FAD or not to FAD?

I have tackled the FAD issues before, yet las week, in a very compelling study published recently by the top journal Marine Policy, G.Moreno, M. Herrera and J.Morón of OPAGAC* asks ‘FAD or not to FAD: A Challenge to the MSC and its conformity assessment bodies on the use of units of assessment and units of certification for industrial purse seine fisheries’.

Image from PEW's“Estimating the use of driftings FAD around the globe” paper

The association considers that an industrial tuna purse seine fleet should only be certified as a whole, for its total operations, and not on “artificially construed components of the fishery”, referring to the mixed free-school and FAD fisheries in the WCPO.

Currently, all industrial purse seiners depend on drifting fish aggregating devices (dFADs) for a significant part of their catches, including companies certified by the MSC.

Fish caught in association to dFADs are, however, deemed to not meet the MSC standard and have not been certified.

OPAGAC argues that the certification of FAD-free fish is misleading as the largest proportion of the catch of any vessel comes from fishing operations that are associated to dFADs. Furthermore, the division between dFAD-associated and free school fish is not scientifically robust and can be misconstrued to get certification where it is not warranted.

The main criterion used to separate the two types of school, namely the distance to a floating object, has not been applied consistently by MSC’s Conformity Assessment Bodies, and there are serious doubts that even if it were applied consistently the level of certainty to differentiate FAD-free from FAD-associated schools could not stand up to scientific scrutiny.

The paper also raises questions about the use of species composition, another criterion used to separate the two types of schools, to validate catches. The uncertainty that is inherently present in the current classification raises serious questions about the rigour surrounding MSC-certified FAD-free catches.

“By certifying part of the catch, MSC encourages the misuse of dFADs and does not help to address the issues surrounding their use”,“If MSC wants to improve sustainability of tuna purse seining, all school detections systems (dFADs, anchored FADs, free schools, natural logs and other types of associations) should be included on the certification, Dr Morón concludes.

In response, the MSC issued a statement saying:

The MSC seeks to incentivise the use of responsible fishing techniques – by allowing the separation of tuna caught using drifting FADs, anchored FADs and free school fishing methods, we aim to incentivise a preference towards more sustainable techniques through market preference to MSC certified catch.

In the case of tuna fisheries where only part of the catch is seeking MSC certification, the relevant fisheries and processors must be certified to the MSC Chain of Custody (CoC) Standard requiring that they keep MSC certified catch separate and clearly labelled from non-certified catch.

We are very aware of the risks associated with one vessel catching both certified and non-certified catch and are working with certifiers to ensure that the MSC CoC requirements are effective and adhered to.

Notably:

• MSC certified tuna must be kept separate from non-certified catch. This may involve storing and holding it in different containers, or separating it in the hold using nets.
• The weight of certified catch is recorded along the supply chain to ensure that no substitution takes place.
• MSC certified tuna fisheries may require on board observers to verify that only tuna caught using certified fishing methods can be sold as MSC certified. Observer coverage is often submitted as evidence that adequate systems are in place to assure compliance with our standard, and in some cases observers may be required by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations.

As an example, the MSC certified PNA tuna fishery has developed a sophisticated traceability system to ensure effective segregation and identification of their certified tuna catch from non-certified. It starts at sea with specially-trained observers who confirm that an individual purse seine set captured only free school tuna, and that no aggregating elements (FADs, logs, vessels or whale sharks) contaminated the set.

Free-school catches are then stored in sealed wells, and traceability is required in all stages of the transfer from catch, through transhipment to carrier vessels to landing at tuna canning factories.

Shipments are checked on landing to ensure that segregation and traceability has been maintained, and cross checks are made using data collected at the point of capture by observers and catch composition data sampled on landing. Only shipments that meet PNA’s rigorous testing and checking procedures are confirmed as coming from free school catches and can pass into the supply chain as MSC certified.

No doubt this is a valid and interesting discussion.

Beyond any ulterior motives (there is always that possibility), there is a point (at least for me) in challenging the sustainability brand of a fishery, based on the fact that the same fleet/vessel has a “sustainable” and a “non-sustainable” (or at least not sustainable enough to certify as "sustainable") way to catch the same stock..

If using no FAD, (or one particular type of FAD) makes it “sustainable” and using dFAD makes it "non-sustainable"… So should a vessel using a “non sustainable” practice be certified only for it “sustainable” one while ignoring the other? Isn't that cherry picking?

Should Tuna fisheries be only be certified if they can prove that they have not fished with FADs? Or should be fishing with FADs banned for that matter, if it obviously leads to a lesser degree of sustainability?

Really interesting set of questions, beyond the fact that the MSC certification can prove traceability and chain of custody for each well in a seiner, assuring that only the FAD-free fish get their certification.

I would also ask deeper in terms of the role of “flag state performance” for some of the assessments where vessels from Flags with poor records of compliance are involved. Even if the rules are quite clear and consistent by the regulators, and the specific vessels involved in the fishery are “clean”… but this issue may need a post on itself in the near future.

*  OPAGAC is an Spanish association of purse seine fishing companies operating in the three main oceans (Indian, Atlantic and Pacific)

The Impact of Wasted Fish on Subsistence Fishers

Despite fish waste being a global problem, post harvest losses mostly affect the subsistence fishers in developing countries, who depend on fish for food, nutrition and income.

Back in May, I wrote about a contract with APEC with aim of the project is to develop a manual to facilitate the improvement of the catch condition of subsistence fishers (aiming at food security) by reducing economic losses and overfishing by the deterioration of fish products that were not properly handled, achieving that consumers receive high-quality products.

I'm off to present the resulting manual at the APEC Ocean and Fisheries Working Group meeting in the north of Peru.

The topic is much complex that I anticipated, fish post harvest losses are the measurable reduction in the quality or quantity of the fish produced in a value chain. Losses and waste can occur at varying intensities in different stages of the value chain, which themselves vary across countries, production systems and fisheries.

There are four types of fish losses and waste:

1. Physical: when fish are completely lost from the value chain

2. Quality: when the quality of a fish is harmed (usually expressed in a reduction in monetary value) and is the most common type.

3. Market: when market forces create high marketing and production costs or gluts cause prices to drop

4. Nutritional: linked to biochemical changes within the fish flesh as a result of spoilage, processing or meal preparation.

My friends in FAO estimated that for small-scale fisheries in lower-income countries, quality losses account for more than 70 % of total losses, compared with only 5 % physical losses . These losses because of the processing, transport and marketing techniques used, make the fish vulnerable to external forces.

When fish is wasted, less fish is supplied, meaning less fish is available for consumers. This increases the price, which most affects poor consumers, and limits their access to fish, an important source of protein and micronutrients.

For those working in the value chain, as the value of fish degrades because of poor handling, the reduced market price means their income is decreased. When the quality of fish deteriorates, it is not wasted but sold at cheaper prices to consumers, often the poor. This may create negative health impacts as they are consuming fish with a lower nutritional value or that is unsafe to eat.

Fish loss has gender impacts too. In developing countries, men, women, the young and the old all have different roles in fish value chains. But women are most affected as they do up to 90% of post harvest activities (FAO data), where the majority of losses occur.

Lower-quality fish sell for less, making it a cheap protein source for low-income consumers, who cannot afford the higher prices of better quality products and whose diets often lack the micronutrients present in fish.

The manual I wrote is (in a modest way) trying to help APEC Economies to tackle this problem. The manual is intended for use as a training aid to help introduce and explain post-harvest fishing topics to subsistence fishermen and others actors in the coastal fisheries value chain.

To support this aim, the manual presents as much information as possible in a visual form, for the benefit of fisherfolk whose literacy may be limited. For the same reason, the text has been kept as simple and non-technical as possible.

In compiling this manual, I have split the many interwoven aspects of post-harvest and fishing into a series of individual topics. Each covered in “chapters” intended to convey the information and practices relevant to that particular subject. I have tried to be comprehensive in the coverage of each topic.

The manual has a structure of separate but consecutive chapters, as to allow for training delivery in an integral programme or by chapters. Each chapter has guiding text to be used as “aide memoir” by trainers and illustrations for each concept, as to convey the message without relying only on written words.

• Chapter 1 deals with the basics of good fish handling and is general to all other chapters

• Chapter 2 deals with good fish handling at the time of capture and harvesting.

• Chapter 3 deals with good fish handling at the landing.

• Chapter 4 deals with good fish handling during transport.

• Chapter 5 deals with good fish handling at point of sale and the prior importance of these practices

• Chapter 6 deals with very basics of traceability at all stages

• Chapter 7 deals with the very basics of the importance of the ecosystems approach to fishing.

The pages of each chapter present the contents in a “graphic narrative” with the key concepts of the chapter supported by minimal text and examples of common good and bad practices.

The illustrations are based on a fisherfolk family along with different “characters’ representing fish, bacteria and enzymes. The fisher guides the explanations to his family and colleagues along the manual.

The illustrations are in black and white to facilitate printing, but also to be used as “colouring book” and encourage the children in the fishing families to keep the manual in their households. (I really like this idea)

Predictably, it has proven impossible to avoid overlap altogether. However, I hope that the cross-references in the text will enable trainers and trainees to follow a given theme through the manual, independently of the mode and time of training delivery.

All the illustrations were done by my friend David from Emphasise and Kim Thomson helped me with the research and language

Summary of WCPFC’s Twelfth Scientific Committee Meeting

The Scientific Committee Meetings of the WCPFC are where the status of the tuna stocks are discussed for the members to make the management decisions, and while some advances are made, normally the member that loses the most is the tuna.

Catch in mt of the 4 main species in the WCP

This year the meeting took place from the 3-11 August 2016 in Bali, Indonesia and was attended by around 150 participants. The text below is quoted from FFA's Trade News, a very good bimonthly summary produced by my colleague Len Rodwell.

An overview of the WCPO tuna fisheries was provided using the latest scientific data available. In 2015, the total provisional tuna catch in the WCPF-Convention Area (WCPF-CA) was estimated at 2,687,840 mt, the third highest on record, accounting for 80% of total Pacific Ocean catch (3,379,789 mt) and 56% of global tuna catch (4,799,697 mt).

In terms of gear type, the purse seine fishery accounted for 68% of the total WCPO catch (1,766,070 mt), which was the fifth highest catch on record, but more than 280,000 mt less than 2014, largely due to reduced fishing effort. The longline catch declined below both the 2014 level and the last five-years’ average to 243,547mt, and represented 9% of the total tuna catch. Pole and line catch for 2015 (228,129 mt) remained amongst the lowest annual catches for the fishery since its peak in the late 1960s.

In terms of species, skipjack accounted for 68% of the total WCPO catch, yellowfin 22.5%, bigeye 5% and albacore 4.5%.

The WCPO tuna catch for 2015 was valued at US $4.77 billion, which was a decline from $5.78 billion in 2014 (and the previous two years), due to a reduction in catches and fish prices for all four tuna species. Capacity in the purse seine fishery continues to expand since pre-2007 levels when the vessel day scheme was introduced - 279 purse seine vessels actively fished in 2015 vs. 228 in 2007; total gross registered tonnage was 440,000 mt in 2015 vs. 300,000 in 2007; total well capacity was 380,000 m3 in 2015 vs. 250,000 m3 in 2007. While total purse seine effort in 2015 was 15% lower than recent years, the fishing effort and catch on unassociated (free-school) sets relative to drifting FAD sets increased by 72% and 59% respectively.

Catch per unit effort (CPUE) for purse seine-caught skipjack continues to increase, averaging around 35 mt/day for all fleets, but reaching as high as 50 mt/day for the Korean fleet vs. around 28-30mt/day for the US, Japanese and Taiwanese fleets. Strong

El Niño conditions were sustained in 2015 which resulted in the majority of catch occurring east of 160°E and partially explaining the lowest bigeye catch by purse seiners since 2007 (48,772 mt).

A new stock assessment was released for skipjack which yielded results broadly similar to the 2014 assessment. The WCPO skipjack stock remains healthy, but fishing mortality is approaching maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Scientists recommend that management action is taken to avoid further increases in fishing mortality to maintain stocks around the target reference point (50% of unfished spawning biomass).

Japan raised concerns that the latest assessment does not adequately take into account range contraction of the skipjack stock which it believes is negatively impacting skipjack catches in Japan’s coastal waters. Studies to date do not support this theory.

Bigeye, yellowfin and albacore stocks were not formally assessed in 2016, with stock status’ and management advice reported in line with the last assessments. Bigeye remains overfished with overfishing occurring, with a 36% reduction in fishing morality from 2008-2011 average levels recommended to return catch levels to MSY and allow the stock to rebuild above the limit reference point (20% unfished spawning biomass).

Yellowfin stocks remain healthy, with a recommendation that catches not be increased above the 2012 level and measures implemented to maintain current spawning biomass levels until a target reference point is agreed. Given high fishing mortality of yellowfin in several tropical regions, scientists recommend that spatial management approaches also be considered.

South Pacific albacore also remains healthy, but it is recommended that longline catches be reduced to avoid further declines of the stock and ensure economically viable catch rates can be maintained. Both silky shark and oceanic white tip shark stocks remain in an overfished state, with overfishing occurring.

Improvements in data provision were noted, with the majority of Commission Members and Cooperating Non-Members (CCMs) providing annual catch estimates for 2015 by the deadline. Japan provided operational data for the first time for 2015 and Korea and China for the second year running. Several CCMs are still yet to provide aggregated and/or operational level catch and effort data for key tuna species and sharks.

Under management issues, SC12 noted that WCPFC13 is scheduled to record management objectives for each fishery/stock as part of the development of a harvest strategy framework. To help progress this task, the WCPFC Chair has circulated draft management objectives (biological, social, economic and ecosystem-based) for consideration by CCMs, based on ‘strawman’ discussions held during the second Management Options Workshop in 2013. WCPFC13 is also scheduled to agree on a target reference point for South Pacific albacore (FFA members propose 45% of unfished spawning biomass).

