main redeeming factor of commercial fisheries is that it has to be commercially viable, and subsidies distort that need.… but I have written sufficiently in the past against subsidies (here, here, here, here).

I quote straight from the report that was authored by a consortium of consultants that lead by MRAG, but there are no individual names to acknowledge. Yet from reading it, I assume that it must have been a quite frustrating and tedious work, since many of the countries have absolutely no interest in sharing this data. Yet this report, while bringing some needed clarity, still does not allow us to see the bottom of the subsidies conondrum. In any case, my full respect to the authors for giving this a good shot.

What is a subsidy?
A ‘subsidy’ is a form of direct or indirect government support, often monetary and often provided to the private sector. Subsidies to the fisheries sector have been attracting increasing attention and are identified as important in terms of monetary value and the potential impact on fleet capacity, fishing effort, production and market value. However, there are difficulties in defining precisely what is meant by a ‘fisheries subsidy’ and existing information regarding such subsidies appear uncertain and somewhat patchy

For the purpose of the study, subsidies are defined and categorised based on their objective and the stage of the production chain that they intend to support. This work develops a framework for defining and classifying fisheries, aquaculture, and seafood-processing and marketing subsidies that are compatible with internationally recognised methods of classification.

Subsidies are placed within four broad categories:

• Services: transfers that are not received directly by actors, but that reduce the costs faced by the sector as a whole. This includes common infrastructure, fisheries access management, enforcement of fishing regulations and research.
• Production: individual transfers to fishers that impact profitability through cost or revenue adjustment. Those which reduce input costs are categorised by the type of input they affect, such as fuel, ice, gear, vessel construction and engine purchase. There are others which relate to infrastructure, such as storage and some relating to marketing. Subsidies for modernisation are recorded separately from those for vessel construction.
• Social assistance: individual transfers to fishers that impact labour input via direct and indirect income support to fishers. This can include payments to establish businesses, subsidised training and learning and income tax exemptions.
• Resource access: include payments for withdrawal of access rights on a temporary or permanent basis and payments made to third countries to allow access for national vessels to third country fisheries.

Subsidies are further classified as either direct or indirect payments depending on the type of transfer. Direct payments are made by the government to the fisheries sector, whereas indirect payments involve active government intervention which does not involve a direct financial transfer, for example tax exemptions.

Japan
Information regarding subsidies is made publicly available in Japan – in the form of an online depository of official fishery subsidy programmes dating back to 2008. Data used in the analysis of subsidies to the fisheries sector were from this official source.   

The total amount of subsidy was about USD 1.3 billion (EUR 1.2 billion) in 2015, mostly in the form of direct grants and loans to the catching subsector – accounting for 99% of the total subsidy. Value of catching subsector subsidy as a proportion of landed value of catch in 2013 was 7%; representing EUR 170 per tonne in 2015. Conversely, the aquaculture subsector subsidy was approximately EUR 54 per tonne in 2015. Aquaculture, and marketing and processing subsidies are negligible. Estimates provided by this study are lower than those reported to the OECD, but higher than subsidies reported to the WTO.

Much of the subsidy was specifically orientated towards providing disaster (Earthquake, Tsunami) protection and insurance to port facilities, coastal infrastructure and fishing vessels, after re-establishing their fishing industry following natural disasters. Subsidy to the fishery sector, peaked in 2012 (EUR 2 billion) following the 2011 earthquake and Tsunami - financing efforts to re-establish the fishery, increase vessel construction, rebuild port facilities and increase the workforce. Funding then reduced in the years 2013 and 2014 (EUR 616 and 676 million, respectively) before steadily increasing to amounts available pre-2011 (EUR 1.2 billion). Almost 50% (EUR 576 million) of the catching subsector subsidy in 2015 is provided in services to infrastructure, providing financial support for regional fisheries improvement plans, infrastructure improvements for port facilities, sanitation, storage, vessel construction and disaster protection. Often in the form of loans and grants to help rebuild lost and damaged infrastructure. Subsidies are often implemented through a range of semi-public entities, however, the Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries retain the centralised database of information.

Korea
Data used in the analysis were collected from an official document on public transfers and subsidies for the period 2009 to 2014, published by the Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries. 

