Although the term "tuna diplomacy" has been used for some time, I first encountered it through my friend Dr. Transform Aqorau. I read about it in 2015 in the book “The New Pacific Diplomacy”, which featured a chapter titled “Tuna Diplomacy" and an article by Transform.
Recently, I used that concept and was asked, "What is Tuna Diplomacy?” I provided a vague description of a vast topic. So, yes... this is my attempt to write and respond.
Before I delve into this, I’d like to qualify my opinion from two critical angles:
I am not a Pacific Islander; I have lived and worked in the region for over half my life (since 1991), so I consider myself a guest rather than a host. I have been honoured to converse with the people I work alongside, but not on their behalf. The era of colonisation, during which others presumed to know what was best for the locals, should have concluded with independence.
I am not a diplomat; I am primarily a fisheries operational advisor. I am keenly interested in policy, history, and geopolitics.
As Transform said: “The geopolitical underpinnings of the region’s tuna management provide an interesting backdrop to this analysis”.
All of the world’s major trading nations are involved in this fishery: Japan, South Korea, the United States, the EU, and China. Japan has the longest history in the region’s tuna fishery, while recently, China has emerged as a significant player. The region’s tuna resources have become a central focus for advancing the strategic geopolitical interests of these powers. Access to these resources affords them a physical presence over a vast geographic area of the Pacific, from which they can pursue their strategic interests aims.
Here is the first thing I learned, which is a direct consequence of what I believe to be the first tenet of tuna geopolitics, particularly in an RFMO setting: “If you have a presence, you have rights.” This tenet permeates the existence of fleets in numbers that may exceed the economic basis for fishing and justify subsidies. It also establishes the next tenet I have learned: “There are no permanent friends, no permanent enemies, only permanent interests.”
Tuna diplomacy plays a significant role among Pacific Island Countries (PICs) and underpins the relationships between DWFNs and PICs. It is often connected to fisheries, historical, and cultural ties.
The two sides' wildly differing economic development statuses impact the interests of PICs. Access to fish is linked to disputes and the imposition of conditions for global trade, equitable development, climate change, and state sovereignty. Yet the “ownership” of tuna harvest rights has led to PICs winning disputes against much larger nations.
However, this perceived "strength” arising from South Pacific regionalism is relatively recent within the context of the international rules-based system. Until recently, most PICs were colonies of America or Europe. Decolonisation took place across the region, commencing in the 1960s and continuing into the 1980s.
It is easy to overlook that the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)—the premier regional institution—was established in 1971. In the following years, its membership expanded as more PICs achieved independence. The Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), an independent offshoot of the PIF, commenced operations in 1979. It is considered the cornerstone of the essential framework that enables PICs to manage, control, and develop their tuna fisheries effectively.
A subgroup of the FFA wields the most significant influence over tuna diplomacy—the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA), which, while established in 1982, arguably began to demonstrate their power in 2007.
The PNA consists of eight Pacific Island nations that collectively manage 14.3 million square kilometres of ocean within their exclusive economic zones. Consequently, the PNA oversees harvesting nearly half of the tuna canned globally.
With the negotiation and establishment of the Vessel Day Scheme in 2007, they altered how DWFN accessed tuna rights and fished critically in the High Seas pockets, effectively undermining the freedom of high seas fishing in those areas through cartel-like pressure: “Of course, you are permitted to fish there… but if you do, you won’t fish in our waters ever again. Your choice.”
However, they crucially revised the South Pacific Tuna Treaty (SPTT) to compel the USA to alter a long-established, nearly exploitative tuna-for-aid agreement.
While the USA now adopts a more proactive approach to fisheries compliance and specifically targets China for its fleet size and political manoeuvring in the Pacific, it was not long ago that the USA played the bully.
Between 1982 and 1994, PICs played a vital role in negotiating, signing, and ratifying the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS consolidated earlier maritime law treaties by defining the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as a 200-nautical-mile extension of a nation's maritime territory while outlining sovereign states' development rights. Regarding tuna fishing, the EEZ grants PICs authority over who can fish in their waters and the fees they must pay.
A fundamental truth of international law is that it only binds parties that consent to the convention, and non-signatories are not obliged to adhere to it. While UNCLOS is the most ratified agreement globally (168), it took some time to achieve acceptance.
The USA has not ratified UNCLOS; therefore, in the early 1980s, American fishing vessels operated within the EEZs of various small island states. From the perspective of PICs, which were signatories to UNCLOS, this infringed upon their sovereignty and had economically detrimental effects. Interestingly, the USA remains one of 14 countries that have yet to ratify UNCLOS and is the only developed nation that has not done so.
