The net closes slowlly on IUU fishing by Francisco Blaha

Is not news to most people my deep disgust with fisheries subsidies, based on many reasons.  But my main grief is because the biggest culprits here are the bigger Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN).

Would that hold be full without subsidies?

Would that hold be full without subsidies?

This week I'm attending and presenting a paper at the 5th Global Fisheries Enforcement Training Workshop (GFETW) in Auckland. Sharing with people of over 60 countries many of the advances we have achieved in the Pacific.

I'm happy to see that many of the systems we deploy are at world class level, which more than admirable since many of the PICs are classified as Least Developed Countries and services that are guaranteed in the rest of the world (like Internet and electricity) are still irregular features. Even so, and based on a mixture of determination, lateral thinking and stubbornness we have a unique "state of the art" system that is getting stronger and stronger by the day... And all this without subsidies.

However, with the honorable exemption of EU, the rest of the DWFN are completely absent of the picture. Nor China or Taiwan have representatives. Korea sent 3 people that have not yet make them selves heard at all.

These are not small countries, in fact Taiwan and China have the biggest fleets in the Pacific, and the biggest subsidies.

China
World’s largest subsidizers of commercial fishing, estimated US$4 billion annually.
China operates in over 90 countries, and all oceans and regions of the world, except in the Caribbean, the North Atlantic and the Arctic. China has 50% of all of the fishing vessels larger than 24 meters.  By way of comparison, no other country has more than 10%.  of this industrial fleet.

Taiwan
€400 million on the distant water fishing industry in the period 2002 to 2010.Of the total, about 75% was used to increase the capacity of the fleet, including subsidization of diesel for vessels and vessels buy- back programs.

Against this picture, I feel very disheartened... We are expecting the Fisheries Authorities of Small Developing Islands coastal and port states, to take on the burden of controlling the vessels of rich Distant Waters Fishing Nations that subsidise their fleet with amounts that far exceed the global estimates of IUU fishing.

If Pacific Island Countries can take positive steps to control their own and the DWFN vessels operating in their waters... there is absolutely no reason why China, Taiwan and Korea cannot do the same, when they are way more developed and spend obnoxious amounts of money subsidising their fleets.

And while the EU also subsidizes their fleet (not to Chinese levels tho), its main beneficiary, Spain, is doing incredibly well in terms of closing the net on IUU operators.

While have yet to see the news published in English,  4 members of Antonio Vidal's family have been detained in Galicia for their involvement in the illegal fishing operations for tootfish in the southern seas that finished with the detention of 4 vessels, the sinking of 1 while 1 still at large. And while the tackling of family members seems to relate more to a mafia operation than to IUU fishing... but reality is that there is no much difference.

Many if us in the fisheries compliance world have been skeptic of the EU's anti IUU fisheries drive in foreign countries, when some of their own members where active participants and financiers of those operations... but this is changing rapidly, and I applaud Spain's new law enforcement.

 

 

"Fairness to United States Distant Water Fishermen Act of 2016” by Francisco Blaha

Many times I discussed that the root of fisheries problems, are not really in fisheries itself but in geopolitics, subsidies and transparency... and in many cases vindictiveness and ego fighting.

fisheries and politics (illustration from the Economist)

fisheries and politics (illustration from the Economist)

I paste here a direct copy of a bill presented on the 1st of February to the US Congress by two Republican members. Is a truly vindictive piece of legislation... a real "lowlight" of foreign policy and geopolitics in my opinion.

It explicitly says "PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT ARE PARTIES TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM FISHERIES AGENCY CONVENTION".... all this of course comes out as consequence of the recent collapse of the US Tuna treaty with the Pacific Islands.

Very shameful I think... and it basically opens the door wider to the Chinese, Taiwanese and Koreans Distant Water Fleets... as my friend Pam says: "they are shooting themselves in the foot"

---

114th CONGRESS 2d Session
H. R. 4413

To prohibit the use of funds to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency under the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
February 1, 2016
Mr. Hunter (for himself and Mr. Vargas) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL
To prohibit the use of funds to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency under the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the “Fairness to United States Distant Water Fishermen Act of 2016”.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM FISHERIES AGENCY UNDER THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM FISHERIES AGENCY.

(a) Prohibition.—Funds made available to carry out chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.; relating to Economic Support Fund) may not be used to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency under the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency.

(b) Effective Date.—This section takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and applies with respect to funds made available for any fiscal year—

(1) in which a notice of intent to withdraw from the Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of America, done at Port Moresby on April 2, 1987, is submitted by the United States in accordance with Article 12.6 of such Treaty; or

(2) in which such Treaty is not in effect with respect to the United States for any part of such fiscal year.

SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT ARE PARTIES TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM FISHERIES AGENCY CONVENTION.

Funds made available to carry out chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.; relating to International Military Education and Training) or any other provision of law for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 may not be used to provide assistance to any foreign country that is a party to the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention, signed at Honiara on July 10, 1979.

The promises of technology in Fisheries and MCS by Francisco Blaha

A reporter asked me a couple of days ago: "Some of what we've heard about the technologies to fight IUU fishing has had an element of fantasy and Starwars about it - are we now moving into a new era where real technological advance is going to change things completely?" and then "There has been a lot of gloomy thoughts about the fate of the world's fish stock - is technology now offering us a real hope for the future?"

"we are stuck with technology when what we really want is just stuff that works" D. Adams

"we are stuck with technology when what we really want is just stuff that works" D. Adams

He was referring to the two big MCS (Monitoring, Control and Surveillance) meetings happening in Auckland over the next couple of weeks.

The question, made me think about how I see the role of technologies in this area...

So I wrote back this:

Douglas Adams wrote "we are stuck with technology when what we really want is just stuff that works".... So I don't think that these workshops are being held/sold as miracle panaceas providers. Technology provides tools that help with solutions.

the crap I do....

the crap I do....

The problems in fisheries (in my opinion) do not relate to the lack of technology, they relate to politics and management. I have been vocal in my opinion that if we were to find solutions around subsidies and transparency, a big chunk of the issues would be gone. Rich nations spend more in subsidizing fisheries that the estimates losses of revenue from illegal fishing... Yes, the global cost of fisheries subsidies is greater than the cost of IUU fishing.

Deal with this, the rest will follow...

Deal with this, the rest will follow...

Fisheries sustainability relates to many things, but at its basics, we could abstract it to: "how much is being fished in one area, over a period of time". The technologies we are talking in these conferences, help us to know who is fishing legally and who is not, and to ID those fishing legally, knowing how much, where and for how long...

But these technologies do not infer on why countries expand fleets or other expand their fishing permits numbers. These technologies help in fine-tuning what we know is been fished, and identifying and providing evidence on those that are not playing by the rules... But technologies are not a solution for the fisheries geopolitics.

A more profound mistake is at work here, and it concerns technology in general. It is the expectation that technology can and will solve all problems, that the future will be better because technology will have made it so... But technology does not make policy decisions, in the best case scenario can only help and guide those making them

There are also some problems that technology cannot solve. Not because it is too sluggish, fragile, or clumsy, but because not all problems are instrumental, most problems in fisheries (in my opinion) are political.  

I start many of my talks with a quote of B.F. Skinner “The real problem is not whether machines think but whether men do.”  

As far as I read, in regards the topics and the presenters, this is a technical meeting where people present the advances in their fields and what they are working on the MCS spectrum.

Some are purely technical (how this software/tool works and what it does) other are more conceptual like my one:  in the Pacific, we have this problem and this is what we are doing to help working it out, and we are using the following established technologies for this.

If you are, let's say, an oncologist you don't go to an oncology conference expecting to hear that the "cure" for cancer has been found... you go learn and hopefully pick up tools and knowledge from other people in other parts of the world, that may help you in helping your patients. I don't see these Auckland events as any different nor of less merit itself. (In fact, we have only one of these a year worldwide while you have hundreds around other topics)

Finally, there is not really "one world stock that will collapse" and will wipe out fisheries of the planet. There are thousands of fisheries that are at different levels of exploitation and there are many (an estimated 30% that are over exploited) but also many that have to stop declining and/or are recovering thanks to better management, transparency, better science and technology...

Plus, we need to remember that while fishing is old, its management is new... people was rocketing off to the moon at the time that we started getting serious about fisheries statistical models.

There is clearly a role for science and technology in fisheries sustainability. Science can determine if the management of a fishery will lead to long-term sustainability. Technology around MCS can help capture the data needed to support science determinations.

However, it would be very difficult for science and technology at present to tell you what environmental impacts are low or high enough – that is a question of individual choice or public policy.

 

The US makes a move on its anti IUU fishing system by Francisco Blaha

The US has been slow burning is anti IUU system and policy, and it looks like they started their game with a consultation, which is already a good thing.

The US imports seafood from over 100 countries with thirty countries each providing over $100 million of fisheries products

The US imports seafood from over 100 countries with thirty countries each providing over $100 million of fisheries products

We all knew that something was coming (I wrote about it here, here , and here).  So a cpuple of weeks ago the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) unveiled the "new" requirements for imported seafood. The regulations are the product of a presidential task force I blogged before.

NOAA Fisheries spokesmen said that the “U.S. seafood traceability program” will require seafood importers to document the “catch” to first “landfall” in the United States for certain species. The regulated species were chosen based on:

  •                         principals of enforcement capability;
  •                         species misrepresentation;
  •                         catch documents;
  •                         complexity of the chain of custody and processing;
  •                         mislabeling or other misrepresentation; and
  •                         human health risks

On the “at risk” species list are: abalone, Atlantic cod, blue crab, mahi-mahi, grouper, red king crab, Pacific cod, red snapper, sea cucumber, sharks, shrimp, swordfish, albacore tuna, bigeye tuna, skipjack tuna and yellowfin tuna.

The criteria and the list were chosen by the presidential task force known as the National Ocean Committee to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud.  It was the task force that last year recommended a “harvest to entry in the U.S.” approach to traceability

The at risk list represents about 40 percent of the seafood that enters the U.S. when measured by value. NOAA eventually wants to include all seafood species imported into the U.S.

The Seafood Import Monitoring Program, as it is officially known, is in the Federal Register for a 60-day comment period.

Some of the most interesting areas I rescue are:

Summary:

Pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), this proposed rule would establish filing and recordkeeping procedures relating to the importation of certain fish and fish products, in order to implement the MSA's prohibition on the import and trade, in interstate or foreign commerce, of fish taken, possessed, transported or sold in violation of any foreign law or regulation. The information to be filed is proposed to be collected at the time of entry, and makes use of an electronic single window consistent with the Safety and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 and other applicable statutes. Specifically, NMFS proposes to integrate collection of catch and landing documentation for certain fish and fish products within the government-wide International Trade Data System (ITDS) and require electronic information collection through the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) maintained by the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Under these procedures, NMFS would require an annually renewable International Fisheries Trade Permit (IFTP) and specific data for certain fish and fish products to be filed and retained as a condition of import to enable the United States to exclude the entry into commerce of products of illegal fishing activities. The information to be collected and retained will help authorities verify that the fish or fish products were lawfully acquired by providing information that traces each import shipment from point of harvest to entry-into commerce. The rule will also decrease the incidence of seafood fraud by collecting information at import and requiring retention of documentation so that the information reported (e.g., regarding species and harvest location) can be verified. This proposed rule stipulates the catch and landing data for imports of certain fish and fish products which would be required to be submitted electronically to NMFS through ACE and the requirements for recordkeeping concerning such imports.

So it introduces the concept of a “catch certificate scheme” of sorts via a International Trade Data System (ITDS) and the it would require an annually renewable International Fisheries Trade Permit (IFTP) and specific data for certain fish and fish products to be filed and retained as a condition of import to enable the United States to exclude the entry into commerce of products of illegal fishing activities.

The ITDS would be the electronic means of collecting NMFS-required catch and trade data at the point of entry for imports subject to existing trade monitoring programs. They anticipates that would require entry filers, when importing at-risk species, to submit data elements at the point of entry into U.S. commerce and use the CBP ACE portal for submission of import data and/or document images (as applicable for HTS codes covered under multiple programs).
This proposed rule would also require the importer of record to obtain a permit to import a designated at-risk species (the International Fisheries Trade Permit) At-risk species, and some products derived from such species, would be identified by Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) codes (in combination with other codes where applicable), and entries filed under these codes would be subject to the additional data requirements set forth in this proposed rule. While some HTS codes will have a direct correspondence to the at-risk species, other applicable HTS codes, particularly for processed products, may be broader (i.e., potentially including species other than those designated at-risk.)

Entry Into U.S. Commerce

This proposed rule addresses only the collection of information on imported fish and fish products at the point of entry into U.S. commerce. For imported fish and fish products, entry into commerce is the landing on, bringing into, or introduction into, or attempted landing on, bringing into, or introduction into, any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, whether or not such landing, bringing, or introduction constitutes an importation within the meaning of the customs laws of the United States.

At-Risk Species

A working group including representatives from NMFS and other Federal agency partners solicited comment on principles to be applied in the identification of fish species likely to be most at risk of IUU fishing or seafood fraud.
Taking into consideration public comment received, the working group evaluated the strength and utility of various indicators of IUU fishing or seafood fraud as well as their measurability and the robustness of data available to assess them. The working group endeavored to minimize overlap of principles to ensure that alignment with multiple principles did not overstate associated risk, and also to distinguish between risk of IUU fishing and risk of seafood fraud.