Analysis was presented at SC12 of three management alternatives to achieve a 45% TRP by 2033, with an early effort reduction (immediate 53% cut from 2013 level) identified as the most economically viable option vs. break-even scenarios of a delayed reduction until 2024 (49% effort cut on 2013 level in 2024) and a spread reduction (3% annual reduction from 2013-2033).

The Scientific Committee was also tasked to determine a “biologically reasonable timeframe” for bigeye stock recovery. An analysis of five rebuilding scenarios over 30 years indicated only a full fishing closure would enable the stock to rebuild within the average generation time (2-4 years), while the status quo scenario (current management arrangements) could take 8-30 years depending on the acceptable level of risk adopted.

While the acceptable level of risk adopted by other tRFMO’s ranges from 5-20%, WCPFC requires the risk to be “very low” (i.e. 5-10%). FFA members will present a proposal to WCPFC13 in line with the 5% interim risk level for skipjack and albacore and 10% for yellowfin and bigeye currently considered. Scientific analysis presented at SC12 will also assist the Commission in developing harvest control rules and monitoring strategy evaluations for albacore and skipjack in 2016-2018, as per the 2016 Harvest Strategy Workplan, as well as performance indicators to evaluate harvest control rules and a monitoring strategy to assess performance against reference points.

The tropical tunas measure (CMM 2015-01) requires the Commission to formulate and adopt purse seine and longline yellowfin catch limits for CCMs at WCPFC13, in line with advice by SC12. Yellowfin tuna stocks status is relatively insensitive to purse seine set type (unassociated vs. FAD) and 2015 catches for both the purse seine and longline sectors are fairly stable.

Hence, FFA members indicated that yellowfin catch limits are not immediately necessary, but expressed concern about the increase in yellowfin catch by the Indonesian and Philippines’ handline fisheries. SC12 will recommend that WCPFC13 considers the need for continued improvement in data collection in these fisheries.

CMM 2015-01 includes a provision that CCMs who have achieved a verifiable reduction in bigeye catches by their purse seine fleet to 55% of 2010-2012 levels are able to claim an exemption from the 2017 high seas FAD closure. SPC data analysis indicates that several fleets, including the EU have achieved catch reductions in 2015 greater than the required 55% reduction.

However, some CCMs expressed concern that CMM 2015-01 does not stipulate the period of time over which the reduction has to have been achieved, nor how long it needs to be sustained for. PNA members indicated that they are considering alternative FAD management measures (i.e. FAD charging, FAD tracking) to reduce bigeye catches in their waters.

On ecosystem and by-catch mitigation issues, SC12 noted the limitations in evaluating compliance and the effectiveness of CMM 2010-07 for sharks, given difficulties evaluating the 5% fin to carcass ratio requirement. It also considered applying a definition of longline fisheries “targeting” sharks as problematic, given fisheries need not be targeting sharks to have a significant impact on vulnerable shark stocks. SC12 will recommend that WCPFC13 considers adopting guidelines for the safe release of Manta and Mobula rays caught incidentally in WCPFC fisheries.

if this isn't enough, download the Summary Report of the meeting.

The Traceability Interoperability Initiative

The Use of Regulatory Data to Improve Supply-chain Traceability and Combat IUU Fishing

In the over 30 years I been in commercial fishing, research and management, there have been a lot of changes, but generally, a very stable type of people has been the norm, so I'm excited and intrigued when I see new "people" coming in.

A while ago Jeff Douglas, an interesting entrepreneur from the IT industry, that has worked on various fisheries and marine projects contacted me (along other people) with his 'plan". He was getting into traceability with the focus on the mechanics of implementing and integrating IT systems to enable the secure capture, exchange, and processing of digital seafood traceability data. He produced an interesting and lucid proposal I’m quoting below:

His objective is to provide a “digital passport”—ideally, with a cryptographically provable chain-of-custody—that follows seafood as it moves through the supply chain: from harvest, through processing, export, import, and wholesale, to retail sale.

This supply-chain is a complex one, mixing both public and private sector organizations, at all stages of harvest and handling:

All images are from Jeff Douglas report

What Data Exists?

Traceability can mean many things to different audiences. For our purposes they define it in terms of Key Data Elements (KDEs), and the organizations that collect these. Existing public and private sector databases often record:

It is fair to say that much of the relevant data is already captured in electronic systems (databases)—either by regulators or by private sector organizations. However most exchanges of this data occur in paper form: through printing, scanning, and faxing or emailing of documents. This is inefficient, and creates an elevated risk of documentation fraud or mislabeling.

For both commercial and political reasons, it seems unlikely that a single “grand database” of global seafood traceability data could be assembled. Of necessity, the government (regulatory) and private (commercial and NGO) sector organizations will continue to maintain independent databases. Additionally, there are unique challenges involved in designing interoperable IT solutions: particularly, given the multi-jurisdictional nature of the seafood supply-chain, and the number of participants; i.e. multiple regulators, customs agencies, food safety agencies, the seafood industry, and independent certification providers.

The data is difficult to harmonize. For valid scientific, commercial and political reasons regulators require different KDEs. Introduction of a “global” catch report is, therefore, problematic. However, a standardized extract of catch details—from existing databases—is feasible.

Enabling this process is their objective.

Why do we Need Standards?

The structure of the seafood supply-chain implies the need to develop standards—and agree these jointly between regulators and industry. This becomes essential when electronic traceability scales to, eventually, include all harvest.

They can find technical standards in-use within the cold-chain segment—for packaged goods—but these are largely unknown to fisheries regulators, and have a high degree of complexity to implement. Conversely, many aspects of importance to fisheries regulators do not have accepted mappings—and certainly there are no global standards—when one seeks to integrate this data within supply-chain systems.

For example, there are no globally interchangeable electronic records covering: registration of vessels; recording of crew details/transfers; issuance of licenses, permits and quota; or, recording and reporting of catch/harvest location. Additionally, there are significant differences in how fisheries are managed (the mix of capacity, input and output controls).

This reflects in the differing Key Data Elements (KDEs) required by each fisheries regulator.

A Standards Body Will Fix This?

Yes, and no.

There are standards bodies who can address the technical elements within one domain, but none that act across the entire group of broader stakeholders. For example, national fisheries regulators often set their own technical/data standards (and in some cases, RFMOs or transnational bodies, such as the EU, do likewise). Within the supply-chain, the GS1 organization is influential, but does not provide implementations of their standards in a form easily taken up by fisheries regulators.

Additionally, there is valuable work occurring at many levels on traceability and interoperability, including:

• Initiatives by the United Nations Food & Agriculture Organization; whereby RFMOs and National Fisheries Regulators exchange vessel particulars on a voluntary basis, to assist in building a history of fishing vessels identifiers.
• The Global Food Traceability Center (GFTC) and GS1.org are working to define Key Data Elements (KDEs) from the perspective of mainstream cold-chain IT systems, in a manner that facilitates integration and interoperability.
• Private sector traceability providers have demonstrated the ability to collect data, and to provide it to regulators, wholesalers and retailers—including limited interoperability between competing IT vendors.
• A number of regulators, most notably within the United States and European Union, have published data standards for electronic catch reporting. However, some standards do not address aquaculture/processors and/or are restricted to exchanges via trusted government data networks only—hence, they are not directly suitable for supply-chain use.

All these initiatives are encouraging, but what appears to be lacking is an initiative focusing exclusively on the most pressing gap in interoperability. This occurs at the intersection of the regulatory sphere—fisheries, food safety and customs regulators—when their IT systems must interface with the systems operated by harvesters, processors and the cold-chain.

Defining Success

Our Key Performance Indicator (KPI) can be stated as follows: “What percentage of the global seafood harvest is reported via a regulator participating in the Traceability Interoperability Initiative?”

They have a particular focus on the Top 20 national regulators and Top 10 RFMOs.

Put simply, seafood regulators should be able to implement—at reasonable cost—software modules within their existing IT systems to provide the seafood industry with electronic equivalents for paper documents of record (i.e. fishing permits, receipts for catch matched against quota). Such electronic representations must be digitally signed, tamper-proof, and verifiable. It is of equal importance that these documents are standardized in presentation (i.e. XML schemas): so that industry, certification bodies, traceability providers, NGOs and other private sector organizations may integrate this data efficiently.

Only once this occurs, do they have a feasible path towards true electronic seafood traceability (Additionally, in approaching this discussion, they must be mindful that, despite the end objective being a fully electronic system, there is a requirement for the foreseeable future to support hybrid paper-based, and partially-electronic options also)

Traceability must begin with the regulators: Certain functions (e.g. authorizing vessels to fish, issuing quota, and approving exports) are inherently governmental functions. As such, these functions cannot be “outsourced” to the private sector: yet, this data is critical for the chain-of-custody and must also flow to private sector participants; i.e. harvesters, processors, and customs agents.

By analogy, this role is similar to that of a Land Registry (recording deeds), a Department of Motor Vehicles (issuing drivers licenses), or a Passport Office (issuing passports). In each case private sector organizations and foreign governments rely on the data—and there are well-defined methods to obtain this information electronically (i.e. an insurance company querying a driving record; biometrics embedded on an RFID chip within a passport). The challenge within seafood traceability is to find a similar path towards public-private sector data interoperability.

Of course, our KPI is easy to state, but rather more difficult to implement in practice. They turn to this next.

How do we get there?

They propose to establish:

• An open, non-profit, technical organization with membership extended to seafood regulators, the seafood industry, and all technology suppliers having an interest in seafood traceability.
• To hire a core set of technical experts who will become the preeminent source of deep knowledge on the relevant supply-chain data standards and relevant fisheries data standards. They do not envisage this to be a static process, but one that evolves over time as new standards are developed and implemented by our members.
• To maintain a publically accessible GITHUB repository, which codifies this knowledge through a series of open source reference implementations—widely adopted by fisheries regulators in conjunction with their existing IT providers. (To include security roles, and scaffolding to enable regulators to efficiently wire implementations to existing databases.)
• To maintain a website of participating fisheries authorities: including public keys to facilitate verification of digitally signed traceability documents. (This website will contain only public keys, and redirect links to the relevant implementation by each fisheries regulator. No traceability data is received or stored.)

Perhaps, more importantly, what they are not:

• They are not a primary standards organization. They seek to implement existing standards, and to identify real-world issues as they arise (i.e. different methods of coding fish species), and provide the appropriate data mapping tools.
• They are not a portal or repository of traceability data. They provide only code (software). Regulators handle all digitally signed documents directly. For example; basic vessel details (Good Standing Lists) might be public (where they are now), commercially sensitive data—such as receipts for catch records—are provided by the fisheries regulator direct to the harvester (via web or email)— mirroring existing paper-based workflows. They are not involved in these processes.
• They do not seek to become an IT supplier to fisheries authorities. Instead, they propose that existing IT professionals (whether in-house or contractors) become members, and then perform the integration work directly with their clients.
• They are not an electronic logbook supplier; catch reporting vendor; or traceability provider. However, organizations of this nature are welcome as members (and they anticipate many will wish to join).

Current Status:

They are seeking funding! Once they have this, they will start work immediately—in collaboration with a core set of “early-adapting” fisheries regulators and private sector traceability suppliers (who have agreed to contribute to the development, and assist in beta testing, of the data exchange APIs). Our intention, over time, is to move to a self-funded model: perhaps, based on the volume of seafood processed by each regulator. However, to “bootstrap” this initiative, and prove it’s worth to regulators, they anticipate the majority of early funding will need to come from private sector and philanthropic sources.

Structure & Governance

They propose that all participants in the seafood supply-chain have a seat at the table. Only in this manner can they accommodate the unique considerations of each stakeholder: data sovereignty, in the case of regulators; commercial sensitivities and privacy, in the case of industry; technology choices, in the case of IT professionals.

Different countries (and even individual fisheries) have differing views on acceptable fishing practices. To properly support all participants, it is essential that they not be viewed as a lobbying organization. They can take no position on specific fisheries policies; catch methods; or any other aspect of fisheries management.

Their role is narrow: To facilitate efficiency and transparency within the supply chain. Primarily, through offering electronic/automated means to exchange data that is handled manually, in paper form, at the present time.

Noting the nature of the work, they believe the board should consist primarily of technical/subject-matter experts. They are seeking a balance between regulators (preferably, through their IT suppliers—either in-house or contractors), the fishing industry (to ensure they properly address concerns regarding data confidentiality and commercial sensitivity of information), and the technology industry (to ensure they adopt best practices for all engineering work). Individuals interested in serving in some capacity on the board, or otherwise being involved with this initiative, are invited to provide an indication at this time.

This is a small, tightly focused initiative. To avoid the outlays of a standalone governance structure, they are in discussions with a non-profit incubator. (And will update, pending approval.) The option of joining an existing organization was also considered. However, due to the requirement for strict neutrality on fisheries management practices, and furthermore, a desire to avoid any perception of favoring one participant over another (i.e. regulators or industry), it was felt that a standalone initiative was more appropriate. This said, over time, they might revise this view if another home becomes suitable.

On location, they propose Massachusetts, USA—based on the nexus of technology and seafood expertise. They have received a few comments suggesting alternate locations (all of which, themselves, would give rise to similar questions!) Although they have to pick one location initially, they are open to collaborations with other academic and non-profit institutions, particularly those willing to house developers, interns or researchers performing complementary work under this initiative (our intention in designating this an open-source project is to encourage a broad range of contributors, beyond the core team).