To challenge the illegal American presence in their maritime territory, US fishing vessels were apprehended for illegally fishing in the waters of PNG in 1982 and the Solomon Islands EEZ in 1984, which subsequently led to the imposition of a retaliatory (and crippling) US embargo.
The FSM threatened to blacklist the USA-flagged Purse Seiner Ocean Pearl when the crew warned they would drop a speedboat rigged to her boom onto a boarding party after being caught fishing illegally. Specifically, sightings of US purse Seiners illegally fishing within Kiribati's territorial waters were common. Several helicopters used to scout for tuna landed on various outer islands without clearance. Notably, the USA-flagged Purse Seiner Carol Linda ran aground while engaging in fishing activities well inside Kiribati's territorial waters. Furthermore, in 1987, an RNZAF Orion reconnaissance aircraft photographed 10 purse seiners in Kiribati waters involved in fishing. Despite vigorous protests (and evidence of wrongdoing), the US Government did nothing, preferring to view any interference by Kiribati as an "act of hostility". Kiribati eventually responded to the USA's provocations, employing a blend of tact and cunning to apprehend the Purse Seiner “Tradition”. Caught in the act with fresh fish in her hold, the vessel's owners had no choice but to plead guilty. Fines exceeded USD 300,000, and the vessel was sold back to her owners for USD million.
This communicated a message to the other young PICs through the subsequent enforcement of sanctions under the Fishermen's Protective Act and the Fishery Management and Conservation Act. These laws offered compensation to USA tuna fishermen whose vessels were confiscated for illegally fishing in the fisheries zones of other states. They included provisions for imposing an embargo on importing fish products from any country that confiscates a USA fishing vessel for taking tuna without a license.
Unlike the PICs and other nations, the USA maintained (or at least at that time) that highly migratory species, particularly tuna, do not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of coastal states beyond 12 nautical miles from their shores. The official reasoning behind the USA's position is that, due to the vast distances these highly migratory species cover and their crossing of numerous nations’ waters, they would be managed more effectively by an international body comprising coastal states and DWFNs.
However, this occurred during the Cold War, making diplomacy with Moscow a form of resistance. Kiribati, possessing the largest EEZ in the Pacific, took the initiative and negotiated a fisheries access agreement with the Soviet Union in 1985. Vanuatu soon followed in 1986, while PNG and Fiji were included on the list.
This represented a masterful economic and strategic move for Kiribati. Consequently, all other PICs were able to express their disapproval of the American stance on tuna fishing and their intention to pursue similar agreements with the Soviets.
The fear of Soviet expansion in the Pacific—an area that America has always viewed as its backyard since the annexation of Hawaii, the acquisition of islands through the Guano Act, and its occupation during the Second World War—ignited national security concerns not only in the USA but also in New Zealand and Australia. This particularly elevated the establishment of a South Pacific desk in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, an embassy in Vanuatu in 1986, and diplomatic relations with Papua New Guinea.
Ironically, the key objections for the USSR in 1985 could mirror the ones to China in 2025… that is it could lead to the establishment of Soviet military and intelligence bases in the countries with whom they signed the agreements, and ultimately in the whole of the South Pacific.
Certainly, this was rather ludicrous and exaggerated by the USA. At that point, the Soviet Union had been fishing in the WCPO for decades, and importantly, it overlooked the fact that the Soviet Union had maintained a fisheries agreement with New Zealand since 1978. Furthermore, it perpetuated the paternalistic postcolonial notion of "we know what is better for you," suggesting that the PICs lack the necessary sophistication to exercise what is, after all, a sovereign right, which is an affront to their sovereign integrity.
Cornered, the USA ultimately concluded the so-called "Tuna Wars," marking a significant victory for the PICs and tuna diplomacy. However, other challenges loomed on the horizon. In the 1980s, the global tuna industry, following Japan and the USA, began to venture into the Western Pacific due to supply constraints resulting from overfishing in the Atlantic and Mediterranean and growing demand from consumers in Europe and the US.
In 1988, the South Pacific Tuna Treaty (SPTT) was ratified, involving 17 Pacific nations, including Australia and New Zealand. The SPTT provided these nations with US$12 million annually, comprising US$10 million contributed by the US government and US$2 million from the industry.
Eighty-five percent of this total would be allocated to countries according to the quantity of tuna caught in their waters. Simultaneously, the remainder would be distributed equally through aid and various technical assistance programmes.
In return, Pacific states would ensure that US vessels had ample time in the water. The geopolitics that brought the United States to the negotiating table highlight the political acumen of the PICs; however, the collapse of the Soviet Union undermined their negotiating power in subsequent engagements, and the USA began to apply pressure once more.
In the 1980s, global catches of tuna and tuna-like species weighed roughly 2.5 million tonnes. By the 1990s, this figure increased to about 4.5 million tonnes, and by 2010, it was approximately 6.5 million tonnes.