The working group identified the following draft principles:

Enforcement capability, existence of a catch documentation scheme, complexity of the supply chain, known species substitution, history of mislabeling (other than misidentification of species), and history of fisheries violations.
Applying those principles to a base list of species, thirteen fish species/species groups were identified as likely to be most at risk of IUU fishing or seafood fraud. Under this proposed rule, importers would therefore be subject to the permitting, reporting and recording keeping requirements, which are described below, with respect to imports of the species and species groups as proposed, subject to revision at the time of issuance of the final rule. Entries of the fish and fish product of species covered by this rule filed under the following HTS codes would be designated in ACE as requiring the additional data in order to obtain release of the inbound shipment: (go to the original for the list).
Regulatory requirements for reporting and recordkeeping already exist for certain products subject to this rule. In particular, tuna products would be subject to this proposed rule and are now subject to the Tuna Tracking and Verification Program (TTVP) (See http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/dolphinsafe/tunaHTScodes.htm), which monitors compliance under the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA).

They argue that:

Furthermore, in light of the similarity in underlying reporting and recordkeeping requirements of the IUU fishing seafood fraud traceability program and the TTVP program, which verifies whether tuna product marketed as “dolphin safe” meets the eligibility conditions for the dolphin safe label, NMFS intends to ensure that any future changes to the IUU fishing and risk of seafood fraud requirements such as converting certain recordkeeping requirements to a reporting requirement, as discussed below, will be replicated in the TTVP program (through the inclusion of appropriate HTS codes) so that entities serving the U.S. tuna product market will not be subject to conflicting reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

In my experience there substantial differences in between the level of verification that declaring something IUU free and dolphin safe entitles… but lets see what it comes out.

Data for Reporting and Recordkeeping

The working group considered the minimum types of information that should be reported in order to determine that imports of at-risk species are not products of illegal fishing or are fraudulently represented. The area of harvest or the location of the aquaculture facility, and the time at which the harvest took place, represents the initial “link” in the supply chain. At-risk species entering U.S. commerce will be traced to their harvest and its authorization. Information on each point of transshipment and processing throughout the fish or fish product's chain of custody culminating at the point of entry into U.S. commerce can also be used to trace product back to point of harvest.
NMFS proposes that, at the point of entry for species covered by this rule, importers of record would be required to report the following information for each entry in addition to other information that CBP and other agencies, including NMFS, currently require:
  • Information on the entity(ies) harvesting or producing the fish (as applicable): Name and flag state of harvesting vessel(s) and evidence of authorization; Unique vessel identifier(s) (if available); Type(s) of fishing gear; Name(s) of farm or aquaculture facility.
  • Information on the fish that was harvested and processed, including: Species of fish (scientific name, acceptable market name, and ASFIS number); Product description(s); Name(s) of product; Quantity and/or weight of the product(s).
  • Information on where and when the fish were harvested and landed: Area(s) of wild-capture or aquaculture harvest; Harvest date(s); Location(s) of aquaculture facility; Point of first landing; Date of first landing; Name of entity(ies) (processor, dealer, vessel) to which fish was landed. Such information may be contained, for example, in catch certificates, landing reports, and port inspection reports. Entries may comprise products from more than one harvest event and each event relevant to entry must be reported.
  • The NMFS IFTP number issued to the importer of record for the entry.
Additional information on each point in the chain of custody regarding the shipment of the fish or fish product to point of entry into U.S. commerce would be established as a recordkeeping requirement on the part of the importer of record to ensure that information is readily available to NMFS to allow it to trace the fish or fish product from the point of entry into U.S. commerce back to the point of harvest to verify the information that is reported upon entry. Such information would include records regarding each custodian of the fish and fish product, including, as applicable, transshippers, processors, storage facilities, and distributors. The information contained in the records must be provided to NMFS upon request and be sufficient for NMFS to conduct a trace back to verify the veracity of the information that is reported on entry. NMFS expects that typical supply chain records that are kept in the normal course of businesses, including declarations by harvesting/carrier vessels, bills of lading and forms voluntarily used or required under foreign government or international monitoring programs which include such information as the identity of the custodian, the type of processing, and the weight of the product, would provide sufficient information for NMFS to conduct a trace back. In addition to relying on such records, the trade may choose to use model forms that NMFS has developed to track and document chain of custody information through the supply chain.
Due to technological limitations of automated data processing for imaged documents and requirements associated with the phase-in of ITDS, this proposed rule requires that chain of custody information be retained by the importer of record and made available to NMFS upon request. However, NMFS recognizes the conservation value of requiring reporting of key chain of custody data elements for the purpose of real-time verification and compliance risk assessment if those data can be accessed and analyzed using automated processes.
In developing software for assembling and transferring the additional data to ACE, importers may wish to consider inter-operability with existing traceability systems that are prevalent in the private sector supply chain or which may exist for certain commodities subject to catch/trade documentation schemes under the auspices of a regional fishery management organization (RFMO). While NMFS does not endorse any particular private sector traceability system, use of such systems may facilitate the collection of the required information along the supply chain in order to report this information through ACE. However, importers of record are still responsible for the accuracy of the information in their import transactions, irrespective of whether integration software or other automated supply chain solutions are utilized.
Where RFMO catch/documentation schemes apply to the affected at-risk species, including those that have been implemented by NMFS through regulation (e.g., the swordfish statistical document of the ICCAT, it is anticipated that compliance with the entry data collection requirements of these schemes would for the most part meet the data reporting and recordkeeping requirements of the traceability program proposed here. However, ITDS provides sufficient flexibility to collect additional data in cases where the data requirements of the seafood traceability program proposed by this rule would exceed those of an RFMO scheme applicable to the same species. NMFS will work with CBP to avoid duplication of reporting requirement in cases where more than one reporting program applies to a particular fish or fish product, and to ensure that all the data are reported to meet the requirements of each applicable reporting program.

International Fisheries Trade Permit (IFTP)

 The ITDS proposed rule would establish the IFTP to consolidate existing permits under the highly migratory species international trade program (HMS ITP) and Antarctic marine living resources (AMLR) program, and would require a permit for the TTVP.
This proposed rule would extend the IFTP requirement in the ITDS proposed rule to include importers of record identified in CBP entry filings for shipments containing the designated at-risk species covered by this rule. Requiring the IFTP would allow NMFS to identify, and have current contact information for, importers of the at-risk species covered by this rule. This will enable NMFS to provide information about data reporting and recordkeeping requirements applicable to at-risk species; alert permit holders in advance of any pending changes to data reporting and recordkeeping requirements, including additional data elements or at-risk species; and minimize the potential for disruptions in trade and costly delays in release of shipments.
To obtain the IFTP, U.S. importers of record for designated at-risk species covered by this rule and seafood products derived from such species would electronically submit their application and fee for the IFTP via the National Permitting System Web site designated by NMFS.

Reporting and Recordkeeping

This proposed rule would require that an IFTP holder (i.e., importer of record as identified on CBP entry/entry summary) report certain data for entries of at-risk species covered by this rule. NMFS would provide detailed information to permit holders regarding submission of such data, as well as on recordkeeping, in a compliance guide for industry that will be prepared in advance of NMFS' implementation of a final rule. (The guide may include information on electronic filing through ITDS.) The IFTP holder/importer of record would be required to maintain or have access to, and make available for inspection, electronic or paper versions of records associated with an entry for at-risk species at their place of business for a period of five years after the date of entry.

Verification of Entries

To implement this proposed regulation, business rules would be programmed into ACE to automatically validate that the importer of record has satisfied all of the NMFS Message Set and document image requirements as applicable to HTS codes subject to multiple programs (e.g., all data fields are populated and conform to format and coding specifications, required image files are attached). Absent validation of the NMFS requirements in ACE, the entry filed would be rejected and the entry filer would be notified of the deficiencies that must be addressed in order for the entry to be certified by ACE prior to release by NMFS and CBP. In addition to automated validation of the data submitted, entries may be subject to verification by NMFS that the supplied data elements are true and can be corroborated via auditing procedures (e.g., vessel was authorized by the flag state, legal catch was landed to an authorized entity, processor receipts correspond to outputs). For shipments selected for verification, if verification of the data cannot be completed by NMFS pre-release, NMFS may request that CBP place a hold on a shipment pending verification by NMFS or allow conditional release, contingent upon timely provision of records by the importer of record to allow data verification. Entries for which timely provision of records is not provided to NMFS or that cannot be verified as lawfully acquired and non-fraudulent by NMFS, will be subject to enforcement or other appropriate action by NMFS in coordination with CBP. Such responses could include a re-delivery order for the shipment, exclusion from entry into commerce of the shipment, or enforcement action against the entry filer or importer of record.
To select entries for verification, NMFS would work with CBP to develop a specific program within ITDS to screen information for the covered commodities based on risk criteria. For example, risk-based screening and targeting procedures can be programmed to categorize entries by volume and certain attributes (e.g., ocean area of catch, vessel type or gear), and then randomly select entries for verification on a percentage basis within groups of entries defined by the associated attributes. In applying these procedures, NMFS would implement a verification scheme, including levels of inspection sufficient to assure that imports of the at-risk species are not products of illegal fisheries and are not fraudulently represented. Given the volume of imports, and the perishable nature of seafood, it would not likely be cost-effective for most verifications to be conducted on a pre-release basis. However, the verification scheme may involve targeted operations on a pre-release basis that are focused on particular products or ports of concern.

Voluntary Third Party Certifications and Trusted Trader Program

NMFS is considering how voluntary third party seafood certification programs could simplify entry filing for designated at-risk species or could be used to meet reporting requirements under this proposed rule. NMFS requests comment on how interoperability of third party data systems could be applied to meet the data reporting requirements on a pre-arrival basis or at the point of entry. Such interoperable systems would have to provide the information necessary for NMFS to trace product to the harvest event and therefore be sufficient to identify product that is the result of IUU fishing or is misrepresented.
Additionally, NMFS is considering how a Trusted Trader program might be used to streamline entry processing for designated at-risk species. The Trusted Trader Program is intended to streamline entry processing consistent with ensuring that all traders in the supply chain comply with applicable U.S. regulations. Participants in the Trusted Trader Program would collect or have access to the same data as non-participants, but may not need to provide it prior to entry. NMFS requests comment regarding the potential design and use of a Trusted Trader Program in connection with the requirements proposed in this rule, in particular how it could be used to streamline entry while allowing the United States to determine that imported seafood has been lawfully acquired and not misrepresented and to deter the infiltration of illegally harvested and misrepresented seafood into the supply chain.

And my favorite:

Consideration of the European Union Catch Certification Scheme

The EU's IUU regulations do not include a traceability scheme equivalent to that as contemplated by the IUU Task Force and as proposed in this rule. However, NMFS is interested in comments on how some of the elements inherent in the EU's IUU regulations may be adapted to this rule as a means of facilitating compliance and reducing burden for exporters, either through the design of the traceability process itself or as part of a trusted trader program.

Implementation Timeframe

As an initial estimate, NMFS anticipates that firms may need between 90 days and 12 months to adapt their practices to comply with the requirements of this rule and proposes an implementation date of somewhere between 90 days and 12 months following publication of the final rule.

International Cooperation and Assistance

Subject to the availability of resources, NMFS intends to provide assistance to exporting nations to support compliance with the requirements of this proposed rule, including by providing assistance to build capacity to: (1) Undertake effective fisheries management; (2) strengthen fisheries governance structures and enforcement bodies to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud; and (3) establish, maintain, or support systems to enable export shipments of fish and fish products to be traced back to point of harvest.

Reality is that the US never been been particularly interested in incorporating other people's or countries views (unless they match completely their own ones), hence I have no idea if the consultation process will, at the end of the day, incorporate the doubts of the non US interests... the key voice here is the one of the American companies that import and trade fish.

From my side, I still not clear how the conundrums in between ports, flag, coastal and processing states would be worked out... and I just hope that the final system (that will indubitably affect the Pacific Islands because all tunas are included) is data format friendly so the systems we are developing can be "twitched" at the final step to interact with their system... it would be truly frustrating having to run paralleled systems to satisfy two masters.

Reinserting state agency in global value chains by Francisco Blaha

My friend Gilles sent me new paper on the PNA and MSC certification, written by someone I know, the paper called my attention and was a good reading. I’ll quote some parts only… as always read the original! Is worth.

The resource owners (in the small boat) and the users (in the big one)

The resource owners (in the small boat) and the users (in the big one)

I have meet Steven Adolf at some of the tuna forums I been invited, and I always like when someone from outside the industry (his background in economics and journalism), as it brings a fresh approach that sometimes those who are on the inside don't really see. His latest publication (surely part of his PhD) raises some interesting points about the role of PNA and its association with the MSC.

Abstract

In the agri-food sector global sustainability partnerships play an increasing role in setting and enforcing certification standards through global value chains. Amidst perception that the capacity of states to steer sustainable transnational forms of production is diminishing, these partnerships are increasingly led by firms and non-firm actors. Using the case of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification of free school skipjack tuna purse seine fisheries, this paper challenges this idea of diminished state agency by exploring how these states are repositioning themselves in the global tuna value chain.  We document how PNA created the conditions for its small island member states to use the MSC certification for expanding their role as the owner of tuna resources and becoming global value chain actors themselves through a novel and disruptive public–private partnership. The results indicate that states can use market demand for certified tuna to improve their position as both producers and intermediaries in the chain, and in doing so recapture greater sovereign control over tuna resources while improving their capacity for domestic wealth generation.

The 1st part that I like is hat bring to my attention a concept that I wasn't very aware of:

Global sustainability partnerships exist in a variety of forms, but are most commonly between lead firms in GVCs and non-firm actors, such as environmental and social NGOs. And the (re) insertion of the state in market oriented forms of global sustainability governance.

They go into a good analysis of the MSC (Marine Stewardship Council) Ecolabel. My cautious views on ecolabels are not a secret… but I always admit that the only of the lot I have some respect is MSC, because it certifies a fishery and not a company like the others… and if you deal with a fishery, even if the ones paying for the certification is the industry the state (or states like in PNA) need to have a key role.