Benefits

The benefits to regulators and the seafood industry are substantial:

For regulators: Our approach can reduce or eliminate the cost of negotiating proprietary data-exchange solutions for each traceability provider, or alternatively, the difficulty in developing and supporting a country (or fishery) specific API. At point of import, interoperability allows the digital chain-of-custody to extend back to the original national regulator (or RFMO).

For industry: Interoperability avoids the cost of integrating and testing with each regulator—using disparate technical standards—and promotes traceability across multi-jurisdictional supply-chains. In particular, lacking interoperability, it becomes difficult to maintain a strong-chain-of-custody, as data conversions are not permitted on digitally signed data.

For IT Professionals: Access to a well-tested, professionally developed and documented code base is always attractive when developing solutions—whether this is used to integrate with an existing Fisheries Information System, Vessel Monitoring System or Catch Reporting System, or to automate exchanges with such systems on behalf of commercial clients within the seafood industry. The need for interoperability is obvious: With at least 40 significant fisheries regulators, and likely a similar quantum of traceability providers, if one approaches this on a point-to-point integration basis, the number of system combinations to be integrated and tested would be staggering (and simply not feasible); i.e. 40 x 40 = 1,600.

Seafood traceability is only as strong as its weakest link: The ability to electronically obtain vessel particulars, fishing licenses/permits/quota, and vessel location/track data (where applicable) becomes key to the entire chain-of-custody. Such data sources are essential to developing an evidentiary-grade seafood traceability solution.

Of specific interest are the Key Data Elements (KDEs) which establish: vessel/facility particulars (“who”); the entitlement to harvest (“what”); and the location of harvest (“where”/“when”).

They are mindful that simplicity is key: Technical solutions that minimize the change needed to systems in-use by fisheries regulators and industry are far more likely to be widely adopted, making interoperable seafood traceability a reality.

Managing the security surrounding this data, so that different participants can receive different levels of access, is one of the key discussions that this initiative is well placed to undertake, with all stakeholders represented.

You wanna know more and/or be part of this, Please Contact:

Jeff Douglas - Jeff(at)douglasitech.com - +1 (617) 320 1326

From Bitcoin to Catch Documentation Schemes?

I know that technology isn’t going to solve all the issues around IUU fishing and slave labour, the same way it hasn't solved money laundering… but if it helps and is solid, I take it!

My project in development with FIMS

I do believe that a way ahead is around something that I have named “private transparency” (the benefits of English not being my 1st language) that works in principle as a decentralised network where everyone along a data chain knows “a bit of information” as part of a data field that makes sense, as long as everyone in the chain maintains their “bit”.

You don't know what everyone else has, you know yours and the ones that want to share it with you. Now if you want to change your data bit, you’ll need to convince everyone else in that chain about that… and unless you have a truly justifiable reason, this would be really complex. So data integrity is maintained along the chain… which exactly what we need in a eCDS (electronic Catch Documentation System) to fight IUU fishing

In principle that is what the “blockchain” principle behind “bitcoin” does: is an information system that is shared between many computers and in which new information cannot be removed or changed after it has been written. In real life, it allows any set of parties to agree on some information and be certain that it will still be in the system in the future. They don't need to trust one another, nor do they need to trust a third party. Blockchains do not belong to anyone, however they can be trusted. This little video explains it neatly

The clever people from Provenance (they call themselves a “framework for knowledge”) have run a 6 month trial that was aimed more towards social claims, but does fit nicely into IUU. Their goal was to aid robust proof of compliance to standards at origin and along the chain, prevent the “double-spend” of certificates and explore how these new technologies could form the basis for an open system for traceability powering consumer-facing transparency for food and other physical goods. The pilot was successful in tracking fish and key social claims down the chain to export

The used blockchain technology, along with mobile and smart tags, to track physical products and verified attributes from origin to point of sale (POS). The first system to use blockchain was a peer-to-peer (p2p) payment system that became (in)famous under the name of Bitcoin, Provenance used the same p2p technology to track a tuna fish caught in Maluku, Indonesia from landing to factory and beyond - demonstrating how blockchain technology can enable supply chain transparency and traceability.

Their trial was in Indonesia is the largest tuna-producing country, ideal for assessing opportunities to drastically increase transparency in fish and seafood supply chains. Conducting research and deploying our prototype in the region allowed us to understand the problems, assess technology opportunities and iterate both the design and implementation of our application for building an important part of an impactful and sustainable software system for end-to-end (e2e) traceability.

There is a rallying call from customers, governments, NGOs and businesses towards the end of the supply chain for information about the origin and social standards of fish and seafood products - to prove their compliance to regulation (e.g. no slavery) and voluntary social and environmental standards to warrant premiums or preferential access. To do so, it is also essential to know each link in lengthy supply chains – the chain of custody of a product from capture to customer, which is what we refer to as traceability. With current systems however, effective interoperability of data along the supply chain poses a large technical challenge.

A centralized system, with a governing third party was, until recently, the only conceivable way to achieve data and transaction transparency. The truth is that no single organization can be responsible for making data throughout a whole supply chain transparent. Third parties like NGOs or industry associations, rarely manage even one of these two aspects of transparency, and even if they could, they would become a single point of weakness. This would make them and their operations a vulnerable target for bribery, social engineering, or targeted hacking. Adoption of such a transaction platform among various third parties would add further difficulties, as the shared costs for set-up and operation would be difficult to apportion and agree on, and benefits to each party are not usually made transparent.

What if we could share the same truth between all stakeholders - fishermen, factories, certifiers and consumers, without giving any of them a backdoor to the system?

Blockchains offer precisely this opportunity. This project explored new methods for enabling traceability - a secure flow of information enabling the full chain of custody to be accessed, including key social attributes such as fishing method, vessel type and compliance data.

Building on the blockchain enables a global p2p network to form: an open platform that can deliver neutrality, reliability and security, particularly in grassroots trade.

• It makes it possible to avoid double-spending of certificates and claims, which is otherwise impossible without a trusted third party
• It acts as the base layer of truth that everyone throughout the chain can refer to in a trusted way
• It allows the definition of unbreakable rules called smart contracts that will be enforced by the protocol itself

This project tested their beta chain-of-custody application to estimate and optimize its impact for slavery-free, sustainable practices in the fishing industry. Read more about the technology and its background in their whitepaper.

There are many initiatives big and small (e.g. mFish, Trace Register, ThisFish and many more) looking to digitise data capture along the supply chain but few have presented a convincing approach for making that data truly interoperable without monopoly. Every fisherman, supplier and factory worker we met had a mobile phone. 3G and wifi was patchy but accessible from most of the towns and villages we visited.

As an alternative to current methods, the Provenance application is designed to work through a simple smartphone interface - either through the Provenance application itself or by linking Provenance with existing interfaces and systems for data capture along the supply chain. The application links identity, location, material attributes, certifications and audit information with a specific item or batch ID. The data is stored in an immutable, decentralized, globally-auditable format which protects identities by default, allowing for secure data verification.

Pilot phase 1: Registration and data collection from the "first mile"

Provenance worked with local fishermen from two different supply chains to help them collect catch data and track it through to suppliers. The respective fishermen sent simple SMS messages to register their catch, thus issuing a new asset on the blockchain with each SMS. Accompanied by permanent, unique IDs, the assets were then transferred from fisherman to supplier along with the catch, in both physical transactions and in the digital register on the blockchain. At this point, the items originally owned by the fishermen become linked to the suppliers. The identities of the fishermen are saved forever in the list of previous owners held on the blockchain.

The social and environmental conditions for the fishermen at the point of capture are verified through trusted local NGOs, whose audit systems validate their compliance to an external standard, resulting in their eligibility to participate in the Provenance-validated chain of custody.

from Provenance webpage

Using a blockchain explorer like morden.ether.camp allow them to check the raw content of the digital asset that represents the item on the blockchain. It ensures the history and any details about the item have been recorded on the blockchain. The system they built is thus completely standalone and, more than building it on top of the Provenance platform, they rather peg a stakeholder object to a Provenance user in order to take advantage of both.

The 1st mile work like this:

1. Registration of fisherman > 2. Item attribute confirmation > 3. Fisherman issues item (catch) > 4. Fisherman transfers the item to supplier. > 5. Supplier receives the item > 6. Checking item on blockchain explorer.

 Pilot phase 2: Linking the blockchain with existing systems

Many supply chain management systems already exist, although most are expensive, large-scale enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems that run on internal hardware or in private cloud environments. These data silos discourage interoperability and open standards, rarely cover a product's full supply chain, and are often unable to capture the first mile from the original source.

from Provenance webpage

Interoperability

Standards allow unconnected systems to communicate using the same language, structures and identifiers. GS1, for example, manages a closed set of global standards for most supply chain concepts such as barcodes and shipping container codes. There are, however, very few standards for identifying individual instances of products or their history. They are working to develop this as a community-owned, open standard.

A unique ID in their system takes the form of an address on the blockchain (this is where I see my concept of Unloading Authorisation Code fitting in). More than a simple identifier, fetching the data stored at that address on the blockchain allows any entity to access details about that particular item. It is thus interoperable by default – as long as each entity along the chain commits its transaction to the blockchain in some fashion, the platform or system they use to access the blockchain is irrelevant.

 Single Source of Truth

To ensure trust in a system, there should be a single source of truth (SSOT) for each piece of information. They propose that in this system, the blockchain should be the SSOT for verifying an actor’s identity, as well as the validity of any certification or attribute they claim to have. It should also be the SSOT for the full ownership history of each item from first mile to end consumer (i.e. its chain of custody) as well as the validity of any certification or attribute associated with it.

Integration details

1. Accepting items / ingredients / materials

Today, only paper records and tags accompany the sale and purchase of items such as skipjack tuna. By digitising the supply chain at the first mile, these items will be sold along with a digital record. The record will be held on the blockchain, accessible to anyone with the unique identifier attached to the item as a QR Code, RFID tag or using any other hardware technology.

2. Registering new or transformed items

from Provenance website

When raw materials are processed and turned into new products, the corresponding assets on the blockchain need to be updated or transformed accordingly. For example, a whole fish whose catch was registered to the blockchain initially will leave the factory in multiple cans, which will each need their subsequent sale tracked separately. They will implement the concept of process as a contract on the blockchain to handle this. To counteract malicious processing, open-source conditions will be defined, publicly enforced by the contract.

Tally-O uses mass balancing to account for the amounts of ingredients used in the transformation. For example, the calculation for a can of Fairtrade skipjack tuna might be 200g of certified skipjack tuna and 10ml of olive oil. The details of this calculation will be sent to the process contract once the transformation has taken place, and the identifier then encoded in a label that will be passed with the transformed product down the chain.

3. Accepting transformed items

Just as inputs were transferred on the blockchain when physically arriving at the factory, outputs are transferred to the next actor in the chain when leaving the facility. Tally-O is connected to scanners that enable shipping management. Scanning labels containing a reference to the digital asset issued at the transformation step triggers the transfer of that asset to the next actor in the chain.

In short, the blockchain provides an audit layer sitting on top of an existing ERP or other data management system - like Tally-O. This allows data to be shared and mass balancing of certified product to be conducted between two separate factories. Even more, it allows that data to be joined with data collected from the first mile in a trustworthy way - providing a true end-to-end record without the need to change existing interfaces to data capture.

Pilot phase 3: The consumer experience and building an interface for trust

The final part of this pilot explored how the information from origin and the supply chain can be reached and trusted by shoppers towards the end of the chain.

To effectively integrate Provenance into physical retail environments, they conducted a workshop and in-store prototyping session with local Brighton supermarket Hisbe Food CIC. The workshop provided significant insights on consumer behavior, influencing ideas for how Provenance technology could best manifest in a supermarket scenario. The resulting strategy: to replace the clutter of traditional printed communication with Provenance online stories and journeys, accessible via in-store tablets and NFC-enabled smart stickers. On the tablets, shoppers can view stories for each product range, seeing the producers and suppliers involved in farming or processing. Through smart stickers and packaging, shoppers can hover their smartphones over a product to track its provenance right on their screens. This system empowers a new era of more conscientious, trusting consumers willing to pay more for products with proven origins.

from Provenance website

Key choices and challenges for Provenance: Towards an open registry for material products, their attributes and ownership

Provenance aims to define open traceability standards for the material world. They do not seek to be yet another solution added to the list of data silos. Instead, they strive to build a system from the grassroots that can use existing interfaces and apps wherever possible - simply providing the first layer of shared truth for the material world.

Public vs. private blockchains

Most well-known blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum are public. This means that anyone can join the network without any restriction to read, write or take part in the consensus. Consortium blockchains then emerged to take advantage of the distributed consensus when it comes to maintaining a shared, consistent source of truth within a business process, company or industry at low maintenance cost. They give a controlled number of validators the responsibility to reach a consensus.

We know that building on a consortium blockchain would be an easier path: they are currently more scalable, cheaper to operate and provide better privacy options. But we believe that the incremental complexity of using public chains is worth the effort:

• Equality: Since anyone can take part, this makes sure we can take consumer input and onboard new stakeholders without changing consensus mechanisms.
• Consensus: Trust in consortium chains rest on an assumption that the small number of validators involved can not collude. They could still however decide to censor certain information if they share some common interest in doing so. Public chains make that impossible, and so censorship can only happen outside of the chain, leaving the core data untouched.
• Network effect: We see blockchain as an empowering technology and want to use it in an open way, taking advantage of other projects such as identity frameworks. Learnings from the early days of the internet also weigh in favor of the public approach.
• Commons: Our goal is to define standards for supply chain data without linking to a proprietary system. We are building a public utility to keep track of our material world.

This task is obviously bigger than them, and one that will have the most impact if it is developed as an open source project. They will welcome industry experts to take part in building the standard and extend our current protocol.