Total value of fisheries subsidies in 2014 was USD 1.7 billion (EUR 1.53 billion), 20% higher than in 2009. The total amount of subsidy is similar to previous estimates in the existing literature, greater than the values reported to the OECD and lower than those reported to the WTO. The catching subsector accounted for over 90% of the total subsidy between 2009 and 2014. The precise form that these subsidies took was not clear form the available information. Subsidies represented EUR 770 per tonne for the catching subsector in 2013. There appear to be no marketing subsidies in South Korea and aquaculture and processing subsidies are small, despite the increasing production, and importance, of the aquaculture subsector in recent years.

China
Data used in the analysis were collected from a single official source, the official fisheries yearbooks and a range of secondary sources.

The total value of subsidies at the federal level in the 2011 to 2013 period was estimated at EUR 17 billion, representing an average annual figure of EUR 5.56 billion (additional subsidies may be available at the sub-national level). Approximately 98% of federal subsidy was for the catching subsector and 2% for the aquaculture subsector. Value of catching subsector subsidy as a proportion of value of landed catch in 2012 was approximately 17%. Within the catching subsector, about 90% subsidy was for fuel, which classifies as an indirect production subsidy. Subsidies represented EUR 78 per tonne and EUR 2 per tonne for catching and aquaculture subsectors, respectively for 2011-2013.

Comparisons with other sources are not straightforward and there is considerable uncertainty about the scale of subsidies, especially at the sub-national level. This results in subsidy figures for 2013 ranging from EUR 3.6 billion to EUR 6 billion. These are all greater than the figure for subsidies reported to the WTO (EUR 2.7 billion in 2013).

Subsidies in China support development of the fisheries sector in China, which is in turn framed by the national policy aim of ‘going global’. This policy is in some way a recognition of the depleted state of some local resources, as well as a means of creating additional employment and business opportunities, particularly, via increasing the DWF and its scope to explore new waters. This expansion of the fisheries sector as a whole, and the focus on the DWF, calls for increased government subsidies. Specific reference was made to adjusting the subsidy ratio to as high as 30-50% for projects involving modernisation of fishing vessels. The report identified government subsidies for exploratory fishery license fees, diesel fuel, shipbuilding and ‘external economic cooperation’ as contributors to the success of the DWF industry.

Russia
The subsidies go to the catching subsector, and have largely the same between 2001 and 2015. They focus on management, vessel purchase and construction, research and enforcement. Within aquaculture, research and infrastructure are the largest subsidies. About 60% of subsidies are in the form of direct payments, such as management and enforcement. The total amount of subsidy was estimated to be USD 308 million (EUR 277 million) in 2015. The catching subsector accounted 63% of the total subsidy in 2015. In 2005 subsidies to the catching subsector represented around 9.5% of the landed value. Aquaculture subsector subsidy increased to 33% of the total subsidy in 2015. This may be related to government plans to implement a program to support aquaculture expansion in an effort to overcome food availability. Processing and marketing subsidies are small. Subsidies represented EUR 42 per tonne and EUR 57 per tonne for catching and aquaculture subsectors respectively for 2014. Subsidies are clearly administered at various levels in the Russian Federation – at national, regional and local levels.

Subsidies reported by the OECD and other studies are higher than estimated by this study but they include fuel tax concessions that were reported to not be provided by the Russian Federation. All studies report higher levels of subsidies than are reported to the WTO (EUR 75.45 million in 2013).

Taiwan
Data for Taiwanese subsidies has proved to be scarce - official sources were reviewed but recent data proved hard to obtain. Furthermore, access to officials in Taiwan has proven difficult. As a result it has been necessary to rely on subsidies figures reported to the OECD.

The total amount of subsidy was estimated to be in the region of EUR 25 million in 2013. The catching subsector accounted for 88% of the total subsidy in 2013. The precise composition of the catching subsector subsidy changed somewhat between 2004 and 2013, with focus shifting from management subsidies towards research and vessel buyback programmes. Aquaculture, processing and marketing subsidies are small. Value of catching subsector subsidy as a proportion of value of landed catch in 2011 was approximately 3% - representing EUR 21 per tonne and EUR 5 per tonne for catching and aquaculture subsectors, respectively for 2011. Subsidies reported to WTO were EUR 72.3 million in 2013, although this includes EUR 62.0 million of agricultural loans that include fisheries.