By 2008, the SPTT's contribution had only increased to US$18 million, along with a US$5.7 million contribution from the industry for a region producing 2.5 million tonnes. This Tuna treaty was more than incongruent with the industry's growth trajectory.
An FFA study at the time highlighted that 60% of the global catch comes from within the EEZs of PICs, representing an 8—to 10-billion-dollar industry. However, for various reasons related to economies of scale, geographical isolation, and limited resources, most of the profit generated from these catches escapes the region to foreign canning facilities in Southeast Asia and Latin America, where it is distributed for consumption in the EU and the US.
As mentioned before, in 2007, the PNA implemented the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) as a means to gain greater control over their extensive natural assets by altering how their primary clientele, the international fishing industry, accessed their waters.
Before the VDS, international fishing fleets (excluding the USA) paid a fee based on the expected weight of their catch. This payment method resulted in inconsistent income levels, which created challenges for PICs, as they had limited monitoring capabilities at that time and relied heavily on the revenues generated from tuna.
The VDS limits the number of fishing days per year the industry can operate within PNA waters and requires international fisheries to bid for these time slots to fish. This change has generated consistent and higher incomes for the tuna-dependent economies of the Pacific. Initially, prices were set at US$ 1,200 – US$ 2,500 per day during the 2007-2011 period; however, with early success, price floors rose to US$ 5,000 in 2012, then to US$ 6,000 in 2013, and to US$ 8,000 in 2014, continuing above US$ 12000 at present (possibly indicating a natural ceiling).
Critically, from 2010 until now, the income generated by VDS rents and related programmes has surged fromUS$50 million to an estimated US$900 million.
The VDS was established under the legal framework of UNCLOS, which provided PNA countries with a basis to implement the scheme and exercise their rights to restrict access to EEZs in response to non-compliance.
Except for the USA (which is still under the SPTT), this robust domestic enforcement mechanism significantly enhanced these governments' capacity to negotiate terms and compel firms to adhere to them. So in time, the SPTT became a suboptimal deal within the context of the PNA because it guaranteed American vessels time on the water, significantly lower than VDS rates. For example, in 2011, Japanese fleets paid an average of US$ 6,050 per fishing day, whereas their American counterparts, through the SPTT, paid US$ 1,800 per fishing day.
This discrepancy halted the renegotiation of the SPTT in 2011, when Papua New Guinea unilaterally withdrew from the process and began the nullification of the treaty in 2012. Although a few more years were agreed upon, the end was inevitable.
From the USA's perspective, the SPTT served as the cornerstone of its commercial and developmental relationship with the region, aside from USAID. In the wider geopolitical context, the Obama administration was shaping its pivot to Asia foreign policy.
This "Pacific-centred” policy instigated significant drama and even prompted a process of retaliation from the USA. For instance, a bill was presented to the US Congress on 1 February by two Republican members. It explicitly states, "PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT ARE PARTIES TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM FISHERIES AGENCY CONVENTION"... a genuinely vindictive piece of legislation... a true "lowlight" of foreign policy and geopolitics, and (once again) very indicative of the US's attitude in dealing with this.
To restart negotiations, Washington proposed US$58 million for 9,000 fishing days, much closer to the demand of US$60 million for 7,000 fishing days. With communications restored and a motion passed to extend the negotiating period, an agreement was finalised in 2016. The PICs received US$21 million in aid and agreed to pay US$12,500 per fishing day through the revised SPTT.
Finally, in 2023, the US Congress passed the South Pacific Tuna Treaty Act, which amended the 1988 SPTT to incorporate the 2016 amendments. Consequently, the SPTT was extended in 2024 and is set to last until 2033 at more realistic income levels for PICS. Yet, who knows what might happen with the current government? If things go awry… There is no longer a USSR to leverage, but there is China, which is well-represented and mastering the game.
The primary lesson is that analysing the three negotiation periods for the SPT reveals that small island states diligently defend their rights and interests against the USA in areas such as sovereignty, trade, and international law.
In 1988, the Pacific Islands had inexperienced institutions and little power to negotiate beyond their waters. To encourage the Americans to engage in discussions about a trade deal, they leveraged the external threat of significant Soviet involvement. By 2011, the success of the VDS demonstrated that robust internal networks had been established. These networks enabled Pacific nations to collaborate, thereby enhancing their power in negotiations with more prominent players, including the USA, the EU, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and, increasingly, China. At the same time, they now dominate the bargaining table, compelling others to join the negotiations.
But now China excels at long-term strategy and is undoubtedly familiar with the region.
Part 2 of this blog will focus on China and what lessons from the Soviet deal are relevant to the present.