They bring this up nicely:

Empirical studies of MSC recognize that changing chain coordination depends on the interests of large retailers, food service companies and their chain-suppliers in European and US markets.  How-ever, an emerging set of studies have also examined the interaction of MSC certification with states, and in doing so have looked beyond standards as objective, technical, science-driven instruments for achieving sustainable management of marine resources .
The State has a dual position in the certification process when claiming the role of ‘producer’ in the chain. By doing so, he argues, the state is able to directly intervene in struggles over surplus value, and influence the environmental conditions of production.

The paper then focus on the MSC certification of PNA Skipjack tuna and makes a good analysis of the global value chain of skipjack and present a good table naming all of the players, and which “strangulation” points they have and a very nice illustration.

Points of concentration of main companies in the global value chain of canned skipjack tuna caught by the purse seiner fleet in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.

Points of concentration of main companies in the global value chain of canned skipjack tuna caught by the purse seiner fleet in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.

The role of PNA is also made clear:

In doing so the PNA members have attempted to establish a monopoly-like control over approximately 25% of the global production of canned tuna. As outlined by leading officials, the PNA has as such sought to define itself as the ‘OPEC of Tuna’: a state driven, profit maximizing commodity cartel. By creating a cartel-like structure the PNA hope to create a new coordinating mechanism that goes beyond the ownership of the resource alone.

And the role of Pacifical:

Key to the PNA’s MSC certification strategy is the creation of Pacifical; a 50/50 public–private partnership with the Dutch trading company ‘Sustunable’. Pacifical is part of a wider strategy of the PNA to gain greater control over the production, trade and marketing of the certified skipjack tuna. Pacifical is therefore seen by the PNA as an instrumental part of both commercial and state policy objectives to promote and control the sustainable management of skipjack tuna as well as capture higher future national revenues from tuna through a price premium. Through Pacifical the PNA seeks greater agency in three ways. First, Pacifical expands the position of member states from ‘owners’ of the skipjack stock in their EEZ, and clients and holders of the MSC certification, to a central commercial role in the chain contracting fishers, traders and processors, and marketing the Pacifical brand to retailers. Second, Pacifical compliments the management systems of the PNA by feeding back information from the chain of custody traceability system and in doing so increases surveillance over vessels, crew and processing factories. Third, by branding cans of the MSC certified canned skipjack tuna, Pacifical is designed to create a direct link to consumers by promoting the PNA as a recognizable production source of sustainable tuna and social accountability.

Which is all fair enough, as the pacific island gets pathetically little form tuna revenues in comparison to the DWFN and the processors (even if they are solid reasons on why processing in smaller pacific island countries would always struggle)

Then he goes on a explanation on why there was opposition to the MSC assessment process and doubts on the success.

Notwithstanding the interest of retailers for the Pacifical canned tuna, non-cooperation to outright exclusion of the MSC-Pacifical scheme has directly influenced the success of the PNA in reaching their goals. Because conventional traders and leading brands did not want to participate, processors were also reluctant to participate. The industrial fleets of purse seine vessels contacted by Pacifical lacked interest, with the exception of Frabelle — one of the biggest Philippines fisheries in the region. Frabelle has strong long-standing strategic links with the PNA through processing plants and fishery licenses in the EEZ waters. By landing MSC certified fish, the company has supported the PNA in its aspirations of establishing an extended role in the chain. In return Frabelle has further reinforced its business relation with the PNA and strengthened its commercial interests in Papua New Guinea, the main processing hub in the PNA with tariff free entry to the EU market. Respondents outlined several reasons for the lack of cooperation by these firms. Traders and brands expressed doubts that the proposed price premium of 20%, to be divided between the fisheries, the traders, processors, retailers and Pacifical, was realistic over the long term. They also noted that this concern would become even more real if the MSC certified tuna move from a niche to mainstream consumer product given that margins in the trade and processing of canned tuna are small (Hamilton et al., 2011). The industry is convinced there is a strong negative price elasticity of demand in canned tuna, resulting in lower demand when the consumer prices rise. Econometric modelling supports this negative relation in demand for canned tuna, but not as strongly as the industry suggests, while overall demand in the US is falling and stagnating in Europe.

He does document then the change in hearth by the big players such a Trimarine and FCF.

I did always had an issue with the price premium (and form what you read above I wasn't the only one)… particularly in low cost product like canned tuna.

The ideal of that a certified product may get a price premium is not a golden rule, furthermore the logic of that assumption is flawed, in NZ we have argued that the industry should not even expect a price premium for certification noting that: “No plausible case can be made for a premium for ‘sustainable seafood’. I anything, a well managed fishery should also be a cheaper fishery to harvest as the fish should be more abundant and easier to catch!” said my friend Alastair MacFarlane.

Their discussion then bring 3 good elements

We distinguish three contingent factors that must be in place for states to play these multiple roles in the evolving processes of certification and standard-setting in global value chains.
First, in order to become the client and holder of the MSC certification, states must have some sort of ‘landed property right’ on the resource that is being certified (Campling and Havice, 2014). As they describe, state ownership of the EEZ is the basis of property in fisheries and therefore defines the role of the state in relation with the market. This enables coastal states to capture surplus value from fish stocks, as well as enforce measures to improve the environmental conditions of production. By setting harvest control rules for free-school tuna, and having them certified, the PNA member states are moving beyond capturing control back from the distant water fleets through the WCFPC (see Havice, 2013, 2010; Miller and Bush, 2014), to also taking greater control over their tuna resources by extending control over surplus value through the market. This supplementary extension of property relations in the oceans is an innovative development in industrial fishery value chains, allowing states to draw on their position as ‘landlord’ and confront the prevailing market power of transnational firms.
Second, the role of the state in the local and regional economy of control can create new forms of governance facilitated through the market, wherein producers and intermediaries offset the power of global buyers (Foley and Hébert, 2014; Gereffi, 2014). Because clients are defined based on their capacity to control and manage a specific resource territory (Foley and Hébert, 2013; Vandergeestet al., 2015), resource ownership is a pre-requisite condition. How-ever, by positioning themselves as a MSC client in the Pacifical partnership, the PNA member states are also extending their influence over the value chain through the chain of custody certification. Through this dual position, the PNA member states are able to increase their influence over multiple stages of the chain by set-ting clear conditions for cooperating with an alternative value chain than that coordinated by the prevailing lead firms in the non-MSC certified chain. By using the demand for certified tuna to strengthen their position as producer and intermediary in the chain, the PNA member states not only position themselves in the tuna GVC but also reshape the captive and hierarchical governance structures in the prevailing tuna global value chain led by traders, brands and retailers.
Third, these states are able to fulfil and combine these roles because they partner with a company in the public–private partnership Pacifical, which is legitimised by the MSC certification (Glasbergen, 2007). The participation of states in the partnership enable them to create and try out new combinations of their rules and practices with those of the private sector. Hence, they not only compete with firms but establish partnerships in order to find common ground for creating projects that link businesses to the state in a legitimate way (Evans, 1995). In doing so, the role of these state changes from a custodian regulator to a subordinate but regulatory demiurge, which facilitates competition with industry for the sake of reaching the collective end goal of sustainable fish stocks. This role can be seen as the mutual reinforcement between state and industry through partnerships, which is a fundamental characteristic of Evans ‘developmental state’. How this developmental role is organised within the state is beyond this scope of this paper, but does present a relevant set of questions for further research. As a consequence, value chain partnerships offer the conditions to combine the market based power of lead firms with the legiti-macy of states to regulate natural resource management (Vellemaand Van Wijk, 2014). By partnering in joint activities with a commercial partner, states can explore new modes of governance by coordinating the implementation of voluntary sustainability measures and in doing so increase their influence over production and trade, as well as the sustainability of fishery resources. The even broader consequence of these findings is that assessment of certification impacts needs to go beyond the technical assessment of sustainability performance, to look at the wider impacts and consequences certification holds for sustainability ‘governance’ in more general terms (Eden and Bear, 2010; Ton et al., 2014). Doing so can reveal the positive impact certification can have as a tool for influencing the political economic conditions that often under-lie persistent and complex sustainability issues in sectors such as seafood.

I like the paper, made me think... (and I like thinking!)

Now... the “issue” I still have, is that ecolabels exist because good fisheries governance and management has failed in the first place… so shouldn't we fix that first, independently of the fishery be dealing with? Ecolables only have an interest in highly traded species, as is commercially driven by retailers and paid by producers, who will only invest in a certification for the fisheries they make more money. So I feel that we are commercializing fisheries management trough a branding exercise… and those who are not part of the commercial market chain (as most subsistence fisheries or low value species) will as in many other areas, be left aside.

Please cite this article in press as: Adolf, S., et al., Reinserting state agency in global value chains: The case of MSC certified skipjack tuna.Fish. Res. (2015)

 

A new NGOs study on the impact of the EU IUU Regulation by Francisco Blaha

Last week a group of NGOs (Oceana, Pew, EJF and WWF) published a analysis on the EU IUU Regulation. And while it raises some good (but already known) issues, in my opinion, it does not totally reflect the reality of its implementation at a operational level in many exporting countries.

I been working on the implementation of this regulation for the last 7 years in almost 20 countries, and as I said many times it was game changer, no doubt… it put IUU at the front of fish trade and public opinion, a very smart and courageous move, and the EU deserves full recognition for that.

But its key tool, the “Catch Certification Scheme” was poorly planned and the corrections that were imposed along the way, were not thought as to made the system more effective and less complex for the countries that have to implement it. (I wrote about this before here, here, and explained it in detail in this EU Market Access publication)

In any case, if you work in this area, is hard not to agree with the main recommendation:

Modernising the catch certificate system in 2016 by establishing a centralised, digital, EU-wide database, with a standard risk analysis tool, for processing, crosschecking and storing information.

Said so, the opportunity was there right at the 2010 implementation, as the EU's DG SANTE (in charge of Sanitary Certification) had a web based system already, the TRACES Portal.

Interestingly all recommendation pretty much mirror a the results of a much wider and deeper study that was commissioned by the EU Parliament in 2012 (published 2013) and that I was asked to peer review: "Compliance of imports of fishery and aquaculture products with EU legislation" No. IP/B/PECH/IC/2013-112

In regards the study itself, I just going to mention two issues that “pops up” nastily to me:

The description of the EU catch certification process

This nice illustration and its description in the text, just continue to portray the idea that it is really a “catch certificate” provided at the moment of the catch being landed. Its not the case at all.

While initially it was a “Catch Certificate” (hence certified the fish caught, at the time of landing), after the implementation “Weight In the CC ” notes (part I and II) (aka WICC notes), it became a “Export Certificate” for fish being processed in the country of the Flag State (WICC: Weight in the Catch Certificate should only cover the consignment to be exported to the EU and not the total catch landed).

As these are based on the volumes in the consignment exported, the consignment could consist of various landings of various vessels, hence there could be 20+ vessels in one consignment. Furthermore, is always certified retroactively, in cases some months after the event, hence the authorities in the flag state need to go backwards to find the information of the landing and its volumes, which in many cases could have happened in another country. 

The illustration portrays the CCS as a "forward" looking process, when in reality is a "backward" looking one, from export consignment back to landing. And here is where the system is both open to abuse and very resource consuming for the smaller countries.

It is only is a “Catch Certificate” (in the sense that certifies catches at the moment of landing) when the whole load of fish is unloaded in country that is not the Flag State. Then, it is “one vessel - one volume”, but this type of even is quite rare.

So really I don't know how deep the authors of the report really understand the application of the regulation in third countries. A read on the above mentioned EU parliament report would have cleared these (and many other) issues up.

The other issue that I think, could have been explored is the impact that the legislation has in the exporting countries as the present system is very resource consuming and impacts disproportionately countries with small fleets but big fishing grounds, as they are not only evaluated in terms of the management of their own fleet, but on the control they have on their waters and ports, which are fished mostly by DWFN that do not take good controls of their fleet.

If one of these small countries was to get red carded, the loosers are their own domestic fleet that cannot export any more, and not the DWN that would keep fishing their waters. In my experience less developed countries spend more of the very limited resources per capita in compliance towards the regulations that the bigger fishing nations.

But anyway... back to the recommendation, I think there is another that i found positive:

Maintain the regular, transparent assessment of third countries in the fight against IUU fishing by: Continuing to provide public information on the criteria used to assess third countries.

So far, there has been not much of that… Reasons for election of a country for "dialogue" and subsequent visit reports are kept confidential. DG SANTE's for example is completely transparent on its evaluations (this also was also highlighted in the EU parliamentary report), so it should be no reason for the same policy.

In fact, only recently the EU started tackling (yellow carding) the “big guys” (Taiwan, Korea, Philippines, Thailand) and some of then (i.e. Korea and Philippines) seems to have gone away with very little effort (i.e. Korea by imposing its Distant Water Fleet of over 300 vessels to have VMS!… one of the technologically most advanced nations did not had a technology that has been a standard for the last 20 years? or the Philippines, whose MCS system - from my experience- is crude at best! even so they got the green card very soon).

Furthermore, a potential red card on Thailand (a processing state that is the main exporter of tuna and shrimp to the EU) would only affect the exports of the vessels flagged there... which is minimal as they don't have any tuna vessels and shrimp, that comes mostly from aquaculture is exempt from the regulations. Hence the economical impact to the country would be almost negligible.

In the meantime, small island countries which much smaller fleets (1 to 7 vessels) and much more limited human and economic resources drag yellow cards for years, and a red card would collapse their industry - normally a huge employer.

In any case, I do understand that geopolitics do play a role here… nevertheless more transparency is always welcome.

