The Pacific Possible: A World Bank Tuna Fisheries Report

A new World Bank report (released for public comment last week at the annual Forum Fisheries Committee Meeting in Port Vila) says better management of tuna fisheries can help Pacific Island countries gain as much as US$344 million per year in additional sustainable revenues and create 7,500 to 15,000 jobs by 2040.

His future is in that tuna

While I’m always bit cautious of this type of long term projections (how do we numerically account for the key drivers of fisheries non sustainability: greed and selfishness?), it is a good read with well researched content, lots of economics (is the World Bank after all), and very well referenced to many of my friends and colleagues. You can download it here (130 pages)

I will only reference the summary here:

Pacific Island countries are endowed with valuable tuna resources. The stocks of four tuna species in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) – a region that includes the Pacific Island countries (PICs) and extends south below New Zealand and north to the Bering Sea to cover some 8 percent of the global ocean - collectively form the basis of one of the world’s largest and most valuable fisheries. This fishery supplies roughly 60 percent of the world’s tuna from what are some of the last healthy tuna stocks. PIC waters alone cover half of the WCPO region and supply some 34 percent of the world’s tuna catch each year, with an estimated delivered value to processors on the order of US$3.4 billion in recent years. From this endowment PICs received net economic benefits on the order of US$500 million in 2013, the majority of which came from the purse seine fishery in the waters of countries near the equator. While not distributed evenly, these benefits have been significant for some PICs, for example with public revenues estimated to be equivalent to 36 percent of GDP in Tuvalu, 32 percent in Kiribati, and 10 percent in FSM, and constituting a much higher proportion of the total public budget (e.g. 63 percent in Kiribati in 2012).

These resources will need to make bigger economic contributions to help avoid a ‘low-growth future’ in the region. Despite this tremendous natural endowment, the rate of economic growth in many (though not all) PICs has generally been low over the last decade, and if this trend were to continue over the next 25 years, with only Fiji and Palau’s gross domestic product GDP per capita growing at a rate higher than two percent annually, many PICs will fall significantly behind other countries, with per capita GDP levels only moderately higher than at present. One of the few opportunities to avoid this ‘low-growth future’ is utilization of the region’s tuna resources.

This report describes a scenario for the year 2040 where this might plausibly happen. The report aims to look forward over the next 25 years, to suggest some viable answers to the questions: in a plausible best case scenario, how much more could the WCPO tuna resources contribute to Pacific Island countries’ economies by the year 2040, and what policy decisions would be required from the countries? In complement, what would be the impacts and benefits in terms of employment and food security of these policy decisions? Building upon the 2010 Future of Fisheries report and subsequent Regional Roadmap for Sustainable Pacific Fisheries endorsed by Forum Leaders in 2015, the report develops a best-case scenario for the tuna fisheries in the year 2040, identifying the potential additional economic contributions to PICs, and proposing further detail on likely policy decisions that would need to be taken. The report does not aim to provide predictions or forecasts of the future, but rather a plausible story based on recent trends and expected future directions that can communicate risks and opportunities to inform policy-making – and thereby provide a better understanding of the policy choices in the upcoming decades and highlight present-day developments.

Illustration of the WCPO Purse Seine Tuna Fishery Value Chain in 2013 & Net Economic Benefits to Pacific Island Countries

As a starting point, some of the recent trends in the fisheries have been summarized, including:

• The purse seine fishing ‘revolution’ and the explosion in these fishing vessels and their catch. Purse seine fishing to produce canned tuna has grown exponentially in the WCPO since 1980, with 34 vessels catching roughly 100,000 metric tons of tuna that year, increasing to a steady state of some 180 to 220 vessels operating from 1990 to 2006, to 344 vessels catching over 2 million tons in 2014. Fifty-two new purse seine vessels have been built since 2010 and registered to fish in the WCPO. This fleet has grown more efficient over time (notably in the technology used for fish aggregating devices) and its composition has changed. While always largely a foreign fleet, the number of Pacific Island-based vessels is growing (notably in Papua New Guinea), combined catches by Indonesian and the Philippines vessels more than doubled between 1997 and 2014, over half of all purse seine vessels operating in the region that have been built since 2010 are from China, and during this same time catches by vessels from Japan, Korea, the United States and China, Taiwan have been relatively constant.
• Stagnation and possibly senescence in the longline fisheries. Productivity and profitability in the southern albacore longline fishery has declined, even as fishing increased sharply in 2008 with the rise of the PIC albacore fleet, which caught as much as 50 to 60 percent of albacore in 2014, and more recently the rise of the Chinese fleet. Catch rates have decreased steadily since 2009, hitting a low in 2011 for the period since 2002, with only marginal improvements since, even as new (and reportedly subsidized) vessels enter the fishery. Similarly, the trend in catches from the tropical longline fishery (much of which occurs in waters outside the jurisdiction of PICs) supplying sashimi markets has been flat. Over the period from 2003 – 2013, the catch rates for bigeye peaked in 2008 and have generally declined since (i.e. kg caught per hundred hooks on a longline), while yellowfin catch rates consistently declined from 2010 to 2013. In general, these two fisheries have provided relatively little economic benefits for PICs, which have typically captured an estimated 3 percent of the value of the catch delivered to processors, largely via access fees (though locally based longline vessels have provided higher benefits to PICs such as Fiji, Samoa, etc.).
• Establishment of a regional governing body for the tuna fisheries. The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission was established in 2004 as the body recognized under international law to govern the WCPO tuna stocks, and includes both PICs and foreign fishing nations, generally taking decisions based on consensus. However, given the diversity of actors in the Commission, consensus has been elusive in many cases – particularly on issues surrounding the distribution among members of the costs that would be imposed by proposed fish stock conservation measures, and some PIC representatives have expressed frustration when key decisions on conservation and management measures have not been taken. PIC representatives have cited the pace of decision making at the Commission as a rationale for pursuing sub-regional agreements and governance arrangements, such as the vessel day scheme implemented under the Palau Arrangement, and the recent Tokelau Arrangement.
• A new model of cooperation by a sub-regional coalition of PICs to manage purse seine fishing access. The eight Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) and Tokelau established a ‘vessel day scheme’ (VDS) to limit purse seine fishing access to their waters and allow transferability and greater flexibility in access terms. As a result, access fees are estimated to have increased by at least a multiple of four between 2009 and 2015. An estimated 13 percent of the delivered value of the total purse seine catch was captured by PICs via access fees in 2014. While these countrie have generally held the limit on purse seine access through the VDS, throughout the WCPO catch and effort continue to grow. Current information suggests that fishing effort and catch have grown more in the waters outside of the PNA countries, notably in the waters of Indonesia and the Philippines as well as some high seas pockets in 2014. Following the model of the purse seine vessel day scheme, similar arrangements have been introduced for the longline fisheries. In 2015 the same countries began a VDS for the tropical longline fishery, and in late 2014 ten countries signed the Tokelau Arrangement to implement a similar scheme for access to the southern albacore long-line fishery in their waters.
• Failures of state-led efforts to capture more of the tuna value chains in the Pacific Islands. Most of the Government-led enterprises created in the 1980s or 1990s are no longer operating, but a number of private-led companies are currently processing catch in PNG, the Solomon Islands, Fiji and to a lesser extent RMI. In total the WCPO tuna fisheries value chains likely employ less than 0.5 percent of the region’s current labor force. Less than 10 percent of the WCPO purse seine catch is processed locally, and Bangkok remains the world’s largest tuna canner (despite increasing labor costs and several PICs’ trade preference with the EU market).
• Overall, a relatively steady global market for tuna products. In terms of canned tuna supplied by the purse seine fishery and southern longline fishery, the three main markets in the European Union, U.S. and Japan are considered as ‘mature’ with relatively flat growth trends. The price of skipjack in Bangkok has declined significantly in recent years, attributed to the growth (or ‘glut’) in supply – largely from increasing catch volumes in the WCPO. The sashimi market supplied by the tropical longline fishery was pioneered by Japan but has since become global with the remainder destined for the U.S., Korea, China, the European Union and Taiwan, China.
• Decline of the WCPO bigeye tuna stock, while fishing on other stocks approaches limits recommended by scientists. The size of the region’s bigeye stock has shown a steady decline since the 1970s, reaching overfished status in the last five years. At the same time, the growth of purse seining has taken a larger share of the bigeye catch, accounting for 41 percent of the WCPO bigeye catch in 2014. The other three WCPO tuna stocks: albacore, skipjack and yellowfin, remain relatively healthy but approaching limits. While these stocks are not currently considered overfished, they cannot likely continue to support the growth in fishing effort and catch seen in the past, according to current scientific assessments.

Illustration of WCPO Long-Line Tuna Fishery Value Chains in 2013 and Estimated Net Economic Benefits to Pacific Island Countries

Against the backdrop of these trends, a number of key external forces are expected to drive the performance of WCPO tuna fisheries over the next 25 years, including climate change, markets and the economy, science and technology, demographic changes and external governance. Expected changes include:

• Climate change. Modeling conducted to date by the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) on two of the region’s four tuna stocks, skipjack and bigeye, suggest that in twenty years the sizes of the stocks will not be affected by climate change, but the distribution of the stocks may begin to shift towards the central and eastern Pacific.
• Markets and the economy. Globally, the supply of tuna is approaching natural limits with little further increase expected, and likely to remain highly dependent on the WCPO region. In aggregate, demand for tuna may see a modest increase given flat supply and population growth, though with little change for canned tuna where declining mature markets may be balanced by emerging new ones. A slow increase in price for both canned and fresh tuna may be expected, but the same may also be said for fishing costs as crude oil prices are projected to double in real terms by 2040.
• Science and technology. Fishing technology is expected to continue to change in order to enhance efficiency (this is already ongoing in the purse seine fleet, and eventually would be in the longline fleet with the return of economic incentives), as well as product quality. Fisheries monitoring and surveillance technology can be expected to advance to significantly reduce enforcement costs, including expanded satellite tracking of vessels, use of unmanned aircraft systems for patrols and electronic fishing catch and effort monitoring.
• Demographic change. The overall population of the Pacific Island countries is expected to grow by some 50 percent over the next twenty years, together with rapid urbanization. In 2040 coastal fisheries production would be expected to remain largely stagnant (as it likely has since at least 2005), with concerns from SPC that a food fish gap could open in some PICs.
• External governance. The trade preferences that several PICs currently enjoy with the European Union can be expected to erode in comparison to other producers, further reducing the ability of regional tuna processors to compete in the global marketplace. At the same time, foreign fishing subsidies for tuna fleets can be expected to continue in some form in a number of cases. The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission can be expected to slowly take regulatory measures to conserve bigeye stocks, which would affect PICs.

Taking into account past trends and expected external drivers of performance, the following potential scenario can be described for the region’s tuna fisheries in 2040, dependent upon implementation of the policy decisions outlined in the Regional Roadmap for Sustainable Pacific Fisheries:  By 2040, subregional coalitions of PICs are entrenched around the three tuna fisheries – purse seine, tropical longline and southern longline, with norms of transparency and trust established, as well as flexible formulas to distribute the returns on access in order to accommodate spatial shifts in the stocks as impacts from climate change are felt. Countries continue to see greater benefits from cooperation to manage the tuna stocks as shared natural capital assets, and many count upon their annual returns for stability funds and public investment. Working together, these coalitions set targets for maintaining minimum sizes of the four tuna stocks as a basis for firm catch limits from the waters under their jurisdiction, based on regular assessments from the world’s top tuna biologists at SPC. The coalition of countries around the equator – comprised largely of PNA members - operates a well-functioning organization governed by a permanent board of global experts from within the region, with a secretariat of professional staff from strong education and training programs within the region, built over recent years with public revenues from the fisheries.

Similarly, the Tokelau Arrangement’s successor is governed by a permanent board with a well-staffed secretariat. Staff in both organizations are highly skilled and focus on managing registries of tuna catch quota, monitoring trends in use and synthesizing key biological, ecological and economic research for the board, as well as managing quota auctions. The Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) provides monitoring and surveillance support, among other services, to the coalitions, and is recognized as a world leader in cutting-edge surveillance technology.

Seeing a future constraint on returns and potential external influence from the WCPFC, PNA members moved quickly in 2017 - 2018 to invest in research and development for by-catch reduction, and to implement an innovative fish aggregating device (FAD) licensing scheme to spur industry investment – particularly given projected eastward shifts in distribution of the stock. The combination of technology advances and some initially painful catch reductions, coordinated with similar action through the longline VDS, placed the bigeye stock on a slow recovery path, with biomass eventually and steadily increasing towards 40 percent of unfished levels. Albacore, skipjack and yellowfin stocks continue to remain healthy in 2040, with a slightly stricter target reference point to provide some reserve should climate change make it necessary. These stocks provide the world’s last healthy tuna stocks and have become an even more international fishery system, as global demand for tuna products has remained steady with Asian and Middle Eastern markets becoming more mature.

Inclusion of Indonesia in the purse seine and tropical longline arrangements, and the Philippines in the former, enhanced the total allowable catch limits for both and placed most of the world’s skipjack under robust management. Strong restrictions for fishing on the high seas, linked to access to national waters, was recognized in 2020 by the WCPFC, and even with shifting stocks, high seas fishing is minimal. Some three quarters of the southern albacore longline fishery operates on rules set through successors to the Tokelau Arrangement, with profitability on an upward trend.