Connecting digital and physical

For this pilot, they linked products to digital assets using QR codes and NFC stickers. 2D barcodes can store the address of a digital asset on the blockchain and can be generated in batches. However, it is easy to copy these tags at any stage of the supply chain, which would undermine the validity of the physical product associated to the blockchain, without indicating it in the digital register. NFC tags can be programmed to store cryptographically secure data - but they aren’t currently practical for use upstream in the supply chain.

They are exploring ways to avoid duplication and identified two main approaches:

• High tech: advances in NFC technology now enable tags to hold a secret securely. This makes copying advanced NFC tags increasingly difficult and double spending for the item more expensive. Prooftag uses bubbles to generate unique tags that can’t be copied. Other technologies are emerging: for example, « nano spirals » are being engineered using electron-beam lithography and are even harder to clone. These approaches are suited for expensive goods for which authenticity is a critical issue.
• Low tech: for some low-value products, secure tagging technology might not be necessary. Particularly when the financial incentive to substitute goods is low or the system makes it difficult. If goods are digitally transferred and confirmed as received using a public blockchain it would be impossible to sell the asset twice for a premium for a certain claim. However, this would mean systems would need to be linked to ERP systems and POS systems and customers would need easy methods to also confirm the purchase.

Conclusions and next steps

Provenance envisions a future where any material, ingredient or product can have an identity, life, and history on the internet in a shared, interoperable format.

This project highlighted the grave need for a common backend to support the growth of a new digital ecosystem for traceability - uniting the myriad of initiatives with a shared language and public infrastructure.

 More than an interface

They came across several great projects in the data-collection space including vessel tracking, vessel registration, self-reporting of catch and effort, independent port sampling programs, Fairtrade data capture, fish tagging, internal traceability systems and apps for fishermen and suppliers all happening in the areas we researched in Indonesia. Needless to say data capture was rife both by software and hardware.

Sharing data securely between different parties is a clear barrier for achieving the level of trusted traceability needed to prove slavery-free fish. Currently, the main solution being posed is for one of the traceability providers to gain huge monopoly - this is neither secure, just or sustainable. The atrocities in the fishing supply chain mainly occur at catch, before the final destination of the fish is known. This means an incentive structure and data system would have to be shared by a number of companies to cover the data capture needed - but this must be a system that supports each fisherman as much as it helps the brands that add their names to the packaging.

 A system for the lone fisherman and the gigantic retailer to come together

The blockchain won’t solve traceability alone and indeed much of our pilot was spent looking at how information could even be digitised, let alone shared or secured. However, it does provide an ideal base layer upon which architectures for robust traceability systems can be built and participated in without ownership by the biggest or richest actor. It could also open up a powerful driver within this system - access to a premium payment for a fish that is of known origin and proven to be compliant with standards.

That premium may manifest itself through Market Access, however the sooner we demand and require proven compliance of standards and traceability back to the source for the food we eat, the sooner we can fuel an engine for change.

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I’m really interested in this and I’m definitively diving deeper. From my work, I’m interested in the legality and integrity of the value chain in from Harvest to Market. Consumers make their own choicesbased on price, brands and ethics… I just want to make sure that what was caught was legal, and that no IUU fish was laundered along the way.

IUCN Motion 53 calling for 30% of EEZ to become MPAs

The Union of Conservation of Nature (IUCN) congress is meeting in Honolulu, Hawaii from the 1st to the 10th September and will conduct a vote on a number of resolutions which it wishes to present to the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) at the time of the review of the Aichi Targets.

Is your future either way...

These targets are part of the CBD’s biodiversity strategic plan for the 2011-2020 period targeted towards the conservation of biodiversity. Among the many resolutions that will be put to the vote and one which is concerning to Pacific Island Countries is motion 53 which calls for implementation of 30% of members’ national waters as marine protected areas (MPAs).

If this is passed it will require all coastal states to close 30% of their EEZs to all fishing in the next 24 years. Pacific Islands countries already have robust management controls of their commercial fisheries, such as the capping of the number of fishing licenses.

Solomon Islands, for example, will be implementing long liner vessel day scheme (VDS) as early as 2017. In addition, Vessel operators in the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) areas are also faced tough fisheries management measures like the VDS, Fish Aggregating Device (FAD) ban periods and the ban on high seas pocket 1 and 2 in the central and western Pacific Ocean which already covers area of around 1.2 million square kilometers of “no take” closed areas.

Therefore, to find themselves "forced" to a further 30% of “no take” MPA is a unfair to the struggling Island economies where the Fishing Industry is one of the few viable income options.

Further to that, tuna is a highly migratory pelagic fish species and has no residential home in an MPA, therefore the use of large MPAs as a management tool for sustainable fisheries in the pelagic fisheries is arguable from the science and common sense perspectives.

The pelagic fish species shift from a protected area to areas where there is less control like the high seas. This could lead to overfishing in the uncontrolled areas. The other area of concern is that responsible agencies for this agreements are not fisheries agencies but environmental agencies which do not deal with fisheries management or understand the science of it.

These types of conundrums are unfortunately not new. Legitimate conservation agendas are driven by developed economies, that have had bad demersal fisheries policies over years (and where MPAs make more sense). Push a blanket agenda (to calm their own fishing constituency?) over countries that have different fisheries model and set of needs. These issues go beyond conservation and fisheries.

Lets watch the space, as the Pacific Islands Tuna Industry Association (PITIA) is advocating

Review of the use of Manual Reporting when VMS "Malfunction"

I'm always enticed by jobs that take you into "uncharted" waters. Here is one by my colleagues at FFA. They are calling for tender from consultants to review the use (or abuse) of manual reports of the vessels positions of in the case of VMS "malfunctions". 

giving less options could be a good start

The aim of the contract is to conduct an independent analysis and assessment in two areas:

1. providing an outline of the limitations of VMS manual reporting in order to facilitate improvements and developments to this process, both nationally and regionally amongst FFA Members; and
2. proposing recommendations to address the limitations of VMS manual reporting, looking at potential technical, operational, and regulatory improvements or developments.

The issue is worrying one, the most recent version (2014) of the FFA Harmonised Minimum Terms and Conditions (HMTCs), which describes the rights and obligations of all vessels licensed to fish in the FFA region as a matter of “good standing” and includes requirements to carry VMS.

The HMTCs allow for a vessel to manually report its position at intervals of 4 hours or such shorter period as specified by the delegated authority. Additionally, under the criteria for withdrawal or suspension of a good standing designation, the HMTCs address the failure to provide manual reports when so directed by the delegated FFA member authority in the event of an ALC/MTU breakdown.

The use of VMS has proven a critical tool in not only detecting and deterring IUU fishing, but also for securing fundamental fisheries management information. However, MCS practitioners have noted that manual reporting represents a significant loophole in MCS efforts because, in its current form, it effectively allows for vessels to stay out at sea, unmonitored, for up to 45 days.

Pew Environment Group recently highlighted that 100 fishing and carrier vessels provided a total of 2,044 manual reports in just the first eight months of 2014 on the basis that their VMS unit malfunctioned or failed. Those manual reports, assuming a reporting rate of every 6 hours, amount to roughly 511 days where those vessels were effectively invisible. With fisheries observer coverage at less than 5 % of fishing effort for a number of fleets, that vessel time is almost completely unverifiable.

Furthermore, VMS equipment and service providers note that these failure rates are much higher than would be expected under normal operation, suggesting that operators are selectively turning off their units to evade detection.

In addition, regional and national capacity to utilize manual reports (data collection and entering) is also insufficient, further weakening vessel location verification and national and regional MCS capabilities.

Thus, given the potential abuse and under utilization of manual reporting and the importance of VMS to both fisheries management and MCS applications, in addition to a pending review of the requirements for manual reporting by the WCPFC in 2017, an analysis of the use of manual reports is both relevant and timely. FFA has partnered with WWF – New Zealand to provide resources for this consulting role.

So If anyone out there, is a VMS technical guru and wants to partner with someone with local knowledge and access to information for this really interesting job... just let me know :-)

EU removes tariffs on regionally caught tuna processed in Ecuador

The European Union (EU) lifted temporally restrictions on Ecuador’s tuna industrya and will now allow them to use products from countries that also have agreements with the EU. Hence raw tuna from El Salvador, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru, which is processed and exported to the EU by Ecuadorian companies, will be exempted from a 24 % tariff.

From Manta to Brussels one way please

In April 2016 Ecuador applied to the EU for a "derogation from the rules on preferential origin", so that its processing industry could consider raw materials originating in Colombia, Peru, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama to be materials originating in Ecuador, "by virtue of regional cumulation"

Without the accumulation of raw materials from these other nations Ecuadorian exports of preserved or prepared tuna headed for the EU would be reduced by 30 percent.

The announcement was made August 17 after the Official Journal of the EU issued the Implementing Regulation 2016/1380 concerning the rules of origin applicable to regional cumulation for tuna from Ecuador.

Until December 31, 2016 this regulation lifts the restrictions preventing Ecuadorian tuna exporters from using raw materials from those countries, which already have trade agreements with the EU.

"Considering the circumstances, the reasons provided in Ecuador's request and the further adverse impact of the earthquake on its fish processing industry,  Ecuador should benefit from a temporary derogation from the requirement (...).

Consequently, the materials originating in Colombia, Peru, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama used for the manufacture of prepared and preserved tuna and skipjack classified in HS subheading 1604 14 and in prepared or preserved tuna skipjack or other fish of the genus Euthynnus of CN subheading 1604 20 70 should be considered to be originating in Ecuador, provided that certain conditions are fulfilled," states the numeral 8 of the EU Regulation.

Some of the basics on the EU rules on origin, tariffs and cumulation can be found in this publication

A day at the Fisheries Office in Noro

Today I will just like to show you a simple day at the fisheries office in Noro (Solomon Islands) where I’m working. No boats landing today so is time to catch up on paperwork plus the verification of the information we collect on a daily basis.

While most of the fisheries news we read are calamitous, I’m very fortunate to know different because of my work. Yes, there are bad apples in every barrel no one denies that… but there are even more people, like the ones I’m presenting you today, that do their best with whatever little they have, and with all the faults we all have, to control the fisheries to the law and help to create the compliance framework that sustainability requires.

Charlene is the key player in the data collection and volumes verification (mass balance) for all landings and Catch Certificates originating from SI flagged vessels. She studied Marine Affairs and Geography at the University of the South Pacific (USP) in Fiji and had been with the Ministry for five years initially as tag recovery officer and now as a Fisheries Officer.

Derick is the chief officer here, he has been with the ministry for nine years and is the responsible for the operations of the office. Before taking over the office, he was in charge of the observer programme. He also has a background in Marine Affairs at USP, (and we share the Dub and Reggae duties in the office!)

Stanley has been with the ministry (and prior incarnations) for an amazing 34 years, and he brings a wealth of experience to the office… he has seen every potential issue and infractions in the fisheries book at least five times.  I have known him for a long time now, and I still have to see him in a bad mood or grumpy… he is a legend!

John has been a fisheries observer for seven years and in that capacity has a lot of experience of what happens in the vessels, he is associated with this office as an official monitor of the volumes of the unloads next to the scales at the wharf. He does this times off his at sea work. I found that observers are extremely well trained for that work, as they have the discipline to spend longtime at the scales and the knowledge on species identification.

We have 1 more officer, Jamie but he is in Honiara at the present, and from next week we will be training 7 new junior officers to supplement this group in the new office.

Again, nothing spectacular, or news breaking about this post. Just good people doing their vital job, the best they can, in a Least Developed Country like the Solomon Islands… and this in itself is admirable.

Back in Noro, Solomon Islands

I said many times that I'm very fortunate in terms of my job (and my life in general!), so here I'm again working in one of my favorite places in the fishing world. A place where at this stage I feel like home: the fishing town of Noro.

I wrote many times about it in the past, here is the last time communicating the MSC certification of the local fishery.

This time I’m here to assist the Noro based Compliance team in their day to day activities. Is a mentoring contract, to strengthen their capacity to confidently and effectively implement their roles, particularly in relation to Inspection and Catch Documentation Schemes. I also will contribute to preparing a capacity development road map for the Noro based compliance team.

My contract is with the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR), through the Mekem Strong Solomon Islands Fisheries (MSSIF) a New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and trade funded programme inbedded into the ministry. The programme has the overall objective of building capacity in the compliance team of the offshore fisheries division.

Needless to say, I’m stoked... is really the Happy Isles

yes... fisheries people

Electronic Monitoring (EM) and Electronic Reporting (ER) technologies in the WCPO

Among the many meetings that take place during the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC, I would love to have assisted to the one on EM and ER technologies, as it is an area that holds the only hopes I have on the regularization of the Longline fishery in the Pacific, in particular, the high seas one.

Big brother is watching you

I wrote about this topic before, and I love that is gaining momentum. I quote below some of the information in an update prepared by my friend Malo Hosken from SPC,  for the recent 2nd Meeting of the Electronic Reporting and Electronic Monitoring Intersessional Working Group.