On the positive side, the report presents some good information to non initiated and portrays the magnitude of the issues at hand, and I applaud that.

Finally, I do recognise that the EU keeps providing capacity-building and technical support to carded countries and ensuring cohesion with development programmes, and that is to be always commended.

In any case, I understand that these four NGOs that authored the report don't want to rock the boat too much, so the recommendations needed to be a bit sugarcoated with some good intro…

Nevertheless a bit more of technical accuracy and a deeper understanding of how the system work for many of those 90 countries that export to the EU would have made the report much more solid. Something that the caliber of the NGOs commissioning the report deserved in my opinion.

 

The new webpage of the Solomon Islands Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources by Francisco Blaha

The webmaster for the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources here in the Solomon Islands, asked me last December, for some pictures for their new webpage, and they have used them extensively :-) I'm even in the one with the link "Work with us" and acknowledged in the credits!. love it!

Training at NFD's balcony

Training at NFD's balcony

More views on the US Treaty collapse by Francisco Blaha

As anyone could imagine, in topics like this one, there would be different opinions. So here is PITIA's (the Pacific Islands Tuna Industry Association). 

They work as a "association of associations" for the pacific islands national fishing associations, however they are presently working on restructuring membership from its current model to a more open model where individual companies can be members. One of the key strategic focus for PITIA is to secure membership from the Pacific Islands Countries to give it a more holistic representation as a regional NGO.

Their message, as articulated in their last publication "Pacific Tuna Watch" is quite direct. I quote:

"Pacific Islands Tuna Industry Association (PITIA) regrets the current impasse over the US-South Pacific Islands Tuna Treaty. We acknowledge the role of the USA in establishing the Skipjack Industry in the Pacific. The Skipjack Industry we have today owes its roots to the ubiquitous American tuna sandwich and subsequent developments in canning and purse seining tuna industry.

It is the US market that initially gave “the reason for being” that is the Tuna Industry as we now know it. The USA also offers far more liberal access to its markets to Pacific Island origin seafood than most others.

We have seen the exponential increase in the cost of “vessel days” under the PNA vessel day scheme and the current impasse is a direct reflection of this. Whilst acknowledging the need for PIC’s to maximise returns from its Fishery access, due consideration should also be given to the sustainability of those returns. Short term gains seem to have been realised at the expense of stability and reliability and the value of predictable revenues to the national budgets of the PIC’s.

It has come to a point when it is no longer economical to fish due to declining fish price and increasing cost of access. It is also obvious that vessels subsidised by their States will survive the longest despite poor compliance and lack of proper safety measures. The US fleet may well be the first of others to say “enough is enough”.

The domestic flag fleets of the Pacific cannot ever receive the level of Governmental fiscal support that foreign nations enjoy. If the US fleet find it uneconomical – what chance is there of developing a domestic fleet when the cost of access is uncertain and high?

It is not simply selling access to the highest bidder that matters but a more diversify and balance approached is warranted for fiscal stability and maximising domestic development and long term added value of the resource.

Those Island Nations that have signed up to the Long Line VDS should not anticipate any increase in revenue as the Industry simply cannot afford it. Unless a rational approach is taken in establishing access fees under a Longline VDS the “USA Impasse” may be the forerunner of others to follow.

The US Tuna Treaty impasse should be an eye opener for all stakeholders concerned. More particularly the policy making decision organisations that a more balance macro approach is important for the future of the Pacific Tuna Industry with due consideration for the sustainability and economics as major consideration for the common benefits for all the stakeholders concerned.

PITIA website is down (but they are working on it) otherwise I would have linked it.

The sinking of the US Tuna treaty by Francisco Blaha

There have been plenty of talk in the media and tuna world of the “sinking of the US treaty” last week, and I been asked about my views on it. So I here is my take on this, with a big acknowledgement to Chris Lord who put together his views and let me quote him here. The man has been in the Tuna business for a long time and is well read on the issues.

The fact

The United States has given Pacific Island nations notice that it plans to withdraw from the South Pacific Tuna Treaty, one of its most important aid, trade and geopolitical arrangements with the region. The 27-year-old treaty is set to expire 12 months from the date of the withdrawal notice. The announcement came after Washington agreed in South Pacific Tuna Treaty negotiations in August, to a total of $89.2 million for 2016 fishing days, but within months reneged on the deal saying its fleet could not afford to pay.

 What is the Tuna treaty?

The Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries Between Certain Governments of the Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of America (commonly known as the “US Treaty”) began in 1987. It entered into force in 1988 and has since been renewed twice, with the last renewal in 2003 allowing the US Treaty to continue for an additional 10 years until 2013. The treaty enables a maximum of 40 US purse seine vessels to fish in the waters of the 16 Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) member states. From the 16 countries, Australia and New Zealand do not receive any development aid from the treaty. In exchange for fishing access the US contributes an agreed annual amount, regardless of how much fish they take out. Under this arrangement the USA has, in the first 16 years of operation, paid the FFA a total of US$276 million. Once the administration fee is put aside, the FFA then divides these funds in two parts. First, each Pacific Island party receives a fixed minimum payment and the other part (a major component) is based on the amount of tuna caught in national waters of each member states. In effect almost 80%  of the money has been diverted to five countries (Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea and Tuvalu – all PNA countries) based on the distribution of skipjack stock in the region.

Last week, The United States government has officially announced it is pulling out of the US Pacific islands fisheries treaty. The US State Department this week advised the Forum Fisheries Agency that it had officially communicated to the Papua New Guinea government - which is the depository for the treaty - that it is withdrawing from the treaty. The State Department's move was presaged last month when the US government and its tuna fishing industry asked the FFA to "take back" 2,000 fishing days that the American fleet had requested as part of an earlier package of over 6,000 vessel days for 2016. FFA refused, saying it was a signed agreement that the US should abide by. Hence it (FFA) refuses to issue new licences until the U.S. pays for all 5700 fishing days agreed during the Tuna Treaty negotiations in Brisbane during August 2015 (I wrote about it here), a total of $89.2 million, and the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has decreed that, as of 01 January 2016, all 37 purse seiners in the U.S. tuna fishing fleet are prohibited from fishing in the western Pacific region until new licences are issued.

This dispute, of course, has a bigger framework that what is only seen at the surface... it seems (as Chris coined it) the culmination of the “perfect storm”: supply, demand, fishing access and weather.

Supply

A price crisis is hitting the purse seine tuna fishing industry in the central and western Pacific. In fact, tuna landings on both sides of the Pacific have been at record levels for most of the year. Fishing vessels and island-based processors are losing money as a glut of tuna on the market keeps prices low. The western and central Pacific account for half of the global supply of skipjack tuna, and the price of skipjack on the world market has plummeted, from over US$2000 per ton in 2013, to less than US$1000 today. In these circumstances, all US vessels have been losing money, according to the American Tunaboat Association.

In April, the World Tuna Purse Seine Organization (WTPO) announced a 35% reduction in fishing effort until the end of the year, in an effort to pull the industry out of the market crisis. The measure covered the Western and Central Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and applied to all commercial refrigerated industrial tuna purse seiners. Fleets in the Eastern Pacific Ocean were excluded from the measure due to the upcoming fishery closure in the region in Jul-Aug.

The slow-down in operations implemented by the WTPO temporarily lifted prices, but they quickly fell again when catch rates were not significantly decreased.

In Ecuador, annual closures to fishing activity also failed to reduce landings. As a result, cold stores filled and refrigerated carrier vessels were backed-up in regional transshipment ports. Processors in Southeast Asia have been operating below capacity, with many factories in Ecuador reduced to a single-shift basis. Catch rates remained high through the end of the year. This is reflected in current offers of skipjack tuna at $950 per ton for January deliveries to Bangkok.

In short, vessel operators have been losing money.

Demand

Global demand for shelf-stable tuna products has been in a slump for at least the past two years. As the supply increased, prices fell and buyers become reticent to commit forward. It boils downs to a classic case of “supply vs. demand” economics… too much fish and slow sales of finished products.

Another factor in the slump is a growing consumer trend away from canned foods towards, fresh and natural products. Consumption levels in traditional markets such as Europe and the US, are stable or declining. Asia-Pacific processors depend heavily upon these markets for canned tuna and pre-cooked loin exports. In addition, access to these markets, especially the EU, has become increasingly complex.

Future growth in canned tuna demand will likely stem from emerging markets. However, the largest of these, the Middle East, has been severely disrupted by political turmoil, in particular, Egypt and Libya. This makes for stiff competition in other emerging markets, such as Latin America.

Finally, the industry’s propensity for “shooting itself in the foot” has also played a role in eroding consumer confidence. A seemingly never-ending series of events involving major players in the industry have made the headlines. These fall into three (3) basic categories:

  • Social welfare: Human trafficking, slavery and forced labor
  • Responsible fishing: IUU fishing, traceability and sustainability (FADs)
  • Ethical business practices: Under-filling, price-fixing, truth in labeling (Omega-3)

Following are some examples…

  • In 2013, a class-action suit was filed accusing StarKist of “systematically under filling and selling short weighted cans of StarKist Chunk Light Tuna in Water”, a violation of California’s consumer laws, amounting to “negligent misrepresentation”, “unjust enrichment” and “fraud”.
  • About the same time, StarKist’s Korean mother company, Dongwon Industries, came under fire for the mutiny of an American purse seine captain, as well as appalling working conditions, illegal fishing practices, and deceit over tuna fishing licences, all in relation to its purse seine vessel, “Majestic Blue” . The Company later re-flagged the vessel and withdrew from the South Pacific Tuna Treaty as a vessel-owner.
  • The recent disappearance of Keith Davis , a US Fisheries Observer from a Panamanian flagged tuna carrier. Unfortunately one in a list of observers’ deaths I wrote about it before
  • In April 2015, the European Commission issued a 'yellow card' to Thailand (where most of the tuna in the world is processed) for not taking sufficient measures in the international fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU). A somewhat belated response from the government is addressing the issues. Only time will tell if the EU deems the response to be sufficient.
  • In June 2014, Thailand was downgraded to the lowest ranking (Tier 3) on The US State Department Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, joining al illustrious list of countries, including Iran, North Korea, Libya, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. In July 2015, this status was reconfirmed for a second year.
  • A shocking report by the Associated Press (AP) documented a year-long investigation of a single large shipment of slave-caught seafood from the Indonesian village of Benjina, to Thai ports, thru most major Thai seafood processing plants and onto familiar retailers in the United States. This report sparked government action in Thailand and Indonesia that has at least taken steps towards resolving the matter. Sadly, the leader of Thailand's investigation team into Rohingya human trafficking was reassigned to the very area where he conducted the investigations. His pleas to his superiors for reconsideration fell on deaf ears. Fearing retribution from "senior police involved with the trade”, he was forced to flee to Australia, where he is now seeking political asylum.
  • Recently Greenpeace ranked fourteen US tuna brands regarding “fundamental sustainability standards”, which to Greenpeace, means fishing with Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs). The top three US canned tuna brands: Bumble Bee, Chicken of the Sea and StarKist all failed and occupied three of the bottom four positions. A similar ranking in the UK later in the year, ranked Thai Union’s John West brand last out of eleven brands. To drive the point home, Greenpeace followed up with highly publicized protests in San Diego and Liverpool, at the headquarters for Thai Union owned Chicken of the Sea and John West brands respectively.
  • The U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division announced it is conducting an investigation into price collusion in the Packaged Seafood Industry. Forty-three (43) class-action suits from various states, directed primarily at Chicken of the Sea, Bumble Bee Foods and StarKist, followed and have now been consolidated in California. This series of events more or less scuttled Thai Union’s proposed take-over of Bumble Bee.
  • Late in the year, Bumble Bee was also hit with class-action suits regarding improper Omega 3 labeling of tuna and other seafood products. The suit claims Bumble Bee had no legal right to claim the products as an “excellent source of Omega-3s”, as the required applications had not been submitted to US FDA.

Considering the above issues, and growing consumer interest in sustainability, transparency and social welfare, it is logic to see lower consumption (even if not all players are tainted)  .

Fishing Access

A major mitigating factor to this dispute was Kiribati's sovereign decision in October 2014 at the Honolulu negotiations, when they announced that due to “other commitments”, they would allocate only 300 fish days towards the treaty with the US in 2015, a 95% reduction, as compared to 4313 days in 2014.

Whatever the reasons, the number of VDS days Kiribati allocated to the Treaty was not sufficient for the US fleet to be able to operate economically within their EEZ. Neighboring Pacific countries to Kiribati offered fishing days to replace those the US had lost but, they were not feasible options.

Kiribati's EEZ (exclusive economic zone) is closest in proximity, only two to three days away from the tuna processing factories in American Samoa. Fishing grounds in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands or Micronesia are as long as 10 to 12 days away. It is simply not economical for those boats to go such a distance to fish and then turn around and come back all the way to American Samoa. It would be far more practical to transship the fish onto carriers supplying fish to Southeast Asia.

In short, the net effect of this move by Kiribati was to diminish the value of the entire Treaty to the US fleet.

Weather

To make matters worse, the strong El Nino effect during 2015 pushed tuna fishing away from Papua New Guinea towards Kiribati, exactly where the US fleet had limited access. In June, SPC said “stocks will likely move towards the exclusive economic zones of Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tokelau and Nauru. “As water temperatures change, we should see very strong fishing activity and catches towards the central Pacific side of the region”. He also said, “If this event impacts the biology of the tuna resource in a similar fashion as it has in the past, we should see a fairly strong recruitment particularly for Skipjack tuna for the next year”, suggesting that the high catches being experienced will continue. He also offered this opinion, “while that's good from a catching perspective, there is concern the current depressed price of skipjack tuna in the marketplace will not be assisted by continuing strong supply”.