As an example, gradually over the years PNA members enhanced the flexibility of fishing vessel day trading among them while increasing durability of allocations – with some countries moving slowly in order to give domestic fleets time to adjust and improve efficiency (and thereby maintain contributions to local value added). Vessel days with longer duration were progressively issued to companies for higher returns (e.g. for a five-year duration instead of one year), or in some cases in consideration of local investment.

Continued trials in pooling with successful results, as well as improved auction designs, led to an agreement whereby the PNA members directed the secretariat to pool all access rights, allocated via auctions, with revenues distributed to parties via the agreed formula. Several parties opt to continue to invest access revenues in processing clusters, reducing the total fishing effort allowed and their distribution accordingly.

After years of investment in effort adjustments at the individual vessel level, the parties made sufficient preparations for a transition of rules towards a quota-system. Secondary markets for quota developed, regulated by the parties and enhancing overall fleet efficiency. Increased efficiency of fishing operations, together with the enhanced visibility and reduced risk for firms, led to significant investment in technology for higher quality products, generating value throughout the supply chain. As a result of healthy fish stocks and a well-functioning access market, revenues are between 50 percent higher and double 2015 levels in real terms (after management costs and concessions for domestic processing are subtracted).

Building off of healthy stocks and efficiently-regulated access, the PNA countries (plus Indonesia and the Philippines) have created a trading company that controls much of supply to processors and in some cases direct to retailers, supported by freezing/storage facilities in key hubs throughout the region. A number of PICs have well-developed vessel support systems that provide services to the fleets. Utilizing the pooled access regime, several countries exchange revenue distributions for allocations to secure access for coastal tuna fisheries developed through nearshore FAD networks to help ensure sufficient flow of food fish. This process began in the 2020s in advance of continued stagnation in coastal fisheries. Some countries have established dedicated coastal community funds with tuna revenues, to invest in reef restoration and key infrastructure and social goods. Additionally, countries with relatively large populations near ports or transshipment hubs, e.g. PNG and Solomon Islands, trial measures to support greater retention and local sale of purse seine by-catch (not including bigeye).

As a result of the policy strategies and decisions pursued under the Regional Roadmap for Sustainable Pacific Fisheries, public revenues are some US$177 to 345 million per year higher for PICs in real terms, after concessions for onshore investment and investments in administration, monitoring and surveillance are subtracted. A number of countries have increased local value added by a combined US$88 million per year in real terms, due to processing clusters and vessel service hubs (though many processing facilities operate under capacity and at a loss given erosion of European trade preferences). These efforts have created some 7,500 to 15,000 additional jobs in the region for processing, without including the additional employment from service hubs. Over time an Oceanic Tuna Export Company (OTEC) could develop and generate significant profits shared, as well as employment at storage facilities throughout the region.

The policy strategies leading to this potential scenario in 2040 can be summarized as:

1. Regional cooperation around a shared resource, eventually expanded to include key resource owners like Indonesia and the Philippines,
2. Hard fishing effort and catch limits that maintain valuable natural capital assets in the water (and help constrain supply and hence increase price), with proactive efforts and up-front investments to rebuild the bigeye stock before further declines,
3. Flexible access and eventually output rights for fleets, that enhance the value of the fisheries without increasing production, and provide a tool for interested PICs to lever greater foreign investment in processing,
4. Significant investment in skills and capacity to develop the world’s top tuna managers, and
5. Inclusion of coastal communities in the fisheries where feasible, through dedicated access and inshore FAD networks, as well as targeted investments maintain food security with coastal fish supplies stagnating and growing populations.

Developing a Comic/Cartoon type manual for the subsistence fisheries sector

I like to keep it varied in my job, and once in while I take on a challenge that gets me away from Tuna, CDS, IUU, Data, Information Management Systems and so on. On this occasion, I go back to basics... catching fish to eat and survive.

resource owners and users

This is a contract with an organisation that I have not work before, nor I associated a lot to Fisheries, APEC. But in their region fishis important for food security, these products that originate from subsistence or small-scale fishery require good handling practices on board in the landing phase.  Since a great percentage of the catch, up to 30% in some cases, is lost due to poor handling practices. 

Therefore, a proper management and efficiency throughout the core of the supply chain can increase the economic growth of the fishery communities, open new job positions for women and strengthen food security; consequently, we will need fewer marine resources contributing to the conservation of the fish stock.

The aim of the project is to develop a manual to facilitate the improvement of the catch condition of subsistence fishers (aiming at food security) by reducing economic losses and overfishing by the deterioration of fish products that were not properly handled, achieving that consumers receive high-quality products.

The social and economic importance of small-scale and subsistence fisheries are frequently undervalued, and they are rarely effectively managed. There is now growing consensus on how these fisheries could be managed for sustainability and to minimise the risks of crossing undesirable thresholds.

Most of these fisheries are open access in nature and entry into the fishery remains unrestricted. Small-scale fisheries are highly dynamic, labour intensive and usually not integrated with local marketing arrangements. Small-scale fishers, their families and communities are critically dependent on fish for their food and livelihood security and are extremely vulnerable to external pressures and shocks

After a substantial amount of research and in consultation with different representatives from the APEC economies, I proposed that the manual should be aimed at the common factors among their realities:

• The target audience would be the subsistence fisheries segment of their fisheries spectrum
• The key topic would be good fish handling and the application of good handling principles to catching, landing and transport to the 1st point of sale.
• The contents do no aim to set the final level for this group, but the initial level.
• Each economy will be free to add up and transform what they require to adapt it to their needs
• The manual will arrive at the fisher folk via the extension offices or the authorities.
• The manual will be delivered in open format in “Illustrator” software as to be easily adapted by the economies
• The economies can add Chapters but hopefully, maintain minimal content.
• As the "target" audience may have little education, so the way to engage them is via "cartoon" type illustrations and a "trainers aid" document that present the key messages in text
• Cartoon part would be based on the interaction of a fishers "family" approach and with examples of good and bad practices
• The Good Fish Handling message would be presented under four simple pillars:
  • Keep it clean
  • Keep it cold
  • Treat it gently
  • Move it fast

I explain this (in Spanish) in this video

Uploaded by SANIPES TV on 2016-05-05.

The Atlantic Ocean Tropical Tuna Tagging Programme (AOTTP)

Normally if don't do much in the Atlantic anymore (even if I started there). But my friend Pedro Güemes is now the Publicity and Tag Recovery Coordinator Atlantic Ocean Tropical Tuna Tagging Programme (AOTTP), a big job.

My friend Cynthia Wickham tagging tuna in middle of the Pacific    

 The overall objective of the Atlantic Ocean Tropical Tuna Tagging Programme (AOTTP) is to contribute to the food security and economic growth of the Atlantic coastal states by ensuring sustainable management of their tropical tuna resources. Specifically the AOTTP will use the information it collects on tuna stocks in the Atlantic to provide improved and updated scientific advice to developing coastal states, and other Contracting Parties, enabling them to adopt appropriate Conservation and Management Measures (CMMs) for tunas in the framework of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).

AOTTP will collect tag-recapture, and associated data, for the main tropical tuna species in the Atlantic Ocean. Neritic species will also be tagged in an ad hoc manner. The data will be used to calculate key population parameters in support of stock assessments (e.g. growth rates, natural mortality, exploitation rates and stock structure) and subsequent management. Scientists from relevant Contracting Parties of ICCAT will be trained in tagging, data-collection and the use of tagging data in stock assessment and management.

And they are calling for tenders to the First Tagging Recovery Programme (January 2016 to June 2017) outlined in the External Action of the European Union DCI- FOOD/2015/ 361-161, and approved by the AOTTP Steering Committee.

Tuna Tagging is vital from the scientific perspective and a fun to be on. If you belong to a fisheries institution, NGOs, University and have the chance to form a consortium to tender for it, have a go.

The document tenders are here in English and here in Spanish

Here in the Pacific SPC are world references n the issue and sure we can lend a hand, even if we are way to far to provide vessels and so on. See some of the videos that show what and how is done.

A short movie about the latest PNG tuna tagging cruise in January 2012. Project funded by PNG NFA and jointly undertaken with SPC's Oceanic Fisheries Programme. For more information please visit: www.spc.int/tagging. Music by Naio. Images by Malo Hosken (SPC).

Correcting the media

When you work in Fisheries you see plenty of "horrors" more than "errors" in the press. I always find it intriguing that if in any other area of work, if you say something wrong or do not check your sources, you not doing your job right and get done, fired, demoted and so on. The press seems to get away without much... I was saddened to read an article from one of my favourites media outlets Radio NZ (RNZ) getting it very wrong.

RNZ is a well-respected media for fisheries news in the Pacific, and on this occasion, it fell below standard

In an article "Kiribati yellow carded over fishing practice"  (a fact I blogged about it here) they started right... but then they say:

" Kiribati is now only one step away from a 'red card', which would mean fish caught within its waters would be banned in the European Union."

Wrong: A "red card" which means that the country is declared a "Non-Cooperating "country"   implies that fish caught in the Kiribati-flagged vessel cannot be imported into the EU under the principles of the EU IIU regulation 1005/2008. However, as Kiribati is not authorised to export fish and fishery products to the EU since its Sanitary Competent Authority is not recognised as equivalent to those of the EU member states. Hence, even if they were to move to red, the impact would be nil since at the present there is no direct fisheries trade in between Kiribati and the EU.

"Papua New Guinea has a 'red card' and fish caught in its waters is banned from being sold in the EU"

Very Wrng: PNG had a yellow card that was lifted in October 2015. Trade in between PNG (that is authorised from the sanitary perspective) and the EU was never stopped.

I wrote to then to correct them, not because I think I'm pedantic about the true... is just that is not right. So if you get to see this type of mistakes in your media... drop them a line and correct the record.

The Tuna Billions

Taken together, the seven most commercially important tuna species are among the most economically valuable fishes on the planet. In 2014, the volume of landed tuna rose to 4.99 million metric tons with an estimated dock value of $9.8 billion. The estimated end value remained similar to that in 2012 due to falling fish prices and was $32.9 billion, or $42.2 billion when including the full canned product price.

These are some of the conclusions of a report commissioned by Pew Trust to my colleagues Graeme Macfadyen and Vincent Defaux (see and downloaded it from here as it is a very good reference)

While the overall numbers do not reflect the total worth of the seven species, they provide a useful estimate of the contribution made by commercial tuna fisheries to the global economy. A total value of tuna, incorporating sport fishing and in-the-water ecosystem benefits of living tunas, among other things, would be much higher. Therefore, these numbers should be considered conservative.

The methodology used to calculate these global estimates allows for values to be broken down by region, species, and fishing gear.

The Pacific Ocean supports the world’s largest tuna fisheries. Nearly three-quarters of tuna landings in 2012 and 2014 came from these waters, and sales of tuna from the Pacific made up two-thirds of the global dock value and end value in both years.

Commercially landed Pacific tuna generated dock values of more than $6.5 billion in 2012 and $5 billion in 2014. The end value of Pacific tuna surpassed $17 billion in both years. When accounting for the full price of canned tuna, these values were more than $22 billion (in nominal dollars) in both years. Unfortunately, only a pitiful % of that stays in the hands of the Pacific Island Countries.

Indian Ocean tuna fisheries run a distant second, followed by the Atlantic and Southern oceans. The Southern Ocean’s small piece of the global pie is a result of fisheries targeting only southern bluefin. Still, the end value of Southern Ocean tuna is significant (about $500 million).

Based on data reported to the world’s regional fisheries management bodies, the top tuna-fishing nation is Indonesia, with total landings in 2014 of more than 620,000 metric tons. Indonesia’s vessels fish mainly in the eastern Indian and western Pacific oceans, in contrast to several other major fishing nations that support large global fleets.

Most of these nations have diverse fleets, with boats that fish using all gear types and target all species. Six of the top 10—Japan; Taiwan, Province of China; the United States; Korea; Spain; and France—have large global fleets that can fish far from their home waters. The Asian and European fleets, in particular, fish all major ocean basins and land tuna at ports around the world.

The remaining top nations have very large local or regional fleets that fish in the highly productive eastern tropical Pacific (Ecuador) or western and central tropical Pacific (the Philippines and Papua New Guinea).

The large majority of tuna landed worldwide is taken by purse seine fishing vessels, which use very large nets to encircle entire schools of fish. Purse seiners target primarily skipjack and yellowfin, and most tuna caught this way is destined for canneries. Because of the large volumes of these two species captured by purse seine, this gear type accounts for more revenue than any other.

In 2012 and 2014, a relatively small number of large purse seine vessels caught approximately two-thirds of all landed tuna. That accounted for about half of the dock value and end value of all tuna fisheries.

This report represents the first attempt to develop a rigorous estimate of the global value of tuna fisheries. Because this analysis is based solely on available commercial data, the value of the world’s tuna populations likely far exceeds the $42.2 billion estimated here. Despite being a conservative estimate, the report’s findings—that tuna fisheries contribute tens of billions of dollars to the global economy—indicate the critical importance of ensuring that all commercially fished tuna species are managed sustainably.