In terms of the nature of the subsidies programmes, in the catching sector a government vessel reduction led to the scrapping of 183 large-scale tuna longline vessels between 2005 and 2007. A future goal of the government is to increase production from marine and brackish aquaculture and in the marketing and processing subsector the government aims to continue to facilitate transportation and sale channels and develop global markets in order to increase the nation’s fishery products for export.

US
While the US is known to provide subsidies to the fisheries sector, it is widely recognised that the specific details are difficult to identify. Data for the US is dispersed and the US Government does not appear to maintain a centralised database of all the funding and programmes or projects benefitting the fisheries sector. This information is instead held at the regional level and aggregated with other data. Information on subsidies is consequently both difficult to obtain and hard to aggregate. The analysis therefore uses subsidy information as reported to, and published by, the OECD to provide a national picture of subsidies to the US catching, aquaculture and processing and marketing subsectors.

The total subsidy in the United States was estimated to be EUR 1.5 billion in 2013. The catching subsector accounted for 100% of the total subsidy in 2013. Aquaculture, processing and marketing subsidies are very small. The composition of catching subsector subsidies has not changed much between 2004 and 2013 - data indicates that management and enforcement subsidies are the largest. Value of catching subsector subsidy as a proportion of the landed value of catch in 2013 was approximately 30%. Subsidies represented EUR 379 per tonne for the catching subsector in 2012. While information collected on loans from the regional programs suggests that the loan amounts were small, around 5% of the total catching subsector subsidy. Information relating to the aquaculture subsector point to the fact that there are few subsidies going to the US aquaculture subsector, most being in the form of Federal grants.

The analysis is consistent with other sources that indicate that around 85% of total subsidies in the US catching subsector in 2012 were for management, enforcement and research. Estimates are higher than the figures reported to the WTO

Conclusions

China, the US and South Korea have the highest absolute value of subsidies. In all three countries, over 95% of the subsidies are dedicated to the catching subsector Catching subsidies per tonne of catch are highest in South Korea, the US and Japan. Russia has the highest per tonne subsidy for aquaculture, closely followed by Japan. About 33% of total subsidy for Russia in 2015, EUR 91 million, was allocated to the aquaculture subsector. China has the highest absolute value of aquaculture subsidy but per tonne subsidy for China is quite small. Subsidies for marketing and processing are small in all countries. Russia has the highest absolute value of processing subsidy.

The estimates in this study are more detailed for Japan, South Korea and Russia, than existing data from the OECD, the WTO and other estimates in the literature. These have been obtained from fisheries ministries of these countries or the federal budget documents. For the other countries, the country teams found the data difficult to obtain because it has not been published, is otherwise not disclosed or is widely dispersed or administrations were not accessible.

The two main official sources of fisheries subsidies data – the OECD and the WTO – provide significantly different values of total fisheries subsidies for the countries analysed in this study. Country submissions to the WTO are not periodic and lack a systematic template for reporting subsidies across countries. The level of granularity in the data varies among countries but is in general quite low. Although the OECD has a standard reporting template and reports the subsidies data periodically, a more detailed breakdown of subsidy categories is required to enable comparisons between countries and to comprehend which fisheries subsector are being subsidised and the nature of the subsidy. Additionally, the reporting of subsidies data should be consistent across countries, for example, it appears that fuel subsidies are published regularly only for some countries.

The fisheries complexities of the South Atlantic

While for the last 25 years I have been working mostly in the Pacific, my fisheries story started in the South Atlantic, in the rich (and cold!) waters of the southern part of Argentina and what today is the Falklands/Malvinas area.

 Global Fishing Watch IAS based fishing vessels "density" for the last calendar year. See the "accumulation" along the EEZ border.

These are rich fishing grounds arising from the mixing of 2 different water masses, the North to South flowing warm Brazilian current and the South to North Cold Malvinas/Falkland current. These currents meet over an extensive and shallow plateau (it never gets deeper than 180 m from the Argentinean coast to the eastern edges of the Malvinas-Falkland EEZ, and from there the into the continental talud

Hake, Hoki, Shrimp and Squid are important fisheries in these water, plus toothfish but further south (and deeper). Each of these fisheries has already a complex reality, and deserves its own time... for example: Shrimp alone went from from 30000 to 160000 tons during 2016. (A. Balcarcel, per comm)

Since the early 80's Argentina started providing access to the fishery for permitting paying fleets (mostly Spanish, Russian, Bulgarians, Japanese, Taiwanese, Koreans, Chinese). While the Europeans went for hake, Japanese went for hoki and blue whiting for surimi and as well as squid with the rest of the Asian DWFN).