Electronic Monitoring projects in the Pacific

2014 Solomon Islands Tuna Longline Electronic Monitoring trial

• The main objective of the project was to investigate the extent which video Electronic Monitoring systems (E-Monitoring) can record the data normally collected by observers on-board tuna longline vessels based on the required minimum data fields specified under the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) Regional Observer Programme (ROP).
• The project partners were Tri Marine, National Fisheries Developments (NFD), Yi Man Fishing
• Company, Satlink (the service provider), Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), Oceanic
• Fisheries Programme of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC-OFP) and the Solomon Islands Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR). The International Seafood Sustainability Foundation (ISSF) is also a major contributor through support of the Regional Electronic Reporting Coordinator position contracted by SPC.
• Two CT-4 freezer longline tuna vessels were equipped with a video E-Monitoring system and each undertook two trips under this project. The E-Monitoring system (Satlink Sea Tube) installed on-board consisted of high-definition video cameras, GPS and a central computer to record all events and video footage.
• The E-Monitoring records collected from these trips were analysed by experienced longline fisheries observers using the Satlink View Manager (SVM) analysis software. These office observers recorded all aspects of the fishing activity, including setting and hauling parameters, identifying fishing locations, the catch and size composition, and the fate of any bycatch taken. An independent fisheries observer was also assigned to each vessel to carry out the regular on-board task of observing and recording the catch.
• A comparative analysis between the on-board observer data and the E-Monitoring data is presented in this report and shows which of the required Regional Observer Programme (ROP) minimum standard data fields are adequately collected using E-Monitoring. Substantive recommendations for additional work are also identified in then report.
• In the scope of implementing E-Monitoring technology in all or parts of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean fisheries, logistical and legal frameworks will be required at national and regional levels. The Pacific Community’s (SPC) knowledge and experience in managing observer data and the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency’s (FFA) expertise in fisheries legislative mechanisms mean that an SPC/FFA partnership will be paramount if the decision is made to advance and implement EMonitoring in the region.

The complete report from the Solomon Islands trial is available for download on the SPC’s Digital Library.

New Caledonia

In June 2015, the fisheries authority for New Caledonia and SPC began EM trials on a tuna longline vessel based in the port of Koumac. The International Sustainability Seafood Foundation (ISSF) is providing the major financial support for this project. The EM equipment was provided and installed by Satlink. Three high definition video cameras were placed at strategic locations around the vessel to record setting and hauling operations. One Satlink View Manager (SVM) unit is installed at the fisheries authority in Noumea allowing the analysis of the EM records (raw video footage and associated data). Hard drives containing the EM records are removed from the vessel and brought back to the fisheries authority on a regular basis for an office observer to conduct the analysis of the fishing trips. During one trip only, an on-board observer was present on the vessel and was able to monitor the vessel’s setting and hauling activities. The office observer has analysed the EM records for this trip. The same EM records were also analysed by a service provider (Digital Observer Services). In order to ascertain the usefulness of this EM system, a three level comparative analysis is planned for this trip. Three main challenges have been identified for this project. Firstly, the vessel is based in Koumac which is located 400km from where the fisheries authority office is in Noumea. This means that fisheries staff cannot be present each time the vessel returns to port. Had fisheries staff been available to meet the returning vessel and crew each time, it would have allowed monitoring the project more closely, including exchanging feedback and maintaining good relationships. Secondly, the quality of the video footage was not ideal for mainly two reasons: two of three cameras were placed in locations where they were heavily exposed to sea spray and the vessel’s crew were not cleaning the cameras lenses as often as required and agreed. Finally, the office observer tasked with analysing the EM records also works as an on-board observer on other vessels and is unable to analyse EM records before the next ones arrive. A complete report will be available during Quarter 4 2016.

Fiji

In September 2015, the Fiji Ministry of Fisheries and Forest (MFF) began a five year EM pilot project with the support from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (UN FAO). Currently, five domestic tuna longline vessels are equipped with EM systems provided by Satlink. Six SVM units are installed at the MFF offices in Suva allowing the analysis of the EM records. Fourteen office observers have been trained in using the SVM. EM records are collected from the vessels each time they return to Suva port. Office observers also continue to embark as on board observers on a regular basis on either the vessels equipped with EM or other fishing vessels. Each longline vessel equipped with EM also embarks an on board observer. MFF, SPC and Satlink are collaborating to ensure that analysed EM data can be readily uploaded to the national Tuna Observer Database System (TUBs) database in Fiji as well as the regional TUBs database in Noumea. Comparative analyses between on board observer data and EM data analysed by office observers are also planned.

The Nature Conservancy

In June 2016, The Nature Conservancy (TNC) has launched an EM pilot project for up to 24 tuna longline vessels with Satlink as the service provider. Planning discussions with four member countries are currently taking place, including the number and types of vessels and how to set up national and/or regional EM analysis centres. SPC is collaborating in this project to ensure EM analysed data can be readily uploaded to national TUBs databases and the regional TUBs database in Noumea.

Luen Thai Fishing Venture

Since October 2015, the fishing company Luen Thai Fishing Venture (LTFV) has installed their own EM system on 33 tuna longline vessels. SPC is currently collaborating with one member country where LTFV vessels with EM systems are licenced to provide an initial assessment of this ‘in house’ developed EM system.

eTUNALOG: Tonga, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia

In 2013, SPC developed the Electronic Reporting (ER) software eTUNALOG. Originally designed for Purse Seine vessels to submit the SPC/FFA Regional Purse Seine Logsheet, a module was added allowing longline vessels to submit the SPC/FFA Regional Longline Expanded Logsheet. Trials on Purse Seine vessels were stopped in 2015 as the PNA Fisheries Information Management System (FIMS) was providing an integrated solution for submitting Purse Seine logsheet data and providing catch certification or traceability. Nevertheless, the longline module for eTUNALOG is a cost-free solution for tuna longline vessels operating in the Southern Albacore Fisheries. Trials in New Caledonia, Fiji, Tonga and Samoa are on-going. eTUNALOG logsheet data can be directly imported to the TUFMAN2 database system developed by SPC and used by member countries.

National ER and EM officers

Through support funding from the ISSF, SPC has been collaborating with the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Cook Islands and the Solomon Islands to establish national ER and EM positions within the fisheries authorities. These staff oversee the day to day coordination of ER and EM trials and provide a link between the fisheries authorities, the fishing industry, the service providers and SPC. Two ER and EM officers are also present in Papua New Guinea. Investing in these positions is absolutely necessary to ensure member countries can build the capacity to adopt and manage ER and EM technologies efficiently.

Report of the first strategy meeting of the Tuna Fishery Data Collection Committee (DCC)

In April 2016, SPC and FFA organised the first strategy meeting of the DCC. The future role of the DCC was this Strategy Meeting’s main theme. Initially, its future role was considered diminished by the efforts of the WCPFC, as the scope and range of influence in regards to data are similar for both groups, albeit more extensive for the WCPFC. However, a significant difference between the work of the WCPFC and the DCC is that the DCC can and does provide a mechanism for its members to set data standards above and beyond those of the Commission. It was also recognised that while the DCC has no direct mandate to set data standards in certain areas (the high seas for instance), information from such areas are critical to regional stock assessment outputs and therefore of interest to the DCC. Other noted points of difference were the DCC mechanisms to remove data fields, its efforts to ensure that data standards are practical and its documented explanations on the inclusion, or otherwise, for each data field.

Electronic data collection is now a reality in the region. Often instigated by the demands of catch certification or traceability, the number of e-providers and their areas of involvement continue to grow.

The DCC came to the agreement that its area of focus should be in creating standards to facilitate the development of products capable of delivering appropriate outputs for the regional management and data repository structures.

EM Technical Standards Workshop

In June 2016, SPC organised a three day workshop in Noumea to begin the process of establishing EM technical standards. This workshop was attend by SPC and FFA technical staff, representatives from three member countries and representatives from six EM service providers. Funding support from the ISSF was available for this event. The workshop consisted of determining how the WCPFC Regional Observer Programme minimum data fields for longline observers could be collected using EM technology currently and in the future. The panel of experts present was also an opportunity to briefly list key issues regarding the implementation of EM in the region with an aim to develop and discuss these issues in further detail at a next workshop. Such a future workshop would need to include member countries in the objective of developing a regional strategy for the implementation of EM.

Future work

Regional EM strategy (SPC/FFA) SPC and FFA plan to convene a regional strategy meeting in 2016 to answer the following key questions.
What is the broad vision and objectives for fishery monitoring in the WCPO tuna fisheries?
What advice do SPC and FFA provide members implementing ER and EM?
What resources and support can SPC and FFA offer?

EM Purse Seine Technical Standards
SPC plans to convene another technical standards workshop aiming at drafting the standards for EM on Purse Seine fishing vessels. EM trials on Purse Seine vessels are envisaged in collaboration with member countries and service providers. While there is 100% observer coverage on Purse Seine vessels operating in the WCPO, EM could be used to validate claims regarding set type, thus alleviating any un-due pressure on the observers. EM could also be used to obtain more precise species and size composition data.

Capturing economic benefits from the Pacific’s tuna resources

The annual tuna fisheries catch in the western and central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) averaged 2.7 million metric tons, valued at $6.1 billion over 2011–2015. Of this, around 1.6 million metric tons worth $3.1 billion was taken in exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) members.

A key economic challenge that Pacific Island Countries face at both the national and regional levels, as they develop and implement management policies for the Pacific tuna fisheries, is to maximize their share of economic benefits flowing from the exploitation of the tuna resource.

In this FFA Policy Brief (that I quote below) originally published as part of a collection of four externally contributed articles in the July Pacific Economic Monitor of the Asian Development Bank, FFA's Chris Reid, Alice McDonald and Leonard Rodwell conclude their report noting that Agency member nations are continuing to develop and implement policies at the regional and subregional levels in order to implement rights-based management systems to allow them to take control of the WCPO tuna fisheries, set limits that achieve their objectives, and allocate rights among the participating coastal states.

Taking control of the fisheries

FFA members’ commitment to take control of the WCPO tuna fisheries is explicitly laid out in the roadmap as follows: “The long-held Pacific Island Countries (PICs) commitment to Zone based management provides the key to taking control of the major fisheries. FFA members commit to vigorously assert a system of national rights, within a cooperative framework of binding limits that will be managed under formal Harvest Strategies, including through equitable and responsible reduction where necessary.”

In essence, taking control of the WCPO tuna fisheries involves four broad strategies:

1. establishing rights-based management systems;
2. ensuring that the total level of rights allocated under the rights based management system, and hence fishing activity, is binding and meets both biological and economic objectives;
3. allocating shares of limited rights to participants; and
4. ensuring that fishing activities in areas that fall outside of the jurisdiction of the management system are also constrained.

To do this requires cooperation at the regional and subregional levels.

FFA members continue to develop regional and subregional arrangements establishing rights-based management systems for the WCPO tuna fisheries. These systems are based on creating limits to the level of fishing activity across the EEZs of participating coastal states through, for example, catch or effort limits. Shares are then allocated to these states. This approach is in contrast to

Flag state-based limits (common in other international fisheries) where allocations are based on historical catch shares. A zone based approach means that coastal states, which hold the rights to the fishery, determine not only who can fish in their waters but also how much they can catch. Under a flag-based system, coastal states only have control over who can enter their waters with catch rights being allocated to the flag states. To be successful, the management system should cover a significant proportion of the fishery concerned and impose limits on fishing activities. If vessels can easily shift their fishing activity elsewhere or the rights created are freely available to any vessel that seeks them, the system will fail.

To date, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) have led the way in taking control of the Pacifi c’s fisheries resources through the establishment of a rights-based management system for the purse seine fishery that lies within its members’ EEZs. This system, an outstanding global example of coastal states taking control of a fishery based on highly migratory stocks, is known as the purse seine vessel day scheme (PS VDS). The scheme limits fishing activity through an agreed total allowable effort (TAE) limit across participants’ EEZs. The TAE is then distributed among the parties according to an agreed formula based on catch history and relative biomass.

The establishment of the VDS has seen a dramatic increase in the returns that its members are able to achieve from allocating access rights to their EEZs. Access fees paid by foreign vessel operators have increased from an average of less than $1,500 per day prior to the implementation of the VDS in 2008 (Havice 2013) to a minimum of $8,000 per day since 2015, with some VDS participants achieving average returns per VDS day in excess of $11,000 in 2016.

The ability of VDS participants to attract investment to their domestic fisheries sector has also increased dramatically with the number of investment proposals increasing significantly in recent years. The PNA is also implementing the longline VDS (PNA LL VDS), a similar scheme for the longline fishery within LL VDS participants’ EEZs.

Less well known, and at an earlier stage of development, is the Tokelau Arrangement (TKA) under which participants aim to take control of the south Pacific longline fishery. The TKA uses a similar regional cooperation approach to establish a rights-based management system, setting a limit across all participants’ EEZs and allocating shares to participants.

The Tokelau Arrangement for the south Pacific longline fishery

For a number of years, Pacific fisheries ministers have called for urgent action to address the depletion of the south Pacific albacore stock, which makes up around 55%–60% of the catch taken in the southern longline fishery. Despite efforts to implement tighter management through the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WPCFC), effort in the southern longline fishery has continued to grow, depleting stocks of albacore tuna such that catch rates are often below economically viable levels for many Pacific island domestic vessels.

Between 2008 and 2010, the number of hooks set in the southern longline fishery increased by nearly 50% . However, increases in resulting catch rates were only around half those for effort. Further, average catch rates over the most recent 5-year period (2011–2015) were around 22% lower than in 2006–2010.

Since 2011, persistently low catch rates have resulted in poor economic conditions for the southern longline fishery and forced Pacific island vessels to tie up for extended periods or to exit the fishery. Eleven FFA members, within whose waters over half of the south Pacific albacore catch is taken, decided to implement albacore catch limits and an associated zone-based management arrangement across their EEZs.

The TKA took effect in December 2014 with the objective of promoting optimal utilization, conservation, and management of stocks, by developing management approaches that maximize economic returns from sustainable harvesting of the resource, and increasing TKA participants’ control of the fishery. The TKA allows for the expansion of its membership to include other coastal states in the region, such as American and French territories which are not FFA members.

The TKA commits participants to limit the catch of albacore within their EEZs to individual zone limits, and develop measures to regulate catch and manage the zone-based limits. Participants are now in the process of developing a catch management scheme that fulfills these commitments and enables them to make the best use of agreed catch limits through such mechanisms as multijurisdictional harvest control rules, tools for transferability and reciprocal licensing, and flexible national implementation.