To conserve, and build on, the wealth that tuna fisheries generate, steps are needed to improve the precautionary management of tuna populations globally. Managers should:

• Restore depleted tuna stocks to healthy levels, at a minimum.
• Determine and set science-based catch limits that prevent stocks from dropping below healthy levels to ensure an adequate buffer to account for uncertainties.
• Develop and implement a system of pre-agreed management actions that would be triggered when stock sizes drop below predetermined healthy levels; these actions should be designed to reverse trends toward excessive stock depletion.

With these three actions, fisheries managers can work to remove the short-term politics from decision-making. Doing that would secure strong financial returns in tuna fisheries while ensuring the health of marine ecosystems.

Another yellow card in the pacific

Much has been on the news on another Yellow Card for the Pacific, this time Kiribati. And this is significant.

2014 figures

The EU press releases says:

The EU's warning to Kiribati is based on concerns about the country's capacity to control fishing activities by foreign fleets. There are serious risks that illegally caught fish could be laundered through the ports of Kiribati, as they do not have robust traceability systems in place for fisheries products. Kiribati's unwillingness to share important information on third country vessels operating in their waters undermines the Commission's work to improve transparency and sustainability of tuna resources in the Western and Central Pacific.

A couple of DG MARE officers were there earlier this year and did an assessment of the situation, and their results (and the yellow) did not come as a surprise to many people in the game.

And while a red would only impact a few foreign DWFN vessels that are flagged there, the significance for me comes from two non-related factors:

1) In 2014 (and similarly in 2015 I assume) more Tuna was caught in the Kiribati EEZ than in the Whole Eastern Pacific ocean and a bit less than in the whole Indian Ocean. No country has more tuna in its waters than Kiribati and Tarawa is (allegedly) the busiest Tuna transshipping port in the Pacific.

2) Kiribati is one of two countries in the Pacific (the other one is the Cooks) that actually has/had a "Fisheries Partnership Agreement" with the EU. This brings an interesting twist to the fact that the EU is in a fisheries agreement with a country that seems (in the own views) a non-totally cooperating country in terms of IUU fishing.

From the personal perspective, it looks like i may be spending more time there... since helping countries out of yellow seems to have become part of my staple workload (Fiji, Vanuatu, PNG so far, and allegedly Solomons quite soon) :-)

Woman in Fisheries

From the South Pacific to the Caribbean small-scale fisherwomen and processing operators are be the bedrock of food security in many communities, bringing home dependable income and healthy protein when other sources fail.

The best of fisheries  

 Their work nurtures their families and can dramatically impact conservation efforts — yet they have been all but ignored by researchers and policymakers.

These are the conclusions of this Oceana report/study that you should read from here please.

Is a sobering reading and I agree (based on my own personal experience) to most of it.  

Furthermore, while in my line of work most of my colleagues and bosses are male, the few where I had woman colleagues and specially bosses have been the best in terms of the working relationships and the results achieved. Somehow the ego/testosterone driven issues placate and everyone looks into results. I wish this was to happen more often.

You know things get done when Charlyn and Soni are involved :-) 

Is 1 In 4 Fish Stolen In Africa?

My friend Gilles recommended me this blog post, and it raises many valid questions and point, so I think is worth sharing.

The original is by André Standing (here), and has an awesome cover picture.

IUU fishing has become one of the main concerns for a number of organisations working on fisheries, including in developing countries. At the end of last year, the Norwegian government co-hosted the first expert meeting on fisheries crime, held in Cape Town. The report of this “fisheries crime symposium” described IUU fishing in Africa costs 1 billion a year, meaning “1 in 4 fish is stolen”. And it is highly organised groups that cause the most harmful forms of fisheries crime, often with links to other organised crime. Fisheries crime was described as:

Highly organised, well-financed transnational criminal activities…linked to a wider black-economy, a parallel economic system…frequently linked to complex webs of organised crime. Countries are being deprived of taxes, citizens of jobs, food and income, and fisheries and environments are being destroyed. In addition, certain networks within the fisheries sector associate with other crime such as drugs, trafficking, wildlife smuggling and fraud.
There are now demands for drastically strengthening law enforcement, for which more resources and development aid is needed. The required effort to defeat the criminals is increasingly depicted as a war, just as we have heard the need for launching a war against drugs, people smuggling or terrorism. Yet is the information being used to understand the extent, nature and impact of IUU fishing reliable and pertinent?

A recent study in the Pacific, published by MRAG, casts some doubt. It was not quite so alarming about the impact of IUU fishing, and it found no evidence of a conspiracy of criminal groups. The study estimated that IUU fishing for tuna, shark and billfish amounted to about $600 million a year. Almost all illegal fishing was caused by licensed vessels, and seemed quite widespread in the sector. And while the figure of $600 million seems a lot, the author’s of the report explain the economic implications of IUU for Pacific Island States are ambiguous.

Based on the most recent estimates of profitability in the WCPO purse seine and longline sectors, we estimate the rent associated with IUU is around $152.67m. Nevertheless, because of the nature of access arrangements in Pacific tuna fisheries, it is possible that much of the rent associated with IUU activity is captured anyway, and this estimate either overstates or is at least at the upper end of, actual impacts on the real economy.

Indeed, the report reveals that significant forms of IUU fishing, such as misreporting data on catches, cause no loss of income to the coastal state, and other forms of crime can contribute positively to government wealth. Certainly it would be a mistake to imagine eliminating IUU would simply result in increasing the potential wealth from fisheries by $600 million. But this error in thinking is evident in the way statistics are used to describe IUU in Africa. The implications for fisheries policy debates are important.

Hopefully, a new study being undertaken now by the African Union, with funding by the EU, can further our understanding of the problem. According to the terms of reference for the consultants, the study will produce a comprehensive document on the economic, social and environmental impacts of IUU on the continent. This is tremendously important as reliable information about the impacts of IUU are needed to support policy making and guide the allocation of scarce funds. However, the prospects of this new study to deepen our knowledge look slim. The consultants have chosen to gather information by using a basic questionnaire (with multiple answers) sent out to a random group of people working on fisheries. How they expect this data will be useful, other than confirming perceptions about crime, is difficult to know. One hopes the questionnaire is not given too much focus in their study, and the authors can provide us with a more reliable insight using other methods.

Why Africa does not lose 1 billion from IUU fishing

The most influential study on IUU fishing in Africa was commissioned by the UK government and also authored by MRAG. It was published in 2005 and claimed IUU was valued at $0.9 billion dollars (although nearly always rounded up to 1 billion when referenced by others). The method to arrive at this figure relied on estimates of illegal fishing in 8 countries (including one that was not even in Africa - Papua New Guinea). The data was provided by just one anonymous source in each country. There was no explanation of how these people would have such a reliable insight into rates of crime among vessels at sea, many of which are not visible from shore and are subject to minimal state monitoring.

This estimate of the scale of IUU fishing from the 8 countries was then extrapolated for all African coastal countries based on the finding that rates of illegal fishing in the 8 countries closely correlated with their scores on international good governance indexes. So a formula was created, using the World Bank’s governance scores, to predict the amount of IUU fishing in countries where MRAG didn’t commission case study work.

The strength of their data for the 8 country case studies was far too weak to form a reliable prediction on IUU in other countries. But also the theory for this relationship between a country’s score on good governance was not established in any detail. There may well be a relationship, but it will be complex, and an alternative hypothesis is that very weak states probably license too many vessels and they might provide lax license arrangements. States with weak governance may have less illegal fishing but more harmful legal fishing.

While we can ponder the relationships between governance and illegal fishing, a more serious problem is that the single scores produced by these governance indexes are not only criticised for being unreliable and meaningless, but much of the data used for these governance indexes derive from rank ordering countries. This makes the scores unsuitable to predict economic data, for the simple reason that a country that scores 2 on a governance index does not have governance that is twice as good as a country that scores 1. An anomaly of using this method was that 4 countries in Africa returned results that indicated they had no illegal fishing, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa, Mauritius and Cape Verde.

The problem with the 2005 study was not just with its method of estimating the scale of IUU fishing. The study was extremely confusing when it came to understanding the costs. The authors regularly referred to the value of illegal fishing as a loss to African states, and ever since people have referred to the report as providing evidence that African states lose $1 billion a year from these crimes. As the authors explained:

The most obvious impact [of IUU] is direct loss of the value of the catches that could be taken by the coastal state if the IUU fishing was not taking place. Aside from the loss to GNP, actual revenue can accrue to the coastal state in the form of landings fees, licence fees, taxes and other levies which are payable by legal fishing operators. We have estimated…that at a minimum $0.9bn of IUU catch is taken from EEZs of various countries in the sub-Saharan Africa region, the majority of which are developing countries.

But the recent study from the Pacific describes well why measuring the value of fish obtained through illegal means and measuring the resulting economic costs for coastal states are two quite different things. In the case of the Pacific, the most valuable forms of crime were misreporting catches and fishing with prohibited methods (there was very little unlicensed fishing). These crimes can result in extra catches for the vessels, but because vessels do not pay per fish caught, reducing these offences would not increase government income.

So, reducing many forms of IUU fishing would not result in producing economic gains for the state (commensurate with the value of IUU fishing). For the most part it would mean lower profits for fishing companies, which in turn may lower the available rents for governments, assuming that fees charged by governments are influenced by what companies can afford to pay. In the short term, at least, reducing certain types of IUU fishing could have negative economic consequences for coastal states, as well as being a very costly endeavour.

To better understand the economic impacts of illegal fishing we must also appreciate that profits derived from illegal fishing are not simply being removed from the legal economy. Of course, some fish caught illegally may be exported to non-African consumer markets, thereby denying national companies and markets fish supplies, to the benefit of foreign companies and countries. But such tendencies have long been concern about the way the legal sector works, which makes distinguishing the relative costs of crime quite tricky. There are also numerous examples where illegally caught fish are processed and consumed in African markets. Illegal fishing in Africa does not simply involve stealing fish from the continent; it can also contribute to the productive sector, providing income, jobs and fish to eat. But this is rarely factored into the analysis of the costs of IUU fishing.

In South Africa, WWF published a study in 2014 on the value of illegal poaching of lobsters and abalone, which claimed the country was losing 4 million Rand a year. There are legitimate concerns about the ecological impact of this, but as the poachers are mostly South Africans from poor coastal communities, the economic impact of poaching is to add 4 million Rand to the economy every year, as well as provide income for many poor people. Illegal fishing, like many other economic crimes (such as the drugs trade), should be accounted for as part of a country’s GDP (or GNP), not discounted from it. Of course, some profits from illegal fishing may not end up being taxed (although some will be), and the lion’s share of the profits may be realised in foreign jurisdictions, or off-shore. But these problems also happen to profits derived from the legal sector as well.

Is 1 in 4 fish stolen?

Another influential finding from the 2005 study is that IUU fishing accounts for a surprising amount of the total fish caught in Africa. To estimate the scale of this, the study compared the figure of $0.9 billion to official catches reported to the FAO. This method revealed the value of IUU fishing equated to about 19% of the value of legal fish products. This may be why some fisheries experts claim 1 in 4 fish is stolen in Africa?

However, the 2005 study was valuing fish caught illegally among many industrial fishing fleets operating in Africa who don’t land their catches locally, so their catch data is reported as being from their flag state. FAO country data doesn’t reflect what is being caught in African waters. Indeed, for many African countries, given that industrial fisheries are not able or willing to land locally, data submitted to the FAO by coastal states comprises mostly estimates about the small-scale sector and inland fisheries, which are two sectors the MRAG study did not include in their research. Using official country data to contrast with their data on IUU has grossly distorted the picture about the scale of illegal fishing on the continent. We do not know if the outcome is to exaggerate or to underestimate. But certainly there is no robust data that shows 1 in 4 fish is stolen from Africa.

And the statement that 1 in 4 fish is stolen perpetuates a simplistic distinction between the impacts of legal and illegal fishing. The idea that a quarter of fish are stolen suggests all is OK with the other three quarters. We can return to the study of IUU fishing in the Pacific to see why this is problematic. Here the largest single source of illegal fishing by value was purse seine boats fishing with Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) during the 4 months of the year when these are banned. However the Deputy Director of the Forum Fisheries Agency, Wez Norris, explained why these bans can be ineffective.

During those months you have very little bigeye being caught but one of the responses of the industry has been to fish heavily on FADs in the other eight months of the year so that’s reduced the effectiveness of the measure.

So, following the logic of much writing on IUU we can see that the fish caught with FADs during the 8 months would be seen as contributing to the legitimate wealth of the Pacific Islands - forming part of the economic value of the ocean - but the fish caught with FADs during the 4 months would be considered stolen; a loss to the economy. It is muddled thinking, particularly if the level of fishing and by-catch during the 8 months is far more than is desirable for sustainable fishing.   

How can the African Union’s study improve our thinking?

Although empirical claims on the economic costs of IUU fishing are unreliable, and in some ways we can see that they may exaggerate economic costs to African states, there are of course legitimate concerns about criminality in the sector. Perhaps most important of all is the potential for illegal fishing to lead to overfishing and undermine food security. We need to understand the extent of all these threats very carefully, bearing in mind that overfishing and unfair trade have been concerns about the nature of legal fishing in Africa for decades.   