In 1982 the military government of Argentina entered into war with England for the Malvinas/Falkland that is in what Argentina considers its continental platform (less than 200m depth) and things got more complicated (the fact that I got into fishing because this war is another story!)

In any case, after the war, we had two fisheries regimes over the same stocks (never a good idea!). Initially, there was work done jointly, in 1988 to 1990 I collaborated as a scientist for the Argentinean Fisheries Institute with my colleagues Geoff Tingley (now working in the Pacific with SFP) and Tony Beeching (now working with WCPFC) that at the time were contracted by the Falkland Fisheries Authority. (Obviously working there wasn't pleasant as we all independently finished operating in the Pacific)

In any case wasn't to last, nationalistic politics got involved, and joint work was unilaterally suspended by Argentina since in their view this type of work is a tacit recognition that the Malvinas /Falkland are an independent entity. Something successive Argentinian governments deny, furthermore that are the basis in which any attempt to strengthen an RFMO structure there has never gained traction.

Having been a direct witness and participant of the war and having then lived over half of my life the union jack as part my chosen home flag, I promised myself not the get involved in the politics of those decisions. For me, war is never justified, and not getting on with managing a fishery based on politics around a stupid war is even less comprehensible… but then that is the situation.

Entering Ushuaia in 1990 (i think) on the FV "Oca Balda" with my mate Patricio

And while the fisheries in both EEZ is allegedly regulated and managed (even if the stocks move freely in between EEZs but both parts don't talk) the key problem is what happens outside the EEZ. Particularly with the squid fishery.

Ridiculous amounts of vessels (estimated 600+) fish right on the borders of the EEZ and are well known to get over the line. Most are Chinese, but closely followed by Taiwan and Korea, and then Spain either directly of Falkland flagged, as there is no RFMO strength… is free for all. The image at the begging of the blog entry tell you the story of vessels presence over the last year.

And if anyone what to act ethically, it looses against those who don't (Tragedy of Commons).

Argentina does not have the capacity to controls the hotspots with is coastguard (prefectura) vessels, yet In May last year, in the space of just ten days, two Chinese fishing boats were shot at by Argentine coastguards. One of them went down (Lu Yan Yuan Yu 010) the one that escaped, the Hua Li 8, was recently captured in Indonesian waters under an international arrest warrant issued by Interpol.

While the sinking could be seen as a bit of bravado by the new Argentinean government, incursions into the EEZ are constantly happening. Chinese fishing vessels are engaged in both unregulated and illegal fishing activities for squid in Argentina. For the past five years, 5 Chinese squid jiggers were detained off Argentina while one Chinese squid jigger escaped into Uruguay after illegal fishing during the hot pursuit by Argentina coast guard and was never arrested.

From the logistic perspective, these vessels survive based on transhipments regular visits to the ports of Montevideo and the Falklands/ Malvinas, yet even the shitiest squid jiggers need some routine maintenance, therefore the make the long (yet subsidised) trip back to their home ports every 3 to 5 years.

It now looks like they would not have to this anymore. A big Chinese conglomerate (ShanDong BaoMa) is in negotiations with the government of Uruguay to build a port complex in the country that would include, landing sites, cool stores, processing, shipyards the whole lot, so the vessels can do all there and maximise benefits… and if this is not bad enough. They are (allegedly) working towards having the whole are declared a "free port", hence outside the controls of the Uruguayan Fisheries Authorities.

Now, I have worked with the Uruguayan authority in many occasions, and I consider many of my colleagues there, good friends. I know they are not happy with this. Uruguay is a small country of limited resources, and the vessel operations bring real money, yet the fisheries authorities there have managed to exert a reasonable level of control over the last few years, making arrests and detaining vessels with compliance issues.