While the albacore stock is currently biologically healthy, if recent effort levels are maintained the size of the stock will continue to decline as will catch rates, with economic consequences for coastal states and their fleets. Declining catch rates reduce the viability of domestic fleets, and the ability of PICs to levy access fees on foreign vessels.

Participants to the TKA have agreed to an interim target reference point (TRP) for the south Pacific albacore stock aimed at achieving both sustainability of the stock and the economic viability for the fishery. To inform TKA participants and the broader FFA and WCPFC membership, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and the FFA Secretariat undertook a series of analyses examining biological and economic outcomes under a number of potential TRPs (see, for example, SPC 2015 and Pilling et al 2015).

In summary, these analyses indicated that:

1. Maintaining current effort levels would result in the albacore stock size and catch per unit of effort (CPUE) continuing to decline, with CPUE in 2033 being around 14% lower than current levels.
2. There was a significant risk (20%) that the limit reference point (LRP) for albacore agreed by the WCPFC (20% of SBF = 0, that is, a stock 20% of the size that it would be in the absence of fishing) would be breached.
3. The use of maximum sustainable yield as a long-term target for south Pacific albacore is seen as implying a high risk of the stock falling below the agreed LRP. The CPUE was estimated to fall a further 65% by 2033.
4. Achieving maximum economic yield, where economic yield was defined as rents earned from the fishery, required effort reductions of over 75%. This would result in the CPUE increasing by around 50% by 2033 and there being no risk that the albacore LRP would be breached. However, this would be associated with declines in catch in the order of 60%.
5. Effort reductions in the order of 25% are required just to ensure that CPUE in 2033 remains around current levels.
6. Effort reductions in the order of 40%–50% are required to return CPUE to levels prevailing prior to the rapid expansion of effort after 2008. At the reduced effort levels, profitability will increase significantly, ensuring the viability of domestic fleets and increasing returns to coastal states from the sale of access rights.

Based on these outcomes, FFA members recommended that a TRP for albacore be set at 45% of the size that the stock would be in the absence of fishing. This recommendation was based on the estimated changes to catch rates, which they view as the primary driver of profitability in the fishery. It was further noted that the proposed TRP should bring about a CPUE increase in the order of 15% from 2013 levels, which FFA members saw as essential to raising profitability and contributing to the development of domestic fisheries. It was also noted that a 45% TRP would return the stock to the 2007–2008 level (FFA 2015).

A major issue discussed at the WCPFC Harvest Strategy Workshop was the uncertainty regarding the path through which the TRP would be achieved (particularly the time frame over which the reductions would take place, and the burden of reduction for each fleet). These issues were cited as primary reasons why a number of WCPFC members could not accept the proposed TRP (Cartwright 2015).

Nonetheless, TKA participants have adopted this as an interim TRP, pending further developments. A crucial issue will be managing catch within participants’ EEZs to a total allowable catch that achieves the interim TRP. Given the magnitude of required catch reductions, and the need to ensure that any reductions are not simply offset by increases elsewhere, these are likely to take time. However, TKA participants, as part of their policy deliberations, are now considering the biological and economic implications of alternative management interventions that will achieve the interim TRP, and have tasked SPC and FFA to undertake analysis on this issue.

Leveraging control and maximizing the value of allocated rights

Creating, limiting, and allocating rights in highly migratory multijurisdictional fisheries such as the tuna fisheries of the WCPO require a high level of regional cooperation and shared policy development. However, once these are in place, owners need to ensure that there are effective national policies for the management of those rights.

Participants to the VDS continue to develop strategies to maximize returns from the sale of vessel days to foreign companies. Some mechanisms being used include tendering and pooling VDS days from a number of participants, and purchasers of these days can use them anywhere within the participants’ EEZs.

Currently, the main focus of FFA members is on maximizing the returns from selling access rights to foreign fleets, or a combination of this and promoting domestic fisheries development. Some FFA members see the provision of access rights to companies involved in the domestic fisheries sector at concessional rates as a means for achieving the latter.

The tradeoff between the potential additional government revenue that could be obtained from selling the days at the market rate, and additional economic benefits that companies involved in the domestic fisheries sector could generate (compared with operators that simply fish in the EEZ and have little interaction with the local economy) need to be considered.

Some FFA members have been developing processes for setting concessional prices for companies involved in the domestic fishery sector that explicitly consider this tradeoff . In seeking to develop these processes, the need to implement a structured approach to the management of national rights was evident.

To assist in this, the FFA Secretariat has recently embarked on developing a guide for the management of national fisheries rights allocated through regional or subregional rights-based management systems using an asset management framework. This guide will deal with a range of issues, including objectives, policies, strategies, and processes.

Conclusion

FFA members are continuing to develop and implement policies at the regional and subregional levels in order to implement rights based management systems to allow them to take control of theWCPO tuna fisheries, set limits that achieve their objectives, and allocate rights among the participating coastal states. FFA members are also developing policies at the national level to enhance the management of their allocated rights, and ensure that they are able to extract maximum benefits from rights that they have created under regional rights-based management arrangements.

More bad EU news for Taiwan

A recently published inspection report by the EU Inspection body, the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) found that the Taiwanese Central Competent Authority (the Bureau of Standards, Metrology, and Inspection) cannot fully guarantee that fishery products exported to the European Union comply with all relevant provisions of EU regulations.  And this in on top of the present “yellow card” regarding IUU.

Let explain this a bit better, for many years I been working on EU market access requirements for fish and fishery products helping countries to access or maintain EU market access in both topics (sanitary and IUU), I worked for the EU itself in these missions and I wrote quite a few manuals on this (see here and here) so I have a strong interest in this topic and I’ll try to make sense of it in the paragraphs below.

The EU market access is governed by two “technical” regulatory sets (Health/SPS and IUU certification) and a trade related one (Origin) that the exporting country needs to comply with. The most complex requirements are with Health/SPS set, so it is fair to say that the “main” authorisation conditions are the ones in place for health certification.

For non-EU countries, the European Commission is the negotiating partner that defines import conditions and certification requirements.

The two main regulations affecting fish and fishery products seek, among other objectives, to protect final consumers’ health and close EU markets from products originated from Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing activities.

Under these regulations all the fishing products have to be captured, manipulated, elaborated, transported and delivered following standards that are established by European legislators, taking into account European realities and addressed to European citizens.

Presently there are approximately 98 countries authorised for exports of fish and fishery products from the health side, of which around 55 are authorised for aquaculture products and 13 for live bivalve molluscs.

Establishments in a third country intending to export their Fish and Aquaculture Products (FAP) to the EU should be registered by the national CA and appear in the list of approved establishments under their own country.

The registration procedure should be undertaken following the EU legislation. The registering CA must also be listed, to guarantee that the structure and the execution of food/fish products are controlled at least to standards equivalent to those of the EU.

The same principle rules apply for fishing vessels (i.e. freezer vessel and factory vessel). Ice vessels and small scale crafts have only to be registered and “approved” (but not listed) in regards the EU requirements before they can be used to supply exporting facilities.

These approvals are not a “one off” event, but are dependent on continuous compliance with the national and EU specific requirements.

Regulation (EC) No. 853/200410, is the one that lays down specific hygiene rules on the hygiene of foodstuffs of animal origin, and Regulation. (EC) No. 854/200411, lays down specific rules for the organisation of official controls on products of animal origin intended for human consumption, and also includes the basic rules for the surveillance of food and the listing system for imports.

This system includes special rules for fishing vessels, factory vessel and freezer vessels flying the flag of a third country (a non-EU country), in order to be able to control fishery products even when caught by one flag and processed in a different country. Furthermore, the regulation requires a Health Certificate that assures the imported products safety at the EU’s Border Inspection Posts.

DG SANTE is the Directorate of the EC in charge of protecting and improving public health and ensuring that Europe’s food is safe and wholesome. It is also responsible for protecting the health and welfare of farm animals.

The FVO is an inspection service that oversees national audits, both within the EU Member States (MS) and in Third Countries. In its function as the eyes and ears of the Commission, the FVO verifies on site that applicable requirements in the areas of food safety, animal health and welfare and plant health are properly implemented and enforced by MS and by third countries

The FVO checks the performance of important stakeholders (e.g. CA, establishments handling FAPs or related vessels). As the responsibilities have been delegated to the CAs and consecutive to the related industries, there are only a limited number of controls carried out directly in the establishments.

The audits comprise checks on legislation, and structure and activities of CAs, and in third countries check whether the national surveillance structure complies with EU regulations.

Third countries, which are considered as compliant or equivalent with EU rules, will have the possibility to import FAPs into the EU. The reports of the FVO for all countries can be found on their website.

Now, the FVO reported on their November 2015 mission to Taiwan, to assess the sanitary conditions applicable to the export of fishery products and bivalve molluscs to the EU.

lovely...

The mission found that the Central Competent Authority (the Bureau of Standards, Metrology, and Inspection) cannot fully guarantee that fishery products exported to the European Union comply with all relevant provisions of EU regulations.

They found out that:

• The legislation was not fully in line with EU requirements in relation to hygiene conditions at landing sites and auctions and on freezer vessels.
• Correct procedures were not carried out impartially by external bodies delegated to carry out official controls.
• Controls did not adequately cover landing sites and auctions, HACCP plans were not correctly assessed, and the CA could not guarantee the eligibility of imported raw materials for the EU market, and in particular concerning the use of reefer vessels for the transport of frozen fishery products in bulk.
• Deficiencies were noted concerning organoleptic examinations and histamine testing.
• A laboratory used for water testing was not accredited against ISO 17025.
• Plus others issues regarding bivalves

And these findings are based only on what the have saw in Taiwan itself… and not in the hundreds of vessels fishing worldwide.

For those of us that get to see Taiwanese Fishing Vessels in the ports of the pacific and others parts of the world, these findings are no surprise. How the Taiwanese Competent Authority maintains these vessels in the EU approved list is a complete mystery.

The vessels are away from Taiwan for years and have no inspections (nor regarding Seafood Safety or Fisheries) by their own staff. From the fishery side, the Port State authorities do it, but by some reason when a fisheries agreement is negotiated it never involves the seafood safety authorities of the licensing country. Even if the EU itself allows for the CAs of each country to have a MoU in between them and do the inspections on behalf.

Of the many Taiwanese vessels I have boarded in the Pacific that are on the EU list, I have yet to see one that is in any form of compliance with the EU requirements, in comparison with vessels from other authorized flags.

This is mostly evident in the Solomons, where the locally flagged vessels are a poster of good compliance in comparison to the Taiwanese landing next to them, yet both get the same market access and the local CA that witness gross non-compliances, has no authority to take any action on the reporting of these neither to Taiwan or the EU.

The most infuriating thing is that the conditions for the vessels are not complicated, and when a developed country like Taiwan does not comply with them, it set a terrible precedent for countries like the Solomon (a Least Developed Country) that make comparatively a much higher effort to maintain market access.

When a country receives a bad report like this one the EU has the chance to close its market to them (like they did with Fiji in 2008). I think that the EU should either go double whammy with Taiwan and crack them from the Health and IUU side, or make the access of the Taiwanese caught products conditional to Taiwan’s CA having an MoU with the CA of the coastal and/or port state where the vessels operate, so it delegates it capacity to the “local” CA to regularly inspect the vessel to ensure that it continues to comply with Community requirements, while operating in its waters and pays the cost associated to this.

In fact, I’ll propose this a licensing condition to the fleets of most DWFN like China, Korea, Philippines as the compliance with the EU sanitary requirements of these vessels is abysmal and because they are not in the national water when the FVO visits, they never see it.

Furthermore, this MoU scenario is contemplated by the provisions of article 15 of the Corrigendum to Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific rules for the organisation of official controls on products of animal origin intended for human consumption, so they can easily do this.

Solomon Islands’ tuna fishery achieves two MSC certifications

Is no secret that I'm not a fan of ecolabels, but I do concede that MSC is the most believable of the lot, since it evaluates the fishery and not the companies accessing the fishery. But in any case, I'm a fan of Noro in the Solomons Islands and the companies that operate there.

Early morning in a Pole and Liner

So I was very happy to know that the Solomon Islands skipjack and yellowfin purse seine and pole and line fishery has achieved Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification.

Certification firm MRAG Americas agreed that the Solomon Islands fishery will continue to be managed in a way that ensures healthy stocks, minimizing environmental impacts and promoting good management under the existing regulatory structure for the fishery, which includes overlapping national and regional regulations including the Solomon Islands Tuna Management and Development Plan established by the SI Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and the Parties to the Nauru Agreement Vessel Day Scheme, and a framework set by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, encourages sound management.

The certification covers five purse seiners and three pole and line vessels owned by National Fisheries Developments Ltd. fishing out of Noro but within Solomon Islands archipelagic waters and the EEZ. Around 25,000mt- 30,000mt/year of the fleet’s free-school, anchored FAD and pole and line skipjack and yellowfin catches could potentially qualify as MSC-certified, the majority of which is delivered to Noro-based tuna processing facility Soltuna, that is covered by the certification's Chain of Custody.

Soltuna supplies canned tuna locally and to other Pacific Island markets, as well as frozen cooked loins to Europe. NFD and Soltuna are locally managed and collectively employ over 2,000 Solomon Islanders, representing one of the country’s largest private sector employers.

To maintain its MSC certification, NFD must continue to adhere to several conditions, including carrying observers on their participating fishing to ensure regulatory compliance, wich they have done for years.

They must also continue to follow an action plan implementing harvest control rules and adhere to documentation and evaluation standards. Also, NFD and Soltuna must continue to ensure the certified tuna is kept separate from non-certified product at all stages along the supply chain.