But clearly research on IUU that relies heavily on ‘perceptions’ is not sufficient. That the AU is using a questionnaire to update information on IUU is therefore worrying. The Pacific Island study represented a much more rigorous attempt to collate information, but even there the authors relied on best estimates from the fishing authorities to fill in the gaps. There were no investigations or in-depth case study work, including interviews with those best placed to know about crime – the fishers themselves (as well as their lawyers, agents and insurance companies).

This type of research, based on spending time speaking with people close to and involved in crime has been crucial to some of the most insightful studies on corporate or organised crime, and it regularly reveals how perceptions held by law enforcement agencies or the public about crime are often unreliable. No source of information is sufficient in isolation, yet we seem to rely almost exclusively on data about IUU fishing produced by those with a vested interest in fighting it: NGOs campaigning against IUU fishing, consultancy firms (such as MRAG) who provide services to governments to improve monitoring and compliance, and law enforcement agencies.

Getting a more balanced insight into the nature and impact of illegal fishing is very important. Flawed data will distort policy making – potentially convincing governments and donor agencies to put a great deal of time and resources into something that may not be the most important to prioritise (why is there not more interest in addressing corruption, for example?). For the time being, because of the flawed data, we have no idea on the real costs of fisheries crime in Africa. Perhaps it is far more widespread than existing studies suggest (including in the small-scale sector) meaning a law enforcement approach is hardly likely to work. But equally it may not be, and the obsession with IUU fishing may be shifting blame, ultimately dumbing down our understanding about overfishing and unfair fisheries arrangements. And with escalating calls for harsher treatment for the criminals, it seems important to think about the implications for workers and small-scale fishers.

Every other international war on crime tends to be an abject failure that causes a great deal of suffering for those who were never intended to be the target. A tough law enforcement approach may not be the best solution, particularly in countries that score poorly on the World Bank's governance indexes. But can the new study by the African Union consider this, or will it end up simply repeating the call for strengthening policing and punishments based on perceptions by fisheries crime experts? 

Wiki-fishing in Alaska

Came across this interesting article on a project by Alaskan small scale longliners. I would loved to have done something like that when I was fishing snapper here in NZ as to increase the selectivity. Wonder if we could apply this in the Pacific. Perhaps with long tail snapper?

Back in the days when I fished snapper

The original is from the Economist.

Stephen Road, a commercial longline fisherman in Alaska’s verdant south-east panhandle, fishes by two rules. One is: stay married. Mr Rhoads has seen countless marriages of fellow fishermen sink under the weight of so many days at sea. The second rule is: use fewer hooks. (Love both rules!)

Mr Rhoads works the Pacific halibut fishery, which opened for business on March 19th, using baited hooks strung off lines as long as three miles. Using as few hooks as possible and carefully targeting the desired species, Mr Rhoads explains, helps keep fish stocks healthy and smaller businesses afloat. To do so, he relies on a crowdsourced compendium of fishermen’s tales.

A war between small family fishing operations and Seattle-based companies pushed Alaska to statehood in 1959. The state’s $6 billion commercial fishing industry still suffers from a David-and-Goliath complex. Over the years, Alaskan halibut fishermen have faced big reductions in their harvest limits while factory trawlers dump millions of pounds of dead halibut overboard as by-catch. Quotas are becoming consolidated into fewer hands, and fishing permits are leaving Alaska’s small coastal communities and heading out of state. The average age of a fisherman in Alaska is 50, an increase of a decade since 1980.

Mr Rhoads is a member of a network started by the Alaska Longline Fishermen’s Association (ALFA), which aims to do something about this and to reduce by-catch of sensitive species such as rockfish at the same time. Network fishermen, who numbered only 20 at the project’s start, agreed to share data on where and what they were catching in order to create maps that highlighted areas of high by-catch. Within two years they had reduced accidental rockfish harvest by as much as 20%.

Once a young and skinny longliner crew (1996)

The rockfish mapping project expanded to create detailed maps of the sea floor, pooling data gathered by transducers fixed to the bottoms of boats. By combining thousands of data points as vessels traverse the fishing grounds, these “wikimaps”—created and updated through crowdsourcing—show gravel beds where bottom-dwelling halibut are likely to linger, craggy terrain where rockfish tend to lurk, and outcrops that could snag gear.

Public charts are imprecise, and equipment with the capability to sense this level of detail could cost a fisherman more than $70,000. Skippers join ALFA for as little as $250, invest a couple of thousand dollars in computers and software and enter into an agreement to turn over fishing data and not to share the information outside the network, which now includes 85 fishermen.

Skippers say the project makes them more efficient, better able to find the sort of fish they want and avoid squandering time on lost or tangled gear. It also means fewer hooks in the water and fewer hours at sea to catch the same amount of fish. A healthy fleet benefits welders and boatwrights in turn. “If the entire fleet comes up from Seattle,” says Mr Rhoads, “we become just a trailer park and a bar.”

China in IUU Fishing

Pretty much on a weekly basis we hear something on the news on Chinese-flagged fishing vessels involved in IUU activities worldwide or working in some disputed waters in the South China Sea. So what is the deal? Why are they not punish in some way or another?

The Chinese Fishing boat sunk in Argentina

I have been going on China’s massive Distant Water Fleet and Subsidies for a while now (see here, here, here, here, here or read this from the BBC or just do Google search). It has signed (but not ratified): the 1995 Compliance Agreement (flag states to license high seas fishing vessels). And has not signed: the 2009 Port State Measures Agreement (port states to inspect fishing vessels).

We talked with friend Pramod Ganapathiraju about this, and he is clear:

Chinese fishing vessels are engaged in both unregulated and illegal fishing activities for squids in the South Atlantic off Uruguay and Argentina, sharks and tuna in Latin America, the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and in many fisheries in West Africa. Chinese vessels also have a high level of illegal fishing activity off South Korea, and many islands of the South China Sea.

To give you a small sample: For the past five years, 5 Chinese squid jiggers were detained off Argentina while one Chinese squid jigger escaped into Uruguay after illegal fishing during the hot pursuit by Argentina coast guard and was never arrested. (at least one was sunk a few weeks ago)

Off South Korea in 2015, more than 43 Chinese vessels were arrested while the actual number that was detected illegally fishing and never detained is ten times higher than the arrested ones. China has a different policy with each country to get their vessels released sometimes even without fine for example off West Africa. Some countries in the South China Sea don't even arrest them even when they see them illegally fishing within the EEZ, as they don't want a trade war with China. China is often seen as a bully by navies and coast guards in this region.

We can also track IUU activities using AIS data. But, recently I came to know across information with the Chinese asking their vessels to switch off AIS transponders as several NGOs have blown their cover by publicizing detection of illegal fishing through media for their interests. The same thing happened with Fu Yuna Yu fleet that I was tracking this year. This year a source from Burma forwarded information showing illegal Chinese and Taiwanese longliners fishing in the Bay of Bengal, but not even one of them was visible on the AIS. Tracking illegal vessels is a surveillance activity and should not be publicized until the vessel is arrested or seized through courts as every time a cover for one illegal vessel is exposed, ten to twenty others become invisible.

Registration of fishing vessels in China is handled by regional offices responsible for fisheries management such as the Port Supervisory Authority under the Bureau of Fisheries. The system is highly decentralised as the harbour master of the vessel’s home port is responsible for the registration of the fishing vessel. Existing data on vessel registration and authorisation to fish a is not readily available, and it appears to be fragmented and not entirely consistent. Allegedly 50% of the over 2000 Chinese fishing vessels operating in other countries are over 24m.

I never have seen a Chinese fisheries inspector in the field, and the few bureaucrats I meet at international meetings, never give any straight answers to any questions in regards the IUU activities of their fleet.

All Chinese EU IUU catch certificates I've seen look very dodgy... Chinese operators in the Pacific are using their “own" version of the EU CCS and allege that is for their own legislation (that they never provide) saying that it has different requirements (i.e. transhipment – Section 7 - includes landing and sorting into containers), but when you see the form they send it refers to the EU legislation… is soo dodgy… (and they out incredible pressure on the lower ranks of officers in the Pacific). Many countries went into yellow for less than this. See below small snippets of one:

Seems the Chinese IUU Catch Certificate still refers to the EU legislation :-)

So the IUU fishing involvement seems clear to everyone. Furthermore, there is also the 13% rebate that the government gives to the exporters so one would think that would also be against WTO rules as the government subsidies but again, no one seems to be tackling them on that either.

Hence, the question on everyone’s mind is why does the EU dot out a yellow card on them? I guess the question should be if the EU can pick up a fight with a bigger bully?

Morally I’m happy to admit that the EU has changed its ways big time, particularly the Spanish fleet in regards IUU, and as I always say the amount of support they give smaller countries regarding development assistance is commendable, particularly becomes with not (or minimal) strings attached. Something that China does not do at all.

The reality is that the EU unilateral model of trade embargoes (like to one it has now with Sri Lanka) has never been legally contested the WTO level… and China has big pockets and massive trade leverage, try to tackle them there requires guts and good lawyers.

In a recent and interesting article M.A. Young, International trade law compatibility of market-related measures to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, Mar. Policy(2016),  she writes:

Bearing in mind that approaches to address IUU fishing must be developed in accordance with international law, and particularly the trade law agreements such as the WTO and RTAs, this article concludes with the following recommendations:

First, the unilateral trade measures identified in this article, such as the EU catch documentation and import prohibition scheme, appear to have been designed to ensure that they are fair, transparent, and non-discriminatory. The aim to combat IUU fishing conforms to legitimate objectives expressly recognized in trade law, such as national security requirements, the prevention of deceptive practices, and the protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. The implementation of these measures will need to continue in this mode, and it is important to note that the import prohibitions are preceded by the use of less trade-restrictive measures so that more restrictive measures are only used in case of need. As such the measures can provide solid models of WTO-compatible regulation.

Secondly, while the prohibition of imports and other trade measures are currently most often developed on a unilateral basis, the effectiveness of these approaches would be strengthened by a more collective or regional approach, so that the products of IUU fishing are not merely traded in other markets. While some efforts
Have already been made by RFMOs, such as CCAMLR, this could be extended. This would involve cooperation by states, the FAO and/ or RFMOs, and possibly even private bodies, in the following: more widespread compilation and sharing of lists of IUU vessels; the harmonisation of catch documentation schemes and traceability requirements; and the prohibition of fish products being imported, landed, or transshipped by states who have failed to take appropriate measures to ensure compliance by their vessels. The current work of the FAO in elaborating voluntary guidelines on catch documentation schemes is of particular relevance (I worked on it…. But is not going well… topic for another post)

Thirdly, current negotiations on regional trade agreements (RTAs) are important avenues for trade-related IUU measures to be developed through consultation. There is scope, for example, for the inclusion of IUU obligations in the agreements or associated side-agreements and environmental chapters. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),a ‘mega- regional' trade agreement recently concluded between 12 countries Including major fish consuming or producing ones and now awaiting ratification, includes significant provisions on marine capture fisheries. These provisions call upon states to combat IUU fishing practices and help deter trade in products from species harvested from those practices. While such provisions are not yet in force, and remain to be assessed alongside other TPP rules (such as investor protection and investor state dispute settlement) before the TPP's overall environmental credentials are evaluated, they provide a strong signal of the trade law compatibility of market-related measures to combat IUU fishing.

Fourthly, the cooperation on the use of trade-related measures should be open and transparent whether the relevant trade measures are principally state based – such as a joint import ban or whether they involve private initiatives – such as purchase control documentation with in a supply chain. Industry groups and other private actors should maintain good practices in designing and implementing their initiatives, including in consulting with affected stakeholders and proceeding with transparency, openness and impartiality. As far as possible, there should be mutual supportiveness of the trade, environment, and law of these a regimes (including between the FAO, CITES, WTO and other bodies) as well as policy coordination within states.

So potentially yes… But then, would they test it?  

Nevertheless, they could start with a “Yellow Card” and see… I think the fear there, is that the Chinese may don't give a toss and just continue as usual.

So the EU would be in a situation where they either: lose face and credibility against all the other countries … or lock themselves in a potentially very costly battle with a giant… tough decision.

The VDS vs. QMS saga

Has been a lot of talk on the media about NZ pushing a QMS (Quota Management System) type system in the management side of the Purse Seine Fisheries in the Pacific, as a replacement of the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme. So various people asked me my opinion

Already in September 2015 I was asked about this, as I worked in compliance with the NZ QMS (I worked for Sanford and Simunovich before getting into overseas work) and I also know about the PNA VDS from the compliance side.

My opinions still the same: I'm an operational guy. I like to think about new systems but always based on the operational side. For me (my opinion only) the QMS (as operating in NZ) is impossible in the Purse Seine Fisheries for various reasons... but the biggest one is how and where would be the "Licensed Fish Receivers" established and how would they be controlled? (Imagine Thailand, Vietnam, Ecuador and increasingly China as processing states playing ball with the Pacific, yeah right).

Purse Seine Fishery is highly mobile, situations where the flag state, the coastal state, the port state and the processing state are all different, are more the norm than an exemption. So while in principle, something like the QMS could be possible, from the reality perspective as the industry is now, no way. If all the tuna captured in the Pacific was to be landed/transhipped in the Pacific Islands and all of the countries were to be operating under one standardised system… then maybe. But we are a loooong way from that.