Furthermore, they were one of the fist countries to sign the FAO PSMA. Hence they are obliged by their legislation to control the use of their port by foreign vessels. Having them excluded from doing their work, based on the "free port" declaration could be terrible and a dangerous precedent. On the other side, you can see why the trade and diplomatic operators that are trying to foster good relationships with China see a good business opportunity out of a fishery whose collapse may not affect them directly.

I don't know what is going to happen, yet from experience, I know that when fish, geopolitics, money (and China) mix, results are never good and the fish always loose. I hope my friends in Uruguay get a fair chance to do their job and the port (if constructed) is under their control.

The Tuna markets during 2016

My friends at Globefish, produce regularly great market updates on most fisheries commodities. While fisheries work in many contexts, commercial fisheries are framed by markets variables, so is vital to know what is happening.

the initial bending of P&L market trend

The top six exporters of canned tuna for the first half of 2016 in order were: Thailand, Ecuador, Spain, China, Indonesia and Mauritius. Compared with the same time period last year, exports declined from Thailand (-3.4%) and Mauritius (-3.6%) but increased from Ecuador (+3.6%), Spain (+6.8%), China (+15.7%) and Indonesia (+4.6%), for the latter for January-May 2015/2016 period only.

A prevailing trend for the first half of 2016 is that canned tuna exporters who are moving away from the traditional large western markets have increased shipments at higher rates than other exporters who have tended to focus only on the traditional markets. Indeed, Indonesian exports have benefited from this approach as shipments have increased by 10% to the EU, 18% to Saudi Arabia, 60% to Egypt, 640% to United Arab Emirates, 155% to Jordan and 120% to Oman compared with the same period in 2015. 

Imports
Mixed trends continue in the global canned tuna market. Lack of demand persisted in the USA and western European markets during the first half of 2016 but import demand increased in the smaller markets in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia as well as in Latin America, supported by affordable prices.

During the first half of 2016, extra EU-27 imports of processed and canned tuna remained stagnant at 249 000 tonnes due to falling demand for cooked loins by European tuna processors. However, imports of canned tuna for direct consumption increased during this period. 

In order of ranking, extra-EU imports totaled about 62 850 tonnes from Ecuador (+20%), 26 400 tonnes from Seychelles (+16%), 26 000 tonnes from Mauritius (-6%), 21 000 tonnes from Thailand (-13.4%) and 19 000 tonnes from the Philippines (-16%).

Overall, import trends for processed and canned tuna in the USA remained negative with an 8.4% decline in supplies during the first half of 2016. Among the top suppliers to this market, imports fell from all except Thailand. Imports in Canada declined by 0.3%.

USA
Summer demand for canned/processed tuna was disappointing, reflected by the record low half-yearly imports in 2016. Except for canned albacore in oil, all product type imports declined. Cooked loin imports (HS 160414), which took a 35% share of total canned/processed imports, showed a 6% decline to total about 32 700 tonnes.

EU
Spanish imports of cooked loins alone fell by 14%against last year's. Imports into France were also lower than in 2015. Subsequently, total cooked loins imports into the EU dropped by 4.8% to total 68 900 tonnes. Notably, this year's summer demand for canned tuna in the major Northern European markets was negatively impacted by the unusually cold and rainy weather during the summer months.

Among the leading markets, imports increased by 13% in the UK, where demand, particularly for pole and line caught tuna products from the Maldives, strengthened.  In Germany, canned tuna imports declined by 15% during the first half of 2016 compared with the same period in 2015. Among the re-traders, the Netherlands imported 21% more during this period at 23 000 tonnes, but Belgian imports were 12.5% lower than last year’s due to high local inventories. There was marginal import growth in Austria and Poland as well as in the Eastern European members of the EU, namely Czech Republic, Romania and Slovenia.

Other markets
In volume terms, Egypt, Japan, Australia and Canada were the four largest markets for canned tuna after the EU and the USA. Japan and Australia generally import higher-value product, however with the weakening of the Australian currency, canned tuna imports into this market have been falling. Canned tuna imports increased into Japan by 7.4% at 30 000 tonnes during the reporting period, but declined in Egypt by 3.3% (January-May), in Australia by 12.6% and by 0.3% in Canada. 