In light of all the above, it is not difficult to understand why the US pushed so hard at South Pacific Tuna Treaty negotiations in August 2015, in Brisbane, Australia, to increase the number of fishing days, only to declare less than three months later that the US fleet could not afford to pay for them.

I love to hear if anyone out there, that has diverging opinions on Chris take on this, as it is an important for tuna fishing in the Pacific.

 

Do “Catch Reconstructions” really Implicate Overfishing? by Francisco Blaha

As expected there was some answers and rebuttals of the Pauly and Zeller paper I referred in my last post. Not surprisingly some of it comes from Ray Hilborn, as those two are sitting in opposite sides of life (I posted about his views before). Here are some of the responses:

Juan is deconstructing catch

Juan is deconstructing catch

Ray Hilborn, Professor in the School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences at the University of Washington

This paper tells us nothing fundamentally new about world catch, and absolutely nothing new about the status of fish stocks. It has long been recognized that by-catch, illegal catch and artisanal catch were underrepresented in the FAO catch database, and that by-catch has declined dramatically.

What the authors claim, and the numerous media have taken up, is the cry that their results show that world fish stocks are in worse shape than we thought. This is absolutely wrong. We know that fish stocks are stable in some places, increasing in others and declining in yet others.

Most of the major fish stocks of the world, constituting 40% of the total catch are scientifically assessed using a mixture of data sources including data on the trends in abundance of the fish stocks, size and age data of the fish caught and other information as available. This paper really adds nothing to our understanding of these major fish stocks.

Another group of stocks, constituting about 20% of global catch, are assessed using expert knowledge by the FAO. These experts use their personal knowledge of these fish stocks to provide an assessment of their status. Estimating the historical unreported catch for these stocks adds nothing to our understanding of these stocks.

For many of the most important stocks that are not assessed by scientific organizations or by expert opinion, we often know a lot about their status. For example; abundance of fish throughout almost all of South and Southeast Asia has declined significantly. This is based on the catch per unit of fishing effort and the size of the individuals being caught. Estimating the amount of other unreported catches does not change our perspective on the status of these stocks.

In the remaining fisheries where we know little about their status, does the fact that catches have declined at a faster rate than reported in the FAO catch data tell us that global fisheries are in worse shape than we thought? The answer is not really. We would have to believe that the catch is a good index of the abundance.

Looking at Figure 1 of the Pauly and Zeller paper we see that a number of major fishing regions have not seen declines in catch in the last 10 years. These areas include the Mediterranean and Black Sea, the Eastern Central Atlantic, the Eastern Indian Ocean, the Northwest Pacific and the Western Indian Ocean. Does this mean that the stocks in these areas are in good shape, while areas that have seen significant declines in catch like the Northeast Atlantic, and the Northeast Pacific are in worse shape?

We know from scientific assessments that stocks in the Mediterranean and Eastern Central Atlantic are often heavily overfished – yet catches have not declined. We know that stocks in the Northeast Pacific are abundant, stable and not overfished, and in the Northeast Atlantic are increasing in abundance. Yet their catch has declined.

Total catch, and declines in catch, are not a good index of the trends in fish stock abundance.

Pauly and Zeller have attempted to estimate the extent of unreported catch for all the fish stocks of the world. For any individual stock in the U.S. the hardest part of doing the stock assessment is often estimating the total catch. Historical discards are often unreported, species were often lumped in the historical catch data, recreational catch was poorly estimated, and illegal catch totally unreported. Scientists can spend months trying to reconstruct these data for an individual stock and it is recognized that these estimates may not be reliable. Pauly and Zeller’s attempt to do this for thousands of global stocks with a consultant spending perhaps a few months to cover every fishery in an individual country just cannot be very reliable.

We need to move beyond trying to understand the historical fish catches, and instead concentrate on understanding the status of fish stocks at present. If all the effort that had been spent in trying to estimate historical catches by Pauly and Zeller had instead been devoted to analysis of what we know about the status of a sample of fish stocks in different places, we would know much more about the status of world fisheries.

David Agnew, Director of Standards, Marine Stewardship Council

The analysis of such a massive amount of data is a monumental task, and I suspect that the broad conclusions are correct. However, as is usual with these sorts of analyses, when one gets to a level of detail where the actual assumptions can be examined, in an area in which one is knowledgeable, it is difficult to follow all the arguments.  The Antarctic catches “reconstruction” apparently is based on one Fisheries Centre report (2015 Volume 23 Number 1) and a paper on fishing down ecosystems (Polar Record; Ainley and Pauly 2014). The only “reconstruction” appears to be the addition of IUU and discard data, all of which are scrupulously reported by CCAMLR anyway, so they are not unknown. But there is an apparent 100,000 t “unreported” catch in the reconstruction in Figure 3, Atlantic, Antarctic (48). This cannot include the Falklands (part of the Fisheries Centre paper) and it is of a size that could only be an alleged misreporting of krill catch in 2009. This is perhaps an oblique reference to concerns that CCAMLR has had in the past about conversion factors applied to krill products, or perhaps unseen (net-impact) mortality, but neither of these elements have been substantiated, nor referenced in the supporting documentation that I have seen (although I could not access the polar record paper).

The paper does not go into much detail on these reasons for the observed declines in catches and discards, except to attribute it to both reductions in fishing mortality attendant on management action to reduce mortality and generate sustainability, and some reference to declines in areas that are not managed. It is noteworthy that the peak of the industrial catches – in the late 1990s/early 2000s – coincidentally aligns with the start of the recovery of many well managed stocks. This point of recovery has been documented previously (Costello et al 2012; Rosenberg et al 2006; Gutierrez et al 2012) and particularly relates to the recovery of large numbers of stocks in the north Pacific, the north Atlantic and around Australia and New Zealand, and mostly to stocks that are assessed by analytical models. For stocks that need to begin recovery plans to achieve sustainability, this most often entails an overall reduction in fishing effort, which would be reflected in the reductions in catches seen here. So, one could attribute some of the decline in industrial catch in these regions to a correct management response to rebuild stocks to a sustainable status, although I have not directly analyzed the evidence for this. This is therefore a positive outcome worth reporting.

The above-reported inflection point is also coincident with the launch of the MSC’s sustainability standard. These standards have now been used to assess almost 300 fisheries, and have generated environmental improvements in most of them (MSC 2015). Stock sustainability is part of the requirements of the standard, and previous analyses (Gutierrez et al 2012, Agnew et al 2012) have shown that certified fisheries have improved their stock status and achieved sustainability at a higher rate than uncertified fisheries. The MSC program does not claim responsibility for the turn-around in global stocks, but along with other actions – such as those taken by global bodies such as FAO, by national administrations, and by industry and non-Governmental Organisations – it can claim to have provided a significant incentive for fisheries to become, and then remain, certified.

Original source for these two here

I also got a mail from my friend Bob Gillett, an extremely experienced fisheries consultant (his publishing record goes back to 1978), I have his knowledge (and friendship) in the highest regards. He says:

I have run into these "catch reconstructions" for almost every country in my present work of re-writing the ADB Benefish book.  I have come to the conclusion that the concept of having graduate students estimate fisheries production in countries they have never visited by remote control- just does not work.

 

Can we trust FAO Fisheries Statistics? by Francisco Blaha

For years, most work in global fisheries always refer to my former employers statistical data, in particular because that is what they refer to, when the say that such % of world fisheries are “fully fished” or “overfished”. However a recent paper questions the accuracy of that data, and already in the tittle, they drop their conclusion: “Catch reconstructions reveal that global marine fisheries catches are higher than reported and declining”

The paper was published by Daniel Pauly and Dirk Zeller, and you can read it here, I will just highlight some of the parts that “hit” me the most.

Abstract

Fisheries data assembled by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) suggest that global marine fisheries catches increased to 86 million tonnes in 1996, then slightly declined. Here, using a decade-long multinational ‘catch reconstruction’ project covering the Exclusive Economic Zones of the world’s maritime countries and the High Seas from 1950 to 2010, and accounting for all fisheries, we identify catch trajectories differing considerably from the national data submitted to the FAO. We suggest that catch actually peaked at 130 million tonnes, and has been declining much more strongly since. This decline in reconstructed catches reflects declines in industrial catches and to a smaller extent declining discards, despite industrial fishing having expanded from industrialized countries to the waters of developing countries. The differing trajectories documented here suggest a need for improved monitoring of all fisheries, including often neglected small-scale fisheries, and illegal and other problematic fisheries, as well as discarded bycatch.

Introduction

In many developing countries (and likely also in many ‘transition‘ countries), fish is the major animal protein source that rural people can access or afford; and they are also an important source of micronutrients essential to people with otherwise deficient nutrition. However, the growing popularity of fish in countries with developed or rapidly developing economies creates a demand that cannot be met by fish stocks in their own waters (for example, the EU, the USA, China and Japan). These markets are increasingly supplied by fish imported from developing countries, or caught in the waters of developing countries by various distant-water fleets with the consequences that:

  • Foreign and/or export-oriented domestic industrial fleets are increasingly fishing in the waters of developing countries.

  • Industrially caught fish has become a globalized commodity that is mostly traded between continents rather than consumed in the countries where it was caught, and

  • The small-scale fisheries that traditionally supplied seafood to coastal rural communities and the interior of developing countries (notably in Africa) are forced to compete with the export-oriented industrial fleets without much support from their governments.

The lack of attention that small-scale fisheries suffer in most parts of the world manifests itself in potentially misleading statistics that are submitted annually by many member countries of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), which may omit or substantially underreport small-scale fisheries data. FAO harmonizes the data submitted by its members, which then becomes the only global data set of fisheries statistics in the world, widely used by policy makers and scholars.

This data set, however, may not only underestimate artisanal (that is, small scale, commercial) and subsistence fisheries , but also generally omit the catch of recreational fisheries, discarded bycatch  and illegal and otherwise unreported catch, even when some estimates are available. Thus, except for a few obvious cases of over-reporting , the landings data updated and disseminated annually by the FAO on behalf of member countries may considerably underestimate actual fisheries catch. While this underestimation is widely known among many fisheries scientists working with FAO catch data, and is freely acknowledged by FAO, its global magnitude has not been explicitly presented until now.

Here we present the results of an approach called ‘catch reconstruction’ that utilizes a wide variety of data and information sources to derive estimates for all fisheries components missing from the official reported data. We find that reconstructed global catches between 1950 and 2010 were 50% higher than data reported to FAO suggest, and are declining more strongly since catches peaked in the 1990s. These findings and the country-specific technical work underlying these results will hopefully contribute to member countries submitting more accurate fisheries statistics to FAO. Such improved and more comprehensive data contribute a foundation that can facilitate the implementation of ecosystem-based fisheries management , which is a component of the ‘FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries’ .

Results

Global pattern

The sum of the reconstructed catches of all sectors in all Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of the world, plus the catch of tuna and other large pelagic fishes in the High Seas leads to two major observations.

First, the trajectory of reconstructed catches differs substantially from those reported by FAO on behalf of its member countries. The FAO statistics suggest that, starting in 1950, the world catch (actually ‘landings’, as discarded catches are explicitly excluded from the global FAO data set) increased fairly steadily to 86 million tonnes (mt) in 1996, stagnated and then slowly declined to around 77 mt by 2010 (Fig. 1). In contrast, the reconstructed catch peaked at 130 mt in 1996 and declined more strongly since. Thus, the reconstructed catches are overall 53% higher than the reported data.

Contrast between the world’s marine fisheries catches, assembled by FAO from voluntary submissions of its member countries (‘reported’) and that of the catch ‘reconstructed’ to include all fisheries known to exist, in all countries and in the High S…

Contrast between the world’s marine fisheries catches, assembled by FAO from voluntary submissions of its member countries (‘reported’) and that of the catch ‘reconstructed’ to include all fisheries known to exist, in all countries and in the High Sea (‘reconstructed’=‘reported’+ estimates of ‘unreported’). The mean weighted percentage uncertainty of the reconstructed total catches (over all countries and fisheries sectors) based on the quality scores attributed to each sector in each country and territory (dashed line) is also shown.

Figure 1: Trajectories of reported and reconstructed marine fisheries catches 1950–2010.

Furthermore, since the year of peak catches in 1996, the reconstructed catch declined strongly at a mean rate of −1.22 mt·per year, whereas FAO, at least until 2010, described the reported catch cautiously as characterized by ‘stability’19, 20, though it exhibited a gradual decline (−0.38 mt·per year). The reconstructed total catches therefore represent a decline of over three times that of the reported data as presented by FAO on behalf of countries.

A segmented regression identifies two breakpoints in the catch time series (that is, change in trend) of the reconstructed total catches as well as the reported catches. These are in 1967 as a result of a changing slope of the catch time series from a stronger increase prior to 1967 (reconstructed catches=2.82 mt·per year; reported catches=1.88 mt·per year) to a slower increase after 1967 (reconstructed catches=1.86 mt·per year; reported catches=1.30 mt·per year). The second breakpoint is in 1996 (the year of peak catch), with a subsequently decreasing trend (that is, slope) of −1.22 mt·per year for reconstructed catches and −0.38 mt per·year for reported catches, as also presented for the simple regression above (Fig. 1).

Effects of removing discards on estimates of seafood caught per capita, and of removing the catches of the major countries using quota management (that is, USA, New Zealand, Australia and Western Europe) on reconstructed total catches.

Effects of removing discards on estimates of seafood caught per capita, and of removing the catches of the major countries using quota management (that is, USA, New Zealand, Australia and Western Europe) on reconstructed total catches.

Figure 2: Trajectories of marine fisheries catches 1950–2010.