Another area where people could see potential is the biological principles of the determinations of the biomass for sustainable harvest under an Ecosystem Based Management approach, but this is what is what SPC does and to a very good level! In fact, many of the fisheries scientists that are and were in charge of stock assessment are New Zealanders that worked for NIWA or MPI.

That biological assessment in the NZ QMS case, becomes the basis for the determination of the status of fish stocks, so they are maintained at or above a level that can produce the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY).  MSY reflects the greatest yield that can be achieved over time while maintaining a stock's productive capacity, having regard to the population dynamics of the stock and any environmental factors that influence the stock.  Controls are set so that the biomass level can support the maximum sustainable yield (BMSY).  This provides the conditions to maximise the yield of the fishery without compromising sustainability.  Once the BMSY is identified, the TAC of a stock at that time can be determined.

Let's set aside that I already have a BIG problem with MSY… A quantity that has been shown by biologists not to exist, and by economists to be misleading if it did exist ( Dr. John Allan Gulland)

MSY was designed as a political construct more than a fisheries management tool. Is a theoretical construction known as maximum sustained yield (MSY) exists in three realms: as science, as policy, and as a legal concept. Despite substantial criticism by scientists and economists, MSY still remains at the heart of fisheries science and fisheries management (read Carmel Finley, 2009. The Social Construction of Fishing, 1949) and Maximum Sustainable Yield: The Worst Idea in Fisheries Management by Dr. Sidney Holt

Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) would be a much better idea! But I'm getting off point here!

Anyhow… once that TAC (or whatever name you want to put on it) is determined it becomes the basis of the allocation of quota. This is not too dissimilar in principle as to become the basis of the total amount of vessels days (under the assumption of how much a vessel of x size can catch in day), this vessels days are then allocated to the countries (as if it was a quota).

That allocation process is where I believe synergisms are possible.  Hence from my perspective the potential synergies are at the biological and allocation basis, but not at the operational ones.

In fact, the VDS can work under a precautionary principle and keep “buffer days” in the bag. Let me explain, trough iFIMS the fishing days under the VDS scheme are administered, and we are working hard on the integration of all vessel data for CDS purposes; this includes the e-forms (e-logsheet) that the vessel provides electronically in "near real time."  Hence, the accumulative estimated catch volumes can be compared to the so-called ‘reference points’, to see how the fishery is performing and if things are right those buffer days could be sold or kept if the catches are to close to the reference targets.

Anyway… my take and ranting on this!

People in fisheries tend to be larger than life and with a lot of mana and pride, so they tend to react accordingly when they feel someone else is pushing into their house. I see here where the tradition of an "offering" and a soft approach to exchanging ways is the way to go. I never have seen this issue as an "either/or" but as a "let's learn from each other" opportunity.

No fisheries management tool is perfect… they are all perfectible.

Taiwan in Fisheries

Taiwan is a substantial player in world fisheries, and really big in the Pacific. Their complex relationship with China has an impact on the way they conduct their fisheries and their responsibilities as flag state.

In no way I’m and expert on this topic (nor in any really!) but I’m interested in their fishing sector, since I have to deal with their vessels very often, as many of the countries that actually have diplomatic ties with them are in the Pacific and license them to fish. And as I like reading, this is what I found.

Despite being home to one of the largest fishing industries in the world, Taiwan cannot participate fully in international fisheries management and conservation efforts due to its ambiguous political status and restricted “international space:, but has used its fisheries diplomacy as political leverage to expand its participation in bilateral, regional, and international fisheries-related agreements.

Taiwan's official diplomatic relations are few and its participation in international organizations limited as a result of the “One China” principle. Concerned about the perception of elevating Taiwan’s international status, China is reluctant to cede “international space” to Taiwan and objects to Taiwan’s expanded participation in international organizations. China displaced Taiwan at the UN in 1971 and its growing international clout since then has further constrained Taiwan’s ability to participate in the UN and its specialized agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Maritime Organization, and the International Labor Organization—all agencies that address fisheries-related issues.

Taiwan began developing its fishing industry in the 1950s, and by the 1960s turned to distant water fishing to compensate for overfished coastal waters. This shift led Taiwan to be a global player in high seas fisheries, particularly tuna and squid. According to 2013 statistics from Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which I doubt are really accurate), Taiwan fishing vessels bring in 1.2 million metric tons of catch annually worth U$D 3.5 billion; around 50% percent of this value comes from high seas fishing mostly in the Pacific, but also the Indian, and Atlantic oceans.

Image from this source

The UNFSA (United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement) crystallized the concept of “fishing entities” for the first time in a binding UN instrument. The text of the agreement never explicitly mentions Taiwan; however, the term “fishing entities” is generally understood to include Taiwan. Although the international community does not treat Taiwan as a sovereign state for purposes of membership in international governmental organizations that require statehood for membership, Taiwan’s status as a “fishing entity” in the UN enables it to circumvent challenges related to its political status while participating in RFMOs.

Taiwan’s first full RFMO membership in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) in 2002 marked a turning point for Taiwan in terms of its historically limited participation in RFMOs. Despite Taiwan’s designation as “Chinese Taipei,” the WCPFC Convention afforded Taiwan rights and duties similar to those of states with Contracting Party status.

As a non-Contracting Party Member, Taiwan has a slightly abbreviated range of rights: it is ineligible to serve in the chairmanship or vice chairmanship, to determine the Commission headquarters, or to appoint the executive director. Otherwise, it participates fully in the WCPFC’s chief business of managing and sustaining highly migratory fish stocks in the Pacific Ocean. Because the WCPFC was the first effort to implement the UNFSA at a regional level, Taiwan’s membership set the tone and served as a model for its subsequent inclusion in RFMOs.

In the Pacific, the Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Nauru, Tuvalu, and Palau—all of whom officially recognize Taiwan and are WCPFC members, hence supported Taiwan’s participation in the organization.

While in principle the “regulatory gaps” arising from or exacerbated by its limited international space challenge Taiwan’s fisheries and fishing industry in two key areas: in (1) illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and (2) labor conditions aboard long-haul fishing vessels. I think that Taiwan also takes advantage of them too, they pushing the envelope while playing the victim game.

On the labor side, other than the skipper and the chief engineer, I think I never have seen a Taiwanese crew member… all the crew are Indonesians, Cambodians, Philippines, Myanmarians and Vietnamese. And while the conditions on board are really harsh (therefore we have problems finding observers keen to be placed there) obviously the conditions at the home for many of the crew must be worst, because rarely I have seen a crew member jumping boat in Pacific ports… but a personal observation and is not always the case, as reported by media

Issues on/with Taiwanese vessels

On the IUU side, they never been transparent, most of the logsheets I have seen were very dodgy at best, very active with underreporting sharks catches and concealing fins, they are always been involved in allegation of corruption, and so on.

Furthermore, Taiwan could do more at the domestic level to address its industry’s use of “flags of convenience” to evade scrutiny in fishing activities (most of the Vanuatu flagged longliners are Taiwanese), and the list is long

The Taiwanese Industry receive an estimated 330 million USD in subsidies every year (R. Sumalia pers.com) which surely helps to buy sufficient VDS days to their Purse Seiner Fleet (see here for details on their Purse Seiners) and now to the Long Line (see here for details on their LL).

They have also played a political game with Tuvalu and Marshalls by not allowing them to get vessels flagged on their flag as a pressure to get more and cheaper vessels days under the VDS. However, this seems to have been arranged, in November last year Tuvalu has been given the green light to export its newly built purse seine vessel Tautaloa from Taiwan to Tuvalu (bringing its fleet strength to two vessels)

Tautaloa was built in March 2012 by Taiwan’s shipbuilding company Ching Fu but, due to its national laws on the construction of new purse seine boats, stating that the equivalent tonnage of old purse seine boats needed to be scrapped, work on the boat and subsequent delivery to Tuvalu was stalled. Tuvalu raised the issue in PNA, FFA, and WCPFC meetings, as well as negotiations with Taiwan, and had even called for the reduction of fishing days to the distant water fishing nation as a result of its stalling of the new vessel.

Nevertheless, Taiwan’s fishing industry has been going around the limitation on vessels in other countries where they have diplomatic leverage, by flagging them there (most recently the Solomons)

Also, I find interesting that in some of the Micronesian countries were the Taiwanese fleet has charters, the company in charge is Luen Tai, a Hong Kong based company with strong backing from mainland China capitals. So, obviously, politics is not a hindrance for business…

I wasn’t impressed with yellow cards by the EU to the smaller Pacific countries, but on insight they did catalyze a lot of changes that were in the pipeline.

Nevertheless, I was “happy” when they put Taiwan on yellow (Taiwanese fishing companies aren’t happy and criticize their govt as weak and the EU as racist).

Was good that yellowed also Tailand because most of the Taiwanese caught tuna went to Thailand with Taiwanese Catch Certificates, and Taiwan Fisheries Agency must had truly not idea what the vessels were doing (and Thailand did not ask either)... but they want to work in unison now.

Again, the stick works, to my surprise, since then Taiwanese longliners operating in the Pacific are required to report their position daily to Taiwan Fisheries Agency, and yesterday I saw for fist time 2 Taiwanese fisheries officers (acting as Observers) in a Pacific country! They were controlling weights of the part the catch unloaded to be exported. However, they had no idea that their fleet was operating in the port I was until they came (vessels have been unloading here for the last 5 years!)

So obviously they tighten up their game (Finally!) Which is good, but perhaps a bit late since their massive fleet is, directly and indirectly, encysted in the Pacific and bad habits change slowly.

But what irks me massively, is that Taiwan and China are the biggest DWFN in the region, and support their industry with some obscene amount of subsidies. Said so, in 15 years working with the institutional side of Fisheries in the Pacific, I have yet to see a fisheries capacity building or an institutional strengthening project financed by any of them. I find that quite despicable.

UN Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) is all go!

With Gambia's ratification yesterday, the required 25 nations have now signed. Hence, the treaty will enter into force in 30 days from yesterday. Only a few months ago I wrote about the fast pace ratification was taking.

A ray of light in the dark skies

This is big news. Fish does not become illegal trough processing but is rather caught illegally and then landed illegally. Stronger port controls will leave IUU fishers with fewer places to land and sell their catch. This, in consequence, will greatly reduce illegal fishing around the world.

Now for the difficult challenge of implementation on a global scale, most of the ratifiers are minnows, with a few honorable exemptions.

Only when countries with big import markets such as Japan, Taiwan, and China also become a party, then meaningful change and improved traceability would be achieved. (Taiwan can't reality... because is not a UN member)

In any case is a big step... in a very long road.

My friend and colleague Pramod Ganapathiraju explains here where we are at with the PSMA

Traceability and IUU fishing

Last week I was in Kochi (India) as FAO in cooperation with INFOFISH and the Government of India, with financial support from the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), convened a capacity-building workshop on “National and regional good practices in seafood traceability in Asia to combat IUU fishing”.

Cool illustration on the complexities of traceability in seafood, by fishwise.org

Besides presenting a research study, I was asked last year to do (more below). It was a good opportunity to catch up with friends/colleagues I have collaborated a lot over the years: Gilles Hosch, Vincent Andre and Heiner Lehr

Besides being a resource "expert" contracted by FAO to facilitate the workshop, I was asked to present a study they commissioned last year (I wrote about it here), and I have no shame to admit it was big challenge.

This was a comparative study of 10 country cases under the framework of the FAO lead programme called “Fisheries Management and Marine Conservation within a Changing Ecosystem Context.” I tackled this study with the help of other two great people; Melania Borit, Ph. Postdoctoral fellow,  University of Tromsø – The Arctic University of Norway and Kim Thompson, Independent Consultant, Member of the New Zealand Seafood Standards Council

The main objectives of the study were “to review the 10 national traceability case studies, taking into account their relevance for combatting IUU fishing” and “to provide recommendations on ways to improve their traceability practices, especially to combat IUU fishing”.

Furthermore, it was requested that we the food safety component associated to traceability. Hence, and due to the limitations of the analysis, we focused only on sanitary eligibility involving the traceability system associated to the unique identification in terms of control of sanitary and operational conditions that the production chain of seafood in a country is required to comply with, and is therefore controlled and verified by a suitable Competent Authority (CA).

Based on the provided secondary sources (i.e. the 10 reports), we assessed the following aspects:

1. if the state has a functional traceability system;
2. if this system is suitable for fish products traceability;
3. if this traceability system is designed as to optimize combatting IUU fishing, under two components:
   1. if the data captured by the system are relevant for identification of IUU fishing.
   2. if the traceability system covers all the points in the distribution chain relevant for IUU fishing.
4. if this traceability system is designed as to optimize official sanitary eligibility of all the value chain from harvest onwards.

For Point 1, recommendations found in scientific literature for assessment of effective traceability systems were followed.

For Point 2, the recommendations of the ISO standard 12875:2011 Traceability of finfish products - Specification on the information to be recorded in captured finfish distribution chains were followed. As the name indicates, this one refers only to finfish, so shellfish are not included, but it is assumed that the results can be extrapolated to shellfish as well.

For Point 3, there is no standard addressing this issue yet and only one scholarly article could be found on the topic (Borit & Olsen, 2012). Thus, the argument in this article for both point’s 3.1 and 3.2. were followed by making a simplified version of the referenced decision matrix.