With the MSC certification, these fisheries are in an advantageous position to respond to growing demand for certified sustainable sources of tuna.

I wish I could link to the online presence of both companies, but they don't have a solid space there. However, I'm really happy to have introduced them to my friend (and almost brother) Raul Sarrot, owner of the design and branding studio Fresfish (gotta love that name!). He is now working with them in Noro on their branding, company positioning, and online presence as I write this. He is a heavyweight in that area, as a university lecturer, a designer and a consultant to the Better by Design program of the NZ Ministry of Trade and Enterprise.

Besides I know him since we are 16 years old (I was a roadie for his band) and he also lives on Waiheke Island :-)

So soon, I hope I will have links for you to know more about this amazing place and its companies. I said thousand times that this place and people are the way fishing should be in the Pacific.

Ocean Security and the World’s Largest Crime Scene

The Stimson Center produced a brief report, as a snapshot of a broader and evolving body of work aimed at safeguarding our oceans and combating a wide range of natural resource crimes and challenges.

Illustration from my EU market access book

And while in my opinion, is a bit tinted with the expected American exceptionalism (particularly idea #3) and a focus on MPAs (Marine Protected Areas), it does provides an interesting set of technology recommendations. I quote them below the intro. (If you were to replace MPA for a wider concept of fisheries management and eCDS, they still make sense).

Intro

Ocean security is important for conservation, but reasons for conserving our natural maritime heritage go far beyond its breathtaking splendor and endangered species. About one billion people rely on the world’s oceans for fish as their primary source of animal protein. An estimated 880 million people rely on it directly and indirectly for their livelihoods. Rising economic powers such as China have seen fish consumption rates increase 6 percent annually on average since 1990. As fishing fleets deplete stocks and expand operations to every corner of the ocean, global demand for their catch only continues to grow alongside increasing populations worldwide. Some estimates even indicate that local and commercial fish populations have been cut in half since 1970 and countries like China worry that a shortage of fish could trigger societal instability among its growing population. This is one of the reasons why Beijing is heavily subsidizing its 2000-strong distant-water fishing fleet — the largest in the world — that is often found exploiting rich fishing grounds around the world.

There is also a growing body of evidence suggesting that our oceans are the world’s largest crime scene due to rampant illegal fishing that is estimated to represent 20 percent of all catch worldwide and represent a yearly dollar value upwards of $23 billion. Indeed, the pillage of the seas’ resources represents a threat to vital U.S. and global economic and security interests.

Additionally, conflict over fishing grounds in Southeast Asia is escalating in a region many see as on the verge of serious armed conflict. For example, Indonesia has blown up over 170 foreign fishing boats caught illegally fishing in its waters over the past two years. Nearly 5,000 Chinese vessels have been apprehended fishing illegally in South Korean waters. Although the Chinese navy has only been involved to a limited extent, some fishing ports have increased their “maritime militias,” or armed civilian vessels.

Technology Recommendations

Technology is playing a large role in developing strategy to combat illegal fishing and safeguard MPAs. Many innovative and unique technologies have arisen to meet the challenge of illegal fishing — from satellite technology and “smart” buoys, to unmanned surface vessels and aerial vehicles (drones). Yet, despite much energy around creating technology to combat crimes on the seas, there are some key takeaways about this burgeoning space that if applied would help skyrocket its real and immediate impact on ocean protection.

Everyone is innovating, but few are integrating

There is no shortage of technological solutions to enforce the maritime domain. Marine enforcement technology for maritime domain awareness, monitoring, control and surveillance and conservation purposes more broadly has exploded over the last few decades. So much so, in fact, that the technology itself is outpacing our ability to successfully integrate it into MPA enforcement systems. The gap is not one of technology innovation, but rather of integration. In the years to come, the force multiplier will be to integrate satellite data with mobile technology, unmanned systems, radars, enforcement buoys and the like to protect a given MPA. As such, the guiding principle is innovation through integration and finding new value for what already exists.

Surveillance is not deterrence

Deterrence, the act of preventing a particular act or behavior from happening, is critical to the success of any enforcement system. For deterrence to work, it requires a number of ingredients, including defined rules of law, tools for monitoring lawbreakers, and credible threats of interception and prosecution.

The conservation and development communities have long struggled with implementing effective deterrence to protect MPAs, often citing operating environments with low capacity and high corruption as key challenges. However, the main problem is not that of the operating environment, it is a misunderstanding of the tools needed for successful deterrence. Surveillance technology, the category into which most MPA enforcement technology falls, including satellite imagery, acoustic sensors, and onboard observation technology, does not alone create deterrence. It must be accompanied with enforcement technology - tools for interception and prosecution - to effectively deter criminals.

Work with what you’ve got, not with what you want

Technology is only as good as its user, a fact on display in many MPA enforcement technology projects that have tried, and failed, to implement advanced technology for oceans protection. All too often, these technology projects fail to evaluate the existing technological capabilities of a given MPA enforcement system which results in the transmission of technology ill-suited to the realities on the ground.

Instead of deploying the most advanced technological solutions – underwater drones, high definition satellite imagery and top of the line aircraft - to protect MPAs, capacity builders must engage in bottom up approaches that meet users where they are, technologically speaking.

For an MPA with limited resources and personnel, the first step in increasing the capacity of rangers to enforce the MPA may be a simple mobile app to download on their cell phones into which they can track their patrols, any sightings of unregistered vessels and fish population data, for example. While simpler technology than drones and radars, customized solutions that build on existing levels of capacity lay the groundwork for robust technological systems without requiring huge investments of resources or training for the rangers. “Low tech, bottom up technology holds the key to gradually and sustainably building capacity from the ground up to protect MPAs.

Find honest technology brokers

The world is seemingly at the precipice of a new era of safeguarding MPAs and combating illegal fishing. This era, however, will consist of a long journey to reach our goals for oceans protection and MPA enforcement. Yet too many technology projects are led or influenced by short term support dictated by election cycles, donor support or private sector companies with outdated business models.

Technology plans are often designed for short term fixes instead of longer term solutions without interoperability in mind. Part of the solution to this challenge is to identify professionals who understand sensor fusion and longer term technology integration. They exist at universities around the world and are excellent honest technology brokers when designing and deploying technology projects that can outlive their makers.

Technology needs to be multi-use

To avoid duplication of efforts and be successfully integrated into the existing enforcement systems of a given country, technology for MPA enforcement must be able to be used for multiple purposes. Multi-use technology saves resources and increases partnerships and buy-in from adjacent communities. In countries with piracy or human and drug maritime smuggling operations, technology that combats illegal fishing must also be connected to and used for combating these additional threats. In those gathering meteorological data, enforcement buoys can double as observation buoys that gather and report information on water temperature.

Technology that can be customized to serve multiple uses is much more valuable than “silver bullet” technology that is designed to only do one specific task.

Making the wrong conclusion from “failure”

Some technology projects in the illegal fishing world are failing. Yet within those failures are important lessons. In the technology world, these attempts would be called prototyping or a step toward success, in which failure, to some degree, is expected. Relatively new to technology, however, the oceans community is struggling to come to the right conclusions about their technology failures, and is missing opportunities to learn and share lessons learned from them.

In one example of such a “failure,” a partnership between NGOs, military and the private sector formed to implement a high technology solution to combat both illegal fishing and maritime drug trafficking in a remote MPA. It was a pioneer in both its innovative partnership structure and in its technological design.

Initially lauded as a success, the project experienced difficulties likely due to a combination of its remote location, a new partnership with unfamiliar actors, and the fact that it is truly a prototype technology for what it is being asked to do.

Instead of discussing the challenges facing this project openly, however, some in the oceans community speak of its failure as an open secret from which there is nothing to be learned.

The project itself holds interesting information for future technology projects. First of all, the partnership between private and public sector bodies appears to have been a success. The same goes for that between the conservation and military communities. These partnerships are monumental for an issue on which progress, as discussed in the policy recommendations above, is stymied by artificial silos and a “once burned twice shy” attitude about working across sectors.

The desire for immediate success of MPA enforcement technology projects hinders the ability of the oceans community to draw the right conclusions about successes or failures, and slows down the institutional learning process. In the above example, the “failed” project shows a successful understanding of the need for cross-sector partnerships and multi-use, customized technology. This story needs to be heard even when the technology fails or is temporarily struggling.

Early action analysis for a potential La Niña in 2016 – 2017

I wrote before about the impact of "El Niño" in fish distribution. This time, is the other way around, with early warning for a "La Niña".

FAO just produced a small report aiming to consolidate information on La Niña’s potential impacts on agriculture and food security, specifically in the regions which are now dealing
with the consequences of EL Niño, and to provide early action recommendations in the agriculture sector to either reap the beneficial outcomes of La Niña, or prevent, mitigate and prepare for its negative effects.

What is La Niña?
La Niña is the cooling of sea surface temperatures in the tropical Pacific, which occurs roughly every three to five years, lasting from six to 24 months. The chances of La Niña following an El Niño episode are higher on average — half of the El Niño events are followed by a La Niña — and typically it affects global climate patterns in the opposite way El Niño does. The intensity of the La Niña climatic phenomenon generally peaks between October and January.

What is the current forecast for La Niña?
Current forecasts indicate that there is a 55 to 70 percent chance of a La Niña episode developing towards the end of 2016, with a slightly lower chance that the onset may occur as early as July. The timing of a La Niña onset is key to determine how its consequences will impact on agriculture.

What are the main consequences of La Niña for agriculture and food security?
A La Niña phenomena generally affects the same regions that are impacted by El Niño, with opposite climatic consequences. Areas which experienced dry conditions (below-average rainfall and/or increased temperature) during El Niño, for instance, tend to receive above-average rainfall and in some cases cooler temperatures.

The diagram illustrates a potential timeline of La Niña-induced impacts across different regions based on the usual pattern observed during La Niña years.

While the climatic phenomenon usually peaks in intensity between October and January, changes to climatic patterns and their related impacts on food security and agriculture can happen both before and after the peak. It’s possible that La Niña could develop as early as July, in which case it might already start affecting the growing seasons in some parts of the world from September 2016.

Consequences of La Niña on agriculture and food security can be both positive and negative. The positive effects derive from the increased likelihood of above average rainfall which could improve pasture and crop yields. At the same time, if the above-average rainfall results in flooding, then clearly the results may be negative as in this case there is an increased incidence of seeds being washed away, landslides, crops destroyed and livestock morbidity and mortality.

Since La Niña would most likely impact regions that have already been affected by El Niño, the food security situation could further deteriorate and protract into 2018. In the event of a “positive” La Niña, it is important to highlight that the actual full effect of an above average rainfall will not be felt until the next harvest — i.e. the end of 2016 (if La Niña comes early) or by mid-2017 (if La Niña occurs later).

Fisheries wise, the main effect could be the concentration of catches on the Westen side of the Pacific, in contrast to last years' "El Niño" when the fish was in the Central and East Pacific. (Hence my friends in the transhipment ports in PNG, RMI and FSM will have a busy season)

But consequences would vary widely across the Pacific. One of the main potential benefits would be the reduced likelihood of hurricanes in the northeast Pacific.

For a bigger picture of both "Niños" see this post from last year "Climate Change and Fisheries"

CDS Practices and applicability in combating IUU fishing

In the latest GLOBEFISH Highlights | April 2016 my friend and colleague Gilles Hosch wrote a special feature on Catch Documentation Schemes. He is, in my opinion, "the" expert on the topic and I'm very proud (and relieved) that we share most views on the issue.

He has been working been working on a ABNJ / FAO study onDesign Options for the Development of Tuna Catch Documentation Schemes, that I had the honor of having one of the 1st reads. When published, it would be the most comprehensive document on the topic worldwide. I’ll definitively be posting about it.

In the meantime, here is the content of the present article.

Introduction: IUU fishing and CDS systems

Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is not a simple challenge. What act or action constitutes IUU fishing, and what does not? In general, IUU fishing is often complex, making it difficult to define. Owing to its multi-dimensional, illegal and concealed nature, IUU fishing is also difficult to quantify. We do know however, that IUU fishing is systemic in many fisheries worldwide, and it has been shown that the weaker the governance of a country, the likelier and more serious the incidence of IUU fishing. IUU fishing is one of the key challenges to be overcome in order to achieve sustainably managed fisheries.

Catch documentation schemes (CDS) are market-related measures that have been developed specifically to combat IUU fishing. An official definition is as follows:

"A system that tracks and traces fish from the point of capture through unloading and throughout the supply chain. A CDS records and certifies information that identifies the origin of fish caught and ensures they were harvested in a manner consistent with relevant national, regional and international conservation and management measures. The objective of the CDS is to combat IUU fishing by limiting access of IUU fish and fishery products to markets."
(Report of the Expert Consultation on Catch documentation Schemes, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Report No. 1120, July 2015)

This positions a CDS as a market-based Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) tool, which can be applied by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMO), individual countries, or regional economic blocks, such as the EU.

Existing CDS schemes

There are two fundamentally different types of CDS in operation today. The first type, which covers the initial CDS that were developed and deployed, are so-called multilateral schemes and have been put in place by RFMOs.

This first type of CDS in existence includes:

• A CDS covering two species of Toothfish (or Chilean Seabass) harvested in Antarctic waters, introduced in 2000 by the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
• A CDS covering Atlantic Bluefin tuna, introduced in 2008 by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)
• A CDS covering Southern Bluefin tuna, introduced in 2010 by the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT)

While the CCAMLR CDS may now claim to be reaching "adulthood", both tuna CDS are still fairly recent.

The second type of CDS is the unilateral type, which is put in place by a single country (or union of countries). There is only one single such scheme in existence today, the EU's Catch Certification Scheme introduced in 2008 through the so-called EU IUU Regulation, and implemented as of January 2010. The EU CDS covers all marine wild caught fish (with some minor exemptions) traded by non-EU countries into the EU market.