Note that the recent, stronger decline in reconstructed total catches is not due to some countries reducing catch quotas so that stocks can rebuild. For example, a similar decline (−1.01 mt·per year) in reconstructed catches is obtained when the catch from the Unites States, Northwestern Europe, Australia and New Zealand (that is, countries where quota management predominates) is excluded (Fig. 2).

Spatial pattern

Closer examination of the reconstructed versus reported catches in each of the 19 maritime FAO statistical areas suggests that some of the areas where industrial fishing originated, such as the Northwest Atlantic (FAO area 21), are the first regions of the world to demonstrate declining catches (Fig. 3). In contrast, lower-latitude areas demonstrate declines later, or still appear to have increasing catches, for example, the Indian and Western Central Pacific Oceans still showing generally increasing trends in reported catches (Fig. 3).

Contrasting reconstructed and reported catches in the 19 maritime ‘Statistical Areas’ which FAO uses to roughly spatialize the world catch. Note that for Area 18 (Arctic), the reported catch by the U.S. and Canada was zero, while only Russia (former…

Contrasting reconstructed and reported catches in the 19 maritime ‘Statistical Areas’ which FAO uses to roughly spatialize the world catch. Note that for Area 18 (Arctic), the reported catch by the U.S. and Canada was zero, while only Russia (former-USSR) reported a small catch in the late 1960s, even though the coastal fishes of the high Arctic are exploited by Inuit and others.

Figure 3: Reconstructed and reported catches by FAO areas.

Catches by fishing sector

We present, for the first time, global reconstructed marine fisheries catches by fisheries sectors (Fig. 4). They are dominated by industrial fisheries, which contribute 73 mt of landings in 2010, down from 87 mt in 2000 (Fig. 4). At the global scale it is a declining industrial catch (combined with the smaller contribution of gradually reduced levels of discarding) that leads to declining global catches since 1996, while the artisanal sector, which generates a catch increasing from about 8 mt·per year in the early 1950s to 22 mt·per year in 2010, continues to show gradual growth in catches at the global scale (Fig. 4).

Reconstructed catches for all countries in the world, plus High Seas, by large-scale (industrial) and small-scale sectors (artisanal, subsistence, recreational), with discards (overwhelmingly from industrial fisheries) presented separately.

Reconstructed catches for all countries in the world, plus High Seas, by large-scale (industrial) and small-scale sectors (artisanal, subsistence, recreational), with discards (overwhelmingly from industrial fisheries) presented separately.

Figure 4: Reconstructed global catch by fisheries sectors.

Also noticeable is that the inter-annual variations (small peaks and troughs) in both reconstructed catches and reported catches (Fig. 1) are mainly driven by industrial data, which are relatively well documented and reported in time series, while the small-scale sector data are smoother over time (Fig. 4), and more strongly influenced by continuity assumptions over time as part of the national reconstructions.

While some countries increasingly include subsets of artisanal catches in official catch statistics provided to FAO, subsistence fisheries catches (Fig. 4) rarely are10. Worldwide, subsistence fisheries caught an estimated 3.8 mt·per year between 2000 and 2010 (Fig. 4). The current global estimate of just under 1 mt·per year of recreational catches is rather imprecise, and recreational fishing is declining in developed, but increasing in developing countries.

Discarded bycatch, generated mainly by industrial fishing, notably shrimp trawling22, was estimated at 27 mt·per year (±10 mt) and 7 mt·per year (±0.7 mt) in global studies conducted for FAO in the early 1990s and 2000s, respectively. However, these point estimates were not incorporated into FAO’s global ‘capture’ database, which thus consists only of landings. Here, these studies are used, along with numerous other sources, to generate time series of discards (Fig. 4). Discards, after peaking in the late 1980s, have declined, and during 2000–2010, an average of 10.3 mt·per year of fish were discarded.

Discussion

Our reconstructed catch data, which combines the data reported to FAO with estimates of unreported catches (that is, reconstructed data are ‘reported FAO data+unreported catches’) include estimates of uncertainty (Fig. 1) associated with each national reconstruction. Note that many reconstructions are associated with high uncertainty, especially for earlier decades, for sectors such as subsistence which receive less data collection attention by governments, and for small countries or territories (Fig. 1). We include uncertainty estimates here, despite the fact that reconstructions address an inherent negative bias in global catch data (that is, address the ‘accuracy’ of data) and not the replicability of catch data collection (that is, the statistical ‘precision’ of such estimates), which is what ‘uncertainty’ estimates (for example, confidence limits) generally are used for. We do recognize that any estimates of unreported catches implies a certain degree of uncertainty, but so do officially reported data. Most countries in the world use sampling schemes, estimations and raising factors to derive their national catch data they officially report domestically and internationally, all without including estimates of the uncertainty inherent in the numbers being reported as official national catches.

Our comparison of the reconstructed versus reported catches in each of the 19 maritime FAO statistical areas suggests that some of the lower-latitude areas still appear to have increasing reported catches. This generally increasing trend is most pronounced in the Indian and Western Central Pacific Oceans (Fig. 3), where the reconstructed catches are most uncertain, as the statistics of various countries could only partially correct a regional tendency to exaggerate reported catches5. FAO’s Indian and Western Central Pacific Oceans areas are also the only ones with an increasing FAO reported catch, which, when added to that of other FAO areas, makes the FAO reported world catch appear more stable than it is based on our global reconstructions.

Our data and analyses show that, at the global scale, it is a declining industrial catch (plus a smaller contribution of gradually declining discards) that provide for the declining global catches, while artisanal fishing continues to show slight growth in catches (Fig. 4). Thus, the gradually increasing incorporation of artisanal and other small-scale catches in the officially reported data presented by FAO on behalf of countries is partly masking the decline in industrial catches at the global level. Since officially reported data are not (at the international level) separated into large-scale versus small-scale sectors, this trend could not be easily documented until now. Obviously, these patterns may vary between countries. Furthermore, while parts of artisanal catches are increasingly included in official catch statistics by some countries, non-commercial subsistence fisheries catches, a substantial fraction of it through gleaning by women in coastal ecosystems such as coral reef flats and estuaries are generally neglected. The importance of subsistence fishing for the food security of developing countries, particularly in the tropical Indo-Pacific, cannot be overemphasized.

Our preliminary and somewhat imprecise reconstruction of recreational catches indicates that this sector is largely missing from official reported data, despite FAO’s annual data requests explicitly allowing inclusion of recreational catch data. This activity, however, generates an estimated 40 billion USD·per year of global benefits, involves between 55 and 60 million persons, and generates about one million jobs worldwide.

Finally, our country-by-country reconstructed data supports previous studies illustrating that global discards have decreased12, 24. Discarded catches should therefore be included in catch databases, if only to allow for correct inferences on the state of the fisheries involved in this problematic practice.

The reconstructed catch data presented here for the first time for all countries in the world can contribute to formulating better policies for governing the world’s marine fisheries, with a first step being the recognition in national policies of the likely magnitude of fisheries not properly captured in the official national data collection systems.

This recognition will hopefully contribute to improvements in national data collection systems, an aspiration that we share with FAO. For example, in Mauritania and Guinea Bissau, which, in large part as a result of the reconstructions and our ongoing direct engagement with these countries, are now initiating national data collection systems for recreational fisheries (a growth industry in both countries and missing from current data systems). It is hoped that this type of data, and other missing data (for example, subsistence catches), will be included in future national data reports to FAO, as is the case for some other countries such as Finland.

The taxonomic composition of this reconstructed catch (not presented here but available from the Sea Around Us and through the individual catch reconstruction reports) can also contribute to the development of more useful first-order indicators of fisheries status than has been possible previously, especially in the absence of comprehensive stock assessments for all taxa targeted.

A policy change that would be straightforward for FAO to coordinate and implement with all countries around the world is to request countries to submit their annual catch statistics separately for large-scale and small-scale fisheries, which would be an excellent contribution towards the implementation of the ‘Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication’ recently adopted and endorsed at the thirty-first Session of the FAO Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture (COFI) in June 2014 (ref. 35). While we have found that many countries already have such data or data structure at hand, until all countries can implement such a data-change request, FAO could incorporate such a split into their internal data harmonization procedures, based, for example, on the same or similar information sources as used by the reconstructions.

The very high catches that were achieved globally in the 1990s were probably not sustainable. However, they do suggest that stock rebuilding, as successfully achieved in many Australian and US fisheries, and beginning to be applied in some European fisheries, is a policy that needs wider implementation, and which would generate even higher sustained benefits than previously estimated from reported catches.

On the other hand, the recent catch decline documented here is of considerable concern in its implication for food security, as evidenced by the decline in per capita seafood availability (Fig. 2). Note that the recent, strong decline in reconstructed total catches is also evident if catches in countries with well-established quota management systems (United States, Northwestern Europe, Australia and New Zealand) are excluded (Fig. 2).

Low quotas are generally not imposed when a stock is abundant; rather low and reduced quotas in fully developed fisheries are generally a management intervention to reduce fishing pressure as a result of past overfishing. Similarly, it has been proposed that strongly declining catches in unmanaged, heavily exploited fisheries are likely a sign of overfishing. The often raised suggestion that aquaculture production can replace or compensate for the shortfall in wild capture seafood availability, while being questionable for various reasons, is not addressed here.

The last policy relevant point to be made here transcends fisheries in that it deals with the accuracy of the data used by the international community for its decision making, and the generation of factual knowledge that this requires. After the creation of the United Nations and its technical organizations, including the FAO, a major project of ‘quantifying the world’ began to provide data for national and international agencies on which they could base their policies. As a result, large databases, for example on agricultural crops and forest cover, were created whose accuracy is becoming increasingly important given the expanding exploitation of our natural ecosystems.

Periodic validation of these databases should therefore be a priority to ensure they avoid producing ‘poor numbers’. For example, reports of member countries to FAO about their forest cover, when aggregated at the global level, suggest that the annual rate of forest loss between 1990/2000 and 2001/2005 was nearly halved, while the actual loss rate doubled when assessed by remote sensing and rigorous sampling. Similarly, here we show that the main trend of the world marine fisheries catches is not one of ‘stability’ as cautiously suggested earlier by FAO, but one of decline. Moreover, this decline, which began in the mid-1990s, started from a considerably higher peak catch than suggested by the aggregate statistics supplied by FAO members, implying that we have more to lose if this decline continues. Thankfully, this also means that there may be more to gain by rebuilding stocks.

For the global community, a solution could therefore be to provide the FAO the required funds to more intensively assist member countries in submitting better and more comprehensive fishery statistics, especially statistics that cover all fisheries components, and report data by sector. Such improved statistics can then lead to better-informed policy changes for rebuilding stocks and maintaining (sea)food security. Alternatively, or in addition, FAO could team up with other groups (as was done for forestry statistics) to improve the fisheries statistics of member countries that often have fisheries departments with very limited human and financial resources.

Ultimately, the only database of international fisheries statistics that the world has (through FAO) can be improved. The more rapid decline of fisheries catches documented here is a good reason for this.

What is happening with UN Port State Measures Agreement ? by Francisco Blaha

My friend and colleague Pramod Ganapathiraju recently published a very interesting review of the state of the play of the UN PSMA, and where is it going. I reproduce some of the the main parts below. 

South Korea became the 19th country to ratify the UN Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) on 14 January 2016 (surely as result of the EU yellow card pressure). The spree of recent ratifications is seen as a stride in the right direction. If the present pace continues the treaty might come into effect well before the end of first quarter this year.

UN- PSMA (Ratifications) Jan 14, 2016 Countries that have ratified the PSMA

UN- PSMA (Ratifications) Jan 14, 2016 Countries that have ratified the PSMA

The UN Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing was approved by the FAO Conference at its Thirty-sixth Session (Rome, 18-23 November 2009) under paragraph 1 of Article XIV of the FAO Constitution, through Resolution No 12/2009 dated 22 November 2009.

Progress: 23 Parties have signed the agreement until today  include Angola, Australia, Benin, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, European Union, France, Gabon, Ghana, Iceland, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Russian Federation, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Turkey, USA, Uruguay. The Agreement shall enter into force thirty days after the date of deposit with the Director-General of FAO of the 25th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. With the latest ratification 19 parties have ratified the PSMA till date.

So there a need of another six countries to ratify the agreement.

In this context however it is surprising to see that progressive countries like Canada and France are still lagging behind in the ratification process although both signed the treaty as early as 2010 (Canada and France signed the treaty on 19 November 2010). Brazil signed the treaty on 22 November 2009 but is yet to follow up with the ratification process

Countries that have signed the PSMA but not ratified it yet

Countries that have signed the PSMA but not ratified it yet

This fact assumes importance as five countries have directly ratified the treaty without initially signing it just within the last two months. The notable five include Republic of Korea (14 January 2016), Saint Kitts and Nevis (9 December 2015), Palau (30 November 2015), Somalia (9 November 2015), Costa Rica (4 December 2015) and Mauritius (31 August 2015).

Canada, France, Russia, Indonesia, Ghana, Peru and Brazil should expedite the ratification process so that the PSMA will come into effect as soon as possible.

However, only when countries with big import markets such as Japan, Taiwan and China also become a party, then meaningful change and improved traceability would be achieved. (Taiwan cannot in reality... because is not a UN member country due to China's position that taiwan is actually a province of China)

What is the deal in the Pacific?

The position of the Pacific Island Countries is a cautious one, as the signing would incorporate strict requirements to the already limited capacities of many of our countries.  Four of the 100 main fishing ports in the world are in the Pacific Islands. 

Many of the PI countries believe that signing will result in transferring a disproportionate burden of compliance action to them, while the "rich" Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN) like China and Taiwan keep business as usual.