Based on this analysis, the authors evaluated the country reports traceability systems regarding there:

1. Inclusivity - the extent to which the system is designed to provide guarantees for all legally-caught and sanitary controlled fish in the value chain of the species/fishery in question;
2. Impermeability - the extent to which the system is designed to exclude illegal catches, and potential non-controlled processing practices; and
3. Verifiability- the extent to which the system is audited by an independent body or person (i.e. by those other than the parties directly responsible for following the requirements).

Before the country analysis, we considered important to standardize the understanding of traceability and other concepts relevant to the present study based on the relevant bibliography known to them, as this would be the only way to evaluate all the country studies, under the same methodology.

After the analysis of the individual reports, it was found that none of the sources provided enough information to assess whether the principles of effective traceability were met by the traceability systems of the 10 respective countries.

Common issues identified throughout some of the reports were in regards the expectations of ToR’s; the relevance for combating IUU Fishing, ensuring Food Safety and Sanitary Eligibility, reducing vulnerability to threats and crisis (especially for small scale sector), and the importance of the role’s held by RFMO’s and other organizations

Considering the results of each country analysis, we discussed the need for standardization of the methodology and tools required to assess traceability systems, the need for coordination in between the different authorities, the roles of external and internal traceability, the incorporation of information management systems and the need for standardization in the domain language of traceability.

The study concludes that the systematic review of the 10 country reports shows that there is a lot of confusion and inconsistencies in the meaning, scope, legal status, implementation capacity and control of traceability systems.

We believe that FAO, as in other aspects of fisheries and seafood production, it is in a unique position to lead this efforts, by expanding on the work initiated by the “Best Practice Guidelines on Traceability” (COFI:FT, 2014)

We support the proposition that FAO should convene an expert consultation, which would benefit from the findings of this present study, and include international experts on traceability from all geographical regions, as well as representatives of the various stakeholders along the seafood supply chain, to provide not only a set of guidelines on how to implement traceability systems, but equally importantly, how to evaluate them.

The report concludes with a set of overarching recommendations to FAO, and to the group of countries whose reports were evaluated.

The conclusion of the study are:

• Most of the countries analysed have not legislated and standardised traceability as a requirement.
• There seems to be little interaction in between the Seafood Safety CA and the Fisheries CA in terms of its assessment.
• There is no standardized to evaluate traceability systems in the practices along the production chain and legislation.
• It seems that efforts towards the implementation of traceability systems in the analysed countries and across countries have not been supported in an interdisciplinary and standardised way.
• Traceability Systems per se are difficult to achieve with little money, little human resources and lack of political will.

The recommendations to the countries can be summarised as:

• Define within legislation and institutionalize traceability as integral part of their fisheries regulatory framework from a catch legality and sanitary controls perspective, including standardized best practices, definitions and internationally recognized standards.
• Re-evaluate the meaning, scope, legal status, implementation capacity and control of their respective traceability systems, focusing on maximizing their Inclusivity, Impermeability and Verifiability.
• Include cross-countries traceability linkages along the strengthening of their national systems.
• Harmonize the actions and policies of the different official bodies (i.e. Health, Customs, Fisheries, etc.) having responsibilities regarding seafood traceability systems.
• Liaise with Regional Organizations (ROs), International Organizations (IOs) and Bilateral Organizations (BOs) to provide institutional strengthening and capacity building in fisheries and traceability related issues under a FAO harmonised action umbrella.
• Draw on the existent academic body of knowledge when improving existent traceability systems

The recommendations to FAO are:

• Further support the work initiated by the “Draft Best Practice Guidelines on Traceability” as requested by the 13th of the Sub-Committee on Fish Trade (COFI:FT)
• Convene an expert consultation to provide not only a set of guidelines on how to implement traceability systems, but equally importantly, how to evaluate them
• Produce a set of guidelines and analytical tools (i.e. matrixes and parameters) to identify exactly what kind of data should authors of traceability evaluation reports look for in the practices along the production chain and legislation
• Provide and /or facilitate capacity building and institutional strengthening opportunities for those responsible for developing, integrating, implementing and/or evaluating traceability systems
• Provide and /or facilitate capacity building and institutional strengthening in terms of the legislative ability to prosecute when based on evidence originating from analysing data recorded by traceability systems.
• Support country and regional organizations efforts aimed to better data collection and analysis by government agencies along the domestic production chain as to strengthen the overall efficiency of their traceability systems.

I have a huge respect to those that make the study and analysis of traceability their area of expertise... after leading this study I'm happy to just stay on "knowledgeable user" rank :-)

I wonder what he thinks of traceability while working on the guts of a -50C Taiwanese longliner...

The Quantification of IUU in the Pacific Region in a table

Further to my post on the publication last week of the FFA IUU quantification report and some of the worst case scenario figures presented by the press, I thought of presenting the results in a table way to make it easier to understand and identify the key problem areas.

You can download the report from here

Electronic monitoring on fishing vessels

I meant to write a post on Electronic Monitoring (EM) for a while, since it is a topic I'm deeply interested in. I believe it holds the answers to some crucial problems we face in fisheries, but is to be tackle quite purposely and holistically, so based on various publications by friends and colleagues over the last few weeks, here it is.

At its basics, Electronic Monitoring (EM) largely consists of a "closed" video or photographic system integrated with a sensor system that can be used to view changes in fishing activity and to trigger or coordinate detailed viewing. Both (the recording and viewing) are "closed systems". The camera and sensor systems do not allow external or manual inputs nor manipulation of data.

My 1st contact with this technology was in Uruguay actually in 2011, where a progressive little company there (UREXPORT) installed an onboard video surveillance system for their vessels. A lot of positive results came from this technology, including better safety at sea, an enhanced vessel production, training need analysis and a better verification of operations, both at sea and at the harbor. One of the key interest was to avoid the skippers selling/offloading fish at sea to smaller vessels. So it didn't have much to do with regulations, but for own interest.

Interestingly my 1st employer in NZ (Sanford) is also working with this technology by own decision, but includes a regulatory component as well, footage of the system is linked below:

A couple of years ago, the a EM system was installed as a trial in a couple of Taiwanese longliners in the Solomons (blogged here and here about it) by my friend Malo. The aim here was to check their feasibility as a system for extending the observer coverage from the present pathetic less than 5% to a more representative number that could help us with the longline fishery, which we know now is the largest source of IUU fishing in our region.

A recent WWF funded study by Richard Banks (Banks R, Muldoon G and Fernandes V) dealt in depth with the cost benefit of the Fisheries Information Management Systems in FFA, so I quote some the introductory parts here.

The EM system consists of a control center, connected to an array of peripheral components including: 3-4 CCTV cameras, Vessel AIS or GPS receiver, winch and engine sensors and a communications transceiver. Videos are recorded at, recording day and night. Some of the systems also include sensors that transmit real-time positions, in much the same way as VMS, but additionally, record when there is a change in fishing behavior when the fishing gear is used. The application focuses on identifying a number of activities. Geo-referenced images allow vessel tracking and streaming sensor data. Sensor data transmission requirements are equivalent to VMS needs.

Schematic of an Electronic Monitoring System

Cameras may identify interactions with bycatch species, and are especially useful when recording bycatches of protected species. The viewed data can also provide a secondary source of data, for example, to validate catch and bycatch logsheets. Cameras can substitute for the observer requirements, largely where it may be impractical to deploy observers, or where there may be a threat to the security of the observers-on-board.

An EM can provide views of critical vessel areas e.g., gear deployment and retrieval, catch aboard, sorting, processing, storage and can potentially be used to replace or compliment the use of human observers (who are expensive, logistically complex and possibly bribable).

The current providers in the Pacific include:

• Archipelago Asia Pacific video (4 cameras) and sensor recording system, currently applied by AFMA for use in the Australian Eastern Tuna and Billfish longline fishery (ETBF) and other Australian Commonwealth fisheries.
• Satlink Sea Tube Lite, Spain, using a 3 video cameras EM system trialed by SPC/FFA in the Solomon Islands and presently under trial in Fiji in a wider program financed by the GEF and managed by FAO
• Trident's camera system deployed on 3 domestic vessels, under a specific arrangement with two Fijian based companies, and with Sanford and mentioned before.  
• One other provider, but not presently deployed in the Pacific tuna fisheries, is Marine Instruments, who provide the Electronic Eye (Spain).

Both the application by AFMA and the trials undertaken with Satlink in the Solomon Islands demonstrate the view of the project proponents that the system may meet the majority of the minimum data standards of the WCPFC Regional Observer Programme (ROP).

The exception is an on screen-measuring tool to calculate fish length. Measuring the length of the fish on deck was problematic, but a couple of ways are available, software tools (under the Satlink system) like in the image below.

Or, some markers are set at standard distances in the deck of the vessels and fish has to pass trough them, given by proxy the length of the fish

Live video footage through satellite transmission is not cost-effective at present, so footage is stored on a hard drive and sent monthly, or after each trip, to the provider for analysis. The Marine Instruments e-eye system does provide for an integrated Iridium modem, which allows for real-time data transfer. This also allows for less HD space needed for photos and longer periods at sea (6 month in position - linked to HD capacity).

The NZ Trident system is 3G based and data can be uploaded when the vessel is within cellphone range.

While there is provision for this facility in most systems, the cost of transmitting still frames, as opposed to live footage is still prohibitively expensive, and quite impractical because of the high volume required for transmission. That said, health and safety issues may warrant such a facility to be available

Due to the size requirements of video footage, large on-board data storage facilities are required. Cameras film at 5 frames per second (24-30fps is movie standard), and use between 60 and 100 MB per hour of footage. A four-camera setup requires 240 to 400 MB per hour , which results in around 6 to 10 GB for each full day of recording. 1280x720 @ 24FPS on board (HD quality) and minimum recording capacity of the system is 13-14 weeks.

big brother is watching you

Due to these dataset sizes, video surveillance footage cannot feasibly be sent in real-time via a satellite feed. Instead, it is usually transferred directly from the hard drive after retrieval. The HDDs are changed very easily on board and can be examined at the control centre. Videos are stored onboard and encrypted. Videos are extracted locally from the encrypted HDD for analysis ashore by the owner or the Observer Program.

The process of hard drive data retrieval and footage review and analysis is currently relatively slow, taking a few days for dispatch, forensic recording, and then data viewing (~ 3-6 hours) depending on the recording requirements. Rapid shooter (every 3-5 seconds) still cameras may be a better solution for EM as this system use less memory space while offering a far better image resolution, and allows for real-time data transmission. Instruments e-eye system does provide for an integrated Iridium modem that allows for real-time data transfer, but in reality, is rarely used.

The EM application focuses on identifying many activities. Cameras may identify interactions with bycatch species, and are especially useful when recording bycatches of protected species. The viewed data can also provide a secondary source of data, for example, to validate catch and bycatch logsheets. (And this is good news for sharks, when the camera is there most sharks go back to the water)

The interest from the regulatory perspective, cameras can substitute for the observer requirements, largely where it may be impractical to deploy observers, or where there may be a threat to the security of the observers on board.

Within the WCPFC context, there have been dedicated meetings held over the last two years which have considered the application of ER and EM in the WCPO and noted the developments made by both Pacific Island countries and other WCPFC members. A formal working group was established in December 2014, and a meeting held in July 2015. The key risk for WCPFC, as is noted in the Terms of Reference for the working group, is the lack of documented policies and standards for these technologies, resulting in poor data coordination, increased data storage and transmission complexities, higher data security risk and increased long-term costs for the WCPFC.

The adoption by WCPFC of ER and EM standards is expected to support and accommodate those CCMs that have commenced implementation of a range of EM and ER technologies in their fisheries and will ensure that the Commission's databases and systems are ready to exchange electronic data in an orderly and efficient manner. The working group is expected to continue work in 2016 in the development and review of draft ER standards, as well as commence work on the proposed EM standards. Presently, a decision by the Commission to develop data standards will be separated from a decision by the Commission to require certain data/information to be submitted electronically. A notable omission, however, is the inability to sex and sometimes measure fish.

The goal of EM is to provide a cost-effective monitoring solution capable of collecting data for scientific, management, and compliance purposes. Surveillance cameras installed on vessels have proven to be effective at recording crew and fishing activities, which can be checked for compliance with fisheries regulations. As such, camera monitoring that is integrated with Electronic fisheries information solutions (EFIS) can provide a useful means of validating vessel catch and gear reporting (hook numbers, use of wire tracers on longliners or FAD deployment and setting on FADs during the prohibition period).

cameras and sensors

The sensor data is especially useful in identifying steaming, setting and hauling. Sensors may also be inserted into hooks, or added to brails to weigh the fish on transshipment.

Cameras can also be an effective tool to monitor Health and Safety issues. A skipper can monitor crew activity from the deck. It may also be possible to detect any possible threat to observers, noting the loss of life of three PNG observers in the past four years.

EM has certain limitations, and cannot replace the roles of other data gathering techniques entirely. For example, current camera technology does not offer an affordable and reliable means of identifying the sex, age and species composition of a catch sample. Some observations are difficult to make from camera footage/images, even with human input and specialist knowledge. Furthermore, camera setups (unless extremely elaborate) will generally have ‘blind-spots,' where crew could discard bycatch, hide interactions with TEP species, or perform other IUU activities which could then go unreported.