Consumer demand for canned tuna has improved in East Asian markets namely Malaysia, Singapore, as well as in China and Taiwan Province of China. Lower prices also induced demand for processed tuna from Thailand in the regional niche markets such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Nepal. In Latin America, canned tuna imports increased into Argentina, Mexico and Peru, but declined in Chile and Brazil.

Source here

The US Industry sues their government over new IUU rule

A few weeks ago I wrote about the US Seafood Import Monitoring Program and then I went a bit deeper in its details. I also used it as a platform to support the concept of Pacific Wide ‘multilateral” CDS that could communicate with the US system data portal (ITDS) and hopefully one day with the EU one. But look like the US one started with troubles at home, as it has been legally challenged domestically by the US industry before it even started.

I may come form south of the border, but I have traceability señor....

The National Fisheries Institute (NFI) has sued the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Department of Commerce over this rule, arguing that could cost the commercial fishing industry as much as USD 1 billion annually. In addition to NFI, plaintiffs include Trident Seafood Corp., Dulcich Inc. (Pacific Seafood Group), Handy Seafood, Fortune Fish & Gourmet, Libby Hill Seafood Restaurants, Alfa International Seafood, Pacific Seafood Processors Association and West Coast Processors Association. They are asking for a delay and review of the law.

I only can guide myself from what I read in the press (here and here), but some of the arguments seems a bit flimsy, and/or show how insular the USA (industry, gvt, people) seems to be sometimes on what is happen outside their territory, so I will quote some of the things I read, and then give my personal opinion in Italics.

Part of the argument is that the changes required for tracking and processing seafood exported into the U.S. “would reduce exports into the U.S. and would dramatically increase the cost of catching, processing and importing seafood,” according to the complaint. 
Yes, if the fish cannot be proven legal, then the whole idea is that it would not be able to be imported. In fact a drop in imports would prove that the system is working (unlike the EU system where the expected drop - assuming that 10-20% of the fish catches were IUU – never eventuated). As in regards increasing dramatically the cost of catching, processing and importing… in term of catching and processing, I don’t see how… I know plenty of legal operations worldwide that maintain traceability (as they should!) so not much news there. As per the cost of importation, well two fold there: 1) Importers would have to keep systems in place (as anywhere else in the world) and 2) yes supply and demand, if there is less fish available price will go up… isn’t that what free market, neoliberalism and all those policies the USA are about?

"The regulation would also affect the way most fish are processed in the U.S., because the requirements apply to all domestically caught or farmed seafood that are shipped outside the U.S. for processing, and then re-imported back into the U.S." 
Well, then you will to have a good traceability systems on your catches and make sure that the countries you sent your fish for processing also have them, in particular, to control laundering (if you need help with that my friend Gilles and I, just finish writing a book for FAO that can help once is approved for publishing… let us know). Furthermore, if the country that you are sending cannot handle that, maybe another can do it (isn’t that the beauty of competition?) or perhaps, you should consider processing domestically, as so many other countries do.

“Fishermen, many of whom are subsistence workers operating in third-world nations, would have to keep track of each fish harvested, as would the brokers who purchase the seafood from the fisherman, and processors who handle catches from hundreds of fishermen would have to be able to trace each piece of fish to a specific vessel and specific fishing events or to a single collection point,” the complaint said.
Yes… and many do that! In fact, that is the basis of my job!  And is actually quite condescending that the plantifs use them as an excuse for something that they are not able to do domestically, looks like. The Solomon Islands (a least develop country) can do that for every can or bag of tuna loins it process and exports… maybe they should come over and have a look.

The rule “would require seafood importers to trace the origin of the fish they import to either the specific boat that caught the full fish or a “single collection point”, to the day the fish was caught and to the sector of the specific ocean where the fish was caught”, it is claimed in the complaint.
That is a very pessimistic way to see it… here is another: “would require seafood importers to source fish from processors that can provide the required information to prove that their catches are legal and traceable, giving this way the American consumer the required assurances they deserve."

It would require that each link in the supply chain prior to entry into the US -- “from the fisherman or broker in Peru, Iceland, Indonesia, Canada, and the United States, through the processor in Ecuador, Thailand, Vietnam, or Norway,” -- collects and maintains data and pass them on to the importer.
Yes!! And that is the intention! I can tell you that many of the countries you name there have VERY good traceability systems and those who are not there yet, have now a really good incentive to do so!