The USA is in the process of developing its own CDS, most details of which remain to be revealed. However, it would appear that it will differ markedly from the EU scheme, in that it will only target "at-risk" fisheries, and thus the US CDS is unlikely to apply to all wild capture seafood imported into the USA.

Multilateral versus unilateral schemes and implications

The design of the two models is fundamentally different. RFMO CDS are based on RFMO rules, which have the standing of international law. They are technically understood to embody multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). RFMO CDS, once in place, must be followed and complied with by any and all parties participating in the fishing, the processing and the trading of these resources. This means that an RFMO CDS is applied to the entire stock or species under the RFMO's management mandate, and certificates issued under the scheme must accompany all products along all supply chain stops, all the way into end-markets. Through this mode of action, the entire stock covered by the CDS benefits from the protection conferred by the scheme. The CDS is therefore an integral management tool within the suite of conservation and management measures put in place by the RFMO to manage the fishery.

In contrast, the unilateral CDS regulates primarily what may enter into an end-market, not how or what comes out of a fishery. Based on national law, the unilateral CDS can only propose rules for those products that enter its market. Compliance with rules is established by looking backwards into the supply chain by trying to determine whether products have been harvested in accordance to national, regional or international rules, at the point in time when products arrive at the border. This back-tracing process implies that verifiable traceability in these systems must be very solid in order for the back-tracing to be meaningful and achievable. Unilateral schemes do not cover all fish harvested in any given fishery, only the fraction traded into (or through) their market.

A sanctioning procedure is also enshrined within the EU IUU Regulation, and this procedure has received most attention since its first use towards the end of 2012. This is the so-called "identification procedure", through which the EU Commission may identify any non-EU country as "non-cooperating". This status may be conferred to any country for any perceived shortcoming in living up to its international obligations – specifically from a flag State perspective – including (but not limited to) non-compliance with the EU CDS. This process is now widely referred to as the EU's "yellow and red card system". A country stands warned at receiving a yellow card, and if no satisfactory change occurs within a specified period of time, it may be red carded. The red card implies that a trade embargo on seafood products from such a country – in its capacity as a flag State – is enacted, and that no products originating from its vessels may be exported to the EU anymore. This procedure is technically separate from the CDS, and a large number of countries that have been yellow carded to date have not been identified for any established shortcoming in complying with the CDS rules.

Evidence for impacts of CDS systems on IUU fishing

In the ICCAT and CCSBT Bluefin tuna fisheries where CDS systems were implemented, IUU fishing related chiefly to endemic underreporting by otherwise legal operators. Ten years ago, many researchers thought that both Atlantic and Southern Bluefin tuna species were evolving at the edge of stock collapse. The amounts of underreporting by regular ICCAT Members were sometimes estimated to exceed by more than triple the official allocated quota.

It is thought that the endemic underreporting in both Bluefin fisheries has been scaled back to the largest extent since the coming into force of the two tuna CDS. Strong scientific evidence that the IUU catch of the Eastern Atlantic Bluefin stock dropped sharply after 2008, and that catches fell in line with TACs has been provided by ICCAT's Standing Committee on Research and Statistics in late 2014. While other novel management and control measures were also introduced in ICCAT and CCSBT before and since CDS introduction, the CDS is the most effective enforcement mechanism capable of directly targeting and eliminating underreporting.

In CCAMLR, IUU fishing for Toothfish in the Convention Area by non-licensed "pirate" vessels was the most pressing issue, and IUU incidence in the late nineties was estimated to exceed official catches by more than double before the putting in place of the CDS.

In 2015, the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO) estimated the fraction of IUU catch to be 6% of the total annual harvest, crediting the CDS as one of a mix of effective enforcement actions instrumental in achieving this result.

If the EU IUU Regulation was effective in eliminating IUU fish from entering its market, important changes in trade patterns would likely have occurred since its entry into force. Some analysts believe that up to a third of imports – an estimate of how much IUU fish was entering the EU at the time of launching its CDS – would have been substituted by either similar products from other sources, or some product categories would have been gradually substituted for other categories altogether.

Based on the analysis of trade statistics and discussions with EU traders and Member States authorities, a study commissioned by the EU Commission published in 2014 found that no significant impact on trade in relation with the IUU Regulation could be detected. This finding suggests that the expected effect of the CDS may have remained elusive, and that levels of illegal fisheries products similar to previous levels continue to enter the EU market.

With regards to red carding third countries, some believe that the potential for positive impact is possibly greater than that of the current CDS. This is especially true for countries that are generally understood to be a part of the IUU fishing problem and that export significant amounts of seafood to the EU market. If lenient flag States amongst major producer countries can be coerced into becoming more responsible through trade restrictive measures, the overall impact could be important. In recent years, the potentially positive impacts of improved flag State performance through EU action have been highlighted by a number of NGOs, researchers and the EU Commission itself, though little conclusive evidence as to these impacts exist at the present time.

To date, 20 countries have formally been yellow carded by the EU, 4 of which have had trade sanctions imposed (red card). Thailand is the most important processing nation that remains under a yellow card, and for which the yellow card status was extended by another six months in early 2016. Overall, out of the 20 countries yellow carded to date, 8 countries had no established seafood trade with the EU at the time of yellow carding. It is unclear how trade measures applied in this way can effectively contribute to reducing the importation of IUU-derived fisheries products into the EU – which is the stated objective of the EU IUU Regulation. Of the three countries currently red carded, two were not trading seafood into the EU prior to their identification. Within the first group of eight yellow carded countries, no issue of non-compliance with the EU CDS has been raised. In this group, all raised issues related to other perceived failures of the flag State to honor its responsibilities under international fisheries law.

Conclusions

Ultimately, the putting in place of unilateral CDS that denies IUU products market access will imply that third countries must make important investments to abide with new – and now multiplying – unilateral frameworks. As a result, instead of making changes, third countries may instead increasingly sell questionable products to more lenient and accommodating market States. This unintended consequence highlights the inherently multilateral nature of IUU fishing, supply chains and global trade.

Therefore, in terms of sustainable resource management, direct positive impacts of unilateral CDS may only be achieved – potentially – for resources where the market operating the CDS also controls the largest share of the import market for a specific resource.

Multilateral CDS, on the other hand, are full-fledged fisheries management tools applying to entire stock units, and which, if well designed and consistently applied, have shown to be capable of largely eliminating given forms of IUU fishing, and contributing directly (and measurably) to stock recovery – or stock protection from IUU fishing – in a relatively short time.

It is hence of essence that the international community vigorously pursue discussions on how to expand multilateral CDS systems as a means to effectively combat IUU fishing – in line with positions advocated in both the Code of Conduct and the IPOA-IUU – with the understanding and supporting evidence that multilateral challenges are tackled most successfully through multilateral approaches and solutions.

How did I get here?

A while ago I was asked by a friend, while we were having traditional food in PNG, how come I ended up working in the region, which at the end it would be as unusual as him working in the marshes northeast of Curuzu Cuatia in the corner where Argentina meets Brazil and Paraguay. It made me think about it... so I rescue something I wrote to my son in case I do not come back from the ocean one day.

With 2 of my best friends on the deck of a trawler (South Atlantic early 90s)

I don’t know why the sea has such a strong influence in my life. Looking back, I’m an ex-rower, ex-search and rescue swimmer, ex-lifeguard, ex-fisherman, presently a fisheries consultant, but also an avid open water swimmer, spearfisher, sailor, outrigger paddler and surfer...

I grew up in rural swamplands far from the ocean. I did, however, cross the Atlantic on board a cruising ship from Germany all the way to Argentina when I was six years old. I like to think that trip marked my life.

The water was always close to my house, but far from my family’s interest, they were farmers and the family sport was (and still is) tennis!  I guess some people grow by action (they decide that they want similar things to their parents and people around them) and other like me by reaction (aka. the opposite). 

So there I went... rowed and swam competitively all trough my military high school, and being socially awkward, the rest of my time was spent reading history and fantasizing about the South Pacific and far away places. Surely this was feed mostly by a mixture of French characters such as Jules Verne, Jacques Cousteau, Bernard Montesier and so on.

Doing something stupid of "Isla de los Estados" (54S) east of Magallanes, southwest of Malvinas

After the war (Falklands/Malvinas) with the collapse of the military government in Argentina, things looked brighter. So with my high school diploma under my arm, I decided to move to Mar del Plata, became involved in commercial fisheries and boat building and later studied Marine Biology, which that was like deciding to be an astronaut for someone with my rural background.

Getting ready to land in Ushuaia after 7 weeks at sea! (early 90s)

Very close to getting my degree 7 years later (in Argentina you go directly into masters level with a thesis), I got involved in a sad, technical and boring dispute with a “superior” in the fisheries institute (INIDEP) and my temporary contract (on cleaning category as I did not had political connections) was cancelled. Of the 120 students that we started the career, only 2 of us were working -for money- there at the time, I was supposed to be one of the lucky ones.

west coast of NZ (1995)

It was a big shock, but in many ways was a wake-up call. I realize what my future would look like in a research institution that depends on political wills, where you spend half you time trying to do your job and the other time navigating political storms under a lot of jealousies and back stabbings, with low salaries, and no options of moving up the scale without a strong “connection” in the political "system".

So, two weeks after graduation and after having sold everything I had (wasn’t much anyway), I got in a sailing boat that was coming to the South Pacific... no plans, no contacts, just hopes and a smile. Once here spent almost two years fishing and other odd jobs in Fiji, Samoa and Tonga until I made it to NZ, where I fell in love with the place, and I stayed for good.

west coast NZ

I started working for fishing companies in NZ (Sanford, Simunovch, etc) in many roles (fishing, compliance, problem-solving, etc.) and then decided to gain a degree from an English-speaking university.

Is then when I found fisheries consulting mostly by chance than anything planned. I didn’t know that such job existed, but it fitted me well; I know fishing, I have a good practical and academic background and love traveling and spending time with fisheries people… a total lack of shame to try new languages also helped.

But overall, I just love the sea, being in the ocean is a deeply cleansing experience for me. I think I have taken the most important decisions of my life while in the water... migrating, buying a house, marrying, having kids, going to FAO, leaving FAO, just to name a few...

I always feel sheltered in the ocean. Land always makes me feel insecure, too many variables, too many people with things to prove and agendas. At sea, I know what I’m capable and what I’m not, either in a boat, on board, or just my skin.

heading up to Tukealu (i think) from Whangarei in the Ocean Breeze (1999)

And If I die at sea... it would be only fair, it would be under my rules and my mistakes,  I would be OK with it, in whatever way it happens. If I died on land, well, like to be sent back into the ocean. So every time someone I cared for looks at the sea, is like it is coming to visit me... at the place where I feel at home.

The way my wife illustrates my job :-)

Thank you all!

I'm the 1st one to admit that I'm the most unlikely writer/blogger ever. A grammatically challenged fisherman with some fisheries related degrees and almost no formal education in any of the languages I speak. And even if I think the words in the right order, somehow they come up in a different order than intended.

from the stats page of my hosting provider :-)

Therefore to have 21500 views out of over 10000 visits in last calendar year is a huge surprise and an honor I don't take for granted. You all very kind! I had no idea that so many people will be even remotely interested in the fisheries of the pacific.

I started this blog just to cover fisheries topics that I consider interesting (from eCDS and fisheries management to neural patterns in octopuses), as well as issues I’m involved professionally and care personally for people I knew. In general, terms I'm trying to bring a technically sound and (hopefully) non-biased information set, into some of the many realities of the fisheries sector. That was all.

I see myself an independent technical advisor, I don't subscribe to any views other than the ones I like, so I try to keep straight and simple, you decide if you agree or not. So I'm humbled about the positive responses I go over the last 2 years, and as this is something I do as "add-on" to my usual work, I apologize in advance for the random timing of the posts.

Thank you for your support reading this and for the many: "Ahh your are Francisco! love you blog man!" it means a lot to me!

$20 billion dollars each year to support overfishing

Yeap... and mostly from your taxes. We worry about the estimated of IUU fishing in the pacific or worldwide, we ask developing countries to put resources and budgets they barely have into controlling DWFN fisheries in their own countries because their flag states can't be bother, while at the same they pump 20 billion USD into subsidies to support overfishing.

fisheries subsidies... a simple yet effective way to go against all the work we stand for

I have always sustained that if we could "kill" fisheries subsidies issues (and getting the licensing transparency area a bit better) the fisheries situation would be so much better, in a Pareto way, I blame 80% of the problems in today's fisheries on those 2 issues... and in particular subsidies. Rich nations spend more in subsidizing fisheries that the estimates losses of revenue from illegal fishing... Yes, the global cost of fisheries subsidies is way greater than the cost of IUU fishing. I wrote about it here. 

Obviously, people that are way smarter than me and have better tools than I will ever have, seem to see a similar picture. The UN Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) and UN Environmental Program (UNEP) released 2 days ago a joint statement pointing out the astonishing estimated figure of 20 billion USD in capacity-enhancing subsidies that directly contribute to overfishing (out of a estimated 35 billion for all subsidies)

However, the issue of addressing and removing fisheries subsidies has been a complicated and thorny one. The lack of information concerning countries’ activities and comprehension of the magnitude and impact of such support are persistent problems. Another complication is that there are many types of subsidies.

Certain subsidies are associated with development actions focused on developing countries. As such, some subsidies, coupled with development programmes and effective management frameworks, could be instrumental in achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SGDs). A particular area of concern is the continuation of those subsidies that undermine sustainable development, as noted in the outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, held in 2012.

Failure to address these subsidies will jeopardize the livelihoods of coastal populations, particularly in countries and communities most dependent upon fish production. Or more bluntly... just kill legitimate fishing.