The special requirements of developing countries, in particular Small Island Developing States and Participating Territories provided for in Article 30 of the WCPFC Convention and most UN documents, including the importance of port operations in the domestic economies of many Small Island Developing States and Participating Territories, supports they posture.

The recent rejection of a FFA sponsored Post State Measure to be incorporated as a CMM (Conservation and Management Measure) by WCPFC in their last meeting in Bali, by the DWFN seem to prove right their fears.

As usual... is more than just fishing and signing agreements...

Pramod original piece is here

EEZ expansions (but not for fisheries) by Francisco Blaha

France adopted four decrees in September 2015 that redefined the external limits of its continental shelf (the seabed and the soil under the seabed that can be included in a country’s landmass).

some countries do considerably better than others in relation to their land area

some countries do considerably better than others in relation to their land area

Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), which grant special rights to resources such as fishing and mineral extraction in an area extending 200 nautical miles (370km) from a country’s coast, are enshrined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which has been ratified by 167 countries.

Article 76 deals with the continental shelf, not the EEZ. The continental shelf's constrained maximum, if other criteria are met, is either 350 nautical miles or 100 nautical miles beyond the 2500m isobath, whichever gives the best result. The EEZ can only extend to a maximum of 200 nautical miles (thanks Stuart Kaye for a technical correction). But it only applies to the seabed and so excludes fishing rights. France demonstrated an increase was appropriate to its territories of French Guiana, Martinique, Guadeloupe, New Caledonia and the Kerguelen Islands, adding a total of 579,000 square km to its surface area.

est toute la France


est toute la France

These special areas are potentially very valuable so there are plenty of disputes. There are many dual claims on territorial waters such as France’s claim around Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, which is surrounded by Canada’s EEZ. Canada and America have overlapping claims in the Beaufort Sea. In the South China Sea tension has risen over disagreements between China and several neighbouring countries. With the oceans covering 140 million square miles (226 million square km) of the Earth's surface, around a third of which are EEZs, there is plenty up for grabs. It is unlikely to be plain sailing any time soon.

The Imperial Residues

Since 1946, the United Nations has compiled a list of the world's “Non-Self-Governing Territories”: overseas domains it considers, in effect, to be colonies. Since then 100-odd entries have come and gone. Leavers may gain full independence (such as Cameroon or Singapore) or merge more or less fully with their parent nation (Puerto Rico or French Guiana). Today the number of entries has dwindled to just 15, most of which are British, or 16 if you include ambiguous Western Sahara.

The UN lists only inhabited territory. A host of other, unpopulated, territories would be open to scrutiny on grounds of proximity, or lack of it: swathes of Antarctica for example. Norway's Bouvet Island in the South Atlantic is the most remote island on the planet, lying furthest from any other land mass. But at a meagre 12,700 km from Oslo it cannot compete with some inhabited British, French or American islands for the furthest distance from the motherland.

Sources: here and here

The Fisheries MCS (Monitoring, Control and Surveillance) world in Auckland by Francisco Blaha

MCS (Monitoring, Control and Surveillance) are the mechanism for implementation of agreed policies, plans or strategies for fisheries management. The absence of effective MCS operations renders a fisheries management scheme incomplete and ineffective.

measuring is always the 1st step :-)

measuring is always the 1st step :-)

In early March of this year (2016), two big events will take place in Auckland that deal with some aspects of this grounding pilar of good good fisheries management. 

WWF's MCS Emerging Technologies Workshop

This event will take place on March 3-4, 2016 in Auckland, New Zealand. This workshop is organised in partnership with the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), the New Zealand Ministry of Primary Industries (MPI) and in conjunction with the International Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (IMCS) Network's 5th Global Fisheries Enforcement Training Workshop (GFETW).

The workshop will allow technology providers the opportunity to fully understand the unique challenges and circumstances faced by MCS professionals working in the multi-billion dollar tuna fishing industry. 

Several new technology providers will be presenting their advancements, including varieties of aquatic and aerial drones, satellite remote sensing, cloud computing solutions, video imaging, and other exciting technological innovations that could play a role in monitoring, control and surveillance.

Moreover, the workshop will serve as a forum to address questions about emerging technologies such as how or if those new technologies might make MCS efforts more economical, efficient, or effective by engaging experts and vendors who have implemented the technologies in a variety of circumstances.

I'm very lucky to have been invited as a presenter on the work we have been doing with FIMS and iFIMS. I'm very interested to see the other advances on these topics as synergies are always an exiting prospect. 

And then the week after we have

Fifth Global Fisheries Enforcement Training Workshop

Where MCS practitioners from around the world will convene in Auckland, New Zealand from 7–11 March 2016 for the Fifth Global Fisheries Enforcement Training Workshop (5th GFETW), organised by New Zealand’s Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) in partnership with the International MCS Network.

The GFETWs are biennial conferences intended to improve and enhance capacity and communications between MCS professionals from around the world. They offer MCS practitioners a unique opportunity to discuss and resolve issues relating to their work and facilitate international cooperation between national fisheries enforcement authorities, which is essential for promoting compliance and thus sustainability of fish stocks.

The 5th GFETW will build on the past four Workshops (Malaysia in 2005, Norway in 2008, Mozambique in 2011 and Costa Rica in 2014), which have succeeded in raising awareness of the importance of MCS as well as fostering new and stronger relationships among MCS professionals. Like its predecessors, the 5th GFETW will promote cooperation between enforcement authorities across national borders, build trust between MCS practitioners and deliver information about the latest, most effective MCS technologies, programs and strategies.

The themes of the 5th GFETW will be be “Toitu Te Moana” (“Sustaining the Life Force of the Sea”) and “Kahore He Wahi Heihuna” (“No place to hide”), as explained more fully in the Prospectus. The focus of the Workshop will be on “Regional and global collective efforts in combatting IUU fishing using effective MCS management tools including enforcement powers to protect the sustainability and cultural and economic viability of all fish stocks.”

Planned Workshop topics include:

  • Case studies of International and Regional Cooperation
  • MCS Partnerships, Sponsorship and Technical Assistance, including government–nongovernment arrangements
  • Successfully-introduced Cost-effective MCS Tools
  • New MCS Technologies and Methodologies
  • MCS Capability and Capacity Building Activities
  • Case Studies of the Utilisation of MCS Tools in Indigenous Fishing Communities and Archipelago Nations
  • Development of an MCS IUU Risk Framework
  • FAO presentation on Instruments, Future Risks and Opportunities

Again, I'm very lucky to have been invited as a presenter on the work we have been doing with the "Landing or  Unloading Authorisation Code" and its interface with the ecds.fimsportal.com 

If any of you comes over, please let me know and love to catch up :-)

The Main Fishing Ports in this world by Francisco Blaha

Ports play a major role in the fishing industry. They give vessels and crews access to essential services and supplies, and enable vessel operators to land their catch. While the vast majority of ports operate responsibly and seek to avoid becoming conduits for fish caught via illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) means some do not . There are ports that accept IUU catch knowingly while others, because they lack sufficient resources, expertise and/or training, may unwittingly allow IUU caught fish to pass through their facilities.

at #79... never controls to be seen...

at #79... never controls to be seen...

My colleagues Tim Huntington, Fiona Nimmo and Graeme Macfadyen from Poseidon Consultants with the support from The Pew Charitable Trusts, just published a study set out to identify the world’s busiest and most important fishing ports. And is avery good read!

I find the ranking quite interesting (at a professional and personal level) since I worked in many of them. And while I had no idea how they compare with others... it was obvious to me that the levels of controls in many of them (particularly the South American ones) where less than expected. 

Moreover, it surprised me the positioning of some of the ones here in the pacific: Tarawa (Kiribati) is the 17th busiest fishing port in the world, Rabaul (PNG) the 40th, Pago Pago (American Samoa) 67th, Majuro (Marshals) 72th, Honiara  (Solomon Islands) 82nd, Pohnpei (Micronesia) 89th. And while I wonder if the results  for Tarawa include Kirimati and Honiara include Noro.

In any case having 6 in the top 100 is very important reference for the work I do in the Pacific. As my colleague Tim Adams from FFA commented: "It would be even more useful for MCS/IUU work if it analysed the vessel traffic at each port (separating national- and foreign-flagged) rather than just the weight of fish landings. The workload in implementing port MCS measures is related to the number of vessels and inspections more directly than to the amount of fish"... 

The authors themselves recognise that: "

The original objective of this study was to segment existing data on tonnage of fish landed (sorted by factors such as type of fish where possible), port visits (sorted by vessel flag-of-registration where possible), and other basic elements that reflect a port’s activity. Early in the study it became clear that such data were rarely publicly available. As a result, the ranking of the top 100 ports (or in the case of China, provinces) by landings tonnage around the world as presented here and in the online Supplement is the product of a lengthy analysis of multiple, incomplete sources. To the best of our knowledge it is the first ranking of its kind to be published in the modern era of commercial fishing.

I'm sure it would be further developed in the future, and is definitivelly something I would love to keep reading and working on. 

Here is the ranking:

 Top 100 ports or provinces by landing tonnage for 2012 (data for Denmark, Indonesia and Viet Nam is 2011)

 

Top 100 ports or provinces by landing tonnage for 2012 (data for Denmark, Indonesia and Viet Nam is 2011)


The EU Fish Market 2015 by Francisco Blaha

This recent publication by the European Market Observatory for Fisheries and Aquaculture Products (EUMOFA) aims at providing an economic description of the whole European fisheries and aquaculture industry. It replies to questions such as what is produced/exported/imported, when and where, what is consumed, by whom and what are the main trends. For those of us that make a living of exporting there, is always interesting reading. Here are some of the things that grabbed my attention.

The EU confirmed itself as a major seafood consumption market with household expenditures of EUR 54,7 billion in 2013. This marked a 1% increase over 2012 – the highest amount ever recorded.

The EU is the largest trader of fishery and aquaculture products in the world in terms of value. EU trade – comprising extra-EU imports and exports, and intra-EU exchanges – has increased steadily over the past five years. In 2014, the trade flow amounted to EUR 45,9 billion and 13,8 million tonnes.

Apparent consumption per capita for 2012 was 23,9 kg, a 3% decrease from 2011. This downward trend has been seen since 2008, when per capita fish consumption amounted to 26 kg. EU consumers buy less seafood but spend more for it, which indicates a change in consumption preferences as well as fish prices.

Values of extra-EU imports have been increasing since 2009, at an average annual growth rate of 6%. In 2014, the EU imported fish and seafood for a value of some EUR 21 billion. Extra-EU imports of seafood are more than 4 times higher than meat in value, and this ratio is increasing.

Consumption in the EU market is dominated by wild fish. Farmed products represent 24% of EU total apparent consumption. Over 3 out of 4 fish consumed in the EU come from the wild.  

The EU is a net importer of fishery and seafood products, with a trade balance deficit (exports minus imports) that has been growing rapidly since 2009. The 2014 trade deficit was the largest ever at EUR 16.6 billion. This was primarily due to the growing import of shrimps, which increased by EUR 630 million between 2013 and 2014. 

The 2014 trade deficit was the largest of the 12 years analysed. This was caused by the growing imports of fresh and frozen products between 2013 and 2014, both of which peaked in that period, due mainly to remarkable import growth in the top six EU markets: Spain (+EUR 280 million), Sweden (+EUR 195 million), the Netherlands (+EUR 179 million), Italy (+EUR 140 million), the United Kingdom (+EUR 127 million) and Denmark (+EUR 96 million). 

Most of the growth in value is due to tropical shrimps and salmon, which increased by EUR 440 million and EUR 279 million, respectively. For tropical shrimps, the growth took place despite a remarkable 17% increase in prices. The 11% reduction in tuna import price led to values decreasing by EUR 260 million. 

EU self-sufficiency for seafood (production relative to internal consumption) reduced continuously between 2008 and 2011. From 2011 to 2012, it increased from 44% to 44,5%. Flatfish reported a remarkable loss – from 97% to 77% – due to a significant decrease in landings and an increase in imports of frozen products from China.

The EU expenditure for fishery and aquaculture products was lower than meat and other foods. It reached EUR 54,7 billion, around one-fourth of the EUR 216 billion expenditure for meat.

Retail prices of fish and seafood have grown steadily in the last years, but the growth rate has slowed since 2012. However, fish prices increased faster than meat and food over the period 2009-2014.

Canned tuna continued to be the most important product in terms of apparent consumption in 2012, with its 2 kg per capita. This was a 6% decrease from 2011, reflecting a decline of canned tuna imports in several EU countries, mainly Spain and Italy. 

EU imports of tuna and tuna-like species totalled almost 700.000 tonnes in 2014, worth EUR 2,5 billion. Among these, swordfish imports reach 18.000 tonnes, with a value of EUR 87 million. The major part of this commodity (73%) consists of “processed tuna”, which includes canned tuna (80%), and prepared and preserved loins (20%). About 23% of processed tuna imported in the EU originated from Ecuador at an average price of 3,87 EUR/kg. Thailand and Mauritius also were relevant suppliers, at average prices of 3,53 EUR/kg and 3,93 EUR/kg, respectively. As shown in the chart below, each had seen an upward trend between 2006 and 2012, but they reported decreasing values between 2013 and 2014, especially as concerns Ecuador.

Imports, which totalled 505.904 tonnes in 2014 for a value of more than EUR 2 billion, represented a strong decrease of EUR 282 million from 2013. This was in relation to a significant decrease in the average price, which fell from 4,53 EUR/kg in 2013 to 4,01 EUR/kg in 2014. The United Kingdom and Spain imported the most of canned tuna. Most UK imports originated from Mauritius (21.000 tonnes), at a price of 3,74 EUR/kg, while Spain imported the majority of its canned tuna (22.600 tonnes) from Ecuador, at a price of 3,45 EUR/kg.