Plaintiff Alfa, a family-owned seafood importer and distributor based in Miami, Florida, claims the rule would make its operation far more difficult and costly. They say that:

The rule “would require processors in Ecuador and Peru, where most of Alfa’s seafood originates, to change the way in which fishermen or brokers document their catches and the way in which processors actually process these catches, so that fish imported into the United States can be traced to a particular fishing event or to a single collection point”. This will “add hundreds of thousands of dollars” to Alfa's cost of importing, “assuming that the processors abroad are willing to modify the way in which they process fish”.
Well... lets start that it is totally condescending to the fishers and fisheries administration of those two countries (many of the I count among my friends). Having worked in both places... that is actually what they already do (and with some degree of credibility) for the fish going to the EU. So I don't think that is true that the processors are not willing to modify their procedures, in fact that is what processors do when new market access requirements come on board. They did it for your HACCP rule in 1998, they did it for the EU Hygiene package system in 2006, for the EU IUU in 2010… so this one just built among that.

Anyway, we will have to wait and see… but as my master fisherman told me when I started on boats: to make good cake, you have to break some eggs, does not work any other way. One cannot expect to have assurances of the legality of fish and not assume that it would not come at some effort and cost, at least initially.

While I could argue the potential efficiency and design flaws of the US CDS system, but as we agreed at FAO in 2015, a “Catch documentation scheme – is a system that tracks and traces fish from the point of capture through unloading and throughout the supply chain. A CDS records and certifies information that identifies the origin of fish caught and ensures they were harvested in a manner consistent with relevant national, regional and international conservation and management measures. The objective of the CDS is to combat IUU fishing by limiting access of IUU fish and fishery products to markets.”

Ergo, a CDS only works when the flag, port and market States cooperate to apply the scheme, otherwise is just papers... and we have enough of them already.

The Vietnamese “blue boats” sneaking into the central and South Pacific

Lots of info in the news on the so-called “Blue Boats” invasion, since they have been found in have been found in Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and as far south as Australia and New Caledonia. And is true, most come from Vietnam… but then that is part of the problem.

long way from home

Most of the boats apprehended have Vietnamese citizens on board and many come from Vietnamese ports but Vu Duyen Hai the head of Vietnamese delegation to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission which met in Nadi recently, denies Vietnam is responsible.

“Some other countries have informed us that Vietnamese boats also come to other countries like Palau or Micronesia to poach but Vietnam is not so sure that these are Vietnamese vessels.”

He accepted that some fishing vessels stray outside Vietnam’s 200-miles Exclusive Economic Zone but he said this is because they “follow the fish” and most do not have equipment to tell them if they mistakenly enter other countries’ EEZ.

He said the Vietnamese government has tried to advise them not to go to other countries’ EEZ to poach because that would be illegal fishing, and that Vietnamese fisheries authorities also check local fishing vessels but “sometimes, fishing vessels go out, switch off their communication equipment and authorities could not locate them and this becomes a problem and now they are also against this and it has very heavy penalties including removal of licenses for ever”

And that is perhaps the most telling issue, obviously if these guys head off from Vietnam into a REALLY long trip for a long time, is not because hey are interested in keeping their local fishing license impeccable! 

They make it all the way into these countries knowing that coming back may not be an option, but still good business.

FSM authorities assessed that the price for one of the small boats which can handle 10 to 13 crew members is about 300 million Vietnamese Dong, approximately $12,000. The small boats carry 25,000 liters of fuel when they leave port in Vietnam. They return to port when the fuel gets down to 10 or 15 thousand liters of fuel.

The big blue boats which can carry 16 to 17 crew members cost around 600,000,000 Dong, approximately $24,000. The bigger boats carry approximately 35,000 liters of fuel and return to port when the fuel has reached 15,000 liters.

The price for diesel fuel in Vietnam has only changed negligibly in the last few months. On September 5, the price per liter was 50 cents USD. At that price, it costs about $12,500 to fuel an extended journey on one of the bigger boats. The journeys are intended to last two to three months and they bring enough food for that period of time.    

The other option, and one does not have to be a fisheries mastermind, is to asume that there must be a logistic arrangement behind them, with carriers to pick up catch and provide fuel, otherwise they will run out of fuel ( and storage space even if they dry all the fish on board. So they must have a fleet of carriers accompanying the foray, ergo radio and GPS on board are required. 

In any case, the vessels are very basic so their cost is not a disincentive in the case of being detained, add to that the massive overcapacity and subsidies that the Vietnamese government provides its fleet, and the present scenario is not surprising.

The previous and ongoing Vietnamese fisheries subsidies policies on fuel and vessels renewal, upgrading, infrastructure etc, offsets any damages from loosing the boat if they are captured. Moreover, in relation to fisheries management, open access to fisheries is the main problem, and is in fact a lack of management leading to overfishing and over-capacity. Overexploited resources and over-capacity, in turn, lead to boats ready to head off into far and more productive shores, even if it is illegal

Official figures put the Vietnamese offshore fleet at approximately 20000 vessels, almost all of them made of wood. Most vessels are equipped with second-hand truck engines. Among these, 6675 vessels are fitted with engines of 90 hp or above, but who really know what the reality is.

The boats cost almost nothing to buy or to operate, and "allegedly", they aren’t registered anywhere. If countries catch them it’s up to those countries to figure out what to do with them. Countries violated by the boats have confiscated them. They’ve burned them. They’ve even blown them up in spectacular fashion. Sinking, burning, or blowing up a blue boat may be spectacular images for the media and the rest of the world but it does little to keep the blue boats from scavenging the world’s oceans. The Vietnamese scavengers keep coming back because losing a boat is simply not enough of a deterrent to keep them away. 

In any case, they are allegedly two agencies involving in MCS in Vietnam’s sea area: fisheries inspection and Vietnam marine police. Vietnam Marine Police is the coast guard of Vietnam, so It provides protection and assistance to local fishermen when necessary (hence is not really MCS!) and the Fisheries inspection falls under the management of Directorate of Fisheries. It currently has 92 patrol boats, with only 8 boats with engines between 500 to 600 HP, wich could allow then to be checking of vessels leaving the EEZ… not a good ratio.

Besides all these, there are a real "pain" at many levels, they are a huge drain on local finances when they are caught and a huge drain on the local's livelihoods when they are not.

Fisheries wise, they forage the reefs effectively poaching within the 12-mile zones, taking the fish that the coastal populations use, without any form of control or management, affecting directly the livelihood of pacific islanders in remote atolls, the cargo holds inspections show beche de mer (sea cucumber) and reef fish as main catch.

Operationally, they are very hard to catch, don’t have VMS transponders, are primarily wooden so they don’t show very well on radar in that they are small and so FFA (whose mandate is almost entirely focused on oceanic tunas) are trying to trial the use of a number of different forms of satellite surveillance technology which is very expensive but we nevertheless think that in order to assist their member countries have a handle on this issue. And most island countries don’t have airplanes or the budgets for the planes to go out and look and the planes can only go out so far.

Diplomatically, once you catch and arrest the boat the problem continues (or as an affected friend told me, is where the real problem just starts!). The vessels have to be secured somewhere (good wharf space is a scares commodity in the Pacific), or stay anchored with all the responsibilities that that entitles. Furthermore, no papers to be found, no vessels ID, etc, etc.

In the meantime, what the crew does not speak English or so they say, Vietnam has no diplomatic representation in any Pacific Island states (only NZ and Australia), and the crew cannot just be abandon on board, they have no visas, no tickets or money to go back home (plus no direct flights) so they will have to go via the US and or Australia (that are notoriously strict with visas), so crew and vessels languish barely surviving until someone somewhere does something (normally at the cost of the arresting country). In many case the boast (mysteriously) sink inside an operational port, witch becomes even a worst nightmare since they block part of the port or become a pollution incident (or both)

Some countries can take swift action and either sink them during hot pursuit (PNG) or burn them for discouragement purposes (Palau)… but the effectiveness’ of theses measures seem limited…because the keep coming.

Solutions? Unfortunately none easy. Ultimate is flag state responsibility so Vietnam is responsible, and in a logic world, trade sections should be applied… Vietnam is a huge exporter of fisheries and aquaculture products, they should be a tariff structure tied up to flag state performance and compliance. So if you don’t control your fleet, then you products will be subjected to higher tariffs until you get it sorted. Add to that a EU yellow card and perhaps they will start listening and assuming their responsibilities.