As a result, while some see camera monitoring as a viable alternative to onboard human observers, others feel that on-board observers will remain necessary for the foreseeable future, at minimum to perform biological sampling and compliance monitoring where cameras are insufficient. The reality is that EM systems can compliment the role of human observers and enhance overall observer coverage most particularly in the longline fishery.

My friend Malo spend a lot of his time running a study comparing the data obtained from the cameras with the data from traditional observers working in the same boat, and the results are very encouraging, in one of his presentations he quotes that:

Very few differences were noted between the overall species composition of the main tuna species between the two observer types indicating that the E-Monitoring footage is providing sufficient information for identification to the species level. There are several examples described above where it is evident that the species identification and catch coverage from the E-Monitoring video analysis is better than the on-board observer data.

One benefit of E-Monitoring is that it provides a means of reviewing footage of the video repetitively and by a number of people (e.g. including experts in species identification). With more time, further review of the data compiled from these trials could be undertaken to resolve differences between the on-board observer's record and the original E-Monitoring video analysis record to determine where the problem lies.

Without going into deep details,  the table below show how the EM and the human observer compare side by side in one of the trials.

Furthermore, substantial advances are being made at the present regarding software tools (like the one below from the University of Washington)that cannot only identify length but as well species, opening the door for fully automated analysis of video data. In these cases, the human observer analyzing the footage comes only to resolve the events that the software hasn't. This technology has the potential of speeding up the analysis massively, allowing verified to enter the databases in near real-time at some stage.

As said before, there are a lot of positive prospects for e-monitoring: the technology is mature, cost can be recovered, it can be made a condition of licensing and country, region or RFMO level, vessels owners could try to get insurance cost discounts for having it on board, shark retention go rock bottom if the camera is there, the use of wire tracers gets documented, it expands the coverage to the high seas where no observer can/ want to go, and so on.

So the excuses are not there anymore, is a matter of making it happen... and people is working on that.

Towards the Quantification of IUU Fishing in the Pacific Islands Region

FFA presented a big study (almost 2 years in the making) yesterday in Auckland. Is in many aspects a landmark work. I tender for that same study with a team when it was advertised, obviously we weren't successful, but noblesse oblige I have no issues to admit it is a solid piece of work by MRAG.

On one side it does not tell us nothing we didn't knew or suspect already, but it provides two solid tools: a methodology to follow in future studies and a specific quantification for the tuna fisheries in the pacific.

The study set a baseline for the scale, composition and quantified value on IUU fishing and what it is costing this region, against which future success can be measured. It will also help to provide a clearer basis to assess what is working and what needs reworking to ensure that collective regional efforts are targeted toward the most prevalent and costly forms of IUU in the evolving Pacific tuna fishery.

In many ways is a positive report, that provides a clearer sense of what the main IUU risks are, what is working, and what needs additional priority. So I was dismay for the complete negative twist that most news organizations put on it.

All estimations where presented in a lower end, upper end and best estimate, and of course this guys quoted the upper (worst case scenario) end. The risk scenarios that were presented for evaluation where quotedas the prevalent scenarios. Very disappointing coverage… No one ever says that there are no problems, but there are positive steps being made… and now we have well studied grounds to know where the limited resources we have need to go.

The biggest area of IUU activity is the Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN) longliners operating in the high seas (international waters) this fishery is “administered” by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) but because is in international waters, the vessels fishing there are only under the “control” of the respective flag states (read China, Taiwan, Korea, Japan) which in principle don't give a shit for regulatory compliance.  And due to the structure of the WCPFC, is not much anyone else can do.

My friend and former boss Hugh Walton (uncle Hugh to my kids), FFA’s project manager for the EU-funded DEVFISH II programme, which coordinated the study, is on the spot when he points out that the study will allow discussion on mitigation measures “because we already know what they are but we don’t have the ammunition for them”.

“We’re hoping that this report will give us the ammunition, say management measures in the WCPFC sense, then for us at the regional level in terms on how we focus our MCS activities and then at the national level, in terms of our national level MCS activities, how they are focused.”

He cited as an example one of the MCS tools currently being discussed, e-monitoring and e-reporting in terms of the “U” for unreported. “When you look at the e-monitoring and e-reporting tools in terms of the unreported, the camera doesn’t lie. In the trials we’ve done, we have done enough to know that the camera doesn’t lie”

But still, is very hard to do much unless China and Taiwan play their part, and as we see from the news today, Chinese vessels are not always cooperating.

In any case, I quote here the executive summary of the report, and hopefully over time will be going over it with some more detail. And here is the link to download it.

This is the first attempt made to quantify the volume, species composition and value of IUU fishing in Pacific tuna fisheries specifically.  We used a ‘bottom up’ approach which aimed to quantify the level of IUU fishing associated with 11 main risks across four risk categories:

(i) unlicensed/unauthorised fishing, (ii) misreporting, (iii) non-compliance with other license conditions (e.g. FAD fishing during the purse seine closure period) and (iv) post-harvest risks (e.g. illegal transshipping).  Estimates of IUU volume and value were developed for each of the three main fishing sectors - purse seine (PS), tropical longline (TLL) and southern longline (SLL) – and then aggregated to produce an overall estimate for Pacific Islands region tuna fisheries.  Data was used for the period 2010 to 2015.

The approach took account of all of the available information to generate ‘best estimate’ values of IUU activity for each risk in each sector, as well as minimum and maximum range values.  We then used Monte Carlo simulation to account for uncertainty in the underlying information and produce probabilistic estimates of IUU activity.  The level of information available to support estimates of different IUU risks varied considerably between sectors and between risks.  For a small number of risks good quantitative information was available. However, for the majority of risks the level of information available was very limited, reflecting the secretive nature of IUU fishing.  

A key output of the project has been the development of a framework for the quantification of IUU fishing in Pacific tuna fisheries and the design of a basic model that can be refined and updated over time as IUU risks change and better information becomes available. Given the limitations in the information available to quantify many of the risks, the outputs of this work should be seen as a ‘first cut’.  Recommendations to strengthen the availability of information have been made and we would encourage the exercise to be repeated on a regular basis to track trends in IUU fishing activity and help target MCS efforts.

Our simulations suggest the best estimate total volume of product either harvested or transhipped involving IUU activity in Pacific tuna fisheries is 306,440t, with 90% confidence that the actual figure lies within a range of 276,546t to 338,475t.  Based on the expected species composition and markets, the ex-vessel value of the best estimate figure is $616.11m.  The 90% confidence range is between $517.91m and $740.17m.  That is, there is a 95% chance the figure is greater than $517.91m and a 5% chance the figure is greater than $740.17m.

Of the three main sectors assessed, estimated volume of IUU product was highest in the purse seine fishery, accounting for 70% of overall volume.  Estimated IUU volumes in this sector were largely driven by reporting violations and illegal FAD fishing during the closure period.  The TLL and SLL sectors accounted for 19% and 11% of the overall volume respectively.  In the TLL sector, IUU volumes were largely driven by misreporting (49% of total TLL volume) and post-harvest risks (39%), principally illegal transhipping.  Estimates of both misreporting and illegal transhipping were, in turn, influenced by high levels of uncertainty.  Similar results were achieved in the SLL sector, with misreporting and post-harvest risks accounting for 57% and 36% of overall estimated IUU volume respectively.

By contrast, the TLL sector accounted for the highest ex-vessel value of IUU product ($272.55m) given the higher market value of its target species.    This sector accounted for around 44% of overall estimated IUU value, while the purse seine sector accounted for 37%.  The SLL sector had the lowest overall estimates of IUU product value (19%).

Of the four main IUU risk categories assessed, reporting violations and non-compliance with other license conditions (e.g. illegal FAD fishing; use of non-prescribed gear) accounted for 54% and 29% of the total estimated IUU volume respectively.  Post-harvest risks (mainly illegal transhipping) accounted for 13% of the estimated volume but 27% of the estimated value.  This was driven by higher estimates of illegal transhipping in the longline sectors which receive proportionally higher prices for product.  Unlicensed fishing accounted for only 4% of the estimated overall volume.

Among the main target species, skipjack accounted for the largest proportion of total estimated IUU volume (33%), but a lesser proportion of the total estimated ex-vessel value (18%).  The total estimated IUU volume of SKJ (100,730t) equated to around 5.1% of estimated total SKJ catch in the WCP-CA in 2014.   Yellowfin accounted for the next highest volume (96,126t), making up 31% of the total estimated IUU volume, and 27% of the ex-vessel value.   The total estimated IUU volume of YFT equated to around 15.8% of the estimated total catch of YFT in the WCP-CA during 2014.  Much of this is driven by estimates of misreporting in the purse seine fishery which is subject to 100% observer coverage, and therefore may result in little unaccounted for catch.  Bigeye also accounted for 19% of the overall estimated IUU volume, but 28% of the ex-vessel value.  The total estimated IUU volume of BET equates to around 35% of the estimated total catch of BET in the WCP-CA in 2014.  Importantly, this does not necessarily mean that 35% of additional BET have been taken in addition to reported figures.  For example, a substantial proportion of the overall IUU BET estimates come from estimates of illegal transhipping, the product for which may still be reported in logsheets.  ALB accounted for 4% of the overall estimated IUU volume and 6% of the total ex-vessel IUU value.  The total estimated ALB IUU volume equates to around 9.4% of the estimated total ALB catch in the WCP-CA in 2014, although a substantial proportion of this related to post-harvest offences for which information was uncertain.

Apart from the headline volume and value figures, there are a number of key messages arising from the analysis:

• The estimates of IUU volume and value generated here are lower than most commonly quoted estimate of IUU fishing in the WCPO region ($707m – $1.557b), although these studies are not ‘apples Vs apples’ comparisons.  The previous study (Agnew et al, 2009) used a ‘top down’ approach that looked at IUU fishing across a suite of species wider than tuna (e.g. demersal fish, shrimp) as well as including parts of Indonesia and the Philippines (across FAO Area 71). Relatively high levels of IUU fishing in coastal states on the western Pacific seaboard influenced the overall results; 
• Estimates of IUU are dominated by the licensed fleet - assuming catch transhipped illegally is taken by licensed vessels, IUU fishing by the licensed fleet accounts for over 95% of the total volume and value of IUU activity estimated here. This proportion rises to 97% if unlicensed fishing by vessels that are otherwise authorised to fish in the Pacific Islands region (i.e. they are on the FFA RR or WCPFC RFV) are considered part of the ‘licensed’ fleet.  This is consistent with previous studies and has important implications for MCS planning and investment;
•  Ex-vessel value is not a good indicator of actual loss to FFA members – this is because the full value of the catch is not returned to coastal states under normal circumstances (only a proportion of total revenue is, typically through access fees) and because of their nature, some risks may not necessarily result in direct losses.  In general, a better measure of the actual impact on coastal states is likely to be the economic rent lost as a result of IUU activity.  Based on the most recent estimates of profitability in the WCPO purse seine and longline sectors, we estimate the rent associated with IUU product estimated here is around $152.67m.  Nevertheless, because of the nature of access arrangements in Pacific tuna fisheries, it is possible that much of the rent associated with IUU activity is captured anyway, and this estimate either overstates, or is at least at the upper end of, actual impacts on the real economy.  For example, in the purse seine fishery, there is a good argument that the competitive nature of the bidding process under the VDS means that rents generated through IUU activity would be captured in the prices that fishing companies are prepared to pay for fishing days and are therefore not lost to Pacific Island countries.  This is perhaps less the case for the longline sectors where current access arrangements are probably less efficient at capturing rent;
• Stronger catch monitoring arrangements are required in the longline sector – mechanisms to independently verify catch in the longline sectors are limited for many fleets.  Additional measures are required to strengthen confidence in catch reporting and compliance with catch-based CMMs and generate better estimates of IUU activity;
• "IUU’ is not straightforward – while the IPOA-IUU definition of IUU is clear in theory, applying it for the purposes of quantification is not always straightforward.  Interpretations on what is, and is not, considered IUU for the purposes of quantification can substantially influence results;
• More accurate estimates of IUU activity require stronger monitoring and coordination of relevant statistics – the information available to support quantification of many risks was relatively limited and largely confined to expert judgement.  Achieving more accurate estimates of IUU activity will require stronger monitoring and analysis, and the coordination of relevant statistics.  While in some cases, this may require ‘new’ initiatives, in many cases it will simply require more effective use of existing facilities;  
• Strong in zone MCS arrangements must be mirrored on the high seas – the outcomes of this study argue for stronger monitoring of catch and transhipment activity across all sectors, and in particular the longline sectors.  Given the shared nature of stocks in the region, stronger MCS arrangements in zone should be mirrored on the high seas;
• Future IUU risks – the nature of IUU fishing is dynamic and influenced by the mix of incentives and disincentives, as well as changes in the regulatory environment.  Future iterations of the IUU model developed here will need to take changes in the nature of IUU fishing into account.  

Considerable efforts have been taken at the national, sub-regional (FFA/SPC/PNA) and regional levels (WCPFC) to mitigate IUU fishing in Pacific tuna fisheries.  Many of these are likely to have been highly effective at achieving their intended purpose (e.g. the FFA and WCPFC VMS, the FFA Regional Register, the FFA Harmonised Minimum Terms and Conditions for Foreign Fishing Access, the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, Niue Treaty, 100% observer coverage on the PS fleet) and will have contributed to the relatively low estimates of IUU fishing across a number of sector/categories.  Nevertheless, the results of this study indicate that substantial uncertainty still exists in relation to IUU activity across a range of key risks, and additional measures are required to strengthen incentives for voluntary compliance, reinforce deterrents to non-compliance and improve monitoring throughout the supply chain.