According to the report on the Economic Performance of the EU fish processing industry almost 3.500 enterprises in the European fish processing industry in 2012 were registered, with more than 120.000 employees. Employment in the EU fish processing sector has decreased by 5% from 2008 to 2012. Italy accounted the largest number in terms of firms (16% of the total) while the UK reported the highest number of employees (around 20.000).
Compared to 2011, the European fish processing industry increased its income by 2% in 2012. Costs also increased by 4% in 2012. 63%-65% of the total costs regarded the purchase of fish and other raw material for production.

The law of the Sea by Francisco Blaha

Here is a hard discussed topic, that most of us know very little about, the figure below while does not discuss fisheries issues, is quite informative. Maritime trade officially began in the year 1648, when the Treaty of Westphalia confirmed the ideas set out by Hugo Grotius, who said that the sea should be open for international trade. This evolved further in the year 1982, when the first collaborative effort to establish a maritime security organisation, with ocean law framework in place, was established.

Because over 90% of the entire World’s trade occurs by the sea, it is important for its entirety to be carefully preserved in order to ensure that successful trade is not threatened. Numerous developments were made in these laws that established power over things like general security and trading practices.

Three separate conventions, which had occurred between 1961 and 1988, had resulted in much stricter protective policies to be enacted on maritime trade, especially around problem areas. The control measures that were provided by these treaties immediately resulted in the decrease of narcotics and legal drugs being traded on the black market, but the organisation’s goals are far from over.

To learn more about international maritime trade laws, checkout the infographic below created by Norwich University’s Master of Arts in Diplomacy online program. 

Thanks Mercedes Rosello for the link to this!

Inroads on Fisheries Subsidies at the latest WTO meeting by Francisco Blaha

Policymakers in the 10th WTO Ministerial Conference in Kenya yesterday decided to bring effective discipline in subsidies on fishing to conserve the fish resource worldwide.

Considering that the WTO must play a central role in achieving effective disciplines on fisheries subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity, and that action is urgently needed to control, reduce and eventually eliminate fisheries subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity; Australia, Argentina, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Solomon Islands, Switzerland, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu and OECS Economic Union WTO Members (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines) pushed in a "Fisheries Subsidies Ministerial Statement"  (I think NZ was the main driver, tho)

Their aim is "to continue to seek appropriate enhanced WTO transparency and reporting to enable the evaluation of the trade and resource effects of fisheries subsidies programmes,” according to the statement

The members agreed to reduce subsidies on fishing and recognise the crucial role of fisheries in ensuring food security, employment and livelihoods. 

However, India was not satisfied with the text on fisheries trade that has proposed punitive action for unauthorised fishing, something that many developing countries are not comfortable with given that it goes back on the tentative agreement reached in 2008. This is not surprising form India actually... from all the countries I worked (over 50 so far), none subsidises its fisherydirectly or indirectly via compensations) as much as them, nor have a completely lax internal MCS system... but then, from my experience, I think they bigger and more vital priorities.

overcapacity? 

overcapacity? 

Fisheries subsidies contribute to economic losses in the fisheries sector and create serious distortions in global fish markets and push fisheries beyond their realistic economic (and biological) models. I wrote about this here and here. They also produce serious impacts on food security and livelihoods, particularly in developing countries, and that effectively addressing fisheries subsidies will deliver trade, economic, development and environmental benefits.

The other interesting outcome,  not for fisheries but for other commodities is in regards:

Preferential rules of origin for LDCs

The Ministerial Conference adopted a decision that will facilitate opportunities for least-developed countries' export of goods to both developed and developing countries under unilateral preferential trade arrangements in favour of LDCs.

The decision in Nairobi builds on the 2013 Bali Ministerial Decision on preferential rules of origin for LDCs. The Bali Decision set out, for the first time, a set of multilaterally agreed guidelines to help make it easier for LDC exports to qualify for preferential market access.

The Nairobi Decision expands upon this by providing more detailed directions on specific issues such as methods for determining when a product qualifies as “made in an LDC,” and when inputs from other sources can be “cumulated” — or combined together — into the consideration of origin.  It calls on preference-granting members to consider allowing the use of non-originating materials up to 75% of the final value of the product.

The decision also calls on preference-granting members to consider simplifying documentary and procedural requirements related to origin.

Key beneficiaries will be sub-Saharan African countries, which make up the majority of the LDC Group, the proponent for the Nairobi Decision on Preferential Rules of Origin for LDCs. More information on rules of origin is available here; a briefing note on the negotiations for a Nairobi Decision is available here.

Thanks Chris Lord for the tip on this statements.

New rules proposed for the EU Distant Water Fishing Fleet by Francisco Blaha

The new proposed regulation, will apply to all EU vessels fishing outside EU waters, wherever they operate and irrespective of the legal framework under which the fishing takes place.

These vessels will not be able to fish in third country waters or in the high sea unless they have been previously authorised by their flag Member State, i.e. the state under whose laws the vessel is registered or licensed.

Latest design French Purse Seiners

Latest design French Purse Seiners

The fishing outside the EEZ authorisations is supposed to be already a standard under international law, so nothing new there! However what really interested me, is that to obtain authorisation they will have to show that they comply with a set of specific criteria– for instance that they have an International Maritime Organisation (IMO) number and a valid fishing license, and have not been found guilty of infringements.

The flag Member State, under the supervision of the European Commission, will have to check the vessel's information thoroughly before granting authorisation and will enter this information into an official register.

This should facilitate monitoring and record keeping of our vessels' activities abroad, with obvious advantages when it comes to enforcing the EU's rules. Having all EU vessels subject to the same set of rules inside and outside the EU also adds legal clarity and fairness for the sector, even in the case of private licensing and reflagging.

Third countries will benefit as well from the additional safeguards of stricter controls. And as the vessels' information will be partly made public, citizens will have a better overview of where and how their fish was caught. 

If this proposal is made into regulations (which i really hope they do), then PLEASE, make it a Market Access Requirement condition (claim equivalent measures) for fish from other fleets (China, Taiwan, Korea, etc) to enter the EU market at the same level than the Health or Catch Certificate. That would be a radical blow to IUU fishing.

The Fisheries Professor and the Ecolabels by Francisco Blaha

I knew about professor Ray Hilborn's work before I meet him for first time in NZ, he did a lot work under a contract of the University of Washington and the NZ Seafood Industry Council. He is definitively a brilliant scientist and also has a rather controversial public persona.

Who eats who in the fisheries world?

Who eats who in the fisheries world?

Beyond his work, I appreciate the setting of perspectives in regards the sustainability and very limited total environmental impact of fishing in comparison with other forms of food production such as livestock and agriculture. Particularly as his wife run a organic farm and cooperative, so he also has that perspective really near him. 

His critics (mostly environmentalists and some other scientists) accuse him to be a whitewasher for the seafood industry, but I don't thing you get to be a professor at the most well know fishery university in the world if you don't have a solid scientific background, and his opinions are valid even if you disagree with them.

In any case he has been very vocal on his views on Ecolabels, (so do I, if you care to read my opinion)

In this post I'll quote a recent opinion piece he wrote for the CFOOD (Science of Fisheries Sustainability) project page. You make your own decisions, but the title alone says a lot.

Where is the science in seafood sustainability and certification?

Seafood sustainability is again in the news as the Global Seafood Sustainability Initiative (GSSI) released its tool for evaluating the sustainability of fisheries. The GSSI tool has drawn immediate criticism from World Wildlife Fund (WWF) as they recently published an article titled, “GSSI compliance does not indicate sustainability certification, WWF warns.” 

This is an interesting development since WWF is on the board of GSSI. GSSI is intended to provide an agreed standard for the wide range of certification and seafood labeling schemes. As their web site says “GSSI is a global platform and partnership of seafood companies, NGOs, experts, governmental and intergovernmental organizations working towards more sustainable seafood for everyone.” So who is right in this case, does the GSSI benchmarking tool tell you if a fishery is sustainable?

At its core, seafood sustainability is about the ability to produce food from the sea in the long term. Put another way, we can ask ‘Are the fishery and its management system operated in such a way that our grandchildren can still enjoy the same production from the fishery (subject to the constraints of external factors such as climate change) as we do today?’

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, whose charge is food security, has been a big supporter of the development of GSSI. For FAO sustainability is about continued food production. During the 1990s when overfishing in developed countries was at its height, many retailers supported seafood certification because they wanted to have products to sell in the future… again a focus on food sustainability. This interest spawned the development of a number of different ecolabels for seafood, of which the Marine Stewardship Council was one of the first. 

Wat do they really mean?

Wat do they really mean?

However, the newly emerging seafood ecolabels created their own criteria for the assessment of sustainability without necessarily using accepted standards such as the FAO criteria as a benchmark (although some clearly did anchor themselves to these criteria). While in many other areas of food production there are clearly defined and standards and compliance monitoring bodies, this was lacking for the fledgling seafood ecolabels. This lack of oversight led to the development of the GSSI from a German Government initiative to have clear benchmarking of ecolabel standards.

However environmental NGOs such as WWF are interested less in food sustainability, and more in reducing the environmental impacts of fishing on the wider ecosystem, whether that be catch of non-target species like sharks, or impacts of fishing gear on the seafloor. Of course, WWF together with Unilever initiated the development of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) in 1996, and hence not surprisingly WWF has been a strong supporter of the MSC which is perceived by many to be the leading certification scheme for sustainable fisheries.

The MSC standard covers much more than sustainable food production, and sets a high bar for environmental impacts of fishing and is continually evaluating and then improving the rigor of its own process. Yet some environmental NGOs reject MSC certification because they feel the environmental standards in MSC are not high enough. Even within WWF there emerge inconsistent messages with some national chapters of WWF rejecting the MSC standard.

Due to the support of a broad range of diverse stakeholders, GSSI poses a threat to the MSC fished because GSSI will add credibility to other consumer guides Consumer and retailers will continue to face a broad range of conflicting standards and hence seafood advice. Worse still, within the realm of acceptable environmental impacts, things become confused very quickly as there are so many different types of impacts with no consensus on which ones are more important than others. This is where fisheries certification moves from the arena of science to one based either on values or ‘expert’ judgement.

For consumers and retailers all that conflicting seafood advice is confusing. Take pollock from Alaska, the largest fishery in the US. This fishery is MSC certified, yet the Monterey Bay Aquarium Seafood Watch does not rate it as a top choice, but as a “good alternative.” Greenpeace puts pollock on its red list.

Note: Same situation with the NZ Hoki fishery managed under an internationally peer review Quota Management System (QMS) has been certified by MSC since 2001, nevertheless, since 2010 Greenpeace added it to its seafood red list, as Greenpeace believes “the stocks of Hoki are now considered to be overfished”… so who is to believe?

Equally interesting is the conflict within the Monterey Bay Aquarium’s Seafood Watch itself. Skipjack tuna is one of the largest fisheries in the world and provides most of the world’s canned tuna. Skipjack from the western Pacific are red, yellow and green on the Seafood Watch guide, depending on how they are caught. Purse seine fishing has by-catch of many species and is thus red, while pole-and-line fishing has less by-catch and is green. However, purse seining has a much lower carbon footprint than pole-and-line fishing — obviously, Seafood Watch puts more emphasis on by-catch than carbon footprint.

There is clearly a role for science in seafood sustainability. Science can determine if the management of a fishery will lead to long-term sustainability of food production. Science can evaluate the environmental impacts of a fishery. However, it would be very difficult for science at present to tell you what environmental impacts are low enough – that is a question of individual choice or public policy.

So where does this leave consumers, retailers and the rest of us interested in fisheries?

The answer is confused and likely to continue to be confused. GSSI was held out as a hope to sort out the conflicts in seafood labelling – given the WWF response it doesn’t seem that the eNGO community consider that it is likely that it will do so. However, the development of GSSI is a welcome step forward in that it at least provides a mechanism against which ecolabels for seafood can be assessed.

Highlighting those ecolabels that do meet any recognized minimum definition of responsible fishing (e.g. the FAO guidelines) will be a useful start and at least provide a clear division between those ecolabels that are mere green wash and those that have the potential to drive positive change in fisheries.

Jonathan Wara doing his job

Jonathan Wara doing his job

The most interesting development in seafood sustainability is the force driving certification, and — spoiler alert — it isn’t consumers. Not too many people buy their fish based on sustainability ratings. Retailers, like your neighborhood Whole Foods, Costco or Safeway, do not want the media on their backs or an environmental NGO picketing their store for selling unsustainably harvested fish. They certainly want a continued supply of the fish they sell, but they also want to be seen as supporting sustainable fishing to avoid such protests, and they consider seafood certification that is backed by key NGOs like WWF as their protection. The logical next step was formal partnership agreements with the relevant NGO to advise them on what fish products to sell.

This is a dangerous development because the seafood certification turned partnership becomes a secure funding source for the NGO. Tim Wilson, in his 2012 paper, called this relationship between “friendly” NGOs that provide cover from “hostile” NGOs that might picket a retailer “naked extortion.” If, however, initiatives like GSSI were to be widely accepted, those steady sources of funds will dry up.

NGOs have been an important force in fisheries reform, but it is in the nature of NGOs that they must raise money to fund their activities, and alarmist appeals to stop fisheries collapses continue to bring in the big bucks. News of fisheries successes might, at best, raise an indifferent “meh.”

I know of many private conversations where quite reasonable NGO staff admit the need to find new crises to keep donations flowing. It’s no wonder, then, that, no matter how well fisheries are actually performing, the bar must be raised again and again to keep the story alive that fisheries are failing to meet the ever shape-shifting sustainability standards.

In the immortal words of Deep Throat — Follow the money! Science, poor beggar, has largely been lost.