Ultimately the most practical mix of MCS arrangements to deal with IUU fishing will be a function of the balance between the likely effectiveness of the measure in treating priority risks, practicality of implementation and overall costs.   An outline and discussion of possible additional MCS measures that can be taken to further mitigate IUU fishing in WCPO tuna fisheries is provided, taking into account risks targeted, costs and practicality.  Key priorities identified in the longline sectors are to:

• Strengthen mechanisms for independent monitoring of catch through the supply chain;
• Strengthen transhipment monitoring and control;
• Strengthen on-board monitoring of fishing activity through improved observer coverage and the introduction of electronic monitoring technology.

In the purse seine sector, MCS arrangements are generally stronger than the longline sector, though based on the current management of the fishery priorities include:

• Strengthening mechanisms to verify fishing activity (e.g. to assess non-fishing day claims; FAD fishing during the closure);
• Catch verification through the use of cannery data;
• Better monitoring and management of FAD usage.

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And above all this, a solid Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS) for the WCPFC, could help tie all the loose ends and hopefully disincentive the buying of fish that has not been officially certified as legal. and that CDS is what I'm working over the next years.

Rescues of Pacific Islanders drifting at sea by tuna vessels

In my last post I quoted a story form the FFA Trade Bulletin, so here is other that I liked, as I'm working at the moment on a safety at sea chapter, for an illustrated manual for small scale fisherman.

more than fish sometimes

An integral part of the life of many Pacific islanders has for years included offshore fishing expeditions and inter-island voyages. In recent years, these trips are usually undertaken on outboard-powered skiffs. For a variety of reasons - engine failure, lack of tools or spare parts, unanticipated bad weather, or poor planning and boating skills, these activities sometimes result in the participants adrift with no ability to return to land on their own.

Over the years, the international tuna fishing fleet in the WCPO has rescued numerous islanders that otherwise would likely never have been found. Occasionally the rescues are publicized in the media, but it is believed that many more may go unpublicized. This may be especially true for those islands with poor communication with the outside world, or countries without an active news media.

A review of 38 news stories published during the period 1998-2014 describing incidents in just six countries: PNG, FSM, Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, and Solomon Islands, shows that a total of 148 Pacific islanders from those countries were rescued by tuna vessels in the WCPO. Others, but not nearly as many, were identified as rescued by tankers, freighters and the like.

Some stories do not identify the name or type of fishing vessel, while others are very specific and sometimes include interviews with the drifters and/or fishing vessel captains. One US purse seine captain whose vessel had rescued three fishermen from Kiribati undertook extensive interviews with those rescued to learn their survival story and eventually published a book in 2012 describing their 87-day experience.21

Purse seiners are more likely to come across drifters, mainly as a result of their use of helicopters, high powered binoculars and other tools in their search for fish. During the period surveyed just 11 drifters (0.8 percent) were identified as rescued by longliners while 69 (47 percent) were found by purse seiners. But if drifters are not in the areas generally fished by purse seiners their chance of discovery by those vessels is likely diminished. The increased use of FADs could enhance survival chances of those who find these devices during their drift, although there is no guarantee.

There have also been some survivors’ accounts of being ignored by fishing vessels while drifting. In one case, a politician from Chuuk lost with his wife on an inter-island voyage encountered a freighter that came very close to their vessel and then ignored their plight. He had the presence of mind to memorize the call sign on the side of the vessel and report to authorities after his rescue 29 days later. FSM officials identified the vessel (a Chinese fish carrier involved in transshipment) and it was subsequently arrested by an FSM patrol boat and taken to Pohnpei for prosecution under FSM law that requires the rendering of assistance to persons in distress within the FSM EEZ.

The efforts of all tuna fishermen who rescue drifters are commendable, but one in particular deserves special mention. Taiwanese Captain Ming-Chuan Lu serving on the US-flag American Victory rescued drifters in 2012 and returned them to Majuro. This was the third group of I-Kiribati drifters that Captain Lu had rescued since 2007.

Thailand awaits verdict from EU on red card for IUU fishing

Every two months, FFA publishes its Trade and Industry news, a bulletin prepared for the FFA Fisheries Development Division by Dr Liam Campling , Dr Elizabeth Havice, and Mike McCoy, all Consultants Fisheries Trade and Market Intelligence Analysts and they are at the top of their game. You should download it if you have any interest in the tuna world.

From anywhere in the pacific (and by anyone) to Thailand

I get asked about Thailand yellow card a lot, so in this post I would quote one of their articles “Thailand awaits verdict from EU on red card for IUU fishing”, as it resumes (in a 1000 times better English than my one!) what is the rather unique situation of Thailand… that even if it gets a red card, the EU cant do nothing under the present system to stop the tuna trade into their market (even if Ecuador would love for them to do that!)

On 18-22 January 2016, EU delegates conducted a final inspection before DG MARE delivers a verdict on whether Thailand’s yellow card warning received in April 2015 for shortcomings in implementation of the EU-IUU Fishing Regulation would be lifted. If the inspectors are not satisfied that the Thai Government has adequately addressed these shortcomings, a red card will instead be issued, resulting in an import ban into EU markets of fisheries products sourced from Thai fishing fleets.

The Thai Government has reportedly been working hard to tighten measures against IUU fishing, including the adoption of a revised Fisheries Act and extensive supporting legislation, significantly increased vessel and factory inspections, closure of factories in violation of regulations, improved vessel licensing and monitoring systems and enhanced on-board observer coverage. While outside the purview of the IUU Fishing Regulation, extensive investigations into human trafficking cases are also being conducted.

While issues identified by the EU relate more so to Thailand’s shrimp and other fishing industries, rather than tuna (since Thailand does not have a sizeable domestic tuna fishing fleet), the Department of Fisheries (DOF) has implemented a number of measures in line with the EU’s requirements under the IUU Fishing Regulation which impact Thai tuna packers and traders.

DOF has significantly increased the number of fisheries inspectors which are now on-site at wharves and processing plants to monitor every single tuna delivery into Thailand, via either carrier or containers. Processing plants have been warned that they will be fined for misreported species and/or volumes in commercial documentation for imported raw material.

In February, the Thai Department of Fisheries notified WCPFC of six vessels listed on their IUU register. DOF has also advised Thai processors and tuna traders that EU catch certificates must be transmitted to them no later than 30 days after imported raw material has been delivered to processors. While not explicitly related to the IUU Fishing Regulation, DOF will also be closely monitoring whether carriers delivering fish to Thailand for EU production have EU sanitary numbers. 

Although the Thai Government is confident a red card will be avoided, if this does not end up being the case it will be interesting to see how tuna imports from Thailand are handled under a market sanction, since the IUU Regulation is a flag state measure. This means that for the purposes of imported foreign-caught raw materials, Thailand is considered a market state rather than flag state and the regulation is not explicit about market state responsibilities in terms of addressing IUU fishing (besides the completion of an annex to EU catch certificates regarding processing).

EU market sanctions should only apply to products processed from catches sourced from Thai fishing vessels, not products manufactured from imported tuna from foreign flagged vessels, provided the flag state of the fishing vessels has not received a red card under the IUU Regulation.

Nicely explained the quirkiness of all this. The biggest tuna canner in the world does not catches Tuna hence a red card will in principle not affect the tuna flow to the EU.

I know from good sources that if a tuna consignment arrived to a Thai cannery without a EU Catch Certificate (CC), one was made on the spot by cannery staff. And as there is no e-registry of CC validated by flag state or received by the EU member countries, and is all photocopy based, chances to stop the trade of IUU fish are almost nil.

Furthermore, unless the Thai DOF creates its own registry that accounts for all the individual CC numbers, as well as species and volumes received from all the countries notified (listed) under the EU IUU reg, and on top of that has a system to cross check the authenticity of CC with the validating flag state, I don't see how can they really tackle that mammoth task.

Taiwan's fishing industry cry 'faul'... Really?

Once in while you come trough stories that make you go "wt*!". Here is one: "Leaders in Taiwan's fishing industry on Tuesday called on the government to stand up to the people who make the international fishing rules, which they said are usually unfair to the local industry".

Taiwanese Logsheets qualify mostly as works of fiction

The news was in a Taiwanese News article that caught my attention out of a mention by Michael Crispino of PEW trust. It is soo wrong at so many levels... so here I quote some "nuggets" of it.

The heads of Taiwan's tuna and squid fishing associations said that if the government goes ahead with its plan to impose fines of up to NT$30 million (US$915,000) on their members, it will bankrupt them and they will stage a protest at the Legislature.

After four rounds of meeting with the European Commission, the Council of Agriculture (COA) has drafted new legislation that includes a provision for hefty fines, and plans to send the bill to the Legislative Yuan in late March. The COA bill drafted was in response to the EU's warning to Taiwan last October that it risked being listed as uncooperative in the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

The EU's decision to issue a "yellow card" to Taiwan was based on serious shortcomings in the country's fisheries legal framework, a system of sanctions that does not deter IUU fishing, and lack of effective monitoring, control and surveillance of long-distance fishing fleets, according to an EU press release.

And this is all true... in 12 year of doing boardings to Taiwanese longliners (directly flagged or via Vanuatu) I have only recently starting to see logsheets that make any sense. Only since 2015 they are requested to radio their position daily to Taiwan. And I truly doubt anyone in the Taiwan Fisheries Authority has a full idea where the Taiwanese vessels are and what and how much are they catching. Furthermore the authority in charge of giving IUU Catch Certificates is the Food Safety Authority... so obviously they have no idea.

Furthermore (and I could not have made this up!) see what happens when you click on the Combating IUU tab of the Fisheries Policy section of the Fisheries Agency of Taiwan website.  Obviously they don't come to meetings like the one I been involved all of this week.

The EU also said Taiwan had failed systematically to meet the obligations of the Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO).

True... their record of compliance is bad, and the fact that they have not endorsed any UN treaty (because they are not members of the UN due to Chinese pressure) does not make easier

But Taiwan Tuna Association President Hsieh Wen-jung (謝文榮) said Taiwanese fishing vessels are being singled out for penalties. "Japan is a deep-sea fishing country like us," he said. "Doesn't it still kill dolphins and catch whales in international waters?"

Aahhhh? Mr Weng-Jung should know better... Tuna Fisheries and Whaling/Cetaceans capture are rather different topics and covered by different rules. And in comparison, japan has a much better grasp on their fisheries that Taiwan ever had.

Hsieh said he and other fishery associations will call a press conference at the Legislature and protest the "double standards," which he said are "unfair" to Taiwan. His views were echoed by Taiwan Squid Fishery Association President Lei Tzu-kang (雷祖綱), who said he will join the protest because a NT$30,000 fine was "way too high."

The Philippines was also issued a warning by the EU but responded by hiring over 1,000 observers to monitor their fishing boats in international waters, Lei said.

Mhhh... not sure about that Mr Lei... in fact many of us wonder about how come Philippines got the yellow card lifted, their MCS system is better that yours.... but that is not a very high mark. At least they come to the MCS forums.

He said he suspected the COA had adopted the strategy used by South Korea, which increased its fines on its fishermen in exchange for removal from the EU's warning list. "The government should be able to communicate with foreign institutions and fight for the interests of Taiwan's fishing industry, instead of following the South Korean government," Lei said. "Show some backbone, please."

Hsieh of the tuna association said he understood the pressure the government was facing, because he himself had participated annually in five or six international meetings on fishing regulations.

I didn't know there was s many meetings on fishing regulations! I've been missing them... and that is my job!

"Still, I must point out that organizations like the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and Inter-America Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) are dominated by white people who do not see any conservation problems with catching fish that are their favorites, like skipjack tuna and yellowfin tuna, but have a lot to say about the favorites of the yellow people," he said. "It's a classic case of double standards, which is very unfair to us," Hsieh added.

Whoaaa... lets drop some racism into it. For starters the fact you don't even acknowledge the Pacific Island nations role in WCPFC (the place where you boats fish) is kind of racist from your side. Furthermore the EU (Spain) has like 4 vessels in the Pacific... you have 110 (22PS and the rest LL) with permits in PICs (China has 119) and who knows how many more in the International waters. Don't you remember what happened last year when Greenpeace got one of yours?

Lei, meanwhile, said another "unfair rule" is that Americans, who invented the purse seine, are granted much bigger fishing quotas than small countries like Taiwan.

There we go again... there are no quotas in Purse Seiners (you have 22 btw) fact that Taiwan is fishing here is already a product of subsidies... The US (that has 44, of which a substantial chunk are of Taiwanese beneficial ownership) are struggling already (and they invented Purse Seiners!)

So... Maybe they should follow Mr Lei's own advice: get some backbone, put your shit together and stop messing around with your dodgy fleet.

I said in private many times that if the EU wants to do a crucial tackle of the trade on IUU fish in a fundamental way, red carding Taiwan would be an awesome move. . And by doing that, they will indirectly help a lot of the Pacific Islands... as they (for many non fisheries reasons) cannot take such a strong stand by